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ABSTRACT:	 This	 chapter	 provides	 the	 background	 of	 the	 research	 and	
outlines	 its	 theoretical	 and	 conceptual	 foundation.	 The	 overall	 study	
design	that	generated	the	data	is	presented,	and	the	chapter	ends	with	an	
outline	of	the	thesis.	
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1.1	 Motivation	and	background	
What	 prompted	 me	 to	 undertake	 my	 PhD	 journey	 about	 the	 topic	 of	 cotton	
production	and	management?	Still	a	young	student	at	a	senior	agricultural	school,	
my	 academic	 calendar	 followed	 the	 agricultural	 production	 cycle.	 On	 a	 day	 in	
December	1992,	while	on	holiday	in	my	village,	I	witnessed	a	rather	pathetic	event.	
A	farmer,	who	came	to	receive	his	payment	from	a	village	2	km	from	the	payment	
point,	was	deprived	of	his	bike.	His	cotton	production	could	not	cover	 the	costs	of	
the	 inputs	 (fertilisers	 and	 pesticides)	 he	 had	 used	 to	 produce	 it.	 Fortunately,	 the	
value	 of	 his	 bike	was	 estimated	 to	 be	 roughly	 equal	 to	 the	 debts.	 Therefore,	 the	
farmer	could	walk	back	home	without	being	sent	to	jail.	How	would	this	farmer	feel	
on	his	way	back	home	and	what	would	he	tell	his	family?	Since	then,	I	developed	a	
keen	 interest	to	 investigate	what	cotton	 farmers	do	get	 in	return	 for	all	the	effort	
they	invest	in	growing	cotton.	
	
From	the	 late	1980s	onwards,	 there	has	been	a	growing	 interest	 in	 the	cotton	crop.	
Cotton	 is	 a	 critical	 cash	 crop	 and	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 Benin’s	 economic	 growth,	
accounting	for	an	important	share	in	the	State’s	revenues	and	the	income	of	farming	
households.	 Cotton	 production	 has	 been	 progressively	 embedded	 into	 subsistence	
farming	 formerly	 dominated	 by	 food	 crops,	 transforming	 it	 into	 semi‐subsistence	
farming.	 From	 having	 a	 marginal	 status	 during	 the	 1970s	 and	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	
1980s,	cotton	grew	in	importance	during	the	1990s,	both	with	regard	to	area	covered	
and	 income	generated,	 averaging	37	percent	of	 the	 total	 cultivated	area	 throughout	
the	 country,	 and	 representing	 up	 to	 80	 percent	 of	 rural	 household	 incomes	
(Gandonou,	2005;	World	Bank,	2003).	The	increase	of	cotton	production	went	along	
with	its	growing	economic	importance,	both	for	the	State	and	for	farmers.	The	share	of	
cotton	exports	represented	75	percent	of	 the	country’s	 total	exports	during	the	 first	
half	of	 the	2000s	before	 it	dropped	to	40	percent	 in	2008.	Meanwhile,	 the	economic	
weight	 of	 cotton	 in	 the	 State	 fiscal	 revenues	 and	 the	GDP	 rose	 to	 25	 percent	 and	 6	
percent	respectively	(World	Bank,	2003).	Thus,	cotton	production	has	shaped	Benin’s	
agriculture,	 thereby	greatly	shaping	the	country’s	economic	system.	These	dynamics	
were	 nurtured	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 farmer	 organisations,	 whose	 importance	 for	
cotton	production	steadily	increased.		
In	 this	 situation,	 the	 number	 of	 farmer	 organisations	 in	 Benin	 escalated.	 Their	
reputation	spread	during	the	cotton	boom	at	the	end	of	the	1980s.	The	organisations	
elapsed	 into	 a	hierarchical	 network	with	 a	pyramidal	 shape,	 together	 creating	what	
could	be	called	a	 “cotton	system”	 through	which	cultural	 capital	was	developed	and	
farmer	 leaders	 were	 formed.	 The	 cotton	 sector	 became	 institutionalised,	 having	 its	
own	rules	and	practices.	Indeed,	as	the	main	cash	and	export	crop,	cotton	production	
has	 shaped	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 the	 farmers’	 movement,	 and	 the	 economy	 of	
Benin.	Both	economic	and	 social	benefits	were	noticeable	 at	 individual	 as	well	 as	 at	
community	level,	through	the	development	of	infrastructures	and	the	relative	wealth	
of	 households	 (World	 Bank,	 2003).	 However,	 inadequate	 agricultural	 policies	 com‐
bined	with	 the	mismanagement	of	 the	organisations	have	 led	 to	the	 indebtedness	of	
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cotton	 farmers,	 a	 situation	 that	 was	 aggravated	 by	 a	 drop	 of	 cotton	 prices	 on	 the	
international	markets	 and	 a	 steady	 increase	 of	 the	 costs	 of	 inputs	 during	 the	 early	
2000s	 (Ferrigno	 et	 al.,	 2005;	World	Bank,	 2003).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 from	being	 the	
best	organised	agricultural	sector	in	Benin	the	quality	of	the	organisation	of	the	cotton	
sector	declined.	This	is	the	context	for	the	research	on	which	this	thesis	is	based.		
1.2	 The	country	of	Benin:	some	macro‐level	data	
Located	in	West	Africa,	the	Republic	of	Benin	stretches	over	750	km	from	the	coast	in	
the	South	to	the	Niger	River	at	its	northern	border	(Figure	1.1).	Administratively,	the	
country	is	divided	into	12	provinces:	Alibori,	Atacora,	Borgou,	and	Donga	in	the	North;	
Collines	 and	 Zou	 in	 the	 Centre;	 and	 Atlantique,	 Couffo,	 Littoral,	 Mono,	 Oueme	 and	
Plateau	 in	 the	 South.	With	 its	 114,763	 square	 kilometre,	 a	 projected	 population	 of	
about	eight	millions	five	hundred	people	in	2012	(INSAE	(2009),	and	a	GDP	per	capita	
of	about	US	1,508	Dollars	 (UNDP,	2011),	Benin	ranks	167	out	of	176	on	the	Human	
Development	Index	(HDI).	Poverty	is	quite	widespread	in	rural	areas.		
	
According	to	IFAD	(2010),	Benin	is	an	agriculture‐dependent	country	with	a	poverty	
incidence	 of	 47.3	 percent.	 During	 the	 decade	 1998‐2008,	 the	 growth	 in	 agricultural	
employment	was	33.7	percent,	which	is	the	highest	 increase	of	all	economic	sectors.	
About	54	percent	of	the	active	population	engages	in	agricultural	activities	and	agri‐
culture	accounts	 for	35–40	percent	of	Benin’s	GDP	(FIDA,	2005;	World	Bank,	2007).	
Performed	with	traditional	technologies,	Benin’s	agriculture	is	mainly	food‐producing	
and	is	dominated	by	about	550,000	smallholder	farmers	with	an	average	plot	size	of	
1.7	 ha	 (FIDA,	 2005;	 MAEP,	 2011).	 Food	 crops	 such	 as	 cereals,	 legumes,	 roots	 and	
tubers	are	the	main	products,	playing	a	key	role	in	the	domestic	economy	as	food	as	
well	as	cash	crops.	However,	the	revenues	they	yield	are	rather	marginal.	It	is	cotton	
that	played	a	key	role	as	a	cash	crop	throughout	the	country	for	the	last	two	decades.	
Its	share	in	the	state’s	export	revenues	remained	high	and	its	contribution	to	the	GDP	
kept	steadily	 increasing	 from	1990	to	2005,	which	explains	the	 interest	of	 the	State,	
private	actors,	and	farmers	in	the	crop.	
	
Until	 recently,	 cotton	was	 grown	 throughout	 the	 country,	 including	 in	 unfavourable	
areas.	 It	was	extensively	cropped	 in	 ten	out	of	 twelve	provinces,	on	a	wide	range	of	
soils.	Based	on	the	agro‐ecological	conditions	and	vulnerability	to	pest	infestation	that	
determine	 the	 technical	 aspects	 of	 production,	 the	 national	 cotton	 research	 centre	
(RCF/INRAB)	 divides	 cotton‐producing	 areas	 into	 roughly	 four	 large	 zones.	 The	
Soudan	 Savannah	 in	 the	 extreme	North,	 covering	 Alibori	 province	 and	 the	 extreme	
North‐east	 of	 Atacora	 province,	 comprises	 the	 zone	 that	 hosts	 the	 cotton	 belt	 and	
produces	 the	 highest	 share	 of	 cotton	 production.	 The	 Northern	 Guinean	 Savannah	
zone	 comprises	 the	 provinces	 of	 Borgou	 and	 Donga,	 the	 southern	 part	 of	 Atacora	
province	and	 the	northern	part	of	Collines	province.	Although	 the	zone	 is	known	as	
the	food	belt,	 it	also	produces	a	significant	quantity	of	cotton.	The	Southern	Guinean	
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Savannah	 zone	 covers	 the	 northern	 regions	 of	 the	 provinces	 of	 Zou,	 Couffo	 and	
Plateau.	The	more	humid	agro‐ecological	conditions	in	this	zone	do	not	favour	cotton	
production.	 The	 Guinean	 Congolean	 Zone	 that	 covers	 most	 coastal	 provinces	 also	
produces	a	very	marginal	quantity	of	cotton	(Sinzogan,	2006).	So,	cotton	production	is	
concentrated	 in	 the	 Soudan	 Savannah	 zone	 where	 a	 lower	 population	 density	 and	
more	 favourable	 agro‐ecological	 conditions	 in	 terms	 of	 low	 rainfall	 and	 humidity	
make	the	zone	the	largest	cotton	producer.		
	
	
Figure	1.1	 Map	of	Benin	with	the	location	of	the	research	sites	
	
The	present	 research	was	 implemented	 in	 the	 four	northern	provinces	 and	 covered	
two	agro‐ecological	zones.	It	started	in	the	four	provinces	and	progressively	focused	
on	two	provinces:	Alibori	and	Borgou.	These	provinces	are	inhabited	by	many	ethnic	
groups	who	have	their	investment	in	agriculture	as	the	main	economic	activity,	with	
cotton	 as	 the	 major	 cash	 crop,	 in	 common.	 More	 than	 75	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 cotton	
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produced	in	the	country	is	sourced	from	these	provinces.	Consequently,	all	the	cotton	
networks	concentrated	their	actions	in	this	region,	vying	to	enlist	as	many	farmers	as	
they	could	and	to	control	as	much	production	as	possible.	
1.3	 Problem	statement	and	research	questions	
Farmer	organisations	have	 levered	cotton	production,	being	at	the	forefront	of	rural	
development	 policies	 since	 the	 revolutionary	 period	 when	 they	 were	 managed	 for	
political	propaganda.	In	return,	they	have	been	shaped	by	the	crop,	and	cotton	became	
their	 lifeline.	 Originally	 village‐based,	 farmer	 organisations	 developed	 according	 to	
the	country’s	administrative	structure,	resulting	 in	the	forming	of	a	hierarchical	net‐
work	up	to	the	national	level.	With	the	boom	in	cotton	production,	these	organisations	
had	 a	 de	 facto	 central	 role	 in	 community	 development,	 which	 they	 assumed	 and	
achieved	 with	 the	 financial	 returns	 they	 reaped	 from	 cotton	 production,	 thereby	
replacing	the	State	at	some	points	in	time.	They	developed	collective	action	at	village	
level	and	promoted	socio‐economic	development	by	providing	the	basic	services	that	
the	State	 failed	 to	 supply	 in	 the	 fields	of	education,	health,	and	rural	 infrastructures	
(World	 Bank,	 2003).	 They	 also	 facilitated	 “mutual	 and	 solidarity	 practices	 among	
members”	 (Tama‐Imorou	 et	 al.,	 2007:	 108).	The	 social	 cohesion	 and	 its	 corollary	of	
collective	 action	 developed	 through	 cotton	 networking	 were	 extended	 to	 non‐
members,	thereby	building	social	capital	at	community	level.	But	with	the	important	
resources	 generated	by	 cotton,	mismanagement	practices	 crept	 in	 and	added	 to	 the	
burden	 of	 the	 bureaucracy	 of	 the	 governmental	 agencies	managing	 the	 sector.	 This	
situation	 seriously	 overwhelmed	 the	 sector,	 revealing	 the	 inefficiency	 of	 State	
management	of	the	sector	through	costly	bodies.	
The	 reforms	 undertaken	 from	1990	 onwards	 to	 liberalize	 the	 sector	 and	 tackle	 the	
problems	of	mismanagement	and	inefficiency	did	not	only	establish	more	democratic	
procedures	within	farmer	organisations	but	also	brought	together	the	various	stake‐
holders	and	new	institutions,	like	cotton	farmers,	inputs	suppliers,	cotton	ginners	and	
banks,	 who	 together	 composed	 a	 huge	 and	 complex	 stakeholders	 network.	 Farmer	
organisations	are	central	to	this	network	because	of	their	relations	with	all	the	other	
stakeholders,	who	courted	them	assiduously.	Their	leaders	became	very	influential	for	
holding	both	institutional	and	economic	power,	and	attained	a	high	social	status.	But	
while	 their	 leaders	 became	 empowered	 and	 enriched,	 farmers	 got	 indebted	 and	
impoverished.	In	practice,	many	farmers	had	arrears	for	up	to	two	cropping	seasons	
or	 were	 not	 paid	 back	 completely	 (Sinzogan	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 This	 situation	 created	 a	
tense	 and	 suspicious	 atmosphere	 among	 farmers	 and	weakened	 the	 social	 cohesion	
within	 the	network	(World	Bank,	2003).	As	a	result,	dissident	networks	emerged	as	
breakaway	organisations	(Sinzogan	et	al.,	2007).	The	process	of	breaking	away	started	
from	 the	 top	 of	 the	 pyramid	 and	 progressed	 downwards,	 resulting	 in	 atomised	
networks.	The	ensuing	competition	generated	and	reproduced	never‐ending	conflicts	
that	led	to	a	decrease	of	trust	within	and	between	networks.	Additionally,	at	the	same	
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time	farmers	experienced	a	sharp	drop	in	cotton	prices,	declining	yields,	and	a	steady	
increase	of	inputs	prices	(Sinzogan	et	al.,	2007).	This	situation	led	to	a	strong	decline	
of	 cotton	 production	 in	 the	 cotton	 belt.	 Ultimately,	 the	 process	 resulted	 in	 the	
abandonment	of	 the	crop	by	thousands	of	households	(World	Bank,	2003),	entailing	
the	loss	of	their	major	livelihood	source.	Most	of	the	cotton	growers	who	chose	to	give	
up	their	main	cash	crop,	undermined	their	livelihood	and	faced	the	risk	of	impoverish‐
ment.	
The	general	objective	of	the	present	research	was	to	gain	an	in‐depth	understanding	
of	the	dynamics	of	the	“cotton	system”,	that	is	the	interactions	between	the	economic	
activity	of	cotton	production	and	the	structure	of	social	relations	from	community	to	
individual	 level	 in	 which	 the	 activity	 is	 embedded.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 main	 question	
addressed	in	the	research	is	how	farmers’	agency	affected	their	organisations,	cotton	
production,	 and	 the	 collective	 action	 that	 evolved	 around	 that	 crop.	 The	 research	
investigated	 the	 interactions	 between	 individual	 dispositions	 and	 actions	 (micro	
level)	and	the	institutional	mechanisms	(meso	and	macro	level),	and	the	effect	of	such	
interactions	 on	 the	 livelihood	 systems	 of	 the	 households	 (the	 transformative	
mechanism).	The	investigation	 included	an	analysis	of	cotton	production	 in	Benin	 in	
the	colonial	past	and	in	the	contemporary	context,	exploring	how	the	reform	policies	
have	shaped	the	sector,	independently	from	international	contingencies.	
To	achieve	the	general	objective,	the	research	was	guided	by	sub‐questions	linked	to	
the	following	overlapping	research	headings,	which	constituted	the	entry‐points	of	the	
research:		
Heading	 1:	 Emergence	 of	 breakaway	 networks.	 This	 heading	 addresses	 the	
question	 about	 factors	 that	 differentiated	 leaders	 from	 grassroots	 (or	 ordinary)	
farmers	 in	 the	creation	of	breakaway	networks.	The	objective	here	 is	 to	analyse	 the	
social	 mechanisms	 leading	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 breakaway	 networks.	 It	 is	 hypo‐
thesized	 that	 leaders	of	 breakaway	networks	 are	more	 strongly	 embedded	 in	 social	
relations	than	ordinary	farmers	(H1).		
Heading	2:	The	decline	of	social	cohesion	and	 the	squeeze	of	collective	action.	
This	heading	constitutes	an	inquiry	into	the	effects	of	the	decline	of	social	cohesion	in	
cotton	producing	communities.	The	aim	is	to	examine	the	effect	of	the	decline	of	social	
cohesion	 that	ensued	 from	 intra‐	and	 inter‐group	conflicts	 in	 cotton	production	and	
collective	action.	It	is	hypothesized	that	the	decline	of	social	cohesion	resulted	in	the	
demise	of	collective	action	in	cotton	producing	areas	(H2).	
Heading	 3:	 Livelihoods	 reconstruction	 after	 the	 demise	 of	 cotton	 production.	
The	 issues	 dealt	 with	 under	 this	 heading	 are	 the	 shifts	 in	 assets	 endowment	 and	
livelihood	 portfolios	 of	 rural	 households	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 demise	 of	 cotton	
production	and	how	these	shifts	affected	the	gender	relations	within	rural	households.	
This	heading	helped	testing	the	hypothesis	that	the	loss	of	livelihoods	consecutive	to	
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the	 demise	 of	 cotton	 production	 modified	 the	 gender	 relations	 within	 cotton‐
producing	households	(H3).	
Figure	1.2	displays	the	different	concepts	and	theories	used	throughout	the	research	
and	their	interrelations.	The	framework	is	intended	to	help	the	reader	understand	the	
connections	between	the	theoretical	concepts	and	the	different	chapters.	
Figure	1.2	 Conceptual	framework	and	links	between	hypotheses	
1.4	 Theoretical	and	conceptual	framework	
This	 section	 presents	 the	 theoretical	 structure	 of	 the	 study	 and	 discusses	 the	 theo‐
retical	 approaches	 used	 to	 investigate	 the	 dynamic	 relations	 between	 cotton	
production,	 the	 social	 capital	 of	 individuals	 and	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 households.	 The	
research	 attempts	 to	 unpack	 the	 black	 box	 represented	 by	 the	 cotton–people	
relationships,	and	to	show	how	farmers’	agency	built	and	rebuilt	farmer	organisations,	
which	 to	 farmers	 are	 very	 relevant	 institutional	 structures.	 Ultimately	 it	 aims	 to	
uncover	 the	 social	 changes	 resulting	 from	 the	 interactions	 between	 people,	
institutions	 and	 technical	 elements	 through	 the	 meanings	 attached	 to	 them.	 More	
specifically,	the	research	deals	with	the	dualism	structure–agency	in	social	change	in	
the	context	of	cotton	production.	The	analysis	was	based	on	two	broader	theoretical	
approaches:	 Actor‐Network	 Theory	 (see	 Chapter	 3	 in	 particular)	 to	 highlight	 the	
pivotal	role	of	cotton,	and	the	actor‐oriented	approach	(see	Chapters	4,	5,	and	6)	that	
has	 the	 human	 actors’	 logic	 as	 its	 point	 of	 departure.	 Chapter	 2	 combines	 the	 two	
approaches.	
H1 
H3
H2
H3 
Individuals’	
position	in	the	
network
Individuals’	
stock	of	social	
capital		
Collective	action
Household	
livelihoods
Gender	power	
relations	
H3
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1.4.1	 Structure,	actor	and	agency	
Theorizing	about	the	constitution	of	society	and	the	reproduction	of	the	social	order	
over	 time	has	 been	done	by	 opposing	 schools	 of	 thought	 such	 as	 functionalism	and	
structuralism.	 Their	 proponents	 argued	 about	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
evolution	for	the	analysis	of	the	structure	and	functioning	of	social	systems	(biological	
analogies).	 Despite	 their	 differences,	 however,	 functionalism	 and	 structuralism	 con‐
verged	 on	 the	 pre‐eminence	 of	 the	 social	 whole	 over	 its	 individual	 parts	 (Giddens,	
1984:	 1).	 In	 his	 attempt	 to	 find	 out	 “how	 the	 concepts	 of	 action,	 meaning	 and	
subjectivity	should	be	specified	and	how	they	might	relate	to	notions	of	structure	and	
constraint”,	 Giddens	 (1984:	 2)	 formulated	 structuration	 theory.	 Early	 structural	
functionalists	 “assumed	 that	 institutions	 and	 social	 roles	 mesh	 together	 to	 form	
patterned	 and	 predictable	 social	 arrangements”	 (Hier,	 2005:	 7).	 Social	 actors	 were	
considered	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	means	 given	 in	 particular	 situations	 to	 achieve	
particular	goals.	For	Parsons	(2005)	relationships	are	interactive	and	actor	situations	
cannot	 be	 understood	 scientifically	 if	 they	 are	 conceived	 independently	 of	 actors’	
orientations.	 To	 transcend	 the	 agent–structure	 or	 individual–society	 opposition,	
structuration	theory	emphasises	the	interpenetration	and	the	interactional	dynamics	
of	individual	and	collective	action,	thereby	pointing	out	the	important	role	of	agency.	
This	focus	underlies	both	the	actor‐oriented	approach	and	actor‐network	theory,	two	
contemporary	 seminal	 contributions	 to	 the	 study	 of	 social	 action	 that	were	 used	 in	
this	research.	
The	actor‐oriented	approach	deals	with	bridging	the	individual	day‐to‐day	logic	of	
action	 (micro	 level)	 and	 the	 structural	 context	 (macro	 level)	 of	 the	 society.	 The	
approach	 entails	 “exploring	 the	 critical	 interfaces	 that	 depict	 the	 points	 of	 contra‐
diction	 or	 discontinuity	 between	 the	 different	 (and	 often	 incompatible)	 actors’	 life	
worlds,	 including	not	 only	 ‘local’	 actors	 but	 also	 ‘intervening’	 institutional	 actors	 or	
other	stakeholders”	 (Long,	2001:	240).	Therefore,	 it	positions	 the	social	actor	at	 the	
centre	of	the	action.	Long	(2001:	13)	posits	that:	
	
Social	 actors	 [...]	 must	 not	 be	 depicted	 as	 simply	 disembodied	 social	
categories	(based	on	class	or	some	other	classificatory	criteria)	or	passive	
recipients	 of	 intervention,	 but	 as	 active	 participants	 who	 process	
information	 and	 strategize	 in	 their	 dealings	with	 various	 local	 actors	 as	
well	as	with	outside	institutions	and	personnel.	
A	social	actor	can	be	an	individual	person,	a	group,	an	organisation	or	an	institution.	
In	other	words,	any	social	entity	“that	can	be	said	to	have	agency	in	that	[it]	possesses	
the	 knowledgeability	 and	 capability	 to	 assess	 problematic	 situations	 and	 organise	
‘appropriate’	 responses”	 (Long,	 2001:	 241).	 The	 properties	 of	 knowledgeability	 and	
capability	 imply	 that	 a	 social	 actor	 is	 endowed	with	 the	 ability	 to	 exercise	 strategic	
choices,	 thereby	 suggesting	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 agency	 is	 central	 to	 that	 of	 power.	
Agency	is	about	“the	knowledgeability,	capability	and	social	embeddedness	associated	
with	acts	of	doing	(and	reflecting)	 that	 impact	upon	or	shape	one’s	own	and	others’	
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actions	 and	 interpretations”	 (Long,	 2001:	 240).	 Agency	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 the	
individual’s	 or	 the	 organisation’s	 power	 to	 and	 power	 over	 other	 individuals	 or	
organisations,	and	“represents	the	processes	by	which	choices	are	made	and	put	into	
effect”	(Kabeer,	2005:	14).	Applied	to	the	specific	case	of	cotton	networking	in	Benin,	
both	 individual	 cotton	 farmers	 –	 either	 leaders	 or	 grassroots	 farmers	 –	 and	 entire	
networks	could	strategically	interact	with	each	other	to	make	choices	in	the	process	of	
building	 and	 rebuilding	 cotton	 networks.	 These	 actors	 are	 not	 foreign	 to	 the	
tumultuous	 cotton	networking	 and	 its	 consequences	 for	 cotton	production,	which	 –	
instead	–	can	be	seen	as	the	outcome	of	their	various	choices	(see	Chapters	4	and	5).		
Actor‐Network	Theory	 (henceforth	ANT)	originates	 from	the	need	for	a	new	social	
theory	to	connect	with	science	and	technology	studies.	Considered	controversial	at	its	
inception,	 ANT	 has	 increasingly	 gained	 ground	 as	 a	 sociological	 approach	 used	 in	
various	 social	 and	 human	 sciences	 (Alcadipani	 &	 Hassard,	 2010;	 Law,	 1992).	 ANT	
surpasses	the	actor‐oriented	approach	in	its	analysis	of	social	interactions	as	it	aims	at	
“accounting	 for	 the	 very	 essence	 of	 societies	 and	natures”,	 using	 some	principles	 of	
social	network	theory	and	focussing	on	human	relations	in	social	and	natural	worlds	
(Latour,	 1996:	 369).	 In	 designing	 the	 theory,	 the	 endeavour	 was	 to	 bring	 together	
non‐humans	 (objects	 of	 science	 and	 technology)	 and	 humans,	 making	 the	 former	
“social‐compatible”	too	(Latour,	2005:	21).	The	central	tenets	of	ANT	are	the	material	
heterogeneity	 of	 networks,	 the	 symmetry	 of	 networks	 that	 implies	 their	 continuity,	
and	 the	network	ontology	which	 concerns	 the	essence	of	 societies	and	natures.	The	
heterogeneity	of	networks	suggests	that	“society,	organisations,	agents	and	machines	
are	 all	 effects	 generated	 in	 patterned	 networks	 of	 diverse	 (not	 simply	 human)	
materials”	(Law,	1992:	380). The	core	assumption	of	ANT	is	drawn	from	that	property	
and	it	states	that	ordering	and	interaction	are	all	essential	and	immutable.	
The	originality	of	ANT	lies	in	granting	a	role	to	non‐humans	too,	with	no	difference	in	
kind	between	people	and	objects.	The	core	concept	of	“actant”	was	coined	to	designate	
this	role.	An	actant	is	anything	without	figuration	that	modifies	the	state	of	affairs	by	
making	 a	difference	 (Latour,	 2005).	 In	 other	words,	 anything	human	or	non‐human	
(like	cotton	 in	 the	present	research)	 that	causes	an	action	with	no	need	of	a	special	
motivation,	neither	of	individual	human	actors	nor	of	humans	in	general,	is	considered	
to	 bear	 the	 properties	 of	 an	 actant.	 Actants	 incorporate	 non‐human,	 material	 and	
technical	 elements	 into	 the	 analytical	 framework	 of	 the	 social	 world	 and	 not	 just	
individuals	 (or	 institutions)	 with	 motives,	 in	 other	 words	 not	 just	 the	 “human	
intentional	individual	actor”	(Latour,	1996:	372).	Therefore,	ANT	presents	a	new	type	
of	 network	 configuration,	 and	 it	 emphasises	 the	 linkages	 between	 the	material,	 the	
phenomenological	and	the	social	components	of	any	social	situation.	Implicit	in	ANT	is	
the	warning	that	one	should	not	assume	that	“material	and	technical	elements	have	no	
active	 role	 to	play	 in	 social	 dynamics”	 (Callon	&	Law,	1997),	 and	ANT	 recommends	
“exploring	social	effects,	whatever	their	material	form,	if	we	want	to	answer	the	‘how’	
questions	 about	 structure,	 power	 and	 organization”	 (Law,	 1992:	 389).	 For	 ANT,	
neither	 humans	 nor	 objects	 have	 inherent	 qualities	 but	 they	 give	 presence	 to	 one	
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another	 through	 their	 networking	 relations,	 that	 is	 their	 “identity	 emerges	 –	 and	
changes	 –	 in	 the	 course	 of	 interaction”	 (Callon	 &	 Law,	 1997).	 Thus,	 ANT	 enables	 a	
discipline	like	geography	for	example,	a	means	of	“navigating	those	dualisms,	such	as	
nature/society,	action/structure,	and	local/global”	(Murdoch,	1998:	357).	
Both	 individual	 farmers	and	 farmer	organisations	are	social	actors.	They	are	always	
tempted	by	individual	profit	at	the	expense	of	other	actors	or	the	entire	structure	of	
which	 they	 are	 part.	 Farmers’	 deprival	 of	 resources	 consecutive	 to	mismanagement	
resulted	 in	 tense	 situations	 between	 individual	 and	 collective	 rationality	 in	 the	
production	 and	 use	 of	 public	 goods.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 actant,	 cotton,	 and	 the	
actors,	individuals	and	institutions,	liaise	with	one	another	in	the	cotton	system.	One	
of	the	specific	objectives	of	this	study	is	to	find	out	the	different	meanings	that	were	
attributed	to	cotton	through	time	and	what	this	meant	for	each	of	the	actors.	Indeed,	
cotton	links	various	institutions,	namely	cotton	farmer	organisations,	input	suppliers	
associations,	the	syndicate	of	cotton	transporters,	cotton	ginners	associations,	and	the	
multiple	 regulatory	bodies.	How	did	 the	 system	comprised	of	 institutions	 like	 those	
mentioned	above,	people	(individual	 farmers	and	leaders),	and	the	material	element	
cotton	become	one	network?		
1.4.2	 Further	conceptual	clarification	
Investigating	the	social	transformations	involved	by	the	dynamics	between	actors	and	
structures	required	 the	use	of	certain	concepts	 that	need	to	be	clarified	beforehand.	
The	 process	 of	 building	 and	 rebuilding	 cotton	 networks	 reveals	 some	 connivance	
between	network	leaders	on	the	one	hand	and	inputs	suppliers,	cotton	ginners,	public	
officials	and	decision	makers	on	the	other.	The	‘illiterate’	farmers	(as	they	are	seen	by	
these	parties)	refer	to	decision	makers	and	other	literate	actors	as	“intellectuals”.	Both	
farmers	 and	 leaders	 claimed	 relationships	 with	 and	 support	 from	 officials	 and	
decision	 makers	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 breakaway	 networks.	 Whereas	 most	 of	 the	
networks	originated	from	either	an	inputs	supplier	or	a	cotton	ginner,	some	emerged	
from	the	support	from	private	actors,	who,	in	turn,	were	reportedly	acquainted	with	
political	 leaders.	Rival	networks	and	groups	of	 farmers	competed	for	new	members,	
thereby	 negatively	 affecting	 collective	 action.	 Therefore,	 it	 was	 posited	 that	 new	
leaders	 use	 their	 social	 connections	 to	 mobilize	 farmers	 in	 creating	 breakaway	
networks,	which	brings	us	to	the	concept	of	social	capital.	
Social	 capital	 is	 a	 special	 type	 of	 resource,	which	 differs	 from	 financial,	 natural	 or	
human	 capital	 by	 its	 location	 in	 social	 relations.	 Its	 definition	 has	 varied	 over	 time.	
The	concept	and	its	operationalization	is	diverse	and	multidimensional,	but	two	main	
perspectives	can	be	identified,	one	looking	at	its	effects	at	the	individual	level	and	the	
other	at	effects	at	group	level	(Lin	&	Erickson,	2008).	In	various	definitions,	trust	and	
networks	are	perceived	as	its	two	key	components,	with	a	frequent	mention	of	norms	
and	reciprocity	(Schuller	et	al.,	2000).	This	shared	understanding	 led	to	a	consensus	
on	 what	 social	 capital	 consists	 of.	 Thus,	 social	 capital	 is	 commonly	 defined	 as	 “the	
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rules,	 norms,	 obligations,	 reciprocity,	 and	 trust	 embedded	 in	 social	 relations,	 social	
structures,	 and	 societies’	 institutional	 arrangements”	 (Moser,	 2010:	 392).	 Trust,	
particularly,	induces	fair	behaviour	and	leads	people	to	abide	by	laws	and	regulations,	
entailing	 reciprocity.	 In	 that	 sense,	 trust	 is	 a	 key	 constituent	 of	 social	 capital	 that	
facilitates	 cooperation	 and	 makes	 democracy	 work	 (Putnam,	 1993).	 High	 levels	 of	
social	 capital	 in	 a	 given	 society	 or	 group	 increase	 the	 likelihood	of	 cooperation	 and	
facilitate	 collective	 action	 (Ahn	&	 Ostrom,	 2008).	 Collective	 action	 is	 any	 concerted	
and	jointly	conducted	action	that	benefits	an	entire	community	without	exclusion.		
Lin	 (2001:	 24)	 defines	 social	 capital	 as	 the	 “resources	 embedded	 in	 social	 relations	
and	 social	 structure,	which	 can	 be	mobilized	when	 an	 actor	wishes	 to	 increase	 the	
likelihood	of	success	in	a	purposive	action.”	This	definition	guided	the	analysis	in	this	
thesis.	Social	capital	depends	on	social	networks	and	their	 interconnection	implies	a	
real	difficulty	to	delineate	them	(Lin,	2008:	58).	A	social	network	is	a	social	structure	
of	 relations	 between	 individuals	 or	 organisations	 tied	 by	 a	 specific	 type	 of	 inter‐
dependency	such	as	values	and	norms	that	imply	reciprocity.	While	"network	analysis	
focuses	on	the	relations	among	actors,	and	not	individual	actors	and	their	attributes"	
(Hanneman	&	Riddle,	2005:	4),	social	capital	addresses	the	investment	of	resources	by	
individuals	in	social	relations	with	expected	returns	(Lin,	2001).	Thus,	social	networks	
pave	 the	way	 to	 social	 capital	 building	 and	 appear	 to	 be	more	 tangible	 than	 social	
capital,	which	is	located	in	the	relations	among	people	(Coleman,	1988).	
The	 interactions	 between	 social	 actors	 in	 the	 arena	 of	 cotton	 networking	 reveal	
women	 as	 particularly	 disadvantaged.	 They	 appear	 to	 be	 pawns	 in	 the	 male‐
dominated	 bargaining	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 cotton	 system.	 The	 male	
hegemonic	position	is	based	on	gender	myths	and	stereotypes.	Feminist	“critiques	of	
organized	male	power	and	the	organisational	forms	in	which	it	was	expressed”	gave	
birth	 to	 gender‐and‐organisations	 as	 a	 scholarly	 field	 of	 study	 (Acker,	 2006).	 The	
concept	of	gender	is	often	used	as	a	short	cut	to	refer	to	only	women’s	disadvantaged	
position	in	society,	while	men	can	be	affected	in	the	same	way.	However,	gender	is	a	
dynamic	 concept	 that	 refers	 to	 the	 socially	 constructed	 and	 culturally	 embedded	
character	of	men’s	and	women’s	 roles	and	positions	 in	 society.	 It	 is	 a	 “standardized	
marker”	 and	 one	 of	 the	 “most	 all‐embracing	 criteria	 of	 the	 social	 identity”	 in	 all	
societies	 (Giddens,	 1984:	 85).	 Gender	 often	 operates	 through	 the	 “unquestioned	
acceptance	 of	 power”	 (Kabeer,	 2005:	 14).	 Gender	 poses	 serious	 problems	 of	 power	
relations,	 specifically	 the	 imbalance	 of	 decision‐making	 power	 between	 men	 and	
women	 in	 society.	 Women’s	 interaction	 with	 their	 husbands	 at	 household	 level	 is	
marked	 by	 gender	 inequalities.	 These	 inequalities	 also	 influence	 their	 interpersonal	
relations	with	men	outside	the	household.	The	present	research	also	investigated	how	
the	 imbalance	 of	 power	 between	men	 and	women	 affects	 women’s	 involvement	 in	
cotton	 organisations	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 power	 relations	 within	 households	
undergoing	(economic)	shocks	and	in	need	of	livelihood	adaptation	on	the	other.		
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When	 people’s	 means	 of	 living	 are	 profoundly	 disturbed,	 they	 need	 to	 invent	
alternative	ways	of	providing	for	their	basic	needs	and	obligations.	Long	(2001:	241)	
notes	that:	
Livelihoods	 are	 made	 up	 of	 practices	 by	 which	 individuals	 and	 groups	
strive	 to	 make	 a	 living,	 meet	 their	 consumption	 necessities,	 cope	 with	
adversities	 and	 uncertainties,	 engage	 with	 new	 opportunities,	 protect	
existing	 or	 pursue	 new	 lifestyles	 and	 cultural	 identifications,	 and	 fulfil	
their	social	obligations.	
The	 strategies	 of	 finding	 alternatives	ways	 can	 be	 glossed	 as	 livelihood	 adaptation.	
Livelihood	adaptation	often	constitutes	a	challenge	due	to	the	constrained	contexts	in	
which	 it	 occurs.	 Davies	 and	 Hossain	 (1997:	 5)	 defined	 livelihood	 adaptation	 as	 a	
dynamic	 process	 by	 which	 choices	 made	 by	 individuals	 or	 groups	 “either	 enhance	
existing	 security	 and	wealth	 or	 try	 to	 reduce	 vulnerability	 and	 poverty.”	 Using	 the	
concepts	of	structure	and	agency	to	analyse	adaptive	decision‐making	processes,	Carr	
(2008:	 690)	 showed	 that	 “individual	 decisions	 take	 place	 in	 a	 social	 context	 that	 is	
beyond	the	control	of	the	individual	decision‐maker.”	The	dysfunctioning	of	the	cotton	
network	and	 the	overall	 cotton	 sector	 induced	 the	decline	of	 cotton	production	and	
weakened	 farmers’	 livelihoods.	 The	 consecutive	 changes	 in	 cotton	 networking	 are	
observed	 at	 three	 interrelated	 levels:	 individual,	 household	 and	 community.	 The	
household	is	of	particular	interest,	because	it	is	simultaneously	the	site	of	production	
and	consumption	and,	 consequently,	 constitutes	 the	appropriate	unit	of	observation	
for	livelihood	analysis	(Niehof,	2004).		
1.5	 Study	design	and	methodology	
1.5.1	 Study	design	
This	 research	was	 conducted	 from	 January	2009	 to	April	2011	 in	 the	 four	northern	
provinces	 of	 Alibori,	 Borgou,	 Atacora	 and	 Donga	 (see	 Figure	 1.2	 above),	 which	
together	roughly	cover	four	agro‐ecological	zones.	The	area	hosts	many	ethnic	groups,	
who	all	have	agriculture	as	their	main	economic	activity	with	cotton	as	the	major	cash	
crop.	More	 than	80	per	 cent	 of	 the	 cotton	produced	 in	 the	 country	 is	 sourced	 from	
these	provinces	and	all	the	cotton	networks	concentrated	their	action	in	this	area.	
The	 research	was	 set	 up	 in	 two	main	 phases.	 The	 first	 phase	 was	 exploratory	 and	
consisted	of	a	series	of	focus‐group	discussions	with	groups	of	farmers	in	ten	villages.	
The	 second	 phase	 combined	 in‐depth	 interviews	 with	 a	 survey	 among	 network	
leaders	 and	 grassroots	 farmers	 using	 a	 semi‐structured	 questionnaire,	 which	 was	
elaborated	from	the	results	of	the	focus‐group	discussions.	National	network	leaders	
from	 nine	 networks	were	 purposively	 selected	 and	 interviewed	 individually.	 These	
interviews	were	done	all	over	the	country,	because	these	leaders	do	not	always	live	in	
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their	 communities	 but	 in	 cities	 far	 from	 the	 farmers	 they	 represent.	 Farmers	were	
interviewed	in	five	villages	in	the	two	largest	cotton‐producing	provinces:	Borgou	and	
Alibori.	
During	the	exploratory	phase,	an	 institutional	mapping	at	 local	 level	was	conducted.	
Data	were	 collected	about	 farmers’	perceptions	of	 their	organisations,	 the	 causes	of	
conflicts	and	the	motivation	of	leaders	in	breaking	away,	using	a	check‐list	of	issues	as	
headings.	This	 first	phase	resulted	 in	an	 insight	 into	cotton	 farmers	networking	and	
guided	the	development	of	the	survey	tools.		
The	 second	 phase	 was	 divided	 into	 two	 sub‐phases:	 interviews	 with	 leaders	 and	
interviews	with	grassroots	farmers.	At	the	leaders’	level,	the	investigation	focussed	on	
the	discourse	used	by	the	new	leaders	to	create	their	networks,	the	evolution	of	their	
personal	 social	 networks,	 and	 their	management	 strategies.	 At	 the	 household	 level,	
data	 were	 collected	 on	 farmers’	 socio‐economic	 characteristics,	 their	 motivation	 to	
join	 a	 network,	 factors	 influencing	 the	 decision	 to	 give	 up	 cotton	 production,	 the	
effects	 of	 the	 decreasing	 profit	 from	 cotton	 production	 on	 farmers’	 livelihoods	 and	
how	 farmers	 and	 households	 coped	 with	 these	 effects.	 Data	 were	 concomitantly	
collected	 at	 village	 level,	 where	 the	 focus	 was	 on	 conflicts	 within	 and	 between	
networks	and	how	these	affected	inter‐personal	relations	among	cotton	farmers	and	
collective	action	within	cotton‐producing	communities.	
The	sampling	combined	a	purposive	sampling	with	random	selection,	and	was	done	in	
a	three‐step	cluster	process:	first	choosing	the	villages,	second	the	networks,	and	then	
farmers.	The	power	of	purposive	sampling	resides	in	the	selection	of	information‐rich	
cases	 for	 an	 in‐depth	 investigation	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 at	 study	 (Clark	 et	 al.	 2008).	
During	the	exploratory	phase,	ten	villages	were	selected	in	the	four	provinces	on	the	
basis	of	criteria	such	as	the	extent	of	cotton	production,	the	location,	and	the	presence	
of	 at	 least	 one	 operating	 network	 in	 the	 village.	 The	 villages	 selected	were:	 Perere,	
Sekere,	and	Sinende	in	Borgou	province;	Bagou,	Sori,	Kanderou,	and	Wagou	in	Alibori	
province;	Bougou	and	Foumbea	in	Donga	province;	and	Doh	in	Atacora	province.	Five	
villages	comprising	six	networks	were	selected	from	these	villages	for	the	focus‐group	
discussions:	Bagou,	Wagou,	Kanderou,	Sekere	and	Perere.	The	selection	was	based	on	
criteria	like	the	presence	of	at	least	two	networks	in	the	village,	their	level	of	organi‐
sation,	the	extent	of	cotton	production,	and	location	and	accessibility	of	the	villages.		
As	for	the	individual	interviews,	a	purposive	sample	of	leaders	was	first	constructed.	
The	three	to	four	most	influential	board	members	of	selected	networks	were	selected:	
the	president,	 the	secretary,	 the	treasury,	and	the	coordinator	or	 the	manager	when	
necessary.	Thus,	33	 leaders	 from	nine	cotton	networks	were	 interviewed.	Then,	115	
grassroots	 farmers	were	randomly	selected	 through	a	systematic	sampling	 from	the	
lists	of	farmer	groups	members	of	the	selected	networks.	Due	to	the	poor	availability	
of	complete	member	lists,	alternative	data	bases	were	used	for	the	selection,	such	as	
input	distribution	lists,	cotton	payment	lists,	etc.	In	some	cases,	the	women	on	the	lists	
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were	systematically	selected	to	increase	the	proportion	of	women	in	the	sample	and	
reduce	 the	 gender	 bias.	 The	 combination	 of	 the	 two	 selection	 methods	 yielded	 a	
sample	of	148	cotton	farmers	for	the	individual	interviews.	
1.5.2	 Methods	of	data	collection	and	analysis	
The	field	research	adopted	a	mixed	modes	approach	(Creswell	&	Clark,	2008;	Johnson	
et	 al.,	 2007;	 Morse	 &	 Niehaus,	 2009),	 combining	 the	 use	 of	 qualitative	 and/or	
quantitative	 methods	 to	 collect	 the	 data	 throughout	 the	 process.	 While	 their	
respective	merits	can	cumulate	 for	accuracy	and	 the	scientific	value	of	 the	research,	
their	 limitations	 can	 also	 add	 up	 to	 hinder	 the	 benefits	 deriving	 from	 their	
combination.	The	solution	resides	 in	 the	design	and	the	 interpretation	of	 the	results	
(Scrimshaw,	 1990).	 The	 data	 collection	 comprised,	 in	 chronological	 order,	 the	
following	partly	overlapping	and	mutually	cross‐cutting	methods:		
Literature	 search.	The	 literature	 search	was	 done	 by	means	 of	 a	 desk	 study	 using	
qualitative	 document	 analysis	 on	 published	 and	 unpublished	 sources.	 An	 important	
objective	 of	 the	 literature	 search	 was	 the	 historical	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 cotton	
system	 in	 Benin,	 also	 in	 comparison	 with	 other	 West	 African	 cotton‐producing	
countries.	
Secondary	 data	 collection.	 This	 concerned	 published	 and	 unpublished	 statistics	
from	 governmental	 and	 non‐governmental	 sources	 dealing	 with	 cotton	 production,	
and	 data	 from	 local	 cotton	 organisations.	 The	 secondary	 data	 from	written	 sources	
included	data	on	cotton	production	by	district	and	network	over	the	last	decades,	the	
evolution	 of	 cotton	 networks	 in	 terms	 of	 membership	 and	 coverage	 of	 area,	 the	
evolution	of	the	inputs	credit	allocation	by	district,	laws,	orders	and	decrees	that	have	
been	 regulating	 the	 cotton	 sector,	 the	 network‐related	 documents	 such	 as	 the	
registration	number,	other	reports,	and	so	on.	
Focus	group	discussions.	The	focus	groups	were	organised	in	ten	villages	during	the	
exploratory	 phase.	 The	 discussions	 consisted	 of	 interviews	 with	 groups	 of	 farmers	
with	no	pre‐established	relationships,	using	a	check‐list	of	cotton‐related	issues.	The	
discussions	 were	 held	 separately	 with	 male	 farmers	 and	 female	 farmers.	 This	 was	
done	 to	 facilitate	 women’s	 expression	 and	 reduce	 gender	 bias.	 Sometimes,	 the	
discussions	 were	 organised	 one	 after	 the	 other,	 but	 more	 often	 simultaneously.	 In	
total,	 there	 were	 ten	 focus	 groups	 of	 men	 and	 nine	 groups	 of	 women	 (due	 to	 the	
unavailability	of	women	in	the	tenth	village).	
Survey.	A	survey	was	conducted	among	networks	leaders	and	grassroots	farmers	in	
five	 villages.	 The	 surveys	 targeted	 the	 heads	 of	 households,	 either	 male	 or	 female,	
managing	the	cotton	production	in	their	household	unit.		
Oral	 history,	 life	 history	 and	 in‐depth	 interview.	 These	 methods	 were	 used	
throughout	 the	 research	 process	 to	 unravel	 both	 the	 individuals’	 and	 communities’	
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relationship	 with	 cotton	 production.	 Narratives	 on	 important	 events	 and	 develop‐
ments	 relating	 to	 cotton	 in	 the	 Borgou	 and	 Alibori	 provinces	 were	 collected	 and	
analysed.	The	life	history	method	was	applied	in	particular	to	understand	what	helped	
women	leaders	achieve	their	leadership	positions.	
Key	Informants	 interview.	These	 interviewed	were	done	throughout	the	 fieldwork	
whenever	a	key	 informant	was	discovered	among	extension	service	agents,	network	
leaders	 or	 ordinary	 farmers.	 The	 key	 informants	were	 interviewed	not	 only	 to	 give	
insight	 into	 issues	 of	 their	 expertise,	 but	 also	 to	 get	 their	 account	 of	 stories	 about	
which	no	written	documentation	was	available.	
Table	 1.1	 presents	 the	 combination	 of	 data	 collection	 techniques	 throughout	 the	
fieldwork	process	in	chronological	order.	
Table	1.1	 The	process	of	data	collection	
Phases	 Periods	 Data	collected	 Methods	&Techniques	
Literature	
search	
Cross‐cutting	but	
particularly	during	
May	2008	–	April	
2009	
Both	qualitative	and	
quantitative:	
‐ Insight	into	Benin	cotton	
sector	
‐ Statistics	about	cotton	
production	
‐ Desk	studies
‐ Qualitative	
Documents	
Analysis	(QDA)	
Exploratory	
phase	 January	2009	
Qualitative:
‐ Institutional	mapping	of	
villages	
‐ Insight	into	cotton	
production	and	farmers	
networking		
‐ Focus‐group	
discussion	
‐ Observation	
Survey	 October	2009	–	April	2011	
Quantitative:
‐ Cotton	production	
‐ Networking	trajectories	
‐ Interview	
Questionnaire	
‐ Household	survey	
In‐depth	
qualitative		
phase		
February	2010	–	
April	2011	
Both	quantitative and	
qualitative:	
‐ Life	histories	
‐ Networking	experience	
‐ Oral	history,	life	
history,	in‐depth	
interview	
‐ Observation	
Key	informant	
interviews	 Cross‐cutting	
Insight	into	all	aspects	of	
cotton	production	and	
management	
‐ Interview	
‐ Observation	
	
All	 interviews,	with	 both	 individuals	 and	 groups	were	 recorded	 after	 obtaining	 the	
consent	 of	 the	 individuals	 or	 groups	 concerned.	 The	 interviews	 were	 transcribed	
when	necessary.		
Texts	(secondary	data)	were	analysed	by	qualitative	documents	analysis	(QDA),	which	
is	a	technique	used	when	dealing	with	unstructured	and	unwieldy	data.	According	to	
Ritchie	 and	 Spencer	 (1994:	 176),	 qualitative	 data	 analysis	 consists	 essentially	 of	
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“defining,	categorizing,	 theorizing,	explaining,	exploring	and	mapping”	of	meaningful	
elements	 among	 such	 a	 big	 and	 often	 messy	 amount	 of	 information.	 QDA	 enables	
understanding	 internal	 structures,	 creating	 typologies,	 finding	 associations,	 seeking	
explanations,	and	developing	new	ideas,	theories	or	strategies.	
The	qualitative	data	collected	during	 the	 focus‐group	discussions	were	submitted	 to	
textual	 analysis	 (Fairclough,	 2003)	 to	 find	 out	 how	 social	 practices	 (mobilising	
discourses	 and	 particular	 behaviour)	 were	 related	 to	 social	 structures	 (emergence	
and	 multiplication	 of	 cotton	 networks).	 As	 for	 the	 quantitative	 data,	 they	 were	
analysed	through	descriptive	statistics	and	multivariate	analyses	using	SPSS.		
1.5.3	 General	description	of	the	instruments	
The	 two	 basic	 instruments	 used	 to	 collect	 the	 data	 are	 the	 discussion	 guide	 for	 the	
focus‐group	discussion	sessions	(see	Appendix	1)	and	the	semi‐structured	question‐
naire	 for	 the	 individual	 interviews	 (see	 Appendix	 2).	 The	 emergence	 of	 breakaway	
networks	was	a	key	issue	in	both.		
The	discussion	guide	started	with	the	 institutional	mapping	of	 the	village	(i.e.	 listing	
the	organisations	operating	 in	 the	village).	Thereafter,	 the	 importance	of	 cotton	and	
the	 interactions	between	cotton	and	non‐cotton	organisations	were	discussed.	Then	
the	 types	 of	 conflicts	 occurring	within	 and	 between	 cotton	 farmers’	 networks	were	
addressed,	including	the	impact	of	inter‐	and	intra‐group	conflicts	on	collective	action.	
Farmers’	motives	in	creating	a	breakaway	network	and	factors	that	determined	their	
decision	to	join	or	stay	with	a	network	were	listed.	The	discussion	ended	by	eliciting	
suggestions	of	reform	actions	to	be	implemented	for	the	revival	of	cotton	production.		
Data	 from	 the	 focus‐group	 discussions	 was	 analysed	 using	 descriptive	 statistics	 to	
assess	 the	 frequency	 of	 different	 factors	 cited	 in	 villages.	 These	 factors	 were	
categorised	 for	 the	 semi‐structured	questionnaire.	This	questionnaire	was	 first	 sub‐
mitted	 to	 network	 leaders	 and	 then	 to	 grassroots	 farmers	 during	 individual	 inter‐
views,	and	dealt	with	cotton	production	and	household	livelihood	issues.	Respondents	
were	 visited	 at	 their	 place,	 either	 at	 home	 or	 on	 the	 farm.	 The	 order	 of	 questions	
depended	 on	 the	 respondent’s	 answers.	 This	 facilitated	 a	 fluent	 interview	 that	
followed	 the	 reasoning	 of	 the	 respondent	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 an	 in‐depth	 under‐
standing	 of	 the	 logic	 behind	 the	 respondent’s	 actions	 and	 choices.	 The	 interviews	
were	 carried	 out	when	 respondents	were	 available,	 but	 some	 interviews	 had	 to	 be	
spread	over	two	to	three	days.	
The	 semi‐structured	 questionnaire	 consisted	 of	 several	 sections.	 The	 first	 one	 dealt	
with	 the	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 characteristics	 of	 the	 respondents,	
namely	 their	 level	of	 instruction,	 the	 composition	of	 their	households.	The	next	one	
focused	 on	 the	 respondents’	 cotton	 network	 membership	 history,	 including	 the	
description	 (when	 applicable)	 of	 how	 the	 respondents	 got	 board	 positions.	 The	
respondents’	membership	 of	 other	 organisations	 and	 their	 eventual	 responsibilities	
GENERAL	INTRODUCTION	
	
17	
	
were	 enlisted	 in	 that	 section	 too.	 Subsequently,	 the	 relations	 between	 the	
respondents’	membership	 to	 other	 organisations	 and	 their	 cotton	 networking	were	
explored.	 The	 sections	 that	 followed	 concerned	 the	 push	 and	 pull	 factors	 to	
atomisation,	 the	 types	 of	 conflicts	 that	 occurred	 within	 the	 networks,	 and	 the	
interactions	 between	 the	 multiple	 cotton	 networks.	 Questions	 in	 these	 sections	
included	 the	motives	 for	 creating	 breakaway	 networks,	 ties	 that	 provide	 the	 better	
support	 in	 creating	 networks,	 etc.	 Then,	 issues	 of	 collective	 action	 within	 cotton‐
producing	communities	and	their	impact	on	households’	livelihood	were	addressed	in	
the	next	section.	A	section	about	the	respondents’	household	livelihood	followed	suit.	
Questions	 in	 this	 section	 dealt	 with	 the	 household’s	 livelihood	 assets,	 how	 the	
households	faced	the	decline	of	cotton	income,	the	evolution	of	spouses’	contribution	
to	the	household	budget,	etc.	These	issues	were	investigated	with	the	main	two	cotton	
producing	periods	as	reference:	during	the	prime	time	and	after	the	decline.	This	lead	
to	the	section	about	the	likelihood	of	the	cotton	sector	to	revive	and	the	respondents’	
views	on	some	suggested	reform	actions.	The	village’s	characteristics	with	regard	to	
cotton	production	and	cotton	networking	(where	applicable)	were	explored	in	the	last	
section.		
Many	 of	 these	 variables	 were	 ranked	 according	 to	 farmers’	 perception	 of	 their	
importance.	 For	 the	 ranking	questions,	 all	 variables	were	 listed	beforehand	and	 the	
respondents	were	requested	to	rank	them	from	most	to	least	important.	The	literate	
respondents	could	read	the	options	in	the	questionnaire	and	indicate	their	ranking.	
1.5.4	 Ethical	issues	and	methodological	challenges	
On	the	first	page	of	the	semi‐structured	questionnaire	it	was	stated	that	the	research	
was	a	purely	academic	and	non‐commercial	activity,	and	that	 the	data	would	not	be	
disclosed	to	any	third	party	apart	from	those	directly	involved	in	the	research.	Having	
told	the	respondent	this,	the	interviewer	asked	permission	to	record	the	interview.	All	
names	used	in	the	thesis	are	pseudonyms.		
Most	 of	 the	 challenges	 faced	 during	 the	 data	 collection	 process	 were	 related	 to	
meeting	specific	informants	and	discerning	relevant	and	non‐exaggerated	statements	
from	the	often	 long	discussions	we	had	with	some	respondents.	Getting	an	appoint‐
ment	with	 private	 actors	 other	 than	 farmers	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 difficult.	 Specifically,	
inputs	 suppliers	 and	 ginners	 were	 little	 inclined	 to	 make	 time	 for	 an	 interview.	
Respondents	 in	 the	companies	were	so	busy	 that	 they	rarely	replied	 to	our	demand	
for	an	interview.	The	only	inputs	supplier	who	finally	agreed	to	an	interview	categori‐
cally	refused	to	have	it	recorded	in	spite	of	our	assurance	about	its	confidentiality	and	
its	strictly	academic	use.	During	the	interview,	he	turned	out	to	be	seriously	critical	of	
his	colleagues	(inputs	suppliers)	and	decision‐makers.	
A	challenge	we	regularly	 faced	 is	what	we	called	 the	 trap	of	 the	knowledgeable.	We	
were	usually	introduced	to	farmers	by	the	local	leaders	of	their	networks	to	ease	the	
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contact.	But	most	of	them	often	went	beyond	their	role.	They	interfered	by	answering	
questions	 that	 were	 not	 meant	 for	 them	 and	 steering	 the	 answers	 of	 the	 famers,	
instead	of	limiting	their	role	to	establishing	the	contact	between	the	interviewee	and	
the	interviewer.	Less	experienced	interviewers	fall	into	the	trap	of	letting	themselves	
be	 guided	 by	 these	 leaders	 during	 the	 interview,	 sometimes	 hardly	 succeeding	 in	
stopping	them,	which	biased	some	interviews.	Some	leaders	did	this	 intentionally	to	
show	 off	 and	 exhibit	 their	 importance,	 thereby	 valorising	 their	 leadership	 to	 the	
farmers.	
During	the	research,	we	also	benefited	from	farmers’	enthusiasm	about	being	listened	
to	on	their	core	problem:	cotton	issues.	This	advantage	was	a	double‐edged	sword.	On	
the	 one	 hand,	 farmers	 felt	 it	was	 time	 to	 voice	 their	 grievances	 and	were	 talkative.	
Consequently,	 they	 made	 statements	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 considered	 with	 care.	 This	
required	 some	 experience	 in	 interviewing,	 and	 some	 standing	 to	 challenge	 those	
farmers	 who	 sought	 to	 impress	 the	 interviewer.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 many	 farmers	
addressed	the	investigators	as	decision	makers.	“Write	down	in	your	note	book:	we,	we	
have	 enough	 of	 your	 cotton”,	 said	 a	 farmer	 to	 the	 researcher,	 warning	 to	 abandon	
cotton	 production	 if	 the	 ‘intellectuals’	 [including	 the	 researcher]	 would	 not	 find	 a	
solution	for	their	problems.	Dealing	with	such	situations	is	delicate	and	needs	tact	to	
prevent	the	interview	turning	out	to	be	passionate	but	with	little	focus.	
Furthermore,	 the	 victims	 of	 conflicts	we	 had	 to	 interview	were	more	 concerned	 by	
issues	 pending	 at	 court	 and	 their	 chances	 of	 being	 indemnified	 for	 their	 lost	
properties,	than	responding	to	the	inquiries	of	the	research.	Thus,	a	victim	of	conflict	
challenged	the	researcher,	asking	at	the	outset	of	the	interview	why	the	objective	was	
not	 to	 find	 solution	 to	 their	 predicament	 resulting	 from	 the	 destruction	 of	 their	
properties.	 Another	 leader	who	was	 interviewed	 in	 prison	 turned	 around	 the	 roles,	
transforming	 the	 interviewer	 into	 the	 interviewee	 and	 vice	 versa.	 He	 answered	
questions	with	questions,	 always	 trying	 to	discharge	himself	 although	 the	 interview	
was	not	about	what	had	landed	him	in	jail.	Additionally,	he	spoke	loudly	in	the	prison	
hall	to	prove	that	he	was	innocent	of	what	he	was	accused	of.	
Another	 difficulty	 was	 assessing	 the	 relative	 validity	 of	 different	 sources	 when	 the	
information	 was	 contradictory.	 This	 was	 a	 problem	 in	 most	 of	 the	 case‐studies	 of	
conflicts	in	which	actors	who	were	previously	partners	had	separated	and	stated	their	
case	by	using	strong	arguments,	to	the	extent	of	denying	the	fundamental	things	that	
made	 them	 collaborate	 in	 the	 past.	 In	 such	 cases	we	 resorted	 to	 third	 parties	who	
knew	both	parties	well	and	then	we	tried	to	triangulate	the	information.	
The	 last	 challenge	 that	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 is	 an	 ethical	 issue.	 Some	 respondents	
refused	to	have	 the	 interview	recorded,	despite	our	assurance	of	confidentiality	and	
anonymity.	 During	 the	 interview,	 some	 used	 lots	 of	 quotes	 of	 others	 to	 refer	 to	
situations	and	actors	or	digressed	at	length	to	avoid	talking	about	critical	issues.	But	
after	the	interview	was	declared	finished	and	the	recorder	turned	off,	they	voluntarily	
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addressed	 critical	 issues	 provided	 it	was	 off	 the	 record.	 The	 use	 of	 the	 information	
collected	 in	 such	 cases	 –	 information	 that	we	 tried	 to	 transcribe	 right	 after	we	 got	
back	 home	 –	 poses	 a	 serious	 problem	 of	 ethics,	 since	 the	 person	 interviewed	 was	
clearly	 against	 recording	 the	 statements.	 However,	 the	 richness	 of	 the	 information	
collected	in	this	way	made	its	use	mandatory,	though	with	preserving	anonymity.	
1.6	 Outline	of	the	thesis	
This	thesis	comprises	seven	chapters.	Five	of	them	deal	each	with	a	particular	aspect	
of	the	research	problem.	The	subsequent	chapters	are	organised	as	follows.	
Chapter	2	 is	 a	 historical	 overview	 of	 cotton	 production	 in	 Benin.	 It	 aims	 at	 under‐
standing	the	development	of	cotton	production	and	how	from	a	profitable	activity	 it	
turned	into	a	nightmare	for	the	actors.	The	chapter	shows	how	the	meaning	of	cotton	
for	 farmers	and	the	State	has	shifted	over	years,	changing	 from	a	colonial	symbol	 to	
white	gold	and	then	to	pest.	Subsequently,	it	analyses	the	policy	reforms	implemented	
to	 liberalise	 the	 sector.	Given	 the	 shortcomings	of	 these	policy	 reforms,	 the	 chapter	
concludes	 that	 what	 is	 actually	 going	 on	 in	 the	 sector	 are	 the	 logical	 outcomes	 of	
flawed	policies.	
Chapter	3	analyses	 the	emergence	of	 the	breakaway	networks	 in	cotton	production	
through	 the	 history	 of	 cotton	 networking	 in	 Benin	 and	 investigates	 the	 drivers	 of	
cotton	 networks	 disintegration.	 Using	 social	 capital	 theory	 and	 the	 social	 network	
approach,	 the	 chapter	 investigates	 how	 the	 breaking	 away	 from	 cotton	 farmers	
groups	resulted	in	atomised	networks.	
Chapter	4	explores	the	resources	and	conflicts	generated	by	cotton	production.	Using	
group	dynamics	 theory,	 the	 chapter	 first	 shows	how	 cotton‐producing	 communities	
drew	resources	from	cotton	production	to	avail	themselves	of	basic	services	through	
collective	action.	The	chapter	uses	case	studies	to	investigate	how	interpersonal	and	
intra‐organisational	 conflicts	 disrupted	 the	 social	 fabric	 in	 the	 cotton	 production	
areas.	Then,	it	looks	at	conflicts	that	occurred	in	communities	and	between	individuals	
in	cotton	production,	and	analyses	how	the	decline	of	social	cohesion	 led	to	the	dis‐
ruption	and	the	freeze	of	collective	action.	
Chapter	5	addresses	the	 issue	of	women’s	under‐representation	 in	cotton	networks	
and	the	constraints	the	few	women	who	reached	the	boards	of	organisations	faced.	It	
investigates	 the	 gender	 roles	 in	 the	 cotton	 system,	 linking	 the	 exclusion	 of	 women	
from	board	positions	 –	 regardless	 of	women’s	 acknowledged	 contribution	 to	 cotton	
production	–	with	gender	stereotypes.	
Chapter	6	examines	how	the	cotton‐producing	households	adapted	to	or	coped	with	
the	decline	of	income	consecutive	to	the	decrease	of	cotton	production.	It	applies	the	
household	 livelihood	 approach	 to	 investigate	 whether	 women’s	 increased	 contri‐
CHAPTER	1	
	
20	
	
bution	 to	 the	 household’s	 provision	 for	 daily	 needs	 changed	 the	 power	 relations	
within	the	household	and	what	the	men’s	perceptions	about	these	issues	are.	
Chapter	7	synthetises	 the	overall	 findings	by	answering	 the	research	questions	and	
verifying	the	hypotheses.	Then	it	stresses	the	added	value	of	the	thesis	with	regard	to	
policy	implications	for	the	cotton	sector.	
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Chapter	2	
	
Changing	Farmers’	Perceptions	in	Benin’s	Cotton	
Production:	From	White	Gold	to	Pest	
	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT:	 Industrial	 cotton	 production	 in	 Benin	 is	 intertwined	 with	
colonialism.	 The	 pressure	 on	 Benin	 farmers	 to	 produce	 cotton	 after	
Independence	in	1960	generated	resistance	in	some	parts	of	 the	country,	
which	resulted	in	riots	that	led	cotton	to	acquire	a	negative	image.	Thanks	
to	 various	 incentives,	 however,	 cotton	 became	 a	 "white	 gold"	 during	 the	
1990s	when	 it	provided	up	 to	80	per	cent	of	 the	 income	of	about	45	per	
cent	of	 rural	households.	Cotton	production	also	generated	an	 important	
amount	of	fiscal	revenues	for	the	State.	But	from	the	mid‐2000s	onwards,	
incoherent	 national	 cotton	 policies	 caused	 farmers	 to	 being	 deprived	 of	
their	incomes.	Cotton	production	became	problematic,	which	resulted	in	a	
sharp	 decline	 of	 production.	 This	 chapter	 aims	 at	 understanding	 the	
development	of	cotton	production	in	Benin	from	colonial	to	modern	times,	
with	 a	 special	 focus	 on	 farmers’	 perceptions.	 The	 chapter	 shows	 that	
farmers	are	more	rational	than	often	assumed	and	that	they	grow	the	crop	
as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 a	 source	 of	 livelihood	 and	 food	 security.	 The	 results	 also	
indicate	that	liberalisation	in	the	agricultural	sector	can	be	harmful	rather	
than	beneficial	when	 the	State	 fails	 to	play	a	coherent	 role	during	a	 shift	
from	State	monopoly	to	private	interest.	
	
Keywords:	Cotton	production,	liberalization,	farmers’	perceptions,	Benin.	
	
	
	
	
A	shortened	version	of	this	chapter	will	be	submitted	to	The	African	Studies	Review	under	the	
same	title,	by	the	authors	Maboudou	Alidou,	G.,	Huijzendveld,	F.D.	and	Niehof,	A.	
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2.1	 Introduction	
Because	of	cotton	production,	a	child	has	no	father	anymore	!	
Because	of	cotton	money,	a	child	has	no	father	anymore	!	
A	child	has	grown	his	cotton	and	bought	a	motorbike	without	a	father’s	
contribution	!	
A	child	has	grown	his	cotton	and	celebrated	his	wedding	without	a	father’s	
contribution	!	
Because	of	cotton	production,	a	child	has	no	mother	anymore	!	
Because	of	cotton	money,	a	child	has	no	mother	anymore	!	
A	child	has	grown	his	cotton	and	bought	a	motorbike	without	a	mother’s	
contribution	!	
A	child	has	grown	his	cotton	and	celebrated	his	wedding	without	a	mother’s	
contribution	!	
This	 song	 sang	 by	 women	 during	 one	 of	 our	 focus‐group	 discussions	 sessions	 in	
Banikoara,	 the	 heartland	 of	 cotton	 production,	 showed	 the	 importance	 of	 cotton	 in	
rural	 Benin,	 and	 some	 cultural	 changes	 in	 parent‐child	 relationships.	 It	 is	 about	 a	
young	man’s	autonomy	 in	decision	making	vis‐à‐vis	his	parents;	autonomy	 that	was	
gained	 from	his	 financial	 independence	 provided	 by	 cotton	 production.	 The	 song	 is	
based	on	the	true	story	of	a	young	boy	who	did	not	care	anymore	about	his	parents’	
views,	because	by	growing	cotton	he	became	capable	of	availing	himself	of	what	was	
supposed	 to	 be	 provided	 by	 his	 parents,	 like	 the	 arrangement	 of	 his	marriage	 and	
marital	 gifts.	 Songs	 like	 this	 and	 many	 proverbs	 and	 sayings	 could	 be	 heard	 in	
northern	Benin,	where	rural	households	depend	heavily	on	cotton,	because	the	cash	
function	became	largely	vested	on	it.	
From	Independence	 in	1990	to	 the	early	1990s,	cotton	production	multiplied	by	35,	
and	 quadrupled	 between	 1990	 and	 2005	 before	 dropping	 again	 to	 the	 1990	 level.	
Having	 a	 marginal	 status	 during	 the	 1970s,	 cotton	 steadily	 grew	 in	 importance	 to	
become	 the	 backbone	 of	 Benin’	 economy	 during	 the	 1990s.	 Cotton	 dominated	
agricultural	policies,	being	the	main	cash	crop	and	a	critical	livelihood	asset	until	the	
mid‐2000s.	The	 crop	was	 then	grown	by	over	350,000	 farmers	 representing	35	per	
cent	of	the	households	country‐wide,	and	it	covered	37	per	cent	of	the	total	cultivated	
area	(Gandonou,	2005).	The	sector	directly	or	 indirectly	offered	a	source	of	 living	to	
million	of	people	(AIC,	2006).	In	fact,	the	cotton	industry	still	represents	60	per	cent	of	
the	 country’s	 industrial	 sector	with	eighteen	ginning	 factories,	 five	 textile	mills,	 two	
factories	 for	 cotton	oil	 extracting,	 and	one	 factory	manufacturing	 cotton	 for	medical	
use	 (AIC,	 2008).	 It	 accounted	 for	 an	 important	 share	 in	 the	 State’s	 revenues	 and	 in	
farm	 households’	 cash	 earnings,	 providing	 up	 to	 80	 per	 cent	 of	 rural	 households’	
incomes,	mainly	in	the	North.	In	the	period	1995‐2000,	cotton	exports	accounted	for	
about	80	per	cent	of	the	country’s	total	agricultural	exports	and	generated	25	per	cent	
of	fiscal	revenues	(AfDB	&	OECD,	2008),	as	a	results	of	profound	reforms.	
From	 the	 early	 1990s	 onwards,	 the	 cotton	 sector	 underwent	 many	 reforms	 to	
liberalise	 it	 and	 facilitate	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 "monopolistic	 and	 centrally	
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administered	 system	 to	 a	 more	 competitive	 one"	 (World	 Bank,	 2003:	 59).	 These	
reforms	brought	new	dynamics	to	the	sector	and	played	a	key	role	in	making	it	more	
profitable.	As	a	result	of	all	the	policy	actions	implemented	during	the	1990s,	and	for	
that	matter	the	1980s,	Benin	is	"the	country	that	has	witnessed	the	most	impressive	
increase	in	cotton	acreage	over	the	last	thirty	years",	offering	to	the	country	the	most	
significant	jump	in	agricultural	outputs	(World	Bank,	2003:	58).	The	cotton	sector	in	
Benin	became	widely	considered	a	success	story	and	regarded	as	a	poverty	reduction	
sector	(World	Bank,	2003).	But	the	reforms	had	some	dark	sides	as	well.	 In	fact,	 the	
liberalization	 of	 the	 sector	 and	 the	 subsequent	 competition	 between	 private	
companies	 encouraged	 the	 multiplication	 of	 dissident	 organisations	 among	 actors	
(cotton	farmers,	inputs	suppliers,	and	cotton	ginners).	This	rendered	the	management	
of	the	sector	more	complex	and	made	the	reforms	difficult	to	control.		
In	addition,	subsidies	to	cotton	farmers	in	the	developed	world	combined	with	these	
somewhat	internal	constraints	to	worsen	the	predicament	of	cotton	farmers	in	Benin.	
Indeed,	 cotton	 subsidies	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	 most	 important	 trade‐distorting	
interventions	 that	 depressed	 the	 prices	 on	 international	 market.	 For	 example,	 the	
losses	caused	to	Mali	and	Benin	by	the	United	States’	cotton	subsidies	are	higher	than	
the	aid	they	receive	from	this	country	(Minot	&	Daniels,	2005).	In	Benin,	a	12	per	cent	
increase	of	poverty	in	cotton	producing	area	was	linked	to	the	fall	of	cotton	prices	in	
2001/2002	 (UNDP,	 2005).	 However,	 European	 subsidies	 to	 their	 handful	 of	 cotton	
farmers	are	 the	highest	per	kilogramme	of	 cotton	produced,	 and	have	been	pointed	
out	as	more	destructive	to	cotton	producers	from	francophone	Africa	(Cattaneo,	2003;	
Fok,	2010;	Seuret,	2009).	Removing	them	from	cotton	production,	mainly	those	from	
the	United	States,	 still	 remains	a	point	of	dispute	between	 the	developed	world	and	
developing	countries	(Alston	et	al.,	2005;	Badiane	et	al.,	2002;	Minot	&	Daniels,	2005;	
Pesche	&	Nubukpo,	2004).	These	subsidies	further	burdened	the	cotton	sector,	which	
was	transformed	into	a	nightmare	for	farmers,	leading	to	abandoning	the	production	
or	devising	adaptation	strategies.	
It	should	be	noted	that	cotton	production	was	unequally	distributed	over	a	wide	range	
of	soils	throughout	the	country.	Cotton	was	extensively	cropped	in	ten	out	of	twelve	
provinces,	but	the	production	was	concentrated	in	the	North.	The	region	overlapping	
the	limits	between	three	of	the	northern	provinces,	Alibori,	Borgou,	and	Atacora	forms	
what	is	known	as	the	cotton	belt,	accounting	for	more	than	90	per	cent	of	the	national	
production.	 The	 central	 and	 the	 southern	 provinces,	 which	 are	 under	 more	
demographic	pressure	and	have	a	more	humid	climate,	contributed	to	less	than	10	per	
cent	 of	 the	 national	 production	 during	 the	 1990s	 (Gergely,	 2009:	 10),	 and	 has	 now	
moved	from	a	very	low	to	a	marginal	production.	
The	aim	of	the	chapter	is	to	describe	the	development	of	cotton	production	in	Benin	
from	colonial	to	modern	times,	with	a	focus	on	the	farmers’	perspective.	The	chapter	
is	 organized	 into	 eight	 sections.	 After	 describing	 the	 data	 sources	 and	 analysis	 in	
Section	2.2,	the	section	that	follows	presents	a	brief	history	of	cotton	production	in	the	
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West	African	context.	Section	2.4	browses	instances	of	resistance	after	Independence,	
with	 occasional	 references	 to	 the	 situation	 in	 colonial	 times	 and	 in	 other	 African	
cotton‐producing	countries.	Subsequently,	the	outcomes	of	the	reforms	implemented	
in	 Benin	 are	 discussed,	 with	 reference	 to	 neighbouring	 countries,	 such	 as	Mali	 and	
Burkina	Faso.	 Section	2.6	examines	 farmers’	 responses	 to	 the	 later	developments	 in	
cotton	production	that	made	the	reforms	failing	to	live	up	to	the	expectations.	Sections	
2.7	deals	with	cotton	farmers’	perceptions	of	the	prospects	of	the	sector,	followed	by	
the	conclusion	in	Section	2.8.	
2.2	 Data	sources	and	analysis	
The	present	chapter	is	a	historiographical	research	of	cotton	production	in	Benin	from	
the	 early	 1900s	 to	 2010.	 The	 chapter	 addresses	 the	 question	 to	 what	 extent	 the	
liberalisation	policy	 implemented	 in	 the	cotton	sector	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	1990s	
can	explain	the	current	situation	of	the	sector	in	Benin.	It	is	based	on	a	research	that	
combined	 an	 extensive	 literature	 review	 with	 fieldwork.	 The	 data	 set	 comprises	
written	 records,	 including	 historical	 articles	 about	 cotton	 production	 before,	 during	
and	 after	 colonial	 times,	 complemented	 with	 empirical	 data	 about	 farmers’	
perceptions	 on	 various	 aspects	 of	 cotton	 production.	 The	 research	 was	 conducted	
from	 2009	 to	 2011.	 It	 used	 both	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 methods	 to	 gather	
primary	data	as	well	as	secondary	data.	The	research	area	spanned	the	four	provinces	
of	 northern	 Benin,	 covering	 the	 driest	 agro‐ecological	 zones	 of	 the	 country	 that	
constitute	 the	 most	 suitable	 areas	 for	 cotton	 production.	 The	 research	 focussed	
further	on	the	area	known	as	the	cotton	belt	(Figure	2.1).	
The	focus	group	discussions	were	organised	in	ten	villages	 in	three	provinces,	along	
with	key	informant	interviews.	A	survey	was	conducted	among	148	individual	farmers	
in	 five	 villages,	 covering	 nine	 cotton	 organisations.	 The	 sample	 included	 grassroots	
farmers	and	 leaders.	For	a	better	understanding	of	 the	 socio‐political	dimensions	of	
cotton	production,	a	specific	conflict	in	the	past	was	explored.	For	the	case	study,	key	
informants	were	interviewed.	Thus,	five	eye‐witnesses	of	and	actors	in	the	conflict	in	
the	village	of	Perere	in	eastern	Borgou	and	the	chief	commander	of	the	army	in	that	
area.	 In	 spite	 of	 its	 importance	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 it	 affected	 the	 actors,	 there	
were	no	written	records	on	the	case.	Hence,	the	statements	of	the	interviewees	could	
not	be	cross‐checked,	but	there	was	no	reason	to	doubt	the	plausibility	of	their	stories.	
To	get	a	better	grasp	of	the	implications	of	the	reforms,	private	actors	in	inputs	supply	
chain	were	interviewed	as	well.	
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Figure	2.1		 Location	of	the	cotton	belt	
Perere	is	the	city‐centre	of	the	district	with	the	same	name.	The	district	is	one	of	the	
eight	districts	of	Borgou	province,	 located	in	north‐east	of	Benin,	at	 the	South	of	the	
present	 cotton	 belt.	 The	 district	 has	 a	 population	 of	 about	 62,391	 inhabitants	 and	
stretches	 up	 to	 2,150	km2	 	 (Commune	de	Pèrèrè,	 2010).	 The	 city	 centre	 itself	 has	 a	
population	 of	 14,559	 including	 the	 surrounding	 villages.	 Perere’s	 performance	 in	
cotton	production	is	among	the	 lowest	 in	the	province.	It	ranges	between	3,000	and	
4,000	tons	a	year	and	contributes	for	about	10	per	cent	of	the	district’s	revenues,	far	
behind	the	contribution	of	roots	and	tubers	(66%)	and	cereals	(14%).	The	district	has	
also	registered	one	of	the	highest	rates	of	farmers	abandoning	cotton	production.	
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The	qualitative	data	were	analysed	through	an	interpretative	lens.	Log‐linear	analysis	
and	t‐test	were	used	to	analyse	the	quantitative	data.	
2.3	 Historical	overview	of	cotton	production	and	marketing	in	
West	Africa	
2.3.1	 Cotton	production	and	European	settlers	
Industrial	 cotton	 production	 in	 Sub‐Saharan	 Africa	 is	 linked	 with	 colonialism	 (see	
Bassett,	 2001;	 Isaacman	 &	 Roberts,	 1995;	 Levrat,	 2008;	 Moseley	 &	 Gray,	 2008;	
Roberts,	 1996),	 though	 cotton	 had	 been	 grown	 and	 used	 in	 handicraft	 in	 Africa	 for	
hundreds	 of	 years,	 before	 the	 contact	with	 Europeans	 and	 the	 existence	 of	written	
records	 (Metcalf,	 1987).	 However,	 many	 authors	 converge	 on	 the	 difficulty	 of	
reconstructing	 this	 old	 African	 history	 of	 cotton,	 in	 spite	 of	 evidence	 provided	 by	
various	disciplines	using	different	materials	in	their	attempt	to	trace	it	(Kriger,	2005).	
Investigations	 by	 botanists	 and	 archaeologists	 in	West	 Africa,	 for	 example,	 suggest	
that	 the	 crop	 had	 been	widely	 grown	 there	 for	 its	 fibre‐bearing	 properties	 (Kriger,	
2005).	 Handicraft	 comprising	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 cotton	 related	 activities	 –	 from	
spinning,	weaving,	 dying,	 tailing	 and	 embroidery	 –	 developed	 in	West	Africa	 before	
the	beginning	of	the	Atlantic	slave	trade.	During	the	early	sixteenth‐century,	travellers	
praised	the	high	quality	of	Mandinga	and	"Slave	Coast"	cotton	cloth	that	was	found	all	
along	 the	west	 coast	 of	West	Africa	 (Thornton,	 1990).	 Furthermore,	 as	 reported	 by	
early	 European	 voyagers	 and	 explorers	 to	 Africa,	 distinct	 forms	 of	 cotton,	 ranging	
from	raw	fibre	to	hand‐woven	textiles,	were	among	the	goods	that	were	bartered	in	
the	Akan	markets	during	the	1770s	(Metcalf,	1987).	
Before	 the	 colonization,	 Europeans	 had	 made	 a	 number	 of	 ‘ill‐fated’	 attempts	 to	
produce	 plantation‐grown	 cotton	 in	 the	 West	 African	 coastal	 zones	 by	 trading	
companies,	 individual	 merchants	 and	 governments	 (Ratcliffe,	 1982).	 The	 first	
attempts	were	made	by	the	Portuguese	and	British.	As	early	as	1500,	the	Portuguese	
imported	cotton	seeds	from	America	and	tried	to	develop	its	cultivation	on	the	islands	
of	 Cap‐Verde	 and	 on	 the	 African	mainland,	 exchanging	 garments	 for	 slaves	 (Maier,	
1995).	The	British	were	 the	 first	 to	 introduce	 large‐scale	 cotton	production	 in	 their	
colonies,	making	 the	United	States	 the	 largest	producer	worldwide.	Both	 the	French	
and	 the	 British	 experimented	 with	 cotton	 production	 in	 Ouidah	 (an	 important	
historical	 slave	 trade	 fort	 in	 Benin)	 during	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	
"Cotton	must	be	to	Africa	its	gold‐diggings",	said	Buxton	in	1852,	who	was	one	of	the	
influential	proponents	of	the	plan	to	suppress	the	slave	trade.	John	Duncan,	the	British	
Vice‐Consul	 at	 Ouidah,	 backed	 the	 plan	 to	 cultivate	 cotton	 in	 Dahomey.	 The	 cotton	
scheme	failed	for	lack	of	"familiarity	with	tropical	agriculture,	African	farming	systems	
in	general	or	cotton	cultivation	 in	particular"	 (Ratcliffe,	1982:	98).	Furthermore,	 the	
African	 Aid	 Society,	 founded	 by	 an	 American	 organisation	 convinced	 of	 the	 cotton‐
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exporting	potential	of	West	Africa,	 "directed	 its	major	efforts	 to	weaning	 the	king	of	
Dahomey	 from	 the	 slave	 trade	 by	 persuading	 him	 to	 grow	 cotton	 in	 its	 stead"	
(Ratcliffe,	1982:	95).	The	experience	gained	from	these	previous	attempts	to	promote	
cotton	 production	 guided	 the	 colonial	 cotton	 policy	 that	 impacted	 contemporary	
cotton	farming	in	West	Africa.	
Nowadays,	cotton	has	become	a	commodity	“that	is	situated	in	an	international	web	of	
economic	 transfers	 reflecting	 historical	 and	 contemporary	 power	 structures”	
(Moseley	&	Gray,	2008:	3).	The	crop	not	only	links	farmers	to	the	international	market	
but	 also	 contributes	 to	 African	 States	 having	 a	 voice	 in	 international	 negotiations.	
Cotton	 is	 an	 important	 African	 product	 in	 the	 globalized	 arena.	 It	 is	 featured	 in	
international	discourses	and	debates	on	privatisation,	poverty	alleviation,	agricultural	
subsidies,	and	sustainable	development.	But	unlike	gold	or	oil,	cotton	grows	from	the	
efforts	 and	 sweat	 of	 millions	 of	 small‐scale	 farmers,	 with	 households	 and	 entire	
communities	depending	on	 it.	Additionally,	 cotton	has	 internally	given	power	 to	 the	
voiceless	 and	 allowed	 them	 access	 to	 the	 decision‐making	 process	 (Roy,	 2010).	
Externally,	 it	 has	 provided	 African	 leaders	 with	 a	 clear	 agenda	 on	 World	 Trade	
Organization	 rounds	 of	 negotiations,	 showing	 them	 as	 "the	 heralds	 of	 the	 battle	
against	poverty"	(Pesche	&	Nubukpo,	2004).	Far	from	being	just	a	raw	material,	cotton	
acts	 as	 the	 medium	 that	 links	 multiple	 stakeholders	 from	 national	 to	 international	
level.	Unfortunately,	as	 in	most	West	African	countries,	 the	cotton	sector	 in	Benin	 is	
burdened	 with	 internal	 contradictions	 and	 conflicts,	 which	 make	 the	 country	
powerless	in	the	international	markets.	
2.3.2	Cotton	production	from	the	Colony	of	Dahomey	to	the	Republic	of	
Benin	
The	French	policy	to	develop	cotton	cultivation	in	Dahomey	for	export	started	in	1905	
with	six	fields	of	a	new	variety	cultivated	in	the	centre	of	the	colony	(Manning,	1982).		
The	 results	 improved	 throughout	 the	 following	 years,	 thanks	 to	 an	 increased	
knowledge	of	prevailing	agro‐ecological	 conditions,	 the	requisition	of	 labourers,	and	
the	 financial	 incentives	 given	 to	 chiefs	 to	 encourage	 them	 to	 promote	 cotton	
production	 among	 local	 farmers.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 ambiguous	 success,	 the	
experiments	continued	and	progressively	spread	southwards,	due	largely	to	the	high	
demand	 for	 the	 new	 variety	 by	 local	 chiefs	 (Manning,	 1982).	 This	 led	 to	 the	
construction	of	the	first	cotton	mill	in	1908.	The	export	to	France	increased	gradually	
from	nine	 tons	of	 fibre	 in	1905	 to	130	 tons	 in	1909.	 From	1910	 to	1924,	Dahomey	
remained	the	most	promising	French	West	African	colony	for	cotton	production	and	
export.	Only	Togo,	one	of	the	trust	territories	administered	by	France	after	World	War	
I,	 produced	 more	 cotton	 than	 Dahomey,	 thanks	 to	 the	 infrastructures	 left	 by	 the	
Germans	(Levrat,	2008).	Figure	2.2	compares	the	trends	of	cotton	exports	 to	France	
from	its	colonies	from	1910	to	1930,	based	on	the	sparse	statistics	available.	
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Figure	2.2	 Evolution	of	fibre	export	from	French	West	African	colonies	to	France	
(1910–1930).	
Source:	Compilation	by	authors	of	data	from	Bassett	(2001);	Isaacman	and	Roberts	(1995);	
																Levrat	(2008);	Roberts	(1996).	
This	relative	success	of	cotton	production	in	Dahomey	was	the	result	of	the	colony’s	
good	 quality	 of	 the	 fibre,	 a	 dense	 network	 of	 roads,	 and	 the	 "goodwill	 of	 farmers"	
(Adekunle,	 1994;	 Kuba,	 2000;	 Levrat,	 2008:	 83).	 The	 production	 started	 to	 decline	
after	 the	 creation	 in	 1932	 of	 the	 Office	 du	 Niger	 in	 charge	 of	 irrigated	 cotton	
production	 in	Sudan	(present‐day	Mali)	 (Roberts,	1996).	 In	addition,	more	attention	
was	given	to	Côte	d’Ivoire,	where	the	introduction	of	a	new	variety	and	the	increased	
administrative	 coercion	 resulted	 in	many	 peaks	 in	 cotton	 exports	 during	 the	 1930s	
(Bassett,	2001).	
The	 1929	 economic	 crisis	 and	 World	 War	 II,	 however,	 seriously	 weakened	 the	
growing	French	textile	industry.	The	French	textile	industry	suffered	from	an	erratic	
and	chaotic	supply	of	cotton	during	the	war.	Until	1943,	the	production	from	the	West	
African	 colonies	was	 exported	 to	 France	 for	 the	 Vichy	 Government.	 After	 1943	 the	
cotton	 supply	 from	 the	 French	 colonies	 of	 Central	 Africa	was	 diverted	 to	 the	 Allies	
when	the	colonies	joined	the	Free	France	Government	(Levrat,	2008).	In	the	aftermath	
of	World	War	II,	a	new	scheme	of	cotton	development	was	implemented	in	the	French	
African	 colonies.	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	 scheme	 started	 with	 the	 foundation	
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between	1946	and	1951	of	a	research	institute	and	a	textile	company1.	The	goal	of	the	
new	 institutions	 was	 to	 reduce	 the	 dependency	 of	 the	 French	 textile	 industry	 on	
supplies	 from	 the	 United	 States	 (Levrat,	 2008).	 Cotton	 development	 became	 the	
concern	 of	 colonial	 administrators	 who,	 in	 tandem	 with	 cotton	 companies	 and	
research	 institutes	 tried	 to	make	 it	a	 success.	 In	Dahomey,	 the	reorganisation	of	 the	
production	started	curiously	in	the	South	where	the	production	proved	to	be	marginal	
because	 of	 inadequate	 agro‐ecological	 conditions	 that	 resulted	 in	 low	 yields.	
Apparently,	the	relative	success	of	the	early	1900s	was	not	capitalised	by	the	colonial	
authorities	until	Independence	in	1960,	when	cotton	production	was	extended	to	the	
North	 by	 the	 Compagnie	 Française	 pour	 le	 Développement	 des	 Textiles	 (CFDT).	 The	
French	cotton	parastatal	 led	the	cotton	sector	in	Dahomey	until	the	beginning	of	the	
1970s	when	it	lost	the	control	in	the	aftermaths	of	the	military	takeover	in	1972.	The	
political	elite	had	a	Marxist‐Leninist	ideological	orientation	and	rejected	all	things	that	
were	 considered	 colonial	 symbols,	 including	 cotton.	 Hence,	 cotton	was	 left	 without	
any	incentive.	The	country	witnessed	a	steep	drop	in	production	that	plummeted	from	
50,000	tons	in	1972	to	less	than	2,000	in	1978.		
Analysing	 the	 dynamics	 of	 national	 cotton	 policies	 during	 the	 years	 1895‐2008	
through	 the	 path	 dependency	 theory,	 Kpade	 and	 Boinon	 (2011)	 identified	 four	
periods	based	on	the	"critical	junctures"	in	the	process,	defined	by	Mahoney	(2001)	as	
the	 choice	 points	 when	 a	 particular	 option	 is	 adopted	 from	 among	 two	 or	 more	
alternatives.	 These	 critical	 junctures	 are	 the	 results	 of	 previous	 policies,	 including	
international	 policies	 as	 the	 present	 situation	 of	 cotton	 in	 Benin	 illustrates.	 Five	
periods	 can	 be	 characterised	 in	 the	 development	 of	 cotton	 from	 its	 industrial	
cultivation	(Table	2.1):	 i)	 colonial	 times,	 ii)	 from	Independence	 in	1960	 to	1972,	 iii)	
the	 revolutionary	 period,	 iv)	 from	 the	 1990s	 up	 to	 the	mid‐2000s,	 and	 v)	 from	 the	
mid‐2000s	up	 to	now.	The	distinction	 is	based	on	 the	status	attributed	 to	cotton	by	
both	 farmers	and	policy	makers,	 the	 incentives	 for	 the	production,	and	the	resulting	
production.	
	
																																																								
1	The	Institut	de	Recherche	du	Coton	et	des	Fibre	Textiles	(IRCT)	and	the	Compagnie	Française	
pour	 le	Développement	 des	 Textiles,	 founded	 respectively	 in	 1946	 and	 1951	 to	 replace	 the	
Union	 Cotonnière	 de	 l’Empire	 Français,	 created	 in	 1941	 on	 the	 ashes	 of	 the	 Association	
Cotonnière	Française.	
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Table	2.1	 Historical	phases	of	cotton	development	in	Dahomey	and	Benin	
Phase	 Colonial	Times	(1895–60)	
Aftermath	of	Independence	
(1960–72)	
Revolutionary	Regime	
(1972–90):	
Cotton	as	a	symbol	of	colonialism
Prime	time	(1990–05):		
Cotton	as	a	white	gold	
The	decline	(2005–Now):	
Cotton	as	a	pest	
Policies	
Development	of	
industrial	cotton	
production,	based	on:		
- Experience	from	the	
mid‐1800s,	
- Dahomey’s	potential	
and	comparative	
advantages:	good	
agro‐ecological	
conditions,	dense	
network	of	roads,	
goodwill	of	farmers,	
- Use	of	coercion.	
Colonial	policy	continued	by	
French	research	institutes	and	
cotton	parastatal.		
- Creation	of	the	first	farmer	
organisations	in	form	of	
cooperative	for	cotton	in	the	
North.	
- First	resistances	to	cotton	
production.	A	riot	put	off	by	
the	army	in	the	North.	
- The	Marxist‐Leninist	regime	
rejected	cotton	as	a	symbol	of	
colonialism,	
- Later	nationalisation	of	
production	structures,	
- Creation	in	1975	of	a	network	of	
agricultural	extension	
headquarters	in	the	six	provinces,
- Foundation	in	1982	of	the	Société	
Nationale	pour	la	Promotion	
Agricole	(SONAPRA),	a	
corporation	for	agricultural	
promotion,	
- Over‐production	in	1986	and	first	
cotton	crisis.	
Production	and	management	
systems	improved:		
- Advent	of	democracy	and	
political	pluralism,	
- Complete	liberalization	of	the	
sector	
- CFA	devaluation,	
- Empowerment	of	farmer	
organisations	with	the	building	
of	an	hierarchical	network,	
- Cotton	shaped	agricultural	
policies	and	transformed	into	a	
political	instrument,		
- Stiff	competition	between	
private	actors.	
Profound	crisis	and	scramble	
of	cotton	production:		
- Over‐regulation	and	over‐
politicization	of	the	sector	
- Rise	of	conflicts	and	
atomisation	of	farmers’	
networks,	
- Shift	to	private	monopoly,	
- High	rate	of	cotton	
abandonment	and	shrinking	
of	production	area.	
Production	
&	Price	to	
farmers	
- Production	grew	
from	135	tons	in	
1914	to	3,000	tons	
in	1960.	
- Cotton	bought	at	FF	
0.5/Kg	(French	
Franc)	until	1908,	
and	20	FCFA/Kg	
(US$	0.042)	in	1960.	
- Production	steadily	
increased	from	3,000	tons	in	
1961	to	47,000	tons	in	1972.	
- The	prices	passed	from	
FCFA	20/Kg	(US$	0.004)	in	
1961	to	FCFA	28	(US$	
0.0056)	in	1972.		
- Yield	climbed	up	to	0.9	
ton/ha,	thanks	to	the	use	of	
subsidized	fertilizer.	
- Production	fluctuated	before	
stabilising	at	the	end	of	the	1980s:
 Sharp	decline	to	1,400	tons	in	
1978;	
 Jump	to	88,000	tons	in	1985,	
and	pic	to	133,000	tons	in	
1987	to	create	the	first	cotton	
crisis	by	over‐production.	
- Yields	increased	from	0.9	to	1.1	
ton/Ha.		
- Prices	doubled	within	two	
decades.	
- Production	quadrupled	from	
105,000	tons	in	1990	to	427,000	
tons	in	2005.	
- Yield	stayed	around	1	ton/Ha.	
- Prices	doubled	due	to	CFA	
devaluation	from	FCFA	100/Kg	
in	1991	to	FCFA	225/Kg	in	1999	
(US$	0.2	‐	0.425).	
- Over‐ginning	capacity:	600,000	
tons	#	350,000	tons	of	
production.	
- Production	declined	from	
427,000	tons	to	158,000	
tons	in	2010.	
- Yield	decreased	with	big	
contrast	among	zones.	
- Prices	more	or	less	stable	
around	FCFA	210/Kg.	
Source:	Adapted	from	AIC	(2008).	
																																																								
2 Franc	de	la	Communauté	Financière	d’Afrique	(West	Africa)	or	Franc	de	la	Coopération	Financière	en	Afrique	centrale	(Central	Africa),	common	currency	
to	14	French	former	colonies:	€	1	=	FCFA	655.957	(standard	exchange	rate). 
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2.4	 Resistance	to	cotton	production:	From	colonial	to	present	
times	
2.4.1		 Forced	work	as	a	common	labour	policy	in	colonial	times	
As	Beckert	(2005:	506)	pointed	out,	"[...]	cotton	and	imperial	expansion	went	hand	in	
hand	 from	 the	 beginning,	 not	 only	 for	 Germany	 but	 also	 for	 France,	 Russia,	 Great	
Britain,	and	even	Portugal,	Belgium,	and	Italy."	The	worldwide	cotton	crises	in	1861‐
1865	and	1901‐1903	caused	a	severe	shortage	of	cotton	supplies,	resulting	in	soaring	
prices	 that	 threatened	 the	survival	of	 the	European	 textile	 industry.	The	crises	shed	
light	on	the	industries’	critical	dependence	on	supplies	from	the	United	States,	which	
spurred	them	to	look	for	alternative	sources	of	supply	(Onyeiwu,	2000;	Roberts,	1996;	
Sunseri,	 2001).	 Cotton	 came	 to	be	 seen	 as	 a	 strategic	 raw	material	 during	 the	 early	
twentieth	century.	The	quest	for	cotton	thus	became	an	overriding	concern	of	colonial	
powers	 in	 Africa.	 The	 colonial	 regimes	 progressively	 made	 cotton	 production	
obligatory	 throughout	 their	 territories,	 with	 diverse	 results.	 In	 Mozambique,	 the	
Portuguese	put	local	chiefs	in	an	awkward	position	by	demanding	them	to	oversee	the	
imposition	 of	 cotton	 production	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	maintain	 social	 order	when	
farmers	protested	 (Isaacman,	1992).	The	British	enforced	 the	 “Cotton	Ordinance”	 in	
most	of	 their	colonies,	starting	with	Uganda	 in	1908	(Onyeiwu,	2000).	The	policy	of	
forced	communal	labour	in	the	production	of	cotton	with	a	negligible	compensation	to	
farmers	 in	 1905,	 triggered	 the	 "Maji‐Maji"3	 rebellion	 in	 German	 East	 Africa,	 which	
caused	hundreds	of	thousands	of	casualties	(Iliffe,	1967;	Sunseri,	2001).	
	
The	French	scheme	to	establish	cotton	exports	from	Africa	started	in	the	early	1800s	
in	 Senegal	where	 it	 failed.	They	 renewed	 the	 scheme	during	 the	1860s,	 but	had	 the	
same	 disappointing	 result	 (Levrat,	 2008;	 Roberts,	 1996).	 In	 the	 late	 1890s,	 the	
"politique	cotonnière"	was	extended	to	the	remaining	colonies	of	West	Africa,	this	time	
with	more	engagement.	France	battled	unsuccessfully	 to	establish	cotton	production	
in	these	colonies,	from	where	it	could	barely	meet	one	to	three	per	cent	of	its	textile	
industry’s	needs	of	cotton	fibre	(Moseley,	2002).	Among	the	obstacles	in	the	develop‐
ment	of	export‐oriented	cotton	production	in	West	African	colonies	were	ignorance	of	
tropical	 agriculture	 and	 African	 farming	 systems,	 the	 demand	 of	 longstanding	 and	
dynamics	local	markets	in	cotton‐related	products,	and	farmers’	disdain	for	the	export	
market	(Bassett,	2001;	Roberts,	1996).	The	obstacles	constituted	by	the	local	markets	
turned	out	to	be	the	most	challenging	constraints	for	the	colonial	administrators.	The	
vitality	of	local	markets,	where	cotton	could	always	meet	the	demand	and	was	sold	at	
higher	prices,	made	the	supply	for	the	metropolitan	industry	very	erratic.	To	deal	with	
these	constraints,	two	opposing	views	prevailed	among	the	French	main	cotton	actors.	
One	 camp	was	 in	 favour	of	promoting	 the	 age‐old	 traditional	 cotton	 cultivation	and	
																																																								
3	Maji‐Maji	refers	to	a	'water	medicine'	given	to	rebels,	which	was	supposed	to	have	magical	
powers	that	would	protect	them	against	bullits.	
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using	 market	 incentives	 to	 benefit	 from	 local	 dynamics,	 while	 the	 other	 camp	
advocated	for	the	imposition	of	the	industrialised	cotton	production,	using	irrigation	
for	 a	 rapid	development	 and	 growth	of	 the	production.	 This	 divide	 is	what	Roberts	
calls	 the	 "two	 worlds	 of	 cotton"	 (Roberts,	 1996).	 The	 internal	 contradictions	
prevented	cotton	actors	from	effectively	joining	their	efforts	to	implement	any	policy,	
except	 the	 use	 of	 coercion.	 Cotton	 became	 a	 forced‐crop4	 in	 all	 French	 colonies.	
Labour	was	 not	 only	 forced	 but	 also	 unpaid	 or	 underpaid	 by	 the	 colonial	 power	 to	
increase	 the	economic	returns.	The	"stick	of	colonialism	came	 to	be	as	 important	as	
the	 carrot	 of	 the	 world	 market"	 (Manning,	 1982:	 156).	 A	 cotton	 cultivation	
enforcement	 scheme	 determined	 the	 quota	 of	 acres	 to	 be	 cultivated	 in	Upper	Volta	
(Levrat,	 2008)5.	 In	 Western	 Sudan,	 the	 colonial	 cotton	 policy	 led	 to	 riots	 among	
farmers	who	refused	to	plant	the	crop	or	to	hand	over	their	production	to	the	colonial	
administration	 (Roberts,	 1996).	 In	 Côte	 d’Ivoire,	 "repeated	 attempts	 to	 intensify	
cotton	 cultivation	 were	 never	 realized	 in	 a	 sustained	 and	 satisfactory	 manner."	
(Bassett,	2001:	51‐52).		
In	the	colony	of	Dahomey,	farmers	were	more	receptive	to	cotton	production	than	in	
most	of	the	West	African	colonies,	where	there	was	a	direct	resistance.	They	were	said	
to	 be	 full	 of	 goodwill	 for	 cotton	 production	 (Levrat,	 2008),	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 series	 of	
resistance	 actions6	 against	 the	 colonial	 power	 throughout	 the	 colony,	 which	 led	 a	
Governor	 to	qualify	 the	 situation	as	Dahomean	 imbroglio.	Yet,	most	of	 these	 revolts	
were	 reactions	 against	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 policies,	 namely	 the	 forced	military	
recruitment,	 the	 forced	 work	 on	 roads,	 the	 collection	 of	 individual	 taxes,	 and	 the	
transgression	of	 customs	 (Garcia,	 1970;	Manning,	1982).	The	 introduction	of	 cotton	
started	strategically	from	the	more	receptive	areas	in	the	South,	which	corresponded	
to	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 pre‐colonial	 kingdom	 of	 Dahomey	 before	 it	 was	 dismantled.	
Agriculture	 was	 there	 so	 organised	 at	 that	 time	 that	 there	 existed	 a	 minister	 of	
agriculture	 (Manning,	 1982).	 Nevertheless,	 local	 farmers	 were	 subjected	 to	 forced	
labour	that	was	part	of	the	cotton	policy.	All	these	contributed	to	the	relative	success	
of	cotton	development.	
In	 general,	 the	 early	 colonial	 times	were	 characterised	 by	 exports	 highly	 correlated	
with	the	 level	of	coercion	exerted	by	colonial	officials	on	 farmers	 like	 in	1930,	1938	
and	 1942	 in	 Côte	 d’Ivoire.	 The	 use	 of	 coercion,	 the	 mode	 of	 payment,	 and	 the	
management	 of	 local	 markets	 were	 continuously	 debated.	 The	 questions	 and	
dilemmas	 centred	 on	 cotton	 were	 simultaneously	 about	 politics,	 administration,	
economics,	culture	and	everyday	social	relations	(Bassett,	2001).	
	 	
																																																								
4	 “La	 culture	du	 commandant”	 as	 the	 cotton	 cultivation	was	 named	 in	 French	West	 African	
colonies.	
5	About	"le	champ	collectif	obligatoire	de	coton	à	superficie	proportionnelle	à	l’effectif	démogra‐
phique	(4	ha	pour	100	habitants)"	in	Haute	Volta. 
6	The	French	faced	a	fierce	resistance	from	the	“Holli”	people	(Southeast),	the	“Kaba”’s	insur‐
rection	in	Atacora	(Northwest),	and	the	revolt	of	“Bio	Guera”	in	Borgou	(Northeast)	until	1917.	
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2.4.2	 Post‐Independence	resistance	in	Benin		
After	 Independence	 in	 1960,	 the	 colonial	 policy	 of	 cotton	 production	 in	 Dahomey	
continued	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 French	 CFDT	 and	 SATEC.	 The	 production	 was	
performed	on	cooperative	blocs,	rarely	on	individual	plots,	with	subsidized	fertilisers	
to	promote	export	that	could	boost	the	State’s	revenues.	But	for	cotton	growers,	no	or	
few	improvements	could	be	discerned	regarding	the	fairness	of	 the	redistribution	of	
cotton	 revenues.	 In	 areas	 such	 as	 Perere,	 cotton	 incomes	 given	 to	 chiefs	would	 not	
always	reach	the	producers.	At	that	time,	hardly	anyone	would	have	contested	the	use	
of	 the	 yields	 by	 local	 chiefs.	 Thanks	 to	 Independence,	 famers	 started	 voicing	 their	
grievance	against	cotton	production	in	March	1963	at	Perere,	leading	to	the	first	open	
resistance	against	cotton	production	in	the	fledgling	Republic	of	Dahomey.	Farmers	in	
the	 village	 refused	 to	 grow	 cotton	 anymore,	 braving	 the	 warning	 and	 threat	 from	
authorities.	Weeks	of	negotiations	to	bring	the	population	to	change	its	mind	did	not	
result	 in	 compliance.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 people	 prepared	 themselves	 in	 advance	 to	
respond	to	any	military	intervention.	Their	apprehension	of	a	military	intervention	to	
settle	 the	 revolt	was	 confirmed.	An	armed	 intervention	occurred	 late	at	 the	dead	of	
night	 when	 the	 city	 was	 asleep.	 A	 contingent	 of	 gendarmes	 sent	 to	 put	 down	 the	
resistance	started	secretly	arresting	the	leaders.	Riots	soon	broke	out	after	the	leaders	
reacted	promptly	by	trumpeting	to	wake	up	the	population.	Protesters	scurried	off	to	
fight,	with	traditional	weapons	and	tools	on	hand,	such	as	poisonous	arrows,	swords,	
and	machetes.	The	 confrontation	went	 from	dawn	 to	dusk	with	 several	 arrests.	The	
attempt	 from	 villagers	 to	 free	 their	 arrested	 peers	 resulted	 in	 two	 people	 shot	 and	
seriously	 injured.	 The	 confrontation	 was	 finally	 ended	 by	 the	 intercession	 of	 the	
Minister	of	 Interior,	a	half	native	 from	the	village,	who	warned	the	protesters	of	 the	
risk	of	opposing	the	State.	But	in	Perere	that	year,	no	cotton	plant	grew.		
The	 military	 attached	 low	 importance	 to	 the	 revolt	 and	 qualified	 it	 as	 a	 "simple	
operation	to	maintain	social	order",	according	to	the	army	commander.	Conversely,	the	
people	 of	 Perere	 refer	 to	 it	 as	 "the	 cotton	 war".	 The	 event	 is	 committed	 to	 the	
repertoire	 of	 collective	memory.	 First,	 because	 people	 consider	 the	 resistance	with	
bare	hands	and	traditional	weapons	against	armed	forces	a	daring	achievement.	They	
withstood	a	heavily	armed	contingent	of	gendarmes	and	deterred	them	from	arresting	
more	farmers.	Second,	as	one	of	the	first	acts	of	resistance	against	the	new	authorities	
after	 the	 colonial	 regime	 ended,	 it	 raised	 the	 people’s	 awareness	 of	 the	 nature	 of	
political	 power	 whoever	 exercises	 it.	 The	 riots	 resulted	 in	 the	 migration	 of	 some	
leaders	and	young	contesters	to	Nigeria,	 for	fear	of	arrest.	Some	stayed	abroad	for	a	
short	to	middle	term	and	others	never	returned	at	all.	
For	 the	majority	 of	 people	who	 stayed	 in	 the	 village,	 the	 revolt	 and	 its	 subsequent	
repression	worsened	the	reputation	of	cotton.	Beba	was	one	of	those	people.	He	was	
also	 among	 the	 leaders	 who	 were	 arrested.	 Deeply	 embittered,	 Beba	 framed	 his	
feeling	in	a	statement	that	is	often	quoted:	”If	you	see	a	plant	of	cotton	on	my	farm,	the	
seed	has	been	laid	by	a	bird,	if	birds	eat	cotton.”	Nobody	could	expect	such	a	farmer	to	
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cultivate	 cotton	 anymore,	 knowing	 that	 birds	 do	 not	 peck	 at	 cotton.	 Cotton	 was	
progressively	abandoned	in	the	village,	 in	favour	of	food	crops.	It	was	grown	only	in	
more	rural	neighbouring	villages	until	 the	boom	occurred	at	 the	end	of	1980s.	Even	
so,	 farmers	 in	 Perere	 remained	 hesitant	 about	 the	 crop	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 boom,	
reinforced	 in	 their	 scepticism	 by	 some	 farmers’	 disillusionment	 with	 the	 results	 of	
their	 cotton	 season.	 Indeed,	 during	 the	 early	 boom,	 unsuccessful	 farmers	 could	 be	
deprived	of	their	bicycles	or	other	belongings	when	these	were	seized	to	compensate	
for	their	inputs	debts.	Farmers	from	Perere	caught	up	later	on	during	the	1990s,	when	
cotton	 regained	 undeniable	 profitability.	 Even	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 former	 protest	
movement	started	growing	cotton	again,	including	Beba.	When	Beba	was	reminded	of	
his	former	statement,	he	replied	that	“the	city	moves,	the	word	does	so	even	more.”	The	
statement	 is	 inspired	 by	 the	 Baatombu’s	 (the	 autochthonous	 and	 dominant	 ethnic	
group	 in	 the	 region)	 tradition	 of	 moving	 entire	 settlements	 after	 being	 hit	 by	 an	
epidemic	or	a	disaster,	to	exorcise	and	avert	bad	fate.	Beba	expressed	the	logic	of	the	
typical	cotton	farmer,	who	changes	his	rhetoric	of	cotton	production	according	to	its	
profitability.	
2.5	 The	prime	time	of	cotton:	1990–2005	
2.5.1	The	cotton	sector	reforms		
The	 end	 of	 the	 1980s	 witnessed	 the	 inefficiency	 of	 State	 interventions	 in	 different	
economic	domains.	This	inefficiency	resulted	from	the	involvement	of	the	State	in	the	
management	 of	 the	 sector	 through	 costly	 bodies	 that	 overwhelmed	 the	 sector	with	
debts.	 In	 Benin,	 the	 sector	 functioned	 as	 a	 single	 channel,	 with	 the	 State	 company	
exerting	a	full	monopoly	until	2000.	The	State	controlled	the	inputs	supply,	provided	
extension	 services,	 and	 controlled	 the	 ginneries	 through	 the	 State	 parastatal	
SONAPRA	(Figure	2.3).		
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Figure	2.3	 Framework	of	organisational	linkages	in	cotton	production	before	2000	
(Adapted	from	CIPB	(2008)).	
Policy	reforms	to	privatise	the	cotton	sector	became	necessary.	A	reform	is	defined	as	
a	"consciously	chosen	change	in	the	fundamental	organization	of	a	sector	and	related	
changes	in	the	'rules	of	the	game'	under	which	stakeholders	operate"	(Tschirly,	2009:	
8).	 As	 such,	 eastern	 and	 southern	 African	 cotton	 producing	 countries	 underwent	
reforms	in	the	early	1990s	by	either	eliminating	the	single	channel	or	by	privatizing	
cooperatives	 of	 ginners.	West	 and	 Central	 Africa	 countries	 engaged	 in	 that	 process	
slowly	 for	 subsidies	 and	 related‐market	 distortions	 reasons	 (Gergely	 &	 Poulton,	
2009).	 The	 issue	 of	 reforming	 the	 Francophone	 African	 cotton	 sector	 was	 debated	
between	the	World	Bank	on	the	one	hand	and	the	French	Agency	for	Development	and	
Cooperation	and	the	CFDT	on	the	other	hand.	While	the	World	Bank	advocated	for	a	
complete	 liberalization	of	 the	cotton	sector	 to	make	 it	more	competitive,	 the	French	
institutions	lobbied	for	the	"filière	intégrée",	the	single‐stranded	relationship	between	
producers	and	cotton	companies,	regulated	by	State	intervention	(Hugon,	2005).	The	
latter	 option	 guarantees	 sustainable	 inputs	 credits	 but	 also	 entails	 heavy	 operating	
costs	for	farmers.	In	Benin,	after	two	decades	of	military	rule	with	a	socialist‐oriented	
system	of	which	 the	drastic	economic	and	social	 consequences	were	still	prevailing,	
the	 new	 authorities	 could	 not	 do	 less	 than	 adopting	 the	 World	 Bank	 option	 of	 a	
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complete	liberalization.	The	choice	of	that	option	of	‘aggressive	liberalisation’	was	also	
influenced	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 background	 of	 the	 Head	 of	 the	 State	 at	 the	 time	
(Heinisch,	2006).	
Thus,	 Benin	 led	 the	 cotton	 sector	 reforms	 to	 liberalise	 the	 sector	 in	 francophone	
Africa.	A	phased	withdrawal	of	the	State	from	the	cotton	sector	was	set	up	in	a	five‐
year	plan	 that	 transferred	competencies	 to	private	actors.	The	 institutional	 reforms,	
set	 up	 in	 four	phases,	 began	 in	1991	by	 the	 empowerment	of	 farmer	organisations.	
Thirty‐three	 village	 groups	 and	 seven	 district	 unions	 constituted	 the	 pilot	 units.	
Gradually,	 by	 1996,	 about	 1,300	 village	 groups	 and	 fifty‐one	 district	 unions	 were	
covered.	Meanwhile,	the	Fédération	des	Unions	de	Producteurs	du	Bénin	(FUPRO)	was	
created	 in	 1993	 (AIC,	 2008).	 This	 farmer	 federation	was	 the	 first	 one	 in	West	 and	
Central	 Africa.	 Such	 a	 federation	 was	 only	 created	 in	 1997	 in	 Burkina	 Faso	 and	 in	
2000	 in	Cameroon,	whereas	 the	process	 is	still	on‐going	 in	Mali	 (Gergely	&	Poulton,	
2009).	 In	 1992,	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 the	 reforms	 was	 enacted	 with	 the	 entry	 of	
privates	companies	 in	 the	 inputs	 supplying	chain.	From	1994	onwards,	 the	growing	
cotton	 production	 convinced	 decision	 makers	 to	 issue	 agreements	 to	 eight	 private	
companies	to	install	their	ginning	mills	as	the	third	phase.	In	1999,	the	fourth	and	last	
phase	 of	 the	 reforms	 was	 achieved	 by	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Association	
Interprofessionelle	 du	 Coton	 (AIC),	 the	 first	 cotton	 inter‐professional	 committee	 in	
West	 and	 Central	 Africa.	 It	 comprised	 cotton	 farmers,	 inputs	 suppliers	 and	 ginners,	
and	was	expected	 to	enhance	 the	efficiency	and	 transparency	of	 the	 sector.	Burkina	
Faso	 and	 Mali	 followed	 suit	 in	 2006	 and	 2008	 respectively	 (Gergely,	 2009).	
Complementary	measures	were	taken	to	strengthen	the	reforms.	The	first	consisted	of	
the	suppression	in	2000	of	the	State	cotton	parastatal’s	monopoly	in	the	management	
of	cotton.	The	same	year	witnessed	the	creation	of	the	CSPR,	the	French	acronym	for	
Agency	for	Guaranteeing	Payment	and	Credit	Recovery.	This	agency	was	set	up	as	the	
regulatory	platform	among	private	cotton	stakeholders.	To	keep	control	of	the	process	
of	 inputs	 supplying	 and	 combat	 irregularities	 at	 the	 level	 of	 farmer	 grassroots	
associations,	 the	 farmer	 federation	 created	 its	 own	 body	 in	 charge	 of	 issuing	
procurement	 to	 private	 companies.	 The	 implementation	 of	 these	 institutions	 was	
accompanied	by	 laws,	decrees	and	orders	to	purposefully	regulate	their	 interactions	
within	the	cotton	inter‐profession.	
2.5.2		 Institutional	development	and	linkages	
The	 liberalisation	 of	 the	 sector	 and	 the	 privatisation	 of	 the	 commercial	 functions	
implied	that	the	role	of	State	was	limited	to	legislating	and	regulating	the	interactions	
between	private	actors.	Indeed,	the	process	brought	together	many	stakeholders	and	
nurtured	a	new	dynamic	(AIC,	2005).	Specialised	institutions	were	settled	to	facilitate	
the	 interactions	 between	 actors,	 resulting	 in	 an	 institutional	 arrangement	 and	
functional	relations	among	them	(Figure	2.4).	
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Figure	2.4	 Institutional	linkages	in	cotton	sector	after	the	reforms	(Adapted	from	
																											AIC	(2005)).	
The	 reforms	 went	 smoothly	 and	 rapidly.	 The	 cotton	 sector	 in	 Benin	 then	 became	
highly	institutionalised	and	was	hailed	as	a	model	of	inventiveness	and	success.	This,	
at	first,	enhanced	the	efficiency	of	the	sector	and	increased	the	returns	to	farmers	and	
the	State.	Farmers	praised	cotton	production	and	the	positive	social	changes	occurring	
in	rural	areas,	where	both	economic	and	social	benefits	were	noticeable	at	household	
as	well	as	community	level.	The	African	premier	export	crop,	the	"mother	of	poverty"	
and	 the	 most	 unpopular	 crop	 among	 peasant	 cultivators	 during	 colonial	 times	
(Isaacman	et	al.,	1980;	Waller,	1997),	became	the	mother	of	wealth	in	Benin.	All	these	
boosted	the	production,	as	displayed	in	Figure	2.5.	
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Figure	2.5	 Development	of	cotton	production	with	regard	to	price	fluctuations	
Source:	Compilation	by	the	author	of	data	from	AIC	(2007,	2008)	and	unpublished	statistics	
																from	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	of	Benin.	
Thanks	 to	 a	 regular	 payment	 of	 their	 produce,	 farmers’	 relationship	 with	 cotton	
remained	strong.	The	trends	of	cotton	production	were	only	slightly	correlated	with	
the	changes	in	prices.	Even	the	decline	of	farm	gate	prices	consecutive	to	the	drop	of	
prices	 on	 international	markets	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s	 did	 neither	 affect	 the	 pro‐
duction	nor	the	ever‐growing	farmer	organisations.	
2.5.3	 Farmer	organisations:	From	farm	to	cities		
The	 most	 common	 feature	 to	 West	 and	 Central	 African	 cotton	 sectors	 are	 the	
flourishing	 farmer	 organisations.	 In	 all	 countries,	 farmer	 organisations	 were	 trans‐
formed	 into	 rather	powerful	organisations	 that	played	a	 critical	 role	 in	 the	boom	of	
cotton	 production	 (Bingen,	 1998;	 Bonnassieux,	 2002).	 In	 spite	 of	 these	 similarities,	
some	specificities	of	the	situation	in	Benin	are	worth	mentioning.	
From	the	early	1990s,	 the	reforms	provided	a	new	dynamic	 to	 farmer	organisations	
and,	 shortly	 thereafter,	 the	 village‐based	 groups	 came	 to	 be	 organised	 into	 one	
hierarchical	network	up	to	the	national	level.	Both	the	organisations	and	their	leaders	
had	their	influence	limited	to	rural	areas.	Thanks	to	the	boom	of	the	production	and	
the	reforms,	both	farmers	and	their	organisations	started	playing	an	important	role	at	
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meetings	and	forums	on	the	implementation	of	agricultural	policies,	though	they	had	
hardly	been	involved	in	the	design	of	the	reforms.	Organisations	leaders	were	brought	
closer	to	executives	and	political	decision	makers.	Many	disputes	among	farmers	were	
settled	at	cabinet	 level.	These	contacts	gave	their	 leaders	a	sense	of	 importance,	and	
increased	 their	 awareness	 that	 they	 also	 held	 power.	 The	 organisations	 were	
henceforth	 extended	 from	 farm	 to	 cities.	 Many	 leaders	 became	 urban	 dwellers	 to	
increase	their	visibility	among	institutions.	Farming	had	been	transformed	into	entre‐
preneurship	and	reached	its	apogee	at	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	summit	
at	 Cancun.	 The	 representatives	 of	 cotton	 farmer	 organisations	 from	 Benin,	 Burkina	
Faso,	Mali	and	Chad,	known	as	Cotton‐4	countries	(Minot	&	Daniels,	2005;	Woodward,	
2007),	 backed	 up	 by	 international	 NGOs	 advocating	 for	 fair	 trade,	 stayed	 in	 the	
limelight	of	trade	talks	on	cotton	subsidies	throughout	the	summit	and	long	after.	This	
increased	 the	 confidence	 of	 the	 leaders	 and	 contributed	 to	 improving	 the	 power	
balance	 between	 farmers	 and	 private	 actors.	 The	 change	 could	 be	 noticed	 in	 the	
strong	 position	 of	 farmer	 organisations	 when	 controversies	 about	 the	 quality	 of	
pesticides	arose	 in	2005/2006.	Farmers	voiced	their	discontent	 largely	 in	the	media	
to	 keep	 the	 public	 opinion	 informed.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Minister	 of	 Agriculture	 was	
ousted.	 But	 these	 controversies	 have	 persisted	 and	 became	 part	 of	 the	 demise	 of	
cotton.	The	farmers’	voice	lost	effect,	because	their	organisations	were	weakened	by	
the	shift	from	the	State	monopoly	to	private	interests.	
2.5.4	 Major	flaws	in	the	reforms	
The	major	goals	of	the	reforms	policies	were	competitiveness	and	effectiveness	of	the	
sector.	Due	to	many	flaws	in	the	reforms,	however,	the	achievement	did	not	result	in	
lasting	effects.	In	addition	to	the	dysfunctions	of	the	system	resulting	from	the	lack	of	
clarity	about	the	hierarchical	relationships	between	the	regulating	bodies	(AIC,	2008),	
there	 were	 among	 other	 flaws,	 an	 over‐politisation	 of	 the	 sector,	 an	 over‐ginning	
capacity	of	the	country,	and	an	over‐regulation	of	the	system.	By	the	mid‐2000s,	 the	
dynamics	of	the	sector	started	showing	some	weaknesses.		
A	stiff	competition	arose	among	the	private	actors	for	the	control	of	some	domains	of	
the	sector.	It	started	in	the	inputs	supply	chain,	where	farmer	organisations	at	district	
level	 could	 choose	 among	 the	many	 registered	 suppliers.	 Farmer	 leaders	 at	 district	
level	 were	 subjected	 to	 too	 much	 attention	 from	 inputs	 suppliers	 looking	 for	 the	
intention	 to	purchase,	a	constituent	part	of	 the	procurement	commission.	The	chase	
after	 farmers’	 support	 led	 to	 irregularities	 and	 unfairness,	 which	 were	 explicitly	
attested	by	the	deputy	director	of	a	company	previously	operating	in	the	sector:		
We	have	had	a	painful	experience.	Farmers	are,	of	course,	 fraudsters,	
but	 the	other	 inputs	 suppliers	usually	 corrupted	 the	network	 leaders.	
The	network	leaders	are	all	guilty.	
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He	considers	his	company	to	have	been	kicked	out	of	the	system	by	the	company	that	
acquired	the	monopoly	and	exerted	it	until	recently.	The	contestations	of	the	results	of	
tenders	 for	 inputs	 supply	worsened	 the	 situation.	The	 cotton	 sector	 representatives	
admitted	that	"the	inputs	supply	chain	[was]	characterised	by	[...]	repetitious	contro‐
versies	 and	 the	non‐compliance	with	 the	 legislation	pertaining	 in	 the	 supply	 chain."	
(AIC,	2006:	9).	Dissidence	occurred	among	the	inputs	suppliers’	and	led	to	multiplying	
their	 organisations.	 The	 types	 of	 pesticides	 multiplied	 and	 some	 were	 imported	
without	any	agreement	and	with	disregard	of	the	hazards	 involved	in	their	handling	
and	use.		
The	 State	 played	 an	 ambiguous	 role	 in	 regulation	 (Kpade,	 2011).	 For	 instance,	 a	
private	cotton	mill	owner,	the	CEO	of	Marlan’s	Cotton	Industry,	was	at	the	same	time	
an	advisor	of	 the	Head	of	State.	He	managed	to	get	supplied	with	cotton	outside	the	
official	 system	 for	 three	 years	 without	 paying	 back	 the	 farmers.	 Without	 any	
agreement,	 he	 imported	 and	 redistributed	 inputs	 in	 the	 districts	 under	 his	 control,	
encouraging	 other	 inputs	 suppliers	 to	 break	 the	 rules	 as	well.	 Court	 sentences	 and	
cabinets	 decisions	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 against	 his	 company	 were	
suspended	 by	 authorities	 at	 the	 Head	 of	 State’s	 office	 where	 he	 had	 easy	 access	
(Saizonou,	 2008).	 Furthermore,	 while	 the	 country’s	 production	 capacity	 of	 about	
350,000	tons	of	seed	cotton	was	reasonably	balanced	with	the	312,000	tons	of	ginning	
capacity,	private	companies	had	been	issued	licences	to	install	cotton	mills	for	about	
275,000	 tons	 of	 ginning	 capacity.	 This	 stepped	 up	 the	 number	 of	 cotton	 ginning	
factories	from	ten	to	eighteen	and	brought	the	overall	ginning	capacity	up	to	587,000	
tons	(AIC,	2006).	This	over‐ginning	capacity	triggering	the	scramble	for	cotton	by	the	
ginning	 companies.	 Privates	 ginners	 excelled	 in	 breaking	 rules	 and	 bribing	 farmer	
leaders	 in	 order	 to	 get	more	 cotton	 supplies.	 These	 deals	were	 backed	 up	 by	 their	
political	 acquaintances.	 Political	 connections	 emerged	 between	 private	 companies’	
owners,	decision	and	policy	makers,	and	farmers,	thereby	frustrating	any	enforcement	
to	abide	by	the	regulations.	Additionally,	with	the	 important	resources	generated	by	
cotton	 production	 and	 the	 number	 of	 people	 involved	 throughout	 its	 production	
chain,	cotton	became	a	political	instrument	that	many	politicians	wanted	to	control.	
The	 competition	 between	 private	 actors	 encouraged	 the	 emergence	 of	 dissident	
cotton	 networks	 that	 escalated	 in	 number.	 In	 the	 end,	 it	 became	 customary	 to	
attribute	 each	 of	 the	 cotton	 networks	 to	 either	 a	 ginner	 or	 an	 inputs	 supplier,	
connected	 with	 political	 mentors:	 the	 original	 network	 (ANPC)	 to	 Talon	 (formerly	
inputs	supplier	and	now	also	ginner),	AGROPE	to	FRUITEX	and	CSI	(inputs	suppliers	
and	 occasionally	 cotton	 ginners),	 AGROP	 to	 Rodriguez	 (ginner),	 FENAPROC	 to	 Da	
Silva,	an	inputs	supplier	and	eminent	member	of	the	political	party	of	the	Minister	of	
Rural	Development	at	the	time,	and	FENAGROP	to	the	SONAPRA	(the	former	State‐run	
parastatal	 cotton	company).	 In	addition,	until	 the	early	2000s	 (when	 they	had	 to	be	
named	as	cotton	organisations),	the	organisations	were	named	without	any	reference	
to	 cotton,	 even	 though	 they	 were	 dealing	 exclusively	 with	 cotton,	 in	 contrast	 to	
neighbouring	countries	where	cotton‐related	activities	were	reflected	in	the	names	of	
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cotton	 farmer	organisations.	This	encouraged	a	mix	of	genres,	with	 farmer’s	 leaders	
playing,	theoretically,	all	kinds	of	roles	for	any	crops.	
Ultimately,	 the	economic	and	 financial	 losses	 caused	by	all	 these	 flaws	amounted	 to	
several	billions	of	CFA	at	the	expense	of	farmers.	The	operation	costs	of	the	main	three	
institutions	created	for	regulating	the	sector	amounted	to	2	billion	CFA	(≈	€	3	million)	
(Macrae,	ND).	These	constituted	additional	costs	mainly	paid	by	farmers	and,	to	some	
extent,	by	ginners.	Nowadays,	the	negative	impacts	of	the	reforms	are	dominant	(AIC,	
2007).	Although	 the	State	continues	 to	 issue	decrees,	orders	and	new	rules,	 there	 is	
little	improvement.	The	incoherence	of	policies	and	the	growing	discontent	of	farmers	
are	continuously	pulling	down	the	production.	
2.6	 Farmers’	responses		
Cotton	 farmers	 have	 been	 facing	 multiple	 constraints	 for	 almost	 a	 decade:	 soaring	
inputs	 prices,	 the	 drop	 in	 world	 cotton	 prices,	 the	 bad	 quality	 of	 inputs,	 delays	 in	
payment,	etc.	For	instance,	between	2000	and	2005,	the	costs	of	pesticides	per	hectare	
alone	rose	by	80	per	cent	(Ferrigno	et	al.,	2005)	while	cotton	prices	at	the	farm	gate	
rose	by	only	5	per	cent.	In	addition,	the	low	ratio	in	weight	of	seed	by	fibre	of	the	new	
variety	of	cotton	that	is	being	grown	for	some	years,	compared	to	varieties	previously	
used,	makes	farmers	the	losers	of	that	innovation.	The	announcement	of	the	weight	of	
their	production	convinces	them	that	they	are	 indebted	and	will	have	to	 find	money	
from	other	sources	to	pay	back	for	the	 inputs	they	used.	The	disappointment	makes	
them	feel	dizzy	and	they	stagger,	often	knocking	over	the	scale	used	to	weigh	cotton	
ballots,	 hence	 the	 expression	 "kilo	 kurukara"	 in	 the	 local	 language,	 an	 euphemism	
meaning	to	run	over	the	scale.	“If	you	stumble	over	the	scale,	your	effort	and	sacrifices	
are	your	only	benefit”,	said	a	woman	in	Banikoara.	All	these	combined	to	result	in	a	low	
return	 of	 the	 investments	 on	 cotton	 production.	 This	 low	 return	 has	 a	 depressing	
effect	 on	 the	 production,	which	 is	 now	being	 squeezed	 into	 the	 cotton	 belt	 and	 the	
surrounding	areas,	comprising	nine	districts	that	still	produce	more	or	less	5,000	tons	
a	year.	These	are	Banikoara,	Kandi,	Gogounou,	Segbana	and	Malanville	in	the	province	
of	Alibori,	Kerou	and	Pehunco	in	the	province	of	Atacora,	and	Kalae	and	Sinende	in	the	
province	of	Borgou	(see	Figure	2.1).	As	displayed	by	Figure	2.6,	their	share	in	area	and	
production	 is	 growing	 at	 the	national	 level.	During	 the	 2007/2008	 season,	 the	 nine	
districts	represented	68	per	cent	of	the	area	covered	by	cotton	and	83	per	cent	of	the	
production,	reaching	88	per	cent	and	91	per	cent	respectively	in	2010.	
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Figure	2.6	 National	cotton	production	share	of	the	nine	districts	largest	producers	
(2008–2010).	
Source:	Figure	constructed	from	unpublished	statistics	from	CSPR	(2000–2011).	
The	 inadequacy	 of	 certain	 reforms,	 combined	 with	 the	 multiple	 production	
constraints	 led	 to	 farmers	 being	 deprived	 of	 their	 incomes.	 Therefore,	 they	 devise	
strategies	 to	 make	 ends	 meet.	 Nowadays,	 for	 many	 cotton	 farmers	 in	 the	 main	
producing	areas,	 the	purpose	of	growing	cotton	 is	shifting	 from	earning	revenues	to	
accessing	inputs,	mainly	fertilizers,	for	food	crops.	In	the	absence	of	specific	fertilisers	
for	 food	 crops,	 fertilisers	 received	 for	 cotton	 are	 diverted	 to	maize	 and	 other	 food	
crops,	 or	 sold	 for	 cash.	As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 inputs	 consumption	progresses	more	
than	the	cotton	production.	From	2000	to	2006,	the	ratio	inputs	credit	by	seed‐cotton	
marketed	climbed	from	about	31	per	cent	to	73	per	cent	(Saizonou,	2008),	 implying	
very	 low	 economic	 returns	 in	 cotton	 production.	 From	 2005	 to	 2010,	 the	 inputs	
consumption	of	the	largest	district	producer	of	cotton	has	increased	in	value	by	23	per	
cent	while	the	seed	cotton	produced	has	decreased	drastically	by	43	per	cent.	In	2011,	
this	 consumption	 has	 slightly	 decreased	 by	 9	 per	 cent	 but	 the	 production	 steeply	
decreased	 by	 38	 per	 cent.	 Therefore,	 the	 positive	 effects	 of	 cotton	 on	 farmers’	
livelihoods	started	to	decline	and	in	some	cases	reversed,	as	the	World	Bank	(2003:	7)	
already	noticed	in	2003.	
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2.7	 Farmers’	perspectives	on	the	revival	of	cotton	production	
2.7.1	Farmers’	perceptions	of	cotton	revival	
Since	 the	 2005/2006	 season,	 cotton	 production	 has	 been	 undermined	 by	 the	 bad	
quality	of	pesticides,	which	triggered	controversies.	In	spite	of	petitions	sent	up	to	the	
Head	of	State’s	office	by	 farmer	organisations	and	the	dismissal	of	public	executives	
including	 a	minister,	 the	problem	persisted	over	 the	 years,	 leading	 to	 a	widespread	
discontent	among	farmers.	Farmers’	despair	about	the	prospects	of	cotton	got	widely	
shared	and	is	reflected	in	the	survey	results	about	farmers’	perceptions	of	the	revival	
of	cotton	production	(Table	2.2).	These	perceptions	were	coded	from	0	(pessimistic)	
to	2	(optimistic).	Pessimistic	reactions	were	of	the	kind	‘I	have	no	such	hope’	or	‘No,	it	
is	not	possible’,	while	optimistic	reactions	were	 like	 ‘Yes’	or	 ‘Of	course	yes.	Even	more	
than	 before’.	 The	 intermediary	 position	 was	 coded	 1	 (doubtful)	 and	 it	 included	
responses	such	as	‘If	things	change	from	the	top’,	‘If	they	[decision	makers	and/or	inputs	
suppliers]	act	for	that’,	‘If	there	are	good	quality	inputs’,	‘Only	God	knows’,	and	‘I	do	not	
know’.	 Farmers’	 views	 were	 cross‐tabulated	 with	 their	 leadership	 status	 and	 their	
network	 membership	 history.	 Both	 grassroots	 farmers	 and	 leaders	 were	
distinguished	 into	 those	 who	 have	 never	 changed	 their	 network	 membership	
(Stayers)	 and	 those	 who	 were	 a	 member	 of	 more	 than	 one	 network	 (Breakers).	
Grassroots	farmers	are	cotton	farmers	who	never	had	any	leadership	responsibilities	
in	the	network,	as	opposed	to	leaders	who	did	have	such	responsibilities.	
Table	2.2	 Log‐linear	analysis	of	farmers’	views	on	the	revival	of	cotton	production	
Categories	of	cotton	farmers	 Overall	View Observed	 (N=145)	Count	 Percentage	
Stayers	
Grassroots	
farmers	
Pessimistic	 5	 3.4	
2(2)	=	1.69	
n.s	
	
Doubtful	 11	 7.6	
Optimistic	 4	 2.8	
Leaders	
Pessimistic	 3	 2.1	
Doubtful	 6	 4.1	
Optimistic	 6	 4.1	
Breakers	
Grassroots	
farmers	
Pessimistic	 15	 10.3	
2(2)	=	1.66	
n.s		
Doubtful	 22	 15.2	
Optimistic	 8	 5.5	
Leaders	
Pessimistic	 15	 10.3	
Doubtful	 34	 23.4	
Optimistic	 16	 11.0	
Note:	n.s	=	non‐significant.	
Source:	Survey	data	(2009–2011).	
	
The	 results	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 leadership	 status	 and	
breaking	away	 from	a	network,	 indicating	 that	 leaders	broke	away	more	often	 than	
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grassroots	 farmers.	 Farmers’	 views	 depend	 also	 on	 their	 leadership	 status	 in	 the	
cotton	 production	 system.	 About	 31	 per	 cent	 of	 grassroots	 farmers	 are	 getting	
despondent	about	 the	 future	of	cotton	and	are	classified	as	pessimist	against	23	per	
cent	of	 leaders,	while	about	28	per	 cent	of	 leaders	are	 classified	as	optimist	 against	
only	18	per	cent	of	ordinary	farmers.	The	percentages	of	doubtful	farmers	about	the	
revival	of	cotton	production	are	almost	alike	among	leaders	and	grassroots	 farmers:	
50	 and	 51	 respectively.	With	 regard	 to	 breaking,	 stayers	 and	 beakers	 do	 not	 differ	
much	in	their	views.	About	30	per	cent	of	stayers	express	optimistic	views	about	the	
revival	 of	 cotton	 production	 against	 22	 per	 cent	 of	 breakers.	 The	 percentages	 of	
doubtful	 farmers	 in	 the	 two	 groups	 are	 also	 alike:	 about	 50	 for	 stayers	 and	 51	 for	
breakers.	 The	 figures	 show	 that	 the	 optimists	 constitute	 a	 minority.	 Many	 of	 both	
leaders	and	ordinary	farmers	have	considerably	reduced	their	cotton	area.	Some	have	
suspended	the	production	(when	they	expect	the	cotton	environment	to	improve)	and	
others	have	abandoned	permanently.	A	 former	secretary	of	a	 farmer	organisation	 in	
the	cotton	belt	threatened:	“If	they	do	not	change	the	pesticide,	the	current	season	will	
be	the	requiem	of	cotton.”	
2.7.2	 Measures	for	the	revival	of	cotton	production	
A	series	of	actions	that	farmers	consider	incentives	to	be	implemented	for	the	revival	
of	cotton	were	listed	during	the	focus‐group	discussions.	The	actions	ranged	from	the	
provision	of	 inputs	 to	 the	payment	on	 time	of	money	after	 the	commercialisation	of	
their	produce,	including	the	extent	of	the	State	intervention	in	the	management	of	the	
cotton	sector.	These	actions	were	ranked	according	to	their	perceived	importance	by	
individual	farmers	(Table	2.3).	
Table	2.3	 Ranking	of	reforms	actions	envisioned	by	cotton	farmers	
Rank	
	 	
Grassroots	Farmers	
(N=58)	 Leaders	(N=71)	 T	
1	 Improving	the	inputs	quality	and	supply	 2.4	(1.63)	 2.9	(1.90)	 ‐1.54	
2	 Payment	on	time	 3.2	(2.61)	 3.0	(2.10)	 0.40	
3	 Lowering	inputs	prices	 4.3	(2.53)	 3.8	(2.45)	 1.14	
4	 Raising	cotton	prices	 5.3	(2.25)	 4.4	(2.52)	 2.05*	
5	 Eliminating	the	joint	liability	 5.2	(2.34)	 6.2	(2.05)	 ‐2.47*	
6	 Re‐nationalisation	of	cotton	sector	 6.0	(2.36)	 5.7	(2.72)	 0.62	
7	 Sharing	production	risks	between	inputs	suppliers	and	farmers	 6.2	(2.74)	 6.8	(2.16)	 ‐1.28	
8	 Reducing	cotton	networks	to	1	 6.9	(2.54)	 7.2	(2.78)	 ‐0.73	
9	 Restoring	refunds	 7.8	(1.93)	 7.1	(2.09)	 2.03*	
10	 Suppressing	farmers’	cotton‐relateddebts	 7.7	(2.21)	 7.9	(2.12)	 ‐0.53	
*=	p	<	0.05	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
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In	 the	overall	 classification,	 improving	 inputs	quality	 came	 first,	 thereby	 confirming	
the	 high	 importance	 of	 inputs	 for	 farmers.	 This	 was	 followed	 by	 payment	 on	 time,	
lowering	 inputs	prices	and	 raising	 cotton	prices.	Restoring	 refunds	and	suppressing	
cotton	debts	were	 classified	ninth	and	 tenth	 respectively.	There	were	differences	 in	
the	 ranking	 of	 only	 three	 actions	 between	 grassroots	 farmers	 and	 leaders.	 Leaders	
ranked	 raising	 of	 cotton	 prices	 and	 restoring	 of	 refunds	higher	 than	 grassroots	
farmers,	t	=	2.05	(p	<	.05)	and	t	=	2.03	(p	<	.05)	respectively,	while	grassroots	farmers	
ranked	 the	 elimination	 of	 joint	 liability	higher	 (t	 =	 ‐2.47,	 p	 <	 .05),	presumably	 be‐
cause	grassroots	 farmers	 suffered	 more	 from	 the	consequences	of	 the	 joint	 liability	
than	the	leaders	who	are	in	charge	of	its	implementation.	In	fact,	when	the	amount	of	
money	 paid	 to	 an	 organisation	 is	 not	 enough	 for	 equitable	 redistribution	 among	
groups	members,	the	leaders	keep	it	for	a	while,	and,	according	to	grassroots	farmers,	
they	very	often	put	it	at	their	own	disposal.	Refunds	were	sometimes	entirely	used	by	
leaders	 to	 cover	 the	 operating	 costs	 of	 the	 organisations,	 and	 other	 uncontrollable	
expenses	of	the	organisation.	
	
One	 additional	 measure	 was	 added,	 mainly	 by	 leaders	 during	 the	 individual	
interviews:	 the	 suppression	 of	 the	 cotton	 inter‐professional	 committee	 (AIC)	 and	of	
the	agency	for	guaranteeing	payments	and	credit	recovery	(CSPR),	two	institutions	of	
which	 farmers	are	convinced	of	 their	uselessness.	The	 two	 institutions	are	 the	main	
regulating	bodies	in	the	cotton	production	system	and	they	cost	yearly	a	huge	amount	
of	 money	 to	 producers,	 thereby	 reducing	 the	 benefits	 of	 cotton	 production.	 The	
perception	 of	 uselessness	 testifies	 to	 the	 conflicting	 interests	 between	 leaders	who	
represent	 farmers	 and	 the	 executives	 of	 the	 regulating	 bodies.	 Executives	 of	 these	
institutions	 are	 encroaching	on	 the	prerogatives	 of	 farmer	 leaders,	 according	 to	 the	
latter.	
2.8		 Conclusion		
Industrial	cotton	production	in	Benin	dates	from	colonial	times	when	farmers	in	Benin	
appeared	 to	 be	more	 collaborative	 in	 cotton	production	 than	 in	 other	 colonies.	 Just	
after	Independence,	incidents	of	farmer	resistance	gave	cotton	a	negative	image.	A	few	
years	later,	the	regime,	with	its	Marxist‐Leninist	oriented	ideology,	considered	cotton	
production	 a	 relic	 of	 colonialism,	 and	 progressively	 neglected	 it	 in	 favour	 of	 food	
crops.	 However,	 the	 perception	 of	 cotton	 improved	 during	 the	 1990s	 when	 the	
production	 blossomed.	 It	 then	 became	 a	 white	 gold,	 regardless	 of	 the	 fluctuating	
prices	 in	 international	 markets.	 The	 change	 was	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 reforms	
undertaken	from	the	early	1990s	to	liberalise	the	sector.	But	these	reforms	had	some	
harmful	 impacts	 on	 the	 sector,	 due	 to	 flaws	 in	 their	 implementation.	 This	 led	 to	
recognise	that	"the	outcome	of	reform[s]	clearly	fell	short	of	expectations	and	resulted	
in	a	sharp	decline	of	the	sector’s	performance"	(Gergely,	2009:	35).	The	cotton	sector	
in	Benin	is	actually	burdened	not	only	with	technical	problems	but,	in	particular,	with	
institutional	and	political	constraints.	The	ensuing	decreased	profitability	of	the	crop	
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has	led	farmers	to	consider	cotton	a	pest,	and	its	production	to	decline	drastically.	The	
purpose	 of	 the	 production	 has	 therefore	 changed.	 At	 present,	 for	 thousands	 of	
farmers,	cotton	production	is	no	longer	a	way	of	making	ends	meet.	 It	has	become	a	
last	 resort	 or,	 at	 best,	 a	 makeshift	 crop.	 Cotton	 is	 grown	 for	 accessing	 fertilisers,	
instead	of	earning	incomes,	trapping	farmers	in	a	vicious	circle	of	 indebtedness.	Still	
yet,	these	constraints	are	not	adequately	addressed	and	the	shift	to	private	monopoly	
and	 the	 numerous	 new	 regulations	 implemented	 are	 not	 capable	 of	 reversing	 the	
trend.	 If	cotton	is	still	 important,	then	cotton	farmers	are	 important	as	well	and	this	
view	should	be	taken	into	account	in	decision	making.	As	stated	by	Mako,	a	thirty‐five	
year‐old	cotton	farmer	in	Bagou,	“cotton	will	revive	if	only	they	[politicians	and	decision	
makers]	listen	to	farmers	and	the	policies	meet	farmers’	needs.”	
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Chapter	3	
	
	
The	Factors	Behind	the	Emergence	and	Collapse	of	
Cotton	Networks	in	Benin	during	the	2000s	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT:	 The	 liberalisation	 of	 Benin’s	 cotton	 sector	 during	 the	 1990s	
resulted	in	the	emergence	of	an	overarching	cotton	network	which,	however,	
soon	broke	 apart	 (atomized)	 into	 conflicting	 smaller	networks.	This	 chapter	
assesses	 the	 major	 reasons	 for	 that	 atomisation	 of	 the	 cotton	 networks.	
Extensive	 fieldwork	 in	 Benin’s	 cotton	 belt	 using	 a	mixed‐mode	 approach	 of	
qualitative	and	quantitative	methods,	indicated	that	the	atomisation	of	cotton	
networks	 enhanced	 farmers’	 access	 to	 leadership	 positions.	 Although	 the	
quantitative	 results	 did	 not	 support	 the	 qualitative	 ones,	 it	 turned	 out	 that	
farmers’	decision	to	break	away	depended	foremost	on	the	degree	and	type	of	
social	capital	that	farmers	had	at	their	disposal.	Predictably,	a	greater	stock	of	
social	capital	was	positively	correlated	with	the	duration	of	having	a	leaders’	
position	on	cotton	network	boards.	
	
Keywords:	Cotton	networking;	breaking	away;	atomisation;	social	capital;	
Benin	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
A	shortened	version	of	this	chapter	is	under	review	by	Agriculture	and	Human	Values	as:	
Guirguissou	Maboudou	Alidou	and	Jarl	K.	Kampen.	An	empirical	study	of	the	factors	behind	
the	emergence	and	collapse	of	cotton	networks	in	Benin	during	the	2000s.		
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3.1	 Introduction	
The	 last	 two	 to	 three	 decades	 have	witnessed	 an	 increasing	 interest	 of	 agricultural	
policy	makers	in	farmer	organisations	in	Benin.	Farmer	organisations	grew	steadily	in	
importance,	along	with	cotton	production,	and	became	interconnected,	elapsing	into	a	
larger	and	nationwide	organisation.	Indeed,	cotton	production	has	been	at	the	centre	
of	 the	 institutional	 dynamics	 in	 agriculture	 and	 of	 the	 farmers'	 movement.	 Farmer	
organisations	 became	 the	main	 instrument	 for	 cotton	 production,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
reforms	 initiated	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 to	 facilitate	 the	 transition	 of	 the	 cotton	 sector	
from	a	"monopolistic	and	centrally	administered	system	to	a	more	competitive	one"	
(World	 Bank,	 2003:59).	 These	 organisations	 played	 a	 variety	 of	 roles,	 such	 as	
managing	 the	 production	 and	 marketing	 of	 cotton,	 facilitating	 farmers’	 access	 to	
credit,	and	developing	collective	action	to	promote	farmers’	 inclusion	(Tama‐Imorou	
et	 al.,	 2007a).	 The	 organisations	 were	 hierarchically	 structured	 from	 village	 to	
national	level,	and	developed	into	the	first	network	in	the	agricultural	sector	in	Benin.	
Because	this	network	was	beneficial	for	both	farmers	and	the	State,	it	was	considered	
an	important	partner	by	both	public	and	private	development	agencies.	Therefore,	it	
was	at	the	centre	of	rural	development	programs.	However,	from	the	end	of	the	1990s	
onwards,	 several	 conflicts	 arose	 within	 the	 network	 that	 led	 to	 its	 disintegration	
(atomisation)	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 many	 rival	 networks,	 thereby	 triggering	
degenerative	dynamics	in	cotton	organisations.	
The	development	and	dynamics	of	social	organisations	is	a	central	topic	in	the	social	
sciences.	Early	work	on	this	topic	 focussed	on	the	development	and	the	dynamics	of	
small	 groups.	 During	 the	 1970s,	 task‐activity	 behaviour	 was	 distinguished	 from	
interpersonal	behaviour.	Both	belong	to	the	“realm	of	group	behaviour”,	in	which	five	
critical	 stages	 can	 be	 distinguished:	 forming,	 storming,	 norming,	 performing,	 and	
transforming	(Gilley	et	al.,	2010;	Shaw	and	Barrett‐Power,	1998:1311;	Tuckman	and	
Jensen,	1977).	These	stages	are	not	necessarily	incremental,	given	that	the	occurrence	
of	 any	 conflict	 at	 a	 specific	 development	 stage	 can	 force	 the	 group	 to	 return	 to	 a	
previous	stage	for	readjustments.	Though	larger	groups	witness	similar	trajectories	of	
development,	different	theories	apply	to	such	groups,	such	as	network	theories.	
The	debates	about	the	dynamics	of	larger	groups	and	organisations	focus	particularly	
on	 social	 cohesion,	 social	 solidarity,	 and	 social	 differentiation.	 These	 concepts	 are	
widely	 acknowledged	 as	 important	 characteristics	 of	 group	 stability,	 and	 some	 of	
them	 have	 been	 used	 interchangeably.	 Social	 cohesion	 is	 a	 most	 vital	 feature	 of	
organisational	 survival	 and,	 therefore,	 is	 required	 the	 success	 of	 the	 group	 (Moody	
and	 White,	 2003).	 However,	 cohesion	 can	 never	 be	 taken	 for	 granted,	 particularly	
when	 it	 concerns	 hierarchical	 structures	 like	 the	 cotton	 networks	 in	 Benin.	 Indeed,	
hierarchy	leads	to	divergent	orientations	between	sub‐groups	with	opposite	statuses	
(Dovido	et	al.,	2009).	While	 lower‐status	sub‐groups	are	more motivated	for	change,	
those	with	a	higher	status	tend	to	support	the	status	quo.	The	latter	are	attracted	by	
the	advantages	that	accrue	to	leadership	positions	rather	than	by	the	responsibilities	
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pertaining	to	these	positions.	This	affects	 intra‐group	interaction,	which	is	so	crucial	
to	the	structural	cohesion	of	a	group.		
Network	approaches	to	studies	of	social	structure	focus	on	actors’	positions	and	high‐
light	 their	 relationships	 with	 other	 actors.	 Networks	 are	 sources	 of	 social	 capital.	
Their	structure	and	size	are	important	for	their	cohesion	and	the	ability	of	members	
to	 cooperate	 (Moody	 and	 White,	 2003;	 Poulsen,	 2009).	 Kilduff	 and	 Tsai	 (2003)	
identified	 some	 fundamental	 and	 interrelated	 concepts	 in	 network	 approaches	 to	
organisations,	 among	 which	 the	 centrality	 of	 an	 actor	 and	 social	 capital.	 Centrality	
defines	the	social	stratification	of	the	network.	It	determines	an	actor's	access	to	and	
control	of	resources	within	the	network,	thereby	ascertaining	his/her	social	capital.		
The	concept	of	social	capital	is	multidimensional	and	diversely	interpreted	(Kampen,	
2010;	 Lin	 and	 Erickson,	 2008).	 There	 are	 three	 dimensions	 of	 social	 capital,	 all	 of	
which	 are	 located	 in	 the	 structure	 of	 social	 networks	 and	 their	 members:	 1)	 the	
structural	 dimension	 such	 as	 network	 ties	 and	 configuration,	 2)	 the	 cognitive	
dimension	 such	 as	 the	 discourse	 to	 build	 collective	 identities,	 and	 3)	 the	 relational	
dimension	 such	 as	 norms	 and	beliefs	 (Nahapiet	 and	Ghoshal,	 1998:243‐244).	Three	
types	 of	 social	 capital	 can	 be	 derived	 from	 this	 distinction	 (Burt,	 1992;	 Cohen	 and	
Prusak,	2001;	Granovetter,	1983;	Putnam,	1995;	Woolcock,	2001):	1)	bonding	social	
capital,	referred	to	as	strong	ties	that	glue	members	within	groups	such	as	families	or	
clans,	making	the	group	more	than	a	collection	of	individuals,	2)	bridging	social	capital	
that	 links	 members	 to	 outside	 networks,	 and	 are	 referred	 to	 as	 weak	 ties,	 and	 3)	
linking	social	capital	that	connects	an	individual	to	others	in	a	power	position.	These	
different	types	of	social	capital	are	linked	to	formal	or	informal	networks	(Ferlander,	
2007),	 completing	 the	 classic	 distinction	 of	 strong	 and	 weak	 network	 ties	 by	
Granovetter	(1983).	This	distinction	means	that	there	is	a	structural	dynamic	within	
groups,	 which	 entails	 interactions	 between	 members	 for	 access	 to	 and	 control	 of	
resources	 located	 therein,	 for	 the	purpose	of	 their (re)positioning (Bourdieu,	1990).	
Depending	 on	 the	 stock	 of	 resources	 embedded	 in	 members’	 social	 relations,	 the	
interactions	can	1)	maintain	members	at	their	position	in	the	network,	2)	raise	their	
position,	or	3)	suppress	the	position	of	other	members.	Bourdieu	sees	social	capital	as	
enabling	 the	 reproduction	 of	 social	 inequality	 because	 it	 helps	 strengthening	 the	
dominant	positions.		
Referring	 to	 the	 specific	 situation	 in	 Benin	 in	 the	 1990’s	 (discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	
next	section),	the	hierarchical	shape	of	the	original	cotton	farmers’	network	resulted	
in	an	uneven	distribution	of	power	and	resources.	Rapidly,	within‐network	conflicts	
arose	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 the	 network	 in	 a	 battle	 to	 control	 these	 perks	 (power	 and	
resources).	 This	 has	 led	 to	 the	 network	 breaking	 apart	 and	 ending	 up	 in	 atomised	
networks.	This	chapter	seeks	to	elucidate	the	driving	factors	behind	the	atomisation	of	
the	 network	 of	 cotton	 farmers	 in	 Benin.	 It	 will	 analyse	 the	 interactions	 between	
individual	actors	within	and	between	cotton	networks.	First,	the	history	of	the	cotton	
networks	 in	 Benin	 will	 be	 sketched.	 This	 will	 be	 followed	 by	 a	 description	 of	 the	
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research	hypotheses	and	methods.	Then,	the	results	are	presented	and	discussed	and	
a	conclusion	is	formulated.	
3.2	 Historical	background	
3.2.1	 Cotton	farmer	networks	in	Benin:	From	agency	to	associations	
The	history	of	what	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 cotton	 farmer	networks	 in	Benin	 is	
firmly	 linked	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 farmer	 organisations	 from	 the	 late	 1960s	 to	 the	
1980s.	 Farmer	 groups	 were	 formed	 at	 the	 village	 level.	 With	 the	 boom	 of	 cotton	
production	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 the	 advent	 of	 democracy,	 not	 only	 the	 village‐based	
groups	 gained	 more	 autonomy,	 they	 also	 extended	 their	 influence	 beyond	 villages.	
With	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 the	 cotton	 sector,	 farmer	 organisations	 became	 more	
formally	structured,	mirroring	the	country's	four‐level	administrative	division7,	which	
resulted	into	a	hierarchical	and	professional	network	(Figure	3.1).	
	
The	 core	 function	 of	 cotton	 farmer	 organisations	 is	 to	 supply	 their	 members	 with	
cotton	inputs	and	market	their	production.	At	the	village	level,	there	were	grassroots	
farmer	groups,	which	 could	be	 further	divided	 into	 sub‐groups	 to	 ease	 the	manage‐
ment	 of	 resources,	 depending	 on	 the	 size	 of	 the	 village	 and	 the	 volume	 of	 cotton	
production.	 The	 boards	 of	 village	 groups	 dealt	 with	 farmers’	 daily	 concerns	 with	
regard	 to	 cotton	 production.	 Farmer	 groups	 within	 a	 district	 were	 managed	 by	 a	
district	 union	 of	 producers.	 The	 district	 boards	 collected	 and	 centralised	 village	
groups'	demands	for	inputs,	and	managed	the	marketing	and	transport	of	seed	cotton	
from	 the	 farm	markets	 to	 ginning	 factories.	 They	 selected	 and	 issued	 the	 licence	 to	
inputs	 suppliers	 and	 delivered	 the	 authorisation	 to	 the	 transporters	 for	 loading	
cotton.	The	district	unions	formed	provincial	unions,	which	were	managed	by	a	board	
elected	 among	members	 of	 the	 district	 boards.	 The	 provincial	 unions	 of	 producers	
played	the	same	coordinating	role	as	the	district	unions,	managing	demands	for	inputs	
from	the	latter	at	a	larger	scale.	At	the	national	level,	these	unions	became	a	federation	
that	constituted	a	large	network	of	cotton	producers.	This	national	apex	was	created	
in	1994.	The	national	apex	managed	exclusively	cotton	organisations	from	the	top	of	
the	 hierarchy	 and	 represented	 cotton	 farmers	 in	 cotton	 bodies.	 It	 also	 focussed	 on	
lobbying	and	advocacy  for	 farmers’	 interests	 in	 the	national	and	 international	arena	
(Kouton	et	al.,	2006).	
	
Farmer	 organisations	 have	 depended	 on	 cotton	 levies,	 so	 that	 "producing	 cotton	
became	 a	more	 stringent	membership	 criterion	 and	 encouraged	 other	 [cash	 crops]	
producers	to	form	their	own	groups"	(Tama‐Imorou	et	al.,	2007b:113).	 	Membership	
																																																								
7	The	village	groups	(GV)	formed	at	the	77	district	levels,	the	district	unions	of	producers.	In	
each	 of	 the	 six	 administrative	 provinces,	 the	 district	 unions	 are	 grouped	 in	 the	 provincial	
unions	of	producers,	which	in	turn	federated	in	a	national	apex	called	federation	of	producers’	
union.	
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guarantees	farmers	access	to	cash	credit	and	inputs	such	as	fertilizers	and	pesticides.	
In	 return,	 the	 members	 comply	 to	 deliver	 and	 sell	 their	 production	 through	 the	
organisation.	 Control	 over	 farmers	 is	 exerted	 through	 the	 joint	 liability	 of	 group	
members	 enforced	 by	 the	 board	 of	 the	 organisation.	 A	 mechanism	 to	 enforce	
compliance	 with	 the	 system	 that	 linked	 supply	 of	 inputs	 to	 cotton	 production	 and	
marketing	between	 farmers,	 inputs	 suppliers	 and	ginners	was	 set	up	and	known	as	
the	 "mécanisme	 de	 la	 CSPR".	 This	 mechanism	 was	 monitored	 by	 the	 cotton	 inter‐
professional	 association,	 a	 body	 comprising	 the	 different	 institutional	 actors,	 to	
enforce	the	regulations	related	to	the	sector.	It	reinforced	the	hierarchical	structure	of	
farmer	 organisations	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 making	 cotton	 production	 for	 non‐members	
impossible.	
	
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 farmer	 leaders	 at	 all	 the	 levels	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 grew	 in	
importance,	 both	 economically	 and	 socially.	 But	while	 the	 network	 board	members	
knew	 each	 other	 across	 districts	 and	 provinces	 because	 of	 meetings	 convened	 for	
leaders,	this	did	not	apply	to	grassroots	farmers.	Sharing	the	membership	of	a	cotton	
network	 rarely	 involved	 farmers	 from	 different	 villages	 in	 a	 joint	 production.	Most	
members	 of	 the	 networks	 were	 hardly	 linked	 within	 the	 cotton	 networks	 that	
consequently	contained	"structural	holes"	(Burt,	1992:65).	Hence,	grassroots	farmers	
were	 connected	 only	 through	 the	 leaders	 of	 their	 networks,	 with	 little	 interaction	
among	themselves.	Such	networks	need	a	high	level	of	trust	to	function	effectively	(cf.	
Porta	 et	 al.,	 1997).	 The	 bottom	 of	 this	 pyramidal	 organisation	 was	 shapeless	 and	
lacking	natural	boundaries,	in	this	way	exhibiting	one	of	the	core	characteristics	of	a	
social	network	(Deguene	and	Forsé,	1994:14;	Latour,	1997).	
	
	
	 	 Figure	3.1	 The	hierarchical	structure	of	cotton	networks	
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3.2.2		 Naming	cotton	networks:	The	war	of	words	
By	the	end	of	the	1990s,	the	cotton	farmer	network	was	burdened	by	mismanagement	
and	 dysfunctioning.	 This	 caused	 long	 delays	 in	 payments	 to	 farmers	 that	 could	
amount	 to	a	year	 (World	Bank,	2003).	As	a	 result,	dissident	networks	emerged	 that	
challenged	 the	 monopoly	 of	 the	 federation	 (Sinzogan	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 The	 process	 of	
atomisation	 started	 from	 the	 top	 of	 the	 pyramid	 where	 access	 was	 still	 highly	
controlled	 and	 regulated,	 and	 then	 spilled	 over	 into	 its	 bottom	 at	 village	 level.	
Following	 the	 movement	 from	 the	 top,	 the	 village	 groups	 split	 in	 many	 wings	
belonging	to	different	networks.	The	original	federation	created	in	1994,	fell	apart	to	
give	birth	in	2001	to	the	first	breakaway	network.	Between	2001	and	2006,	these	two	
conflicting	 networks	 split	 up	 endlessly,	 generating	more	 than	 ten	 other	 breakaway	
networks	and	raising	the	number	of	cotton	networks	to	14	(Table	3.1).	Although	the	
names	of	 these	organisations	did	not	refer	 to	cotton	until	2005	when	a	 legal	reform	
imposed	the	focus	on	cotton	to	their	naming,	they	had	dealt	mostly	with	cotton.	Of	the	
breakaway	networks,	four	fizzled	out.	The	nine	remaining	networks	vied	for	farmers'	
support	until	2010,	when	the	central	government	decided	to	regain	control	of	cotton	
production.	 Ironically,	 this	 lack	of	control	 in	 the	reform	process	has	been	praised	as	
the	"dynamics	of	farmer	organisations"	(AIC,	2005:8).	Similar	to	the	terminology	used	
in	Chapter	2,	farmers	who	changed	their	network	membership	will	be	referred	to	as	
breakers,	 while	 those	 who	 kept	 to	 only	 one	 network	 will	 be	 called	 stayers.	 Both	
categories	can	stay	constant	or	change	depending	on	 their	choice	 to	 join	or	create	a	
network	later	on.	
The	 process	 of	 atomisation	 stemmed	 from	 Gogounou,	 the	 third	 largest	 district	 in	
cotton	production,	where	a	 leadership	conflict	 led	to	the	first	dissident	organisation.	
After	that	it	spread	to	other	districts.	Gogounou	led	the	contest	for	creating	breakaway	
networks	 in	 the	 country	 thereafter.	 As	 a	 result,	 no	 less	 than	 six	 of	 the	 total	 of	 13	
breakaway	 networks	 emerged	 from	 there.	 The	 prominent	 place	 of	 the	 district	 of	
Gogounou	in	this	process	was	pointed	out	by	farmers	during	focus‐group	discussions	
and	interviews,	as	illustrated	by	the	following	statement	at	Sinende:	“We	did	not	know	
how	to	create	dissidence.	It	is	farmers	from	Gogounou	who	used	to	come	here	by	night	to	
cajole	us	to	join	these	new	networks.”	Cotton	farmers	from	Gogounou	are	still	proud	of	
this	 history	 and	 feel	 honoured	 to	 have	 their	 district	 qualified	 as	 the	 laboratory	 of	
cotton	 networking,	 an	 attribute	 that	 many	 of	 their	 leaders	 proudly	 claim.	 The	
atomisation	of	 networks	proceeded	 along	with	 a	marked	 shift	 in	 their	 structure.	By	
fragmenting,	 they	 became	 smaller	 and	more	 diversely	 structured.	 Only	 the	 original	
network	 exhibited	 the	 four‐level	 structure	 with	 boards	 at	 village,	 district,	 province	
and	national	level.	The	breakaway	networks	showed	a	different	structure	with	two	to	
three	 hierarchical	 levels.	 The	 village	 groups	 were	 no	 more	 on	 a	 one‐village	 basis.	
Instead,	they	became	multi‐village	based	and	were	therefore	called	producers	groups.	
The	top	of	the	hierarchy	was	modified.	It	inflated	with	leaders,	many	farmers	having	
changed	 their	 status	 and	 uplifted	 their	 positions.	 Consequently,	 the	 shape	 of	 the	
networks	shifted	from	the	“pyramidal	shape”	to	a	“vase	shape”.	
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Table	3.1	 List	of	the	active	networks	(2009–2011	survey	data)	
N	 Acronym	 Description	(translated)	 Creation8	 Nature	 Number	of	farmer	groups		(2008)	
Operational	
Status		
1	 FUPRO	(later	on	ANPC)	
Federation	of	Producer	Unions	 1994	
Original	network 2095	 Functional	National	association	of	cotton	producers	 2005	
2	 AGROPE	 Association	of	producers’	groups	and	businessmen	 2000/2001	 Breakaway	Network	(BN)	 ‐	 Broke	apart	
3	 FENAPRA	 National	Federation	of	agricultural	producers		 2003	(May	2002) BN	 360	 Functional	
4	 AGROP	–	Benin	 Association	of	producers’	groups	 October	2003	(February	2003)	 BN	 203	 Functional	
5	 FENAGROP	 National	federation	of	producers’	groups	 April	2005	(2004) BN	 161	 Functional	
6	 AGROP	–	NV	 Association	of	producers’	groups	–	New	vision	 October	2006	(May	2005)	 BN	 115	 Functional	
	
7	
AGROP	–	DEDE/RFC	
(later	on	
ANACODEDE)	
Association	of	producers’	groups	–	
Transparency/For	the	rehabilitation	of	cotton	sector
December	2004	
(June	2004)	 BN	 69	 Functional	
National	association	of	cotton	farmers	Transparency May	2007	
8	 FENAPROC	 National	Federation	of	cotton	producers	 May	2005	(December	2004) BN	 299	 Functional	
9	 UNAPRO	–	B	 National	union	of	producers		 2004	(2005)	 BN	 84	 Functional	
10	 UPROCOB	 Union	of	cotton	producers	 2006	(2005)	 BN	 116	 Functional	
11	 ANCPB	 National	association	of	districts	producers	 ‐	 BN	 ‐	 Fizzled	out	
12	 WEWE	–	PEPE	 “All	white”	 2006	 BN	 17	 Fizzled	out	
13	 URPCB	 Regional	union	cotton	producers	 2006	 BN	(a	union	of	n°	4,	5,	6,	7,	8	and	9) ‐	 Fizzled	out	
14	 –	 National	syndicate	of	producers	of	Banikoara	 ‐	 BN	 	 Fizzled	out	
																																																								
8	Years	in	brackets	are	dates	when	the	networks	started	operating	before	their	official	registration.	
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Dissidence	 among	 networks	 often	 emerged	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 cotton	 growing	
season.	When	that	happened,	breakers	would	have	marketed	their	products	through	a	
network	different	from	the	one	that	had	provided	them	with	inputs.	As	a	consequence,	
most	breakaway	networks	operated	for	at	least	one	cotton	season	before	their	official	
registration.	 For	 example,	 during	 the	 2004‐2005	 season,	 dissidents	 from	 the	 three	
pre‐existing	networks	generated	 three	more	networks	 that	marketed	 their	products	
separately,	 before	 being	 officially	 recognised	 in	 2005.	 Figure	 3.2	 pictures	 the	 con‐
figuration	of	networks	based	on	the	date	of	their	official	recognition.	
	
	 	 Figure	3.2	 Emerging	relationships	between	cotton	networks	
Thus,	disputes	regularly	arose	over	the	use	of	network	names	between	the	conflicting	
wings.	The	disputes	were	settled	by	adding	suffixes	to	the	acronyms.	 Illustrations	of	
such	 practices	 are	 the	 networks	 derived	 from	 AGROPE:	 AGROP‐BENIN,	 AGROP‐
NOUVELLE	VISION,	and	AGROP‐DEDE.	The	second	suffix	refers	to	“new	vision”,	while	
the	 third	 symbolises	 “transparency”.	 They	 all	 kept	 the	 prefix	 AGROP,	 the	 French	
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acronym	 standing	 for	 association	 of	 producers.	 By	 doing	 so,	 they	 aimed	 to	 benefit	
from	the	credit	gained	by	the	first	breakaway	network	AGROPE,	which	lived	up	to	the	
expectations	of	some	farmers	before	it	fell	apart.		
3.3	 Research	hypotheses	and	methods	
3.3.1	 Research	hypotheses	
The	present	 chapter	 addresses	 the	 factors	 that	 affected	 the	 interaction	between	 the	
“cotton	 system”	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 production	 relations	 in	 the	 process	 of	
atomisation.	 It	 is	 intended	 to	shed	 light	on	 the	process	 through	which	 farmers,	who	
had	 greatly	 contributed	 to	 the	 boom	 in	 cotton	 production	 through	 effective	
organisations,	 weakened	 and	 atomised	 their	 cotton	 networks.	 Hypotheses	 were	
formulated	by	applying	 the	 theoretical	perspectives	 to	 the	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	
dynamics	of	networking	to	the	specific	situation	of	Benin’s	cotton	sector.	The	central	
hypothesis	 is	 that	 different	 backgrounds	 and	 attitudes	 of	 farmers	 combined	 with	
networks	 characteristics	 led	 farmers	 to	 make	 different	 decisions	 with	 respect	 to	
staying	 within	 (remnants	 of)	 cotton	 networks	 (stayers),	 leaving	 them	 to	 join	 other	
networks	(joiners),	or	creating	new	ones	(creators).	Hence,	three	categories	of	farmers	
with	regard	to	atomisation	were	distinguished:	stayers,	joiners,	and	creators.	Factors	
that	 influenced	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 atomisation	 (backgrounds	 and	 motives)	 were	
grouped	 into	 push	 factors	 and	pull	 factors.	 Push	 factors	 for	 atomisation	 are	 causes,	
either	 real	 or	 perceived,	 that	 forced	 or	 persuaded	 farmers	 to	 leave	 networks.	 Pull	
factors	 into	 atomisation	 are	 those,	 either	 real	 or	 perceived,	 which	 determined	
farmers'	decision	 to	 join	other	networks	or	 to	becoming	 involved	 in	 the	 creation	of	
new	 networks.	 A	 third	 group	 of	 factors	 that	 could	 have	 influenced	 the	 process	 of	
atomisation	of	cotton	networks	comprises	the	social	networks	of	cotton	farmers	in	the	
form	of	supportive	ties.	Indeed,	social	relations	constitute	the	vehicle	of	social	capital	
and	 have	 been	 revealed	 to	 be	 important	 in	 various	 domains,	 such	 as	 community	
development,	job	attainment,	and	entrepreneurship	(Moerbeek	and	Flap,	2008;	Nancy	
et	al.,	2002;	Putnam,	1993).	The	following	framework	guided	the	research.	
3.3.2	 Study	design	and	sampling	
The	research	was	conducted	in	the	main	cotton‐producing	provinces	of	Benin,	Borgou	
and	Alibori	in	the	North,	from	where	more	than	75	per	cent	of	the	cotton	produced	in	
the	 country	 is	 sourced.	 All	 the	 registered	 cotton	 networks	 are	 concentrated	 in	 this	
region,	vying	 to	control	as	much	production	as	possible.	However,	 the	production	 is	
unequally	distributed	within	the	region	and	the	cotton	belt	 is	quite	distinctive.	Most	
breakaway	 networks	were	 concentrated	 in	 that	 cotton	 belt	 and	 some	 exerted	 their	
influence	in	only	a	few	villages.	
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The	fieldwork	was	conducted	in	two	phases	between	October	2009	and	April	2011.	It	
combined	quantitative	and	qualitative	research	methods	to	investigate	the	process	of	
cotton	 networks	 atomisation.	 The	 first	 phase	 consisted	 of	 an	 exploratory	 survey	
through	focus‐group	discussions	with	farmers,	and	key	informant	interviews.	During	
the	 second	 phase	 individual	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 that	 combined	 in‐depth	
interviews	and	survey	interviews	with	network	leaders	and	grassroots	farmers,	using	
a	semi‐structured	questionnaire.	The	questionnaire	was	submitted	first	to	individual	
network	leaders	and	then	to	grassroots	farmers.	
The	 sampling	 design	 combined	 purposive	 and	 random	 sampling.	 During	 the	
exploratory	 phase,	 the	 sample	 consisted	 of	 ten	 villages	 purposively	 selected	 and	
unevenly	 distributed	 throughout	 the	 provinces.	 The	 selection	 criteria	 were,	 among	
others,	 the	 level	of	 cotton	production	and	 the	presence	 in	 the	village	of	 at	 least	one	
operating	cotton	network.	In	the	second	phase,	the	sample	was	constructed	in	a	three‐
step	 process:	 first	 choosing	 the	 village,	 second	 the	 networks,	 and	 then	 the	 farmers.	
Four	 villages	 and	nine	networks	were	purposively	 selected	 from	 the	 villages	where	
the	focus‐group	discussions	had	been	conducted.	Then,	33	network	leaders	at	national	
and	provincial	 levels	were	 interviewed.	The	first	 three	to  five	most	 important	board	
members	 were	 selected.	 According	 to	 the	 networks’	 statutes	 and	 regulations,	 the	
boards	 should	have	11‐13	members.	 In	practice,	 only	 the	 first	 three	positions	 –	 the	
president,	secretary	and	treasurer	–	and	those	of	 their	deputies	matter.	About	 these	
positions	conflicts	occurred	more	often	because	of	the	power	and	resources	attached	
to	 them.	 In	 the	 daily	management,	 however,	 deputies	 are	mostly	 put	 aside	 and	 left	
with	 an	 empty	 shell.	 The	 main	 position‐holders	 are	 omnipresent	 in	 order	 to	 keep	
control	 of	 resources	 and	opportunities.	 Therefore,	we	 selected	 the	 first	 three	board	
members	 and	 their	 deputies	 where	 available	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 individual	 inter‐
views.	In	addition,	of	some	networks	the	coordinators	and	the	managers	were	inter‐
viewed	 when	 available.	 The	 holders	 of	 these	 positions	 were	 added	 to	 the	 sample	
because	 of	 their	 knowledge	 of	 networks’	 activities	 and	 membership	 development.	
While	 coordinators	 were	 board	 members,	 managers	 were	 mostly	 recruited	 as	
employees	of	the	network.	However,	most	managers	of	the	breakaway	networks	were	
also	 among	 their	 proponents.	 Finally,	 a	 systematic	 sampling	procedure	was	used	 to	
select	 115	 grassroots	 farmers	 from	 the	 lists	 of	 village	 groups’	members	 of	 selected	
networks	to	complete	the	sample	of	farmers.	In	the	end,	this	resulted	in	the	covering	
of	 nine	 operational	 networks,	which	 are	 listed	 in	 Table	 3.1	where	 their	 operational	
status	is	stated.	
3.3.3	 	Data	collection	methods	
Focus	 group	 discussions	 and	 open	 interviews.	 The	 focus‐groups	 discussion	
sessions	 were	 organised	 in	 ten	 villages	 distributed	 over	 four	 provinces.	 The	
discussions	 used	 a	 guide	 of	 fifteen	 items	 that	 addressed	 various	 aspects	 of	 cotton	
networking.	 The	 guide	 started	 with	 the	 institutional	 mapping	 of	 the	 village.	
Thereafter,	the	importance	of	cotton,	the	interactions	between	cotton	and	non‐cotton	
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organisations,	 and	 collective	 action	 in	 the	 village	were	discussed.	 Then	 the	 types	 of	
conflicts	 occurring	 within	 and	 between	 networks	 were	 addressed,	 including	 the	
profile	 of	 leaders,	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 inter‐	 and	 intra‐group	 conflicts	 in	 collective	
action.	 Factors	 that	 determine	 farmers’	 decision	 to	 break	 away	 from	 and	 to	 join	
networks	were	discussed.	In	addition	to	the	focus‐group	discussions,	open	interviews	
were	 carried	 out	with	 some	 key	 actors	 of	 the	 sector,	 such	 as	 agricultural	 extension	
workers,	 employees	of	 cotton	bodies	 as	well	 as	 experienced	 farmers.	Data	 from	 the	
focus‐group	 discussions	 were	 analysed	 using	 descriptive	 statistics	 to	 assess	 the	
frequency	 of	 different	 factors	 cited	 in	 villages.	 The	 frequencies	 indicated	 the	
prevalence	 of	 the	 factors	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	were	 shared	 throughout	 the	
cotton	production	 zones.	 Based	on	 farmers’	 reasoning,	 the	 factors	were	 grouped	by	
similarity	for	the	semi‐structured	questionnaire.		
Questionnaire.	 A	 semi‐structured	 questionnaire	 was	 first	 submitted	 to	 network	
leaders	at	national	 level	and	second	to	grassroots	farmers	and	leaders	at	the	district	
and	village	levels.	Respondents	were	visited	at	their	place,	either	at	home	or	on	their	
farms	 for	 face‐to‐face	 interviews	 that	 lasted	 for	about	one‐and‐half	 to	 two	hours	on	
average.	To	facilitate	a	fluent	interview	that	flowed	according	to	the	reasoning	of	the	
respondents,	the	order	of	the	questions	depended	on	the	respondents'	answers.	
The	content	of	the	questionnaire	was	to	a	high	extent	governed	by	the	results	from	the	
qualitative	 research,	 i.e.	 the	 emergence	 of	 cotton	 networks	 and	 problems	 that	
overwhelmed	 their	 functioning,	 and	 resulting	 in	 their	 breaking	 apart.	 The	 most	
important	 causes	 for	 breaking	 away	 were	 identified	 in	 the	 previous	 qualitative	
research.	 These	 are	 the	 lack	 of	 payment	 to	 farmers	 (which	 constrained	 farmers’	
investment	 projects),	 the	 mismanagement	 of	 resources	 (including	 unequal	 re‐
distribution	 of	 inputs,	 and	 the	manipulation	 and	 corruption	 of	 networks	 leaders	 by	
private	 actors),	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 villages	 (including	 the	 subsequent	 increase	 of	
cotton	production).	These	hardened	the	management	of	the	village‐based	groups.	The	
questionnaire	 was	 built	 on	 these	 factors,	 of	 which	 the	 most	 frequently	 mentioned	
were	submitted	to	individual	farmers	for	a	ranking.	
The	questionnaire	consisted	of	eight	sections	(see	Appendix	2).	The	first	section	dealt	
with	 the	 socio‐economic	 and	 demographic	 backgrounds	 of	 farmers,	 such	 as	 age,	
education,	marital	status	of	the	household	head	and	size	of	the	household.	Other	data	
included	 the	experience	 in	cotton	 farming,	 the	hierarchy	of	 income	sources,	 and	 the	
place	of	cotton	in	agricultural	income.	Data	on	cotton	production	during	the	last	five	
years	in	area	and	tonnage	were	also	collected,	followed	by	the	farmer’s	current	status	
in	 cotton	 production	 (whether	 s/he	 was	 still	 producing	 or	 had	 abandoned	 cotton	
permanently	or	temporarily).	Respondents	were	also	requested	to	list	their	member‐
ship	 of	 organisations	 other	 than	 cotton	 and	 explain	 the	 relations	 between	 these	
organisations	 and	 cotton	 networks.	 A	 further	 question	 concerned	 the	 different	
positions	the	respondent	had	in	these	organisations	and	their	duration.	Questions	in	
the	 second	 section	 were	 about	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 network	 the	 respondents	
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currently	belonged	to:	 the	context	of	 its	creation,	 its	size	at	different	stages,	etc.	The	
third	 section	 concerned	 the	 respondents'	 networking	 trajectory,	 followed	 by	 the	
ranking	of	factors	that	might	have	influenced	this	trajectory	such	as	personal	qualities,	
the	sources	of	support	they	benefited	from,	etc.	The	causes	for	breaking	away	and	the	
motives	 for	 joining	 other	 networks	 were	 also	 discussed.	 In	 the	 fourth	 section,	 the	
relationships	between	network	proponents	(instrumental	in	the	creation	of	networks)	
were	 explored.	 The	 fifth	 section	 ended	 the	 interview	 by	 the	 ranking	 of	 suggested	
reform	 actions	 that	 were	 identified	 during	 the	 focus	 group	 discussions.	 For	 the	
interview	with	 grassroots	 farmers	 and	 lower	 levels	 leaders,	 the	 sections	 four	 to	 six	
were	slightly	modified.	The	part	on	relationships	between	proponents	was	 replaced	
by	questions	about	the	ranking	of	conflicts	occurring	within	networks	with	regard	to	
their	frequency	and	severity.	
Changing	network	membership	was	assessed	by	factors	termed	perceived	causes	for	
breaking	away,	which	were	ranked	according	to	their	importance	for	farmers.	The	set	
of	causes	contained	seven	statements	which	were	ranked	from	1	(most	important)	to	
7	 (least	 important)	by	all	 the	 respondents.	The	 statements	of	which	 the	 importance	
for	 leaving	a	network	had	 to	be	 ranked	 included	 "lack	of	payment",	 "manipulation",	
and	 so	 on.	 Determinants	 of	 farmers'	 decisions	 to	 join	 or	 create	 networks	 were	
measured	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 Eight	 driving	 factors	 were	 put	 to	 the	 farmers	 as	
statements	for	ranking.	They	included	"payment	on	time"	and	"expectation	of	profit",	
etcetera.	 Additional	 factors	 that	 could	 motivate	 farmers	 to	 join	 or	 create	 were	 the	
perceived	sources	of	support	 in	 joining	or	creating	networks.	These	sources,	 ranked	
by	farmers	according	to	their	respective	contribution	to	joining	or	creating	networks,	
contained	seven	statements	like	"kinship	as	a	source	of	support"	and	"professionals	of	
cotton	as	a	source	of	support”.		For	the	ranking	questions,	all	the	factors	were	put	as	
statements	to	the	farmers,	who	were	then	requested	to	rank	them	from	most	to	least	
important.	
3.4	 Findings	from	the	qualitative	research	
3.4.1	 Emergence	of	breakaway	networks		
The	 starting	 point	 of	 the	 atomisation	 of	 cotton	 networks	 was	 a	 leadership	 conflict	
about	 the	 control	 of	 a	 district	 cotton	 union	within	 the	 cotton	 belt.	 The	 conflict	was	
backed	up	by	local	political	leaders	on	the	ground	that	the	current	leadership	dragged	
on	for	years.	The	resulting	dissident	network	emerged	as	an	acceptable	solution	since	
the	 country’s	 political	 system	 guarantees	 freedom	 of	 association.	 This	 first‐ever	
dissident	 network	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	 full	 control	 of	 the	 former	 federation	 over	 the	
management	of	farmer	organisations.	Indeed,	opposing	the	leaders	was	risky	because	
it	would	deprive	the	dissidents	from	accessing	inputs.	Proponents	of	the	first	dissident	
network	experienced	such	coercive	measures	that	they	were	forced	to	resort	to	non‐
official	suppliers	to	get	inputs	during	their	first	year.	For	that	they	eagerly	claim	that	
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“nobody	 raised	his	hand	 to	 contest	 the	 former	 leaders	before	we	did	 so.”	 From	 this	
point	 onwards,	 the	 federation	 could	 be	 circumvented	 by	 cotton	 farmers	 to	 access	
production	inputs.	Farmers	were	offered	alternative	solutions	to	staying	into	remnant	
networks:	either	joining	other	existing	networks	or	creating	new	ones.	Thus,	breaking	
away	 and	 creating	 new	 networks	 became	 a	 contest	 among	 cotton	 farmers	 in	 the	
cotton	 belt,	 from	 where	 more	 than	 three	 quarters	 of	 the	 breakaway	 networks	
emerged.	
The	 multiplication	 of	 cotton	 networks	 went	 along	 with	 an	 increase	 of	 mismanage‐
ment,	which	 the	 leaders	 tried	 to	 cover	by	blacking	out	 communication.	Particularly,	
new	 leaders	 turned	 out	 to	 behave	 more	 selfishly	 than	 the	 former	 leaders	 they	
contested.	For	many	farmers,	however,	 the	atomisation	was	exacerbated	by	external	
actors	to	cotton	organisations.	Among	these	are	inputs	suppliers	and	cotton	ginners,	
the	 crucial	 partners	 of	 farmer	 organisations,	 as	 well	 as	 political	 leaders	 and	 local	
“intellectuals”,	as the	farmers	qualify	the	last	category.	Cotton	farmers	accused	these	
actors	 of	 connivance	 and	 of	manipulating	 and	 corrupting	 farmers	 in	 the	 process	 of	
atomisation.	The	 accusations	derived	 from	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	board	 secretaries,	
whose	lack	of	transparency	in	their	management	of	cotton	organisations	contributed	
to	 the	 farmers’	 indebtedness.	 Cotton	 farmers	 contested	 the	 status	 of	 being	 the	 only	
proponents	of	breakaway	networks.	Executives	of	the	cotton	companies,	both	private	
and	 the	 State‐owned	 one,	 were	 involved	 in	 this	 as	 well.	 Thanks	 to	 the	 growing	
influence	 of	 inputs	 suppliers	 and	 private	 ginners	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 liberalisation	
process,	 they	 controlled	 the	 cotton	 production	 of	 many	 networks.	 In	 addition	 to	
disturbing	 the	 cotton	 supply	 to	 the	 State‐owned	 cotton	 company,	which	 previously	
had	the	monopoly	on	cotton	ginning,	private	companies	also	resorted	to	breaching	the	
rules	 regulating	 cotton	 production.	 To	 counter	 the	 “unfair”	 competition	 and	 secure	
cotton	 supplies	 for	 their	 ginning	 mills,	 executives	 of	 the	 State	 parastatal	 company	
promoted	their	own	networks.	Taking	advantage	of	their	strategic	position,	they	put	
together	 farmers	 from	different	districts	who	hardly	knew	each	other	and	could	not	
have	created	a	network	themselves.	
As	with	the	first	breakaway	network,	most	of	the	later	ones	also	emerged	because	of	
intra‐group	conflicts,	but	this	time	of	a	different	nature.	The	conflicts	were	about	lack	
of	payment	resulting	from	mismanagement	of	network	resources.	Consequently,	being	
paid	 on	 time	 and	 getting	 inputs	 adequately	 remained	 farmers’	 main	 motives	 for	
joining	 other	 networks.	 At	 the	 back	 of	 the	 conflicts,	 however,	 was	 the	 objective	 of	
farmers	to	take	control	over	the	contested	resources	for	more	profit.	To	achieve	this,	
they	needed	 legitimacy,	which	 they	 sought	 not	 only	 in	 bonding	but	 also	 in	 bridging	
ties.	The	search	for	 legitimacy	was	also	reflected	in	the	discourse	used	by	 leaders	to	
convince	 fellow	 farmers	 to	 join	 them	 and	 in	 the	 dominant	 relationships	 among	
members	 of	 the	 network's	 stronghold.	 The	 discourse	 used	 by	 leaders	 included	 not	
only	 addressing	 farmers’	 needs	 by	 promising	 better	 management	 and	 payment	 on	
time,	but	also	denigrating	the	contending	networks	in	order	to	increase	trust	in	their	
own.	As	for	the	types	of	relationships,	they	differed	according	to	the	network	involved	
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and	the	context	of	its	emergence.	While	some	proponents	of	networks	were	supported	
at	the	outset	by	bonding	ties	(kin	and	members	of	their	ethnic	group),	others	got	their	
first	support	from	bridging	ties	or	from	linking	ties	(people	in	power	positions).	
3.4.2		 From	weak	ties	to	linkages	
When	 the	 first	 breakaway	 network	 (AGROPE)	 was	 emerging,	 the	 lack	 of	 payment	
prevailed	on	a	small	scale	in	a	few	organisations	as	a	consequence	of	mismanagement	
practices,	 and	 was	 looming	 in	 others.	 The	 proponents	 of	 the	 new	 network,	 who	
originated	from	one	village,	extended	their	campaign	to	many	other	cotton	producing	
districts	from	where	they	also	selected	some	leaders	for	board	positions.	The	network	
was	an	hybrid	organisation	that	 included	transporters,	 inputs	suppliers	and	ginners,	
hence	 its	 denomination	 as	 an	 “association	of	 producers	 and	businessmen”.	Through	
the	 businessmen,	 the	 network	 proponents	 gained	 support	 from	 political	 leaders	 in	
power	 position,	 who	 had	 a	 great	 stake	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 networks.	 This	
complex	membership	made	the	network	a	mix	of	actors	where	only	few	were	related	
through	kinship	or	friendship,	though	geographical	proximity	could	have	also	played	a	
role.	 “The	only	 thing	 that	brought	us	 together	 is	 cotton	production”,	 said	one	of	 the	
proponents	who	was	leading	another	breakaway	network.	
A	 virtual	 advantage	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 initial	 social	 ties	was	 the	 increased	 likelihood	 of	
extending	the	network	throughout	producing	areas.	Each	of	the	proponents	could	use	
his/her	 social	 ties	 to	 make	 cotton	 farmers	 join	 and	 facilitate	 the	 growth	 of	 the	
network.	Additionally,	the	new	leaders	strategically	adopted	the	practice	of	immediate	
payment	 upon	 selling	 the	 cotton,	 which	 in	 some	 regions	 raised	 enthusiasm	 among	
cotton	farmers	to	massively	join	the	breakaway	network	from	its	outset.	Most	of	the	
cotton	 networks	 referred	 to	 by	 respondents	 in	 this	 research	 followed	 this	 pattern.	
However,	 the	 divergence	 of	 the	 interests	 (e.g.	 profiteering	 on	 input	 supply	 against	
making	 a	 living	 by	 producing	 cotton)	 inhibited	 cohesive	 action	within	 the	 network.	
With	 the	 increasing	 financial	 stakes,	 leadership	 conflicts	 inflated	 and	weakened	 the	
network,	 which	 ended	 up	 falling	 apart.	 Mismanagement	 practices	 escalated	 and	
became	a	critical	cause	for	breaking	away.	Thus,	most	farmers	linked	the	emergence	
of	 new	 networks	 to	 mismanagement	 practices.	 In	 all	 cases,	 farmers	 from	 different	
districts	 joined	 their	effort	 to	 “combat	 these	practices”	and	 to	achieve	 their	 common	
purpose:	the	profitability	of	cotton	production.	These	dynamics	show	the	importance	
of	strong	ties	for	new	networks.	
3.4.3		 From	strong	ties	to	weak	ties		
One	network	(UPROCOB)	of	the	nine	breakaway	networks	included	in	this	research	is	
known	as	an	ethnicity‐based	network.	It	emerged	in	a	village	from	the	initiative	of	one	
person.	 Its	 prominent	 leader	 purposively	 mobilised	 farmers	 from	 his	 Gando	 ethnic	
group	and	"did	all	 the	necessary	administrative	procedures",	according	 to	the	current	
president	of	the	network.	While	the	network	exerted	its	influence	first	in	its	village	of	
THE	FACTORS	BEHIND	THE	EMERGENCE	AND	COLLAPSE	OF	COTTON	NETWOKS	
	
61	
	
birth	and	among	the	members	of	this	particular	ethnic	group,	the	necessity	of	getting	
broadly	accepted	and	being	considered	a	network	instead	of	a	farmer	group	forced	the	
proponents	 to	 extend	 the	 network	 beyond	 the	 village.	 But	 still,	 the	 districts	 and	
villages	 targeted	were	 those	with	populations	dominated	by	 the	 same	ethnic	group.	
Although	 there	 was	 no	 (open)	 ethnic‐based	 competition	 for	 leadership	 of	 cotton	
networks,	 the	 leaders	 of	 this	 network	 used	 in	 their	 discourse	 the	 sensitive	 issue	 of	
ethnicity	 to	 attract	 members	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 defending	 their	 interests.	 This	
communication	 strategy	 got	 them	 more	 members.	 Indeed,	 the	 leaders	 were	 easily	
trusted	by	the	farmers,	who	till	that	time	had	hardly	come	across	a	leader	from	their	
own	 ethnic	 group.	 In	 the	 area,	 members	 of	 this	 ethnic	 group	 are	 known	 as	 hard‐
working	farmers,	and	they	are	perceived	as	being	at	the	lower	end	of	the	local	social	
hierarchy	 (Jones,	 1998;	 Lombard,	 1998).	 Thus,	 the	 success	 and	 cohesion	 of	 this	
particular	network	seems	to	be	based	mainly	on	resorting	to	relational	social	capital,	
i.e.	 the	 ethnic	 solidarity,	 and	 its	 subsequent	 homogeneity.	 Later	 on,	 the	 network	
spread	to	socio‐demographically	(and	ethnically)	different	villages.	
3.4.4		 Preliminary	conclusions	based	on	the	qualitative	research	
The	 results	 from	 the	 qualitative	 research	 allowed	 for	 generating	 a	 number	 of	 pre‐
liminary	 conclusions	 regarding	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 breaking	 up	 of	 cotton	 networks.	
These	were	used	to	formulate	hypotheses	that	could,	at	 least	partly,	be	tested	in	the	
survey	 research.	 The	 internal	 network	 dynamics	 were	 influenced	 by	 several	
identifiable	 factors,	 causing	 and	 shaping	 the	 process	 of	 atomisation.	 Causes	 that	
increased	the	likelihood	of	farmers	to	break	away	from	their	network	were	identified	
as	 push	 factors.	 These	 include:	 the	 lack	 of	 payment,	 mismanagement	 of	 resources,	
poor	 communication,	 intra‐group	 conflicts,	 manipulation,	 the	 expansion	 of	 villages,	
and	 imitation.	 These	 push	 factors	 can	 be	 grouped	 into	 internal	 and	 external	 ones.	
Internal	push	 factors	 are	 those	 related	 to	network	management	 (the	 first	 four	push	
factors);	external	push	factors	are	those	that	originated	from	outside‐network	actors	
(the	 last	 three	 push	 factors).	 From	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 first	 breakaway	 network	
onwards,	 farmers	had	been	offered	more	networking	options.	They	could	either	 join	
operating	networks,	create	new	networks,	or	stay	in	the	remnant	ones.	The	following	
sections	provide	an	overview	of	these	preliminary	conclusions	and	the	corresponding	
hypotheses.	
Push	 factors.	Delays	 in	payment	 for	cotton	yields	often	 lasted	 longer	 than	expected	
and	often	resulted	in	lack	of	payment,	which	pushed	farmers	to	leave	their	networks	
in	 search	of	a	better	managed	one.	Therefore,	 the	 lack	of	payment	should	positively	
influence	 the	 probability	 of	 breaking	 away,	 given	 that	 earning	 income	 is	 the	 main	
purpose	 of	 cotton	 production.	Mismanagement	 and	 unsettled	 conflicts	 can	 result	 in	
selfish	 and	 opportunistic	 behaviour.	 Indeed,	 the	 mismanagement	 of	 network	
resources	(both	inputs	and	financial	outcomes)	led	to	distrust	and	probably	increased	
the	likelihood	of	opportunistic	behaviour	(see	Svendsen	and	Svendsen,	2004:28).	The	
more	 resources	 were	 mismanaged,	 the	 more	 network	 members	 would	 have	 been	
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inclined	to	break	the	rules	as	a	counter‐reaction.	Therefore,	mismanagement	can	also	
be	expected	to	be	positively	correlated	with	breaking	away.	Also,	intra‐group	conflicts	
should	 positively	 affect	 breaking	 away.	 Finally,	 good	 communication	 is	 another	
important	 internal	 factor	 that	 would	 make	 members	 more	 collaborative	 and	 the	
network	more	cohesive.	Close	communication	within	a	network	allows	enforcement	
of	 sanctions	 against	 individuals	 who	 violate	 shared	 beliefs	 or	 norms	 of	 behaviour	
(Burt,	2000:374).	The	extent	to	which	network	leaders	communicated	with	grassroots	
farmers	indicated	the	quality	of	their	management	and	would	have	made	the	network	
tighter	 and	more	 successful.	 Oh	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 correlated	 the	 overall	 effectiveness	 of	
groups	 with	 leaders'	 ability	 to	 connect	 to	 various	 sub‐groups.	 Additionally,	 good	
communication	would	enhance	the	accountability	of	 leaders	and	the	control	exerted	
by	 their	 constituents.	 It	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 "organisations	 that	 are	 more	
member‐accountable	are	likely	to	deliver	greater	economic	and	social	benefits	to	their	
members"	(Smith‐Sreen,	1996).		
The	 liberalisation	of	 the	 cotton	 sector	brought	progressively	 together	private	actors	
(inputs	 suppliers	 and	cotton	ginners).	These	private	operators	vied	 for	 the	 farmers’	
favour	 for	different	purposes.	For	example,	 inputs	suppliers	permanently	sought	 for	
contracts	 to	 supply	 inputs	 to	networks,	while	 cotton	ginners	 looked	 for	 agreements	
with	 networks	 in	 order	 to	 be	 supplied	 with	 the	 cotton	 they	 produced.	 This	
competition	 inflated	 unfair	 behaviour,	 such	 as	 manipulation,	 which	 is	 expected	 to	
positively	 influence	 breaking	 away.	 With	 the	 multiplication	 of	 internal	 problems,	
grassroots	 farmers	 in	 search	 of	 information	 from	 other	 groups	 and	 networks	
communicated	through	formal	and	informal	networks.	Farmers	from	different	villages	
and	different	networks	would	have	shared	information	and	learnt	how	the	other	dealt	
with	 similar	 problems.	 Theories	 on	 farmers’	 behaviour	 such	 as	 adoption	 of	 agri‐
cultural	technologies	have	contended	that	contact	is	critical	in	the	process	of	adoption,	
given	 the	 human	 tendency	 to	 imitate	 fellows	 (Rogers,	 1995).	 Therefore,	 imitation	
should	positively	affect	breaking	away.		
In	short,	while	both	internal	and	external	push	factors	can	be	expected	to	be	positively	
correlated	with	breaking,	with	regard	to	network	cohesion	in	general	and	the	farmer’s	
well‐being	in	particular		the	internal	factors	may	be	assumed	to	be	more	harmful	than	
the	 external	 ones.	 Hence,	 when	 asked	 to	 rank	 the	 push	 factors	 according	 to  their	
importance	for	breaking	away,	it	seems	probable	that	farmers	will	rank	internal	push	
factors	higher	 than	external	ones.	Based	on	 this	 logic,	 and	granted	 that	 the	 farmers’	
socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 backgrounds	 may	 also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	
relative	assessment	of	the	push	factors,	it	seems	likely	that:	
Hypothesis	1.	Farmers	rank	internal	push	factors	for	breaking	away	higher	than	
external	push	factors.	
It	 will	 further	 be	 inquired	 whether	 stayers,	 joiners	 and	 breakers	 (see	 section	 3.1)	
ranked	these	factors	in	a	different	way.	
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Pull	factors.	Comparable	to	the	decision	to	break	or	not,	three	alternative	options	of	
choice	 corresponded	 to	 different	 motives	 identified	 as	 pull	 factors:	 staying	 in	 the	
remnant	 network,	 joining	 another	 existing	 (operating)	 network,	 or	 creating	 a	 new	
network.	 The	 pull	 factors	 were	 defined	 as	 the	 motives	 for	 joining	 other	 networks.	
These	 factors	 include:	payment	on	 time,	 the	 facility	of	 getting	 inputs,	 trust	 in	board	
members,	the	size	of	network,	the	hope	for	board	positions,	the	expectation	of	profit,	
kinship,	and	 the	 taste	 for	novelty.	Within	 the	pull	 factors,	network	efficiency	 factors	
can	be	distinguished	from	personal	aspiration	factors.		
Timely	 payment	 of	 network	 members,	 as	 opposed	 to	 lack	 of	 payment	 that	 push	
farmers	 to	 break	 away,	 would	 pull	 farmers	 towards	 better	 managed	 networks.	
Payment	on	time	is	expected	to	be	positively	correlated	with	atomisation	of	networks	
and	 to	 be	 ranked	 higher	 by	 joiners	 than	 by	 stayers	 and	 creators.	 Like	 the	 financial	
outcomes,	 the	question	of	 inputs	 supply	has	 remained	 central	 to	 cotton	production.	
Input	supply	was	also	crucial	to	food	crops,	to	which	an	important	part	was	diverted.	
Therefore,	 inputs	 facilitation	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 positively	 correlated	 with	 networks	
atomisation,	and	to	be	ranked	higher	by	joiners	and	stayers	than	by	creators.	
Meeting	 the	 two	 criteria	 above	 (payment	 on	 time,	 getting	 inputs)	 that	 constituted	
farmers’	overriding	concerns	attests	to	the	network	effectiveness	and	was	expected	to	
increase	 the	 trust	 in	 its	board	members.	Trust	 serves	as	a	 lubricant	 for	 cooperation	
(Misztal,	1996).	With	 the	prevalence	of	mismanagement‐related	conflicts	within	and	
between	networks	that	had	increased	distrust,	trust	in	cotton	board	members	would	
increase	 from	 incentives	 such	 as	 effective	 supply	 of	 inputs.	 Trust	 would	 be	 ranked	
higher	by	joiners	and	creators	than	by	stayers	and	positively	affects	the	atomisation	of	
networks.	
Personal	aspiration	 factors	are	assumed	to	positively	affect	 the	 likelihood	that	more	
networks	 emerge.	 To	 get	 a	 leadership	position	 (hope	 for	 board	positions)	 and	 earn	
more	than	income	from	own	production,	farmers	tended	to	engage	in	creating	break‐
away	networks.	Therefore,	the	expectation	of	profit	and	the	hope	of	occupying	a	board	
position	 should	be	 ranked	higher	by	 creators	 than	by	 stayers	 and	 joiners.	Also,	 it	 is	
expected	that	in	situation	of	no	or	little	available	information,	farmers	would	prefer	to	
join	networks	where	they	knew	people	whom	they	could	trust,	such	as	kin.	
Both	 network	 efficiency‐related	 factors	 and	 personal	 aspiration	 ones	 are	 likely	 to	
affect	positively	the	atomisation	by	increasing	the	number	of	networks.	The	likelihood	
of	 staying	 within	 a	 network,	 joining	 another	 one	 or	 creating	 a	 new	 network	 is	
expected	 to	be	 affected	by	 a	 farmer’s	 perception	of	 these	pull	 factors.	 Farmers	who	
perceive	some	efficiency	in	an	existing	network	would	join	it,	while	those	with	higher	
personal	aspirations	would	decide	to	create	a	new	network.	Others	would	choose	to	
keep	the	status	quo	by	staying	in	their	original	networks.	For	 instance,	while	 joiners	
(and	stayers)	may	value	network	efficiency,	creators	may	assign	more	importance	to	
personal	 aspiration	 (e.g.	 making	 more	 profit,	 becoming	 a	 leader)	 than	 to	 network	
CHAPTER	3	
	
64	
	
efficiency.	 Due	 to	 the	 membership	 contest	 after	 the	 emergence	 of	 breakaway	 net‐
works,	 leaders	 tried	 to	 increase	 the	 efficiency	 of	 their	 networks.	 However,	 due	 to	
creators’	 tendency	 to	 selfishness,	 leaders	 in	 general	 face	a	 common	dilemma,	which	
leads	us	to	the	following	set	of	hypotheses:	
Hypothesis	 2a.	 Farmers	 rank	 network	 efficiency	 factors	 higher	 than	 personal	
aspiration	factors.	
Hypothesis	 2b.	 Controlled	 for	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 back‐
ground,	 creators	 assign	 higher	 importance	 to	 personal	 aspiration	 factors	 than	
stayers	and	joiners.		
In	 sum,	 personal	 aspiration	 factors	 should	 motivate	 breakers	 to	 create	 "their	 own	
networks"	rather	than	join	existing	networks.	
Social	 ties	 and	 cotton	 networking.	 Creating	 a	 breakaway	 network	 is	 a	 joint	
endeavour,	the	completion	of	which	requires	the	use	of	social	relations	to	extend	the	
network.	 The	 stiff	 competition	 between	 breakaway	 networks	 also	 demanded	 the	
support	of	existing	social	ties	to	make	new	networks	successful.	Ties	in	an	individual’s	
social	 network	 are	 believed	 to	 be	 of	 great	 benefit	 for	 successful	 networking	
(Granovetter,	 1973).	 Leaders	would	 resort	 to	kin,	 friends,	 fellow	 farmers,	 and	other	
members	 of	 their	 social	 networks	 to	 enlarge	 their	 cotton	networks	 and	make	 these	
prosperous.		
Social	 ties	 are	 thus	 expected	 to	 act	 as	 pull	 factors	 as	 well,	 by	 providing	 relational	
support	 for	 joining	 or	 creating	 new	 networks.	 These	 social	 ties	 can	 be	 based	 on	
friendship,	 kinship,	 ethnicity	 and	 religion,	 called	 “strong	 ties”,	 or	 can	 encompass	
cotton	professionals,	public	officials,	and	politicians,	which	are	called	“weak	ties”.	All	
these	 ties	 contain	 social	 resources	 that	 correspond	 to	 what	 Wellman	 and	 Kenneth	
(2001:233)	termed	the	network	capital.	According	to	Plickert	et	al.	(2007:408‐9),	"kin	
are	 [...]	 the	 most	 likely	 network	 members	 to	 be	 densely	 interconnected,	 fostering	
communication	about	the	needs	and	norms	of	providing	help."		
Weak	ties	have	a	greater	contribution	in	extending	networks	than	strong	ties,	because	
they	bridge	actors	to	others	located	in	different	social	networks	(Granovetter,	1983).	
During	the	cotton	boom,	cotton	production	and	farmer	networks	had	become	political	
instruments	that	many	political	leaders	sought	to	control.	Thus,	political	groups	were	
obviously	important	sources	of	support	that	would	increase	the	creators’	efficiency	in	
the	 process.	 Similarly,	 political	 leaders,	 professionals	 of	 cotton	 (private	 inputs	
suppliers	 and	 ginners	 and	 executives	 of	 the  State	 cotton	 company)	 played	 an	
important	role	too.	Cotton	network	leaders	needed	to	interact	with	these	actors	given	
that	 cotton	 production	 depends	 on	 the	 inputs	 being	 supplied.	 In	 return,	 cotton	
professionals	had	a	great	stake	in	supporting	breakaway	leaders	in	creating	networks	
as	a	strategy	to	secure	their	activities.		
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Though	both	types	of	ties	are	important	for	networking,	it	is	speculated	that:	
Hypothesis	3a.	Cotton	farmers	rank	the	importance	of	the	support	of	weak	ties	
higher	than	the	support	of	strong	ties.	
If	weak	ties	are	expected	to	provide	farmers	with	critical	support	for	the	creation	of	
breakaway	 networks,	 their	 bridging	 to	 new	 members	 will	 be	 positively	 correlated	
with	atomisation.	Therefore,	
Hypothesis	 3b.	 Controlled	 for	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 back‐
ground,	creators	rank	the	importance	of	support	of	weak	ties	higher	than	stayers	
and	joiners.	
Similar	to	the	creation	of	networks,	accessing	leadership	positions	in	cotton	networks	
requires	 the	mobilisation	 of	 resources	 embedded	 in	 an	 individual’s	 social	 network.	
Indeed,	cotton	networks	have	been	the	 largest	type	of	networks	of	 their	 type	within	
the	 cotton‐producing	 villages	 and	 they	 encompass	 members	 of	 many	 other	 social	
networks.	Resorting	to	real	social	networks	would	increase	the	likelihood	of	getting	a	
leadership	position	on	cotton	boards,	either	by	election	or	by	unanimous	designation.	
According	to	Lin	(2001),	actors	in	possession	of	valued	resources	are	more	likely	to	be	
involved	 in	 decisions‐making	 processes.	 In	 addition,	 the	 "selection	 of	 occupants	 [of	
positions	 in	hierarchical	 structures]	 favours	 those	who	are	socialized	and	 trained	 to	
carry	out	[the]	rules	and	procedures"	(Lin,	2001:34).	Consequently,	the	membership	
of	associations	other	than	cotton	would	distinguish	leaders	from	grassroots	farmers.	
The	 escalation	 of	 leadership	 conflicts	 in	 cotton	 networks	 led	 to	 never‐ending	 plots	
between	 leaders	to	overthrow	one	another.	Some	succeeded	in	holding	their	 leader‐
ship	positions	longer	than	others,	either	within	the	same	network	or	in	new	networks	
they	 helped	 to	 create.	 All	 other	 things	 remaining	 equal,	 this	 difference	 between	
leaders	may	result	 from	resources	embedded	in	their	social	networks.	Indeed,	social	
networks	 are	 potential	 sources	 of	 social	 capital,	 and	 resources	 facilitating	 action	
(Adler	and	Kwon,	2000).	Leaders’	status	in	their	social	networks	and	their	degree	of	
responsibilities	would	accrue	to	their	stock	of	social	capital	and	help	them	hold	on	to	
their	 leadership	 positions	 on	 cotton	 boards.	 The	 number	 of	 positions	 occupied	 and	
that	 of	 the	 social	 networks	would	 have	 a	 cumulative	 effect	 on	 the	 leaders’	 stock	 of	
social	 capital,	 defined	 by	 Burt	 (2005:4)	 as	 "the	 advantage	 created	 by	 a	 person’s	
location	in	a	structure	of	relationships."	This	brings	us	to	the	last	set	of	hypotheses:		
Hypothesis	4a.	The	larger	the	number	of	social	networks	a	farmer	is	involved	in,	
the	more	likely	s/he	is	to	be	a	leader.	
Hypothesis	4b.	The	greater	a	 leader’s	 stock	of	 social	 capital,	 the	 longer	 s/he	 is	
appointed	at	board	positions.	
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3.5	 Findings	from	the	quantitative	research		
3.5.1		 Operationalization	of	concepts	
This	section	discusses	the	quantitative	operationalization	of	the	hypotheses	proposed	
in	Section	3.4.4.	These	hypotheses	were	tested	through	a	range	of	statistical	analyses	
applied	 to	 the	quantitative	data	using	SPSS.	For	 that	purpose,	a	number	of	variables	
were	constructed	and	combined	with	farmers’	socio‐economic	and	socio‐demographic	
background	data	to	understand	the	process	of	atomisation.	The	emergence	of	break‐
away	networks	was	pivotal	to	all	the	instruments	used	throughout	the	process	of	data	
collection.	The	push	and	pull	factors	were		
Definition	 of	 atomisation.	 The	 process	 of	 atomisation	 consists	 of	 a	 sequence	 of	
decisions	 made	 by	 farmers	 in	 their	 networking	 trajectory	 with	 regard	 to	 their	
membership	 of	 cotton	 networks.	 The	 first	 decision	 of	 farmers	 regarded	 leaving	 or	
staying	 in	 a	 network.	 Correspondingly,	 a	 dependent	 variable	 called	 BREAK	 was	
constructed	taking	the	values	 ‘0’	 for	farmers	who	have	belonged	to	a	single	network	
during	their	entire	cotton	network	life	(stayers),	and	‘1’	when	they	broke	away	from	
their	original	network	at	least	once	during	their	cotton	career	(breakers).	
A	 second	 decision	 of	 farmers	 related	 to	 their	 choice	 to	 either	 join	 another	 existing	
network	 or	 (help)	 create	 a	 ‘breakaway’	 network.	 Ultimately,	 the	 process	 of	 atom‐
isation	of	cotton	networks	resulted	in	three	statuses.		The	derived	dependent	variable	
measures	the	likelihood	that	farmers’	choices	increase	the	number	of	networks,	either	
by	 staying	 into	 remnant	networks,	 by	 joining	existing	networks,	 or	by	 creating	new	
networks.	It	is	named	ATOMISE	and	has	three	values:	‘0’	for	stayers,	‘1’	for	joiners,	and	
‘2’	for	creators.	The	push	and	pull	factors	interacted	with	farmers’	socio‐economic	and	
socio‐demographic	 backgrounds	 to	 shape	 this	 process	 of	 atomisation.	 Farmers’	
perception	of	the	effects	of	push	and	pull	factors	was	measured	by	ranking	them	from	
most	to	least	important.	The	factors	were	ranked	from	1	(most	important)	to	7	(least	
important).	In	case	farmers	could	not	decide	on	the	relative	importance	of	two	causes,	
these	causes	may	occupy	the	same	rank	(ex	aequo).	
A	 third	decision	of	 farmers	 regarded	 their	 ambition	 to	obtain	 a	 leadership	position,	
which	went	along	with	 the	process	of	atomisation.	This	decision	 led	 to	a	dependent	
variable	called	LEADSTAT	about	farmers’	leadership	status,	assigning	the	values	‘0’	for	
farmers	who	had	never	been	appointed	as	board	members	and	‘1’	otherwise.		
Operationalization	 of	 the	 research	 hypotheses.	 The	 hypotheses	 formulated	 in	
Section	3.4.4	were	 tested	as	 follows.	For	hypotheses	1,	2a	and	3a,	 the	mean	of	 each	
push	and	pull	 factor	and	of	each	source	of	support	was	calculated.	The	 factors	were	
then	ranked	according	to	their	respective	mean	for	a	paired‐t‐test.	
To	further	hypothesis	1	and	check	for	differences	between	the	three‐level	outcomes	of	
the	 atomisation,	 an	 analysis	 of	 variance	was	performed.	The	difference	of	 the	mean	
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ranks	 of	 push	 factors	 between	 stayers	 (ܯ௜=0),	 joiners  (ܯ௜=1),	 and	 creators	 (ܯ௜=2)	
regarding	 the	 pth	 ranked	 internal	 cause	 ܴܫܥ௣	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 simple	 linear	
regression:	
	 	 	 ܴܫܥ௜௣ ൌ ܥ௣ ൅ ܯ௜ߤ௣ ൅ ߝ௜௣,	 	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
where	ܥ௣	refers	to	the	model	constant	(in	this	operationalization,	 the	mean	rank	for	
cause	p);	ܯ௜	denotes	the	atomisation	status;	and	ߝ௜	is	an	unexplained	error	term.	The	
hypothesis	is	(partly)	verified	when	differences	exist	between	the	three	categories	for	
at	 least	 one	 internal	 cause.	 However,	 it	 is	 still	 possible	 that	 socio‐economic	 and	
demographic	 backgrounds	 are	 the	 main	 drivers	 for	 ranking	 the	 causes.	 Therefore,	
observed	differences	between	stayers,	joiners	and	creators	may	be	caused	by	different	
backgrounds	 of	 the	 actors	 in	 these	 categories.	 In	 the	 multiple	 regression	 analysis	
performed,	possible	differences	between	stayers,	joiners	and	creators	were	controlled	
for	socio‐demographic	(SD)	and	socio‐economic	(SE)	background:	
	 	 	 ܴܫܥ௜௣ ൌ ܥ௣ ൅ ∑ܵܦ௜ߚ௣ ൅∑ܵܧ௜ߛ௣ ൅ ܯ௜ߤ௣ ൅ ߝ௜௣,	 	 	 (2)	
Hypothesis	 1	 is	 confirmed	when	 at	 least	 one	 ߤ௣	 differs	 from	 zero.	 Incidentally,	 this	
linear	model	is	equivalent	to	an	ANCOVA	(Neter	et	al.,	1996:	663).	
To	test	the	hypotheses	2b	and	3b	the	same	procedure	of	following	up	was	used	as	for	
hypothesis	 1.	 An	 analysis	 of	 variance	 comparing	 the	mean	 ranks	 of	 the	 pull	 factors	
into	 atomisation	 and	 those	 of	 the	 sources	 of	 support	 between	 the	 three‐level	
outcomes	of	atomisation	was	first	performed.	An	analysis	of	co‐variance	followed	suit	
to	deepen	 the	 test	 of	 the	hypotheses,	 checking	whether	 the	mean	 ranks	of	personal	
aspiration	 factors	 and	 the	 importance	 assigned	 to	 perceived	 strong	 ties	 by	 creators	
resulted	from	their	status	only,	or	were	influenced	by	their	socio‐economic	and	socio‐
demographic	backgrounds.	
Hypothesis	4a	was	tested	through	an	analysis	of	covariance	contrasting	leaders	with	
grassroots	 farmers	regarding	 the	number	of	 social	networks	 they	were	members	of,	
and	 correcting	 for	an	extraneous	 influence	of	 their	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demo‐
graphic	backgrounds.	
Finally,	a	linear	regression	was	used	to	test	for	the	relation	between	the	leaders’	stock	
of	social	capital	and	the	duration	of	their	appointment	on	cotton	boards	(hypothesis	
4b).	The	total	duration	at	leadership	positions	ሺܱܻܶܶܧܣܴሻ	of	a	farmer	݅	is	a	function	
of	his/her	stock	of	social	capital	and	the	combination	of	his/her	socio‐economic	and	
socio‐demographic	backgrounds.	The	function	has	the	following	form:	
	 	 	 ݂ሺܱܻܶܶܧܣܴ௜௣ሻ ൌ ܥ௣ ൅ ∑ܵܦ௜ߚ௣ ൅∑ܵܧ௜ߛ௣ ൅ ܵܥ௜ߤ௣ ൅ ߝ௜௣,	 (3)	
where	 ܵܥ	 represents	 the	 stock	 of	 social	 capital,	 which	 is	 the	 combination	 of	 the	
number	of	social	networks	of	which	the	farmer	was	a	member	with	the	positions	s/he	
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occupied	 in	 these	social	networks.	Hypothesis	4b	 is	 confirmed	when	at	 least	one	ߤ௣	
differs	from	zero.	
3.5.2	 	Empirical	results	of	the	survey	
Description	 of	 the	 sample	 in	 term	 of	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	
backgrounds.	 In	 total,	 148	 cotton	 farmers	 from	 nine	 networks	 were	 interviewed,	
comprising	24	women	and	124	men.	With	regard	to	breaking,	the	sample	counted	36	
stayers	 and	 112	 breakers.	 Tables	 3.2a	 and	 3.2b	 present	 the	 socio‐demographic	 and	
socio‐economic	 characteristics	 of	 the	 sample.	 Table	 3.2a	 is	 a	 cross	 tabulation	 of	
farmers’	level	of	education	and	age	(in	groups	of	10	years)	by	gender,	while	Table	3.2b	
presents	the	farmers’	profile	with	regard	to	the	household	features:	size,	the	number	
of	 workers,	 the	 experience	 in	 cotton	 production,	 the	 share	 of	 cotton	 income	 in	 the	
total	agricultural	income,	etcetera.	
Table	3.2a		 Cross	tabulation	of	farmers’	level	of	education	by	age	by	gender	
	
Table	3.2b		 Characteristics	of	the	sample	(metric	variables)	
	 Household	
size		
Number	of	
workers	
Cotton	
experience	
Share	of	cotton	
income	(2005‐
2010)	
Average	cotton	
area	(2005‐2010)
N	 147	 147	 148	 133	 147	
Mean	 16.35	 10.27	 20.16	 45.15	 2.60	
SD	 11.37	 8.77	 10.29	 26.53	 2.52	
Median	 14.00	 8.00	 20.00	 46	 2.00	
Mode	 14	 3.50	 20	 .00	 .00	
Min.	 1	 1	 0	 .00	 .00	
Max.	 100	 83.5	 46	 1.00	 14.80	
Source	(both	tables):	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
	 	
Gender		 Level	of	education	 Age	groups	(in	10‐year	increment	) Total	<30	 30–40	 40–50 50–60 >60	
Female	
No	education	 1	 8 9 2 0	 20	
Primary		 0	 0 0 0 1	 1	
Secondary	&	more	 0	 2 0 1 0	 3	
Total	 1	 10	 9	 3	 1	 24	
Male	
No	education	 5	 14 17 18 9	 63	
Primary		 3	 9	 1	 11	 2	 26	
Secondary	&	more		 2	 8 14 7 4	 35	
Total	 10	 31 32 36 15	 124	
Total	
No	education	 6	 22 26 20 9	 83	
Primary		 3	 9 1 11 3	 27	
Secondary	&	more		 2	 10 14 8 4	 38	
Total	 11	 41 41 39 16	 148	
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More	 than	50	per	 cent	 of	 farmers	 in	 the	 sample	 has	 no	 formal	 education.	 Educated	
women	represent	only	17	per	cent	of	their	category,	while	for	men	the	ratio	educated	
to	 non‐educated	 is	 about	 1.	 Hence,	 male	 cotton	 farmers	 are	 significantly	 more	
educated	than	their	female	counterparts.	About	80	per	cent	of	the	farmers	are	in	the	
ages	of	40	to	50	years	old,	while	50	per	cent	of	 the	women	is	under	40.The	average	
household	size	 is	16.35,	with	an	average	of	11	workers	per	household	 in	male	adult	
equivalents.	Farmers’	experience	in	cotton	production	ranges	from	0	to	46	years,	with	
a	mean	of	20	years	and	a	standard	deviation	of	10.	The	income	generated	by	cotton	
during	the	five	years	prior	to	the	survey	(2005‐2010)	was	on	average	45	per	cent	of	
the	agricultural	 income,	while	agriculture	 is	 the	main	occupation	and	often	 the	only	
source	 of	 income	 in	 the	 area.	 For	 the	 same	period	 (2005‐2010),	 the	 average	 cotton	
plot	 extended	 from	 0	 ha	 to	 about	 15	 ha	with	 a	mean	 of	 2.6	 ha.	 The	minimum	 of	 0	
represents	those	who	abandoned	the	production	permanently	or	temporarily.	
The	 process	 of	 atomisation	 resulted	 in	 about	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 stayers,	 51	 per	 cent	 of	
joiners,	and	about	28	per	cent	of	creators	(Table	3.3).	
The	results	indicate	a	significant	association	between	leadership	status	and	the	three	
atomisation	 statuses	 (χ2(1)	 =	 42.32,	 p	 <	 .001).	 About	 58	 per	 cent	 of	 stayers	 in	 the	
sample	 are	 grassroots	 farmers	 against	 42	 per	 cent	 of	 leaders,	 while	 40	 per	 cent	 of	
breakers	are	grassroots	farmers	against	60	per	cent	of	leaders.	
Push	 factors.	The	means	of	 the	push	factors	 for	atomisation	pointed	out	 the	 lack	of	
payment	(M	=	2.4,	SD	=	1.68)	as	the	first	push	factor,	followed	by	mismanagement	of	
resources	(M	=	2.8,	SD	=	1.67).	The	lack	of	communication	(M	=	3.5,	SD	=	1.63),	intra‐
group	conflicts	(M	=	3.9,	SD	=	1.68),	and	manipulation	(M	=	4.3,	SD	=	1.89)	rank	third,	
fourth,	and	fifth,	respectively.	Expansion	of	villages	(M	=	5.5,	SD	=	1.62)	and	imitation	
(M	=	5.6,	SD	=	1.36)	occupy	the	last	ranks.		
Table	3.3		 Farmer's	leadership	status	by	status	in	atomisation	
Status	in	
breaking	
away	networks	
	Leadership	status	
Atomisation
Total	 Chi‐sq	Stayers Joiners	 Creators	
Stayers	
Grassroots	farmers 18	 3	 0	 21	 χ(1)	=	3.29	
p	=	.141	Leaders 12	 1	 2	 15	Total 30	 4	 2	 36	
Breakers	
Grassroots	farmers 0	 44	 1	 45	 χ(1)	=	36.57
	p	<	.001	Leaders 0	 28	 39	 67	Total 0	 72	 40	 112	
Total	
Grassroots	farmers 18	 47	 1	 66	 χ(1)	=	42.32
p	<	.001	Leaders 12	 29	 41	 82	Total 30	 76	 42	 148	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
CHAPTER	3	
	
70	
	
The	pairwise	comparisons	of	the	push	factors	(Table	3.4)	show	significant	differences	
between	 lack	 of	 payment	 and	 mismanagement	 of	 resources	 (p	 <	 .05).	 Significant	
differences	 also	 exist	 between	 mismanagement	 of	 resources	 and	 lack	 of	
communication	(p	<	.01),	and	between	manipulation,	and	the	expansion	of	villages	(p	
<	.001).	These	results	provide	enough	evidence	to	confirm	hypothesis	1.		
Table	3.4		 Paired	differences	of	means	ranks	of	perceived	push	factors	for	
atomisation	
Pair	push	factors	 M	(SD)	 t	 Diagnos‐tic
Lack	of	payment	‐	Mismanagement	of	resources		 ‐.42	(2.40)	 ‐2.09*	 Different	
Mismanagement	of	resources	‐	Lack	of	communication	 ‐.69	(2.55)	 ‐3.25**	 Different	
Lack	of	communication	‐	Intra‐group	conflicts		 ‐.33	(2.50)	 ‐1.57	 Ex	aequo	
Intra‐group	conflicts	–	Manipulation	 ‐.44	(2.79)	 ‐1.89	 Ex	aequo	
Manipulation	‐	Expansion	of	villages		 ‐1.21	(2.75) ‐5.26***	 Different	
Expansion	of	villages	‐	Imitation		 ‐.13	(2.3)	 ‐.65	 Ex	aequo	
*	=	p	<	.05,	**	=	p	<	.01,	***	=	p	<	.001	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
The	analysis	of	variance	(ANOVA)	of	the	mean	ranks	of	the	perceived	push	factors	for	
atomisation	(Hypothesis	1)	reveals	in	Table	3.5	that	only	mismanagement	(an	internal	
cause)	has	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	the	outcome	of	atomisation	(p	<.05).	
Table	3.5		 Mean	ranks	of	perceived	push	factors	for	atomisation	
	
Lack	of	
payment
Mis‐
manage‐
ment	
Lack	of	
communi‐
cation	
Intra‐
group	
conflicts
Manipu‐
lation	
Expan‐
sion	of	
villages	
Imitation	
Stayers(N=27)	 2.6	 3.3		 3.1	 3.9	 3.7	 5.8	 5.6	
Joiners(N=75)	 2.2	 2.9	 3.7	 3.9	 4.3	 5.2	 5.7	
Creators(N=41)	 2.7	 2.3	 3.5	 3.7	 4.6	 5.8	 5.5	
Overall(N=143)	 2.4	 2.8	 3.5	 3.8	 4.3	 5.5	 5.6	
F(2,142)	 1.77	 2.99	 1.31	 0.36	 1.82	 2.01	 0.42	
Significance	 ns	 p	<	.05	 Ns	 ns	 ns	 ns	 ns	
Correc‐
ted	
F(7,	135)	 1.19	 0.95	 0.95	 0.65	 2.35	 0.79	 1.79	
Sig.	 ns	 ns	 Ns	 ns	 p	<	.05	 ns	 ns	
Note:	ns	=	not	significant.	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
Controlling	possible	observed	differences	for	socio‐demographic	and	socio‐economic	
factors,	 the	 corrected	 model	 shows	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 three	
categories	of	farmers	only	with	regard	to	manipulation	(p	<	.05),	which	is	an	external	
push	factor	for	atomisation.		
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Pull	factors.	The	first	pull	factor	for	atomisation	is	related	to	payment,	similarly	as	for	
push	 factors.	 Payment	 on	 time	 (M	 =	 1.6,	 SD	 =	 1.04)	was	 followed	 by	 the	 facility	 of	
getting	inputs	(M	=	3.3,	SD	=	1.55)	ranking	second,	and	by	trust	in	board	members	(M	
=	3.7,	SD	=	2.01)	at	 the	third	position.	On	average,	kinship	was	classified	 fourth	pull	
factor	(M	=	4.8,	SD	=	2.04),	and	the	hope	for	board	positions	fifth	(M	=	5.2,	SD	=	2.14).	
The	factors	that	appeared	as	the	 least	 important	ones	were	the	expectation	of	profit	
(M=	5.4,	SD	=	1.73)	ranking	sixth,	 the	size	of	networks	(M	=	5.9,	SD	=	1.68)	ranking	
seventh,	and	finally	the	taste	for	novelty	(M	=	6.2,	SD	=	1.8).	
The	pairwise	comparisons	 indicated	significant	differences	between	 the	mean	ranks	
of	three	paired	pull	factors	(Table	3.6).		
The	 difference	 between	 the	 first	 two	 pull	 factors	 (payment	 on	 time	 and	 facility	 of	
getting	inputs)	is	highly	significant,	showing	farmers’	clear	preference	for	payment	on	
time.	 Highly	 significant	 differences	 also	 exist	 between	 trust	 in	 board	members	 and	
kinship.	A	border‐significant	difference	exists	between	expectation	of	profit	 and	 the	
size	of	networks	(p	<	 .05).	The	classification	above	and	the	pairwise	comparisons	of	
the	mean	ranks	confirm	hypothesis	2a.		
Table	3.6		 Paired	differences	of	means	ranks	of	perceived	pull	factors	for	
atomisation	
Paired	pull	factors	 M	(SD)	 t	 Diagnostic
Payment	on	time	−	Facility	of	getting	inputs		 ‐1.66	(2.00)	 ‐9.82***	 Different
Facility	of	getting	inputs	−	Trust	in	board	members	 ‐.40	(2.64)	 ‐1.80	 Ex	aequo
Trust	in	board	members	–	Kinship	 ‐1.18	(3.08)	 ‐4.52***	 Different
Kinship	−	Hope	for	board	positions	 ‐.33	(3.16)	 ‐1.23	 Ex	aequo
Hope	for	board	positions	−	Expectation	of	profit	 ‐.21	(3.02)	 ‐.82	 Ex	aequo
Expectation	of	profit	−	Size	of	networks	 ‐.53	(2.61)	 ‐2.41*	 Different
Size	of	networks	−	Taste	for	novelty	 ‐.26	(2.70)	 ‐1.129	 Ex	aequo
*	=	p	<	.05,	***	=	p	<	.001	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
The	means	of	 two	perceived	pull	 factors	 for	atomisation	were	significantly	different	
between	stayers,	joiners	and	creators	(Table	3.7).	
	
While	trust	in	board	members	(a	network	efficiency	factor)	was	differently	ranked	by	
the	 three	 categories	 of	 farmers	 (p	 <	 .05),	 the	 hope	 for	 board	 positions	 (a	 personal	
aspiration	 factor)	 was	 ranked	 higher	 by	 stayers	 than	 by	 joiners	 and	 creators	 who	
assigned	a	similar	rank	to	that	 factor	(p	<	 .05).	The	control	 for	observed	differences	
with	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 background	 confirms	 the	 difference	
about	trust	 in	board	members	(p	<	 .05).	The	control	reveals	an	additional	difference	
between	 stayers	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 joiners	 and	 creators	 on	 the	 other	 hand	with	
regard	to	the	expectation	of	profit	(p	<	.05).	Therefore,	hypothesis	2b	is	confirmed.		
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Table	3.7		 Mean	ranks	of	perceived	pull	factors	for	atomisation	
	
Pay‐
ment	
on	
time	
Facility	
of	
getting	
inputs	
Trust	in	
board	
members
Kin‐
ship	
Hope	for	
board	
positions	
Expectation	
of	profit	
Size	of	
networks	
Taste	
for	
novelty
Stayers	(26)	 1.5	 3.8	 4.8 4.7 3.8 5.2 6.3	 5.8	
Joiners	(75)	 1.6	 3.1	 3.7 4.7 5.5 5.4 5.7	 6.2	
Creators	(38)	 1.6	 3.2	 2.8 5.2 5.5 5.4 6.0	 6.3	
Overall	(139)	 1.6	 3.3	 3.7	 4.8 5.2	 5.4	 5.9	 6.2	
F(2,136)	 .18	 2.06	 8.13 .74 7.12 .12 1.31	 .71	
Significance	 Ns	 ns	 p<.001 Ns p<.001 ns ns	 ns	
Corrected		 F(7,122)	 1.01 1.44	 1.92 0.98 1.39 1.88 0.83	 1.03Sig.	 Ns	 ns	 p	<	.05	 Ns	 Ns	 p	<	.05	 ns	 ns	
Note:	ns	=	not	significant.	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.		
Table	3.8		 Paired	differences	of	the	mean	ranks	of	perceived	sources	of	support	for	
creating	networks	
Paired	sources	of	support	 M	(SD)	 T	 Diagnostic	
Professionals	of	cotton	–	Kinship	 ‐.25	(2.89)	 ‐1.00	 Ex	aequo	
Kinship	–	Friendship	 ‐.82	(2.22)	 ‐4.33***	 Different	
Friendship	–	Public	officials		 ‐.08	(3.04)	 ‐.31	 Ex	aequo	
Public	officials	–	Ethnicity	 .91	(2.91)	 ‐3.69***	 Different	
Ethnicity	−	Political	groups	 ‐.26	(2.84)	 ‐1.08	 Ex	aequo	
Political	groups	–	Religion	 ‐.13	(2.76)	 ‐0.56	 Ex	aequo	
***=	p	<	.001	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
Social	networks	of	 cotton	 farmers.	 The	 overall	 ranking	 of	 the	 social	 support	 ties	
yields	a	weak	tie	that	ranks	first.	Professionals	of	cotton	(inputs	suppliers	and	cotton	
ginners)	appear	to	be	the	most	important	sources	of	support	(M	=	2.7,	SD	=	1.70)	and	
kinship	(M	=	2.9,	SD	=	1.74)	as	the	second.	Friendship	(M	=	3.7,	SD	=	1.80)	and	public	
officials	(M	=	3.8,	SD	=	2.00)	are	classified	third	and	fourth,	respectively.	Religion	(M	=	
5.1,	SD	=	1.68)	 is	 ranked	 last,	preceded	by	political	groups	(M	=	5.0,	SD	=	1.95)	and	
ethnicity	 (M	=	4.7,	 SD	=	1.63)	 as,	 respectively,	 the	 fifth	 and	 sixth	 source	of	 support.	
However,	 the	 paired	 comparison	 reveals	 differences	 between	 only	 two	 pairs.	
Differences	 of	 the	mean	 ranks	 between	 kinship	 and	 friendship,	 and	 between	 public	
officials	and	ethnicity	are	highly	significant	(Table	3.8).	However,	the	overall	ranks	of	
weak	and	strong	ties	lead	to	rejection	of	hypothesis	3a.	
	
Significant	differences	between	stayers,	joiners	and	creators	were	found	for	the	mean	
ranks	of	three	perceived	source	of	support	(Table	3.9).		
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Table	3.9		 Mean	ranks	of	perceived	sources	of	support	for	creating	breakaway	networks
		
Cotton	
professionals		
Kinship	 Friend‐
ship		
Public	
officials	
Ethnicity		 Political	
groups		
Religious	
groups		
Stayers	(N=27)	 3.0	 3.1	 3.8	 4.4	 4.4	 4.4	 4.9	
Joiners	(N=73)	 2.8	 2.9	 3.9	 3.4	 5.1	 5.1	 4.9	
Creators	(N=38)	 2.3	 2.8	 3.4	 4.3	 4.3	 5.3	 5.7	
Overall	(N=138)	 2.7	 2.9	 3.7	 3.8	 4.7	 5.0	 5.1	
F(2,136‐141)	 1.54	 .23	 1.16	 4.38	 3.71	 1.92	 3.33	
Significance	 ns	 ns	 ns	 p	<	.05	 p	<	.05	 ns	 p	<	.05	
Corrected		 F(7,130)	 0.73	 0.69	 0.85	 2.31	 2.26	 0.97 1.76	Sig.	 ns	 ns	 ns	 p	<	.05	 p	<	.05	 ns	 ns	
Note:	ns	=	not	significant.	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
Joiners	 assign	 higher	 importance	 to	 public	 officials	 (a	 weak	 tie)	 than	 stayers	 and	
creators	(p	<	.05).	Also,	while	stayers	and	creators	rank	ethnicity	higher	than	joiners	
(p	<	.05),	stayers	and	joiners	rank	religion	higher	than	creators	(p	<	.05).	The	control	
of	 observed	 differences	 for	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 background	
confirms	the	differences	between	the	three	categories	for	the	public	officials	(p	<	.05)	
and	ethnicity	(p	<	.05).	Because	all	farmers	rank	professionals	(a	“weak	tie”)	highest,	
hypothesis	3b	is	rejected	by	these	data.	
	
To	test	hypothesis	4a,	a	2	(leadership)	×	2	(gender)	×	3	(education)	ANCOVA	design	
was	 performed	with	 the	membership	 of	 social	 networks	 as	 the	 dependent	 variable	
and	leadership,	gender	and	education	as	the	independent	variables	(Table	3.10).	The	
covariates	are	age,	 the	household	dependency	 ratio,	 the	 share	of	 cotton	 income,	 the	
extent	 of	 cotton	 production.	 The	 preliminary	 evaluation	 of	 the	 homogeneity	 of	
regression	slopes	indicates	a	non‐significant	relationship	between	the	covariates	and	
the	independent	variables	(p	=	.72).		
 
Leadership	is	significantly	associated	with	the	number	of	social	networks	farmers	are	
a	member	of	 (p	<	 .01,	 η2	 =	 .06),	 confirming	hypothesis	4a.	Planned	 contrast	 reveals	
that	being	a	leader	slightly	increases	the	number	of	networks	a	farmer	is	a	member	of,	
compared	to	being	a	grassroots	farmer	(p	<	 .05).	Also,	male	farmers	have	somewhat	
higher	membership	of	 social	 networks	 than	 female	 farmers	 (p	<	 .05),	 and	 a	 greater	
share	 of	 cotton	 income	 is	 associated	 with	more	membership	 of	 social	 networks	 (p	
<	.05).	
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Table	3.10		 Analysis	of	covariance	for	farmers’	membership	of	social	networks	by	
their	leadership	status	by	gender	and	education 
Parameters	 F	(1,110)	 B	(SE)	 t	 Partial	η2
Intercept	 6.39*	 1.85	(0.60)	 3.10**	 .06	
Age	 2.94	 0.01	(0.01)	 1.71	 .03	
Household	dependency	ratio	 2.63	 ‐0.29	(0.18)	 ‐1.62	 .02	
Share	of	cotton	income	(%)	 7.20**	 ‐0.97	(0.36)	 ‐2.68**	 .06	
Average	cotton	plot	(ha)	 0.54	 ‐0.02	(0.02)	 ‐0.73	 .01	
Leadership	Status	(0=Grassroots	Farmers) 7.28**	 ‐1.53	(0.69)	 ‐2.22*	 .06	
Gender	(0=Female)	 2.01	 1.59	(0.69)	 2.30*	 .02	
Education	(0=No	education)	 ‐0.29	 ‐0.65	(0.28)	 ‐2.36*	 .05	
Education	(1=Primary	school	level)	 	 0.11	(0.28)	 0.40	 .00	
Interaction	Leadership*Education	 2.24	 	 .04	
Corrected	Model:	R2	=	Square	=	.29,	Adjusted	R2	=	.20,	F(13,110)	=	3.38***,	η2	=	.29	
*	=	p	<	.05,	**	=	p	<	.01,	***	=	p	<	.001	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009‐2011.	
The	linear	regression	of	the	duration	of	appointment	at	leadership	positions	in	cotton	
boards	confirms	the	effect	of	social	networking	(Table	3.11,	Hypothesis	4b),	 thereby	
confirming	hypothesis	4b.	
Table	3.11		 Linear	Regression	of	determinants	of	the	duration	of	appointment	on	
boards	
Model	1	 Model	2	
	 B	(SE)	 T	 ß	 B	(SE)	 t	 	 ß	
Constant	 1.92	(4.63)	 0.42	 0.01	(4.49)	 0.00	 	
Secondary	level	and	more	 2.72	(1.18)	 2.31*	 0.35	 2.07	(1.15)	 1.79	 	 0.27	
Index	of	social	capital	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.52	(0.20)	 2.61*	 	 0.37	
N	=	71,	R2	=	.12,	ΔR2	=	.10,	F(8,62)	change	=	6.80,	*	=	p	<	.05,	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009‐2011.	
Farmers’	socio‐economic	and	socio‐demographic	backgrounds	were	again	controlled	
to	 test	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 social	 capital,	 which	was	 added	 in	 the	 second	model	 of	 the	
regression.	While	education	(above	the	primary	level)	is	border‐significant	in	the	first	
model,	 it	 is	not	 in	the	second	model.	The	stock	of	social	capital	has	a	significant	and	
positive	relationship	with	the	duration	of	appointment	on	boards.	The	R2‐change	of	10	
per	cent	attests	to	the	relatively	important	contribution	of	social	capital	to	the	model.	
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3.6	 Discussion	
When	 distinguishing	 farmers	 into	 breakers	 and	 stayers	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
grassroots	farmers	and	leaders	on	the	other	hand,	it	was	found	that	more	than	three	
quarters	 of	 cotton	 farmers	 broke	 away	 from	 their	 original	 network	 at	 least	 once	
during	 their	 cotton	 cropping	 career,	 either	 actively	 or	 passively.	 This	 implies	 that	 a	
large	proportion	of	cotton	farmers	in	the	cotton	belt	were	involved	in	the	process	of	
atomisation.	The	 results	 also	 show	 that	more	 than	one	 in	 two	 cotton	 farmers	had	a	
leadership	position	at,	at	least,	one	of	the	four	levels	of	cotton	networks.	It	can	then	be	
inferred	 that,	 as	a	 consequence	of	 the	atomisation	of	networks,	 leadership	positions	
are	well	distributed	and	that	many	farmers	were	able	to	get	such	positions.	However,	
leaders	of	cotton	networks	were	more	likely	to	break	away	than	grassroots	farmers.	
The	 results	 further	 tell	 us	 that	 the	 creators	 of	 new	 networks	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	
leaders	than	stayers	or	joiners.	The	aforementioned	results	confirm	that	by	breaking	
away,	farmers	increased	their	chances	of	getting	leadership	positions.		
The	 perceived	 push	 and	 pull	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	 dynamics	 of	 cotton	 farmers	
leaving	 from	 and	 joining	 networks	 are	 related	 not	 only	 to	 the	management	 of	 net‐
works,	but	also	to	social	ties.	The	importance	of	these	ties	is	strongly	supported	by	the	
results	from	the	qualitative	analysis.	The	quantitative	analysis,	however,	did	not	yield	
much	evidence	of	 a	 strong	 relationship	between	 the	process	of	 atomisation	and	 the	
perceived	push	and	pull	factors.	
3.6.1	 Push	factors		
The	 four	 sub‐groups	 of	 causes	 for	 breaking	 away	 as	 determined	 by	 the	 pairwise	
comparison	imply	a	varied	perception	of	the	push	factors	for	atomisation	by	farmers.	
Farmers	made	a	clear	difference	between	mismanagement	of	resources	and	the	 lack	
of	 payment.	 Earning	 income	 being	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	 growing	 cotton,	 lack	 of	
payment,	which	became	acute	as	internal	problems	escalated,	affected	farmers	more	
than	any	other	cause.	Lack	of	payment	pushed	them	to	break	away,	principally	when	it	
clearly	 resulted	 from	 mismanagement.	 Mismanagement	 of	 resources	 by	 leaders	
affected	both	the	inputs	used	for	cotton	production	and	the	income	derived	from	the	
produce.	 It	 increased	 free‐riding	behaviour	 from	grassroots	 farmers	who	sought	 for	
compensation.	In	the	end,	mismanagement	burdened	farmers	with	debts,	and	blocked	
their	 access	 to	 information.	 The	 lack	 of	 communication	 could	 be	 perceived	 in	 two	
ways:	first	as	a	strategy	of	covering	mismanagement	practices,	and	second	as	the	lack	
of	 consideration	 from	 leaders.	 The	 fact	 that	 lack	 of	 communication,	 intra‐group	
conflicts	and	manipulation	were	put	into	the	same	sub‐group	of	push	factors	implies	
that	 their	 effects	 are	 correlated	 and	 that	 one	 factor	 could	 result	 from	 the	 other.	
However,	manipulation	was	highly	 rated	by	 stayers,	who	accused	breakers	of	being	
manipulated	 by	 inputs	 suppliers.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 analyses	 of	 variance	 and	
covariance,	 however,	 attest	 that	 all	 these	 causes	 could	 affect	 farmers	 regardless	 of	
their	status	in	breaking	away	networks.	
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With	 regard	 to	 the	 overall	 ranking	 of	 the	 push	 factors,	 internal	 push	 factors	 for	
atomisation	appeared	to	be	more	important	 in	farmers’	decision	to	break	away	than	
external	 factors.	 Consequently,	 they	 have	 a	 negative	 relationship	 with	 staying	 into	
remnant	 networks.	 However,	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 ranks	 assigned	 to	 these	 push	
factors	with	 regard	 to	 the	 three‐level outcome	of	 atomisation	are	hardly	 significant,	
except	for	manipulation.	The	high	rank	assigned	to	this	factor	by	stayers	echoes	their	
argument	that	manipulation	by	outside	actors	plays	a	crucial	role	in	pushing	farmers	
to	 leave	their	networks.	The	 lack	of	significant	difference	of	 the	mean	ranks	of	push	
factors	between	stayers,	joiners	and	creators	means	that	the	outcome	of	atomisation	
did	 not	 depend	 on	 these	 factors,	which	may	 have	 affected	 all	 the	 farmers	 similarly.	
Indeed,	all	networks	comprised	the	three	categories	of	cotton	 farmers,	 including	the	
original	network	from	which	some	members	broke	away	before	they	came	back.	Thus,	
all	 networks	 were	 affected	 by	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 breaking	 away.	 The	 analysis	 of	
covariance	confirmed	this	lack	of	significant	difference	in	the	ranking	of	the	causes.	
3.6.2	 Pull	factors	
The	lack	of	any	significant	difference	between	stayers,	joiners	and	creators	regarding	
the	 mean	 rank	 of	 payment	 on	 time	 testifies	 to	 its	 similar	 importance	 to	 all	 these	
categories	 in	pulling	them	towards	other	networks.	Similarly	 to	the	pushing	 force	of	
lack	of	payment	in	the	process	of	breaking	from	a	network,	payment	on	time	exerted	a	
strong	 pulling	 effect	 on	 farmers.	 The	 facility	 of	 getting	 inputs	 and	 trust	 in	 board	
members	 formed	 a	 relevant	 sub‐group.	 Indeed,	 the	 inputs	 for	 cotton	 production	 as	
well	as	for	the	production	of	food	crops	are	of	critical	importance,	and	getting	inputs	
determines	 trust	 in	 board	members.	 Kinship,	 the	 hope	 for	 board	 positions,	 and	 the	
expectation	 of	 profit,	 which	 all	 belong	 to	 the	 same	 sub‐group	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
pairwise	 comparison,	 were	 rated	 lower	 than	 network	 efficiency	 factors.	 This	 result	
was	 confirmed	 by	 the	 overall	 ranking,	 which	 revealed	 that	 the	 three	 categories	 of	
farmers	 assigned	 a	 higher	 importance	 to	 network	 efficiency	 than	 to	 personal	
aspiration.	
Trust	in	board	members	was	the	most	significant	pull	factor,	of	which	the	mean	rank	
confirmed	the	difference	between	stayers,	joiners	and	creators	after	the	control.	Also,	
the	 hope	 for	 board	 positions	 and	 the	 expectation	 of	 profit	 showed	 a	 significant	
difference	between	stayers	who	ranked	them	higher	on	the	one	hand,	and	joiners	and	
creators	who	 ranked	 them	 lower	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 These	 relations	 suggest	 that	 i)	
creators	perceived	those	who	join	their	network	as	trusting	the	board	members,	and	
ii)	 stayers	perceived	 the	hope	 for	board	positions	 as	 an	 important	motive	 for	 those	
joining	 breakaway	 networks,	 which	 is	 an	 explanation	 of	 joiners’	 and	 creators’	
behaviour.		
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3.6.3	 Social	capital	and	cotton	leadership	
Cotton	 professionals	 (inputs	 suppliers	 and	 cotton	 ginners)	 turned	 out	 to	 provide	
critical	 support	 in	 the	 process	 of	 atomisation.	 This	 role	 of	 weak	 ties	 was	
acknowledged	 by	 farmers	 throughout	 the	 discussions	 and	 interviews.	 Cotton	
professionals	 were	 perceived	 as	 the	 most	 important	 source	 of	 support	 for	 the	
emergence	 of	 cotton	 breakaway	 networks	 by	 the	 three	 categories	 of	 farmers,	
regardless	 of	 their	 leadership	 status.	 This	 type	 of	 bridge	 was	 therefore	 crucial	 in	
building	a	large	cotton	network,	given	that	they	facilitate	access	to	more	and	further	
ties.	As	the	cornerstone	of	networks	atomisation,	inputs	suppliers	and	cotton	ginners	
triggered	and	masterminded	 the	process	until	 they	 lost	 control.	Kinship	and	 friend‐
ship	 also	 played	 an	 important	 role	 as	 strong	 ties	 in	 cotton	 networking,	 contrary	 to	
expectations.	 The	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	mean	 ranks	 assigned	 to	 public	
officials	and	to	ethnicity	shows	a	similar	perception	of	stayers	and	creators,	which	is	
different	from	the	rank	assigned	by	joiners.	This	differences	implies	that	joiners	might	
have	 been	 more  oriented	 by	 public	 officials	 in	 their	 movement	 than	 stayers	 and	
creators,	 whereas	 the	 latter	 value	 ethnicity	 in	 expanding	 their	 networks.	 Indeed,	
public	officials	are	important	when	creating	breakaway	networks	because	they	know	
the	official	procedures,	which	 they	 can	apply	 in	a	more	or	 less	 flexible	manner,	 and	
because	they	can	provide	the	networks	and	their	proponents	with	various	materials.	
The	significant	effect	of	ethnicity	and	religion	(strong	ties)	shows	that	they	constitute	
secure	sources	on	which	leaders	could	base	their	action.	However,	the	overall	ranking	
did	not	reveal	any	pre‐eminence	of	weak	ties	over	strong	ties.	
The	 significant	 and	 positive	 relationship	 of	 the	 number	 of	 social	 networks	 farmers	
belonged	to	with	the	leadership	status	implies	that	the	more	social	networks	a	farmer	
is	involved	in,	the	more	likely	s/he	will	become	a	leader.	This	association	was	further	
supported	 by	 the	 results	 of	 the	 regression	 of	 the	 length	 of	 appointment	 on	 boards.	
Indeed,	being	a	member	of	a	social	network	is	not	enough	to	generate	resources	 for	
instrumental	action.	Being	a	leader	therein	increases	the	value	of	these	resources	that	
can	be	derived	from	investment	into	the	network	activities.	It	provides	opportunities	
of	 extending	 one’s	 social	 relations,	 thereby	 strengthening	 one’s	 social	 capital.	
According	 to	 the	 strength‐of‐position	 proposition	 (Lin,	 2001:65),	 access	 to	 social	
capital	 is	 linked	 to	higher	positions	 in	 social	 structures.	Thus,	 the	 interaction	of	 the	
number	 of	 social	 networks	 with	 the	 number	 of	 positions	 occupied	 within	 these	
networks	 other	 than	 cotton	 had	 a	 significant	 and	 positive	 relationship	 with	 the	
duration	 of	 appointment	 as	 leaders.	 The	 more	 experience	 and	 contacts	 a	 farmer	
accumulated	 from	 his/her	 social	 networks,	 the	 longer	 s/he	 might	 have	 stayed	 in	
leadership	positions.	Therefore,	previous	leadership	experience	in	social	networks	is	
as	important	as	a	higher	membership	of	these	networks.	Thus,	it	can	be	inferred	that	
previous	 relations	 and	 experience	 in	 social	 networks	 constitute	 a	 resource	 that	
leaders	use	to	strengthen	their	positions	in	cotton	boards.	The	stock	of	social	capital	
embedded	 in	 an	 individual’s	 social	 relations	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 not	 only	 in	
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building	 a	 (new)	 network	 (Wellman	 and	 Kenneth,	 2001),	 but	 also	 in	 getting	 into	
leadership	positions	and	being	able	to	hold	on	to	those	positions.	
3.7	 Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 investigated	 the	 emergence	 of	 breakaway	 networks	 in	 Benin’s	 cotton	
production	and	how	this	process	elapsed	 into	atomising	 the	original	organisation.	 It	
attempted	 to	 combine	 the	 strengths	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 research,	 but	
unfortunately	the	results	did	not	support	each	other.	The	qualitative	research	aimed	
to	understand	and	identify	factors	of	atomisation,	whereas	the	quantitative	approach	
aimed	 to	 find	 out	 the	 relative	 importance	 of	 the	 factors	 for	 atomisation	 by	 ranking	
them	and	verifying	a	number	of	explanatory	mechanisms.		
Farmers’	agency	and	cotton	networks	influenced	one	another,	shaping	the	process	of	
networks	atomisation	in	Benin.	The	major	drivers	of	atomisation	were	problems	with	
payment	and	problems	with	resources	such	as	the	facility	of	getting	inputs	(fertilisers	
and	 pesticides).	 Payment‐related	 issues	 had	 been	 given	 a	 primacy	 in	 cotton	
networking.	Thus,	whether	farmers	were	paid	and	how	timely	this	payment	was	done	
could	 push	 breakers	 to	 leave	 their	 networks	 or	 pull	 them	 into	 other	 networks,	
regardless	of	whether	they	were	joiners	or	creators.	The	results	further	suggest	that	
the	atomisation	of	cotton	networks	basically	revolves	around	two	dimensions	of	social	
capital:	 the	 structural	 dimension,	 through	 farmers’	membership	 of	 social	 networks,	
and	the	cognitive	one,	relating	to	the	discourse	the	networks	proponents	resort	to	for	
mobilising	 farmers.	 The	 main	 pattern	 is	 that	 breakaway	 networks	 emerge	 through	
weak	ties.	Resorting	to	strong	ties	was	an	exception,	which	implies	that	the	relational	
dimension	 of	 social	 capital	was	 of	marginal	 importance.	 In	 addition,	 farmers’	 socio‐
economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 background	made	 little	 difference	 with	 regard	 to	
their	decision	of	leaving	or	joining	a	network.	Further	results	show	that	a	majority	of	
farmers	 at  one	 point	 became	 leaders	 in	 new	 networks,	 indicating	 that	 becoming	 a	
leader	could	be	a	major	hidden	incentive	for	atomisation.	In	addition,	a	greater	stock	
of	 social	 capital	 was	 correlated	 with	 the	 length	 of	 leaders’	 appointment	 on	 cotton	
network	boards.	
This	 type	 of	 research	 is	 of	 course	 prone	 to	 the	weaknesses	 of	 both	 qualitative	 and	
quantitative	 approaches,	 i.e.	 subjectivity	 and	 reductionism,	 respectively.	 The	 first	
major	 limitation	 of	 this	 research	pertains	 to	 the	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 farmers	
selected	 for	 interviewing.	The	reality	on	the	ground	was	that	getting	access	to	 these	
farmers	 required	 considerable	 logistic	 effort	 due	 their	 geographical	 dispersion	 and	
the	bad	rural	infrastructures.	The	degree	to	which	the	sample	is	representative	of	the	
total	population	can,	despite	our	efforts	to	maximise	it,	only	be	determined	in	future	
research.	Another	limitation	of	the	research	relates	to	the	fact	that	the	same	questions	
were	asked	to	all	categories	of	farmers,	which	made	the	answers	to	perception‐related	
questions	both	an	expression	of	one’s	own	situation	and	a	judgment	of	other	persons’	
behaviour.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 quantitative	 findings	 did	 not	 always	 support	 the	
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qualitative	 evidence.	 Further	 research	 to	 map	 the	 networking	 trajectory	 of	 cotton	
farmers	could	yield	more	insight	into	the	dynamics	pertaining	to	Benin’s	cotton	sector	
for	effecting	a	positive	qualitative	change.	
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Chapter	4	
	
	
Generating	Resources	and	Conflicts:	Profitability	and	
Social	Cohesion	in	Benin’s	Cotton	Sector	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT:	This	chapter	is	based	on	field	research	in	the	northern	Benin,	West	
Africa.	 The	 research	 aimed	 to	 investigate	 how	 interpersonal	 and	 intra‐
organisational	 conflicts	 disrupted	 cotton	 production	 and	 froze	 collective	
action.	Cotton	has	proven	to	be	the	 lifeline	 for	 farmer	organisations,	and	has	
driven	 collective	 action	 in	 rural	 areas.	 The	 struggle	 to	 control	 these	
organisations	 and	 their	 economic	 and	 social	 benefits	 generated	
mismanagement	 and	 free‐riding	 behaviour.	 The	 greed	 for	 resources,	 in	 the	
end,	led	to	hatred,	disruption	of	ties,	and	conflicts	within	and	between	farmer	
organisations,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 decline	 of	 cotton	 production	 and	 the	
freeze	of	collective	action.	Results	from	case	studies	show	that	social	relations	
based	 on	 kinship	 and	 friendship	 deteriorate	when	 financial	 stakes	 are	 high,	
and	 that	 cooperation	 within	 large	 groups	 requires	 legal	 sanctions	 to	 be	
sustainable.	
	
Keywords:	Cotton	production;	Collective	action;	Social	cohesion;	Benin	
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Income	 and	 Conflicts:	 Profitability	 and	 social	 cohesion	 in	 Benin’s	 Cotton	 Sector.	 The	
International	Journal	of	Interdisciplinary	Organizational	Studies,	7(1):	33‐46.	
CHAPTER	4	
	
82	
	
4.1	 Introduction	
For	the	 last	 two	decades,	cotton	has	been	the	most	 important	crop	in	Benin,	both	 in	
terms	of	the	percentage	of	the	population	involved	in	cotton‐related	activities	and	the	
income	 generated	 by	 the	 crop.	 The	 boom	 in	 cotton	 production	 from	 the	 end	 of	 the	
1980s	has	 impacted	many	other	economic	domains	 in	 the	country.	This	boom	owed	
not	 only	 to	 market	 incentives	 but	 also	 to	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 organisations	 that	
evolved	 around	 cotton	 production.	 The	 most	 important	 of	 these	 organisations	 are	
farmer	 organisations,	 which	 instilled	 new	 dynamics	 into	 the	 sector	 to	 make	 it	
successful.	 In	 turn,	 farmer	 organisations	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	 cotton	 farming	 and	
have	 depended	 on	 its	 levies	 for	 their	 functioning	 (Kouton	 et	 al.	 2006).	 From	 the	
resources	generated	by	cotton	production,	collective	action	was	sustained	in	villages	
where	communities	provided	themselves	with	basic	services	 that	were	not	supplied	
adequately	by	the	state:	education,	health,	roads,	and	other	infrastructure.	The	success	
of	the	sector	increased	the	visibility	of	cotton‐related	organisations	and	their	leaders	
who	grew	 in	 importance	both	economically	 and	 socially,	 at	 local	 as	well	 as	national	
level.	 But	 cotton	 as	 source	 of	 income	 also	 became	 a	 source	 of	 conflict,	 because	 of	
divergent	 interests.	 Cotton	 interests	 stirred	 appetites	 and	 attracted	 new	 entre‐
preneurs	 in	 cotton	 production	who	 invaded	 the	 organisations	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	
improving	 the	management.	 This	 led	 to	 conflicts	within	 and	 between	 organisations	
and	organisational	breakdown,	and	inflated	the	number	of	organisations.	The	ensuing	
conflicts	 disrupted	 the	 social	 cohesion	 in	 the	 organisations	 and	 communities,	 and	
resulted	 in	 the	 decline	 of	 cotton	 production	 and	 the	 freeze	 of	 collective	 action.	 The	
ultimate	consequence	has	been	the	loss	by	many	small‐scale	farmers,	of	their	main,	or	
even	their	only	source	of	income.	
Studies	investigating	the	causes	of	the	demise	of	cotton	production	in	Benin,	however,	
have	 pointed	 at	 technical	 and	 trade	 issues.	 The	 latter,	 namely	 cotton	 subsidies	 in	
industrialised	 countries,	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 decline	 of	 cotton	 prices	 on	 the	
international	market,	causing	important	 losses	to	producers	in	developing	countries.	
A	debate	about	the	removal	of	these	subsidies	opposed	the	two	groups	of	countries	in	
international	 forums.	 The	 attention	 focussed	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 debate,	 to	 the	
extent	 of	 overlooking	 the	 dark	 side	 of	 the	 internal	 institutional	 dynamics	 in	 cotton	
organisations.	While	 in	 Benin,	 farmer	 organisations	 have	 been	 pictured	 by	 some	 as	
enabling	 social	 inclusion	 (Tama‐Imorou	 &	 Wenninck,	 2007;	 Tama‐Imorou	 et	 al.,	
2007),	 others	 (e.g.	 Sinzogan	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 saw	 them	 as	 pawns	 caught	 into	 heavy	
institutional	 arrangements	 and	 enduring	 the	 externalities	 of	 global	 policies.	 The	
problem	of	 the	atomisation	of	 farmer	organisations	 that	 subsequently	occurred	was	
not	 seen	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 inter‐personal	 and	 intra‐organisational	 conflicts	 that	
increasingly	affected	cotton	farming.	Indeed,	far	from	undergoing	passively	the	effect	
of	 external	 contingencies,	 cotton	 farmer	 agency	 in	 Benin	 has	 impacted	 the	 trend	 of	
cotton	production.	Therefore,	to	revive	the	sector	a	closer	look	should	be	taken	at	the	
critical	issue	of	the	organisational	dynamics	of	the	sector.	
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The	 purpose	 of	 the	 present	 chapter	 is	 to	 investigate	 how	 interpersonal	 and	 intra‐
organisational	conflicts	have	disrupted	cotton	production	and	frozen	collective	action.	
The	 research	 was	 conducted	 through	 focus	 group	 discussions,	 key	 informant	
interviews,	 and	 in‐depth	 interviews	 with	 148	 farmers	 including	 both	 grassroots	
farmers	 and	 organisation	 leaders.	 The	 chapter	 first	 discusses	 the	 theoretical	
perspective	used	 in	 the	research	and	then	pictures	 the	cotton	system	in	the	cultural	
setting	of	the	study	area.	In	the	following	sections,	the	emergence	of	collective	action	
in	 the	 study	area	 is	described	and	an	analysis	 is	presented	about	how	conflicts	 and	
violence	expanded	throughout	the	cotton	production	zones	and	were	manipulated	by	
traders	and	 intellectuals	 to	enter	cotton	organisations,	 resulting	 in	 the	disruption	of	
social	 cohesion	 and	 the	 demise	 of	 collective	 action.	 Two	 cases	will	 be	 presented	 to	
highlight	 these	 processes.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 with	 a	 brief	 discussion	 on	 the	
implications	for	cotton	production.	
4.2	 Theoretical	perspective	
The	issue	of	group	dynamics	has	been	approached	through	a	focus	on	the	production	
and	use	of	resources	and	the	management	of	 interpersonal	relations.	Both	affect	the	
cohesion	of	 groups,	 thereby	determining	 their	 ability	 for	 cooperation.	 Cohesion	 and	
cooperation	within	a	group	determine	 its	 ability	 to	overcome	 internal	difficulties	 as	
well	as	threats	from	outside.	
	
Experimental	 studies	 of	 cooperation	 stem	 from	 the	 so‐called	 ‘Prisoner’s	 Dilemma’	
model,	 from	which	 the	 concepts	 of	 the	 “public	 goods	 dilemma”	 and	 the	 “resources	
dilemma”	originated.	The	 two	concepts	were	grouped	 together	as	 “social	dilemmas”	
(Kollock,	1998;	Komorita	&	Parks,	1995).	A	social	dilemma	is	defined	as	“a	situation	in	
which	 a	 group	 of	 persons	 must	 decide	 between	 maximizing	 selfish	 interests	 and	
maximizing	 collective	 interests”	 (Komorita	&	 Parks,	 1995:	 190),	 leading	 to	 “tension	
between	individual	and	collective	rationality”	(Kollock,	1998:	183)	in	the	production	
and	use	of	public	goods.	The	use	of	public	goods,	in	contrast	to	their	production,	puts	
actors	 in	 the	 ‘commons	dilemmas’	 or	 a	 ‘social	 trap’,	 a	 situation	 in	which	 individuals	
are	tempted	by	an	immediate	benefit	of	which	the	cost	has	to	be	shared	by	all	users	of	
the	resource.	The	problem	of	cooperation	in	social	dilemmas	poses	a	critical	issue	of	
trust.	
The	 role	 of	 trust	 in	 organisational	 settings	 is	 widely	 acknowledged	 by	 numerous	
researches	 in	various	disciplines.	Trust	 represents	 “a	positive	assumption	about	 the	
motives	 and	 intentions	 of	 another	 party	 [and]	 allows	 people	 to	 economise	 on	
information	 processing	 and	 safeguarding	 behaviours”	 (McEvily	 et	 al.	 2003:	 92‐93).	
Misztal	 (1996:	 18)	 defined	 it	 as	 “the	 willingness	 of	 other	 agents	 to	 fulfil	 their	
contractual	obligation	that	is	crucial	for	cooperation”.	Trust	has	two	key	features:	the	
psychological	 and	 the	 behavioural	 (Kramer,	 1999).	 The	 psychological	 feature,	
associated	 with	 cognition,	 entails	 the	 trustor’s	 perceived	 vulnerability,	 while	 the	
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behavioural	 one	 pertains	 to	 the	 interactions	 between	 actors.	 Trust	 has	 three	
functions:	the	integrative	function,	the	reduction	of	complexity,	and	the	lubricant	for	
cooperation	(Misztal,	1996).	The	 lubricant	 function	makes	cooperation	 for	collective	
action	 possible	 and	 ensures	 group	 cohesion.	 Cohesion,	 as	 the	 sense	 of	 belonging	 of	
group	 members,	 is	 determined	 by	 incentives	 found	 through	 membership.	 The	
“collectivity	 is	 structurally	 cohesive	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 social	 relations	 of	 its	
members	hold	it	together”	(Moody	&	White,	2003:	106).	
The	 present	 research	 hypothesised	 that	 the	 demise	 of	 collective	 action	 in	 cotton‐
producing	 areas	 resulted	 from	 the	 decline	 of	 social	 cohesion	 within	 cotton	
organisations.	 It	 aims	 at	 understanding	 how	 the	 social	 dynamics	 of	 cotton	
organisations	fizzled,	in	spite	of	incentives	provided	by	the	sector	that	should	allow	an	
enduring	cooperation	for	the	benefit	of	the	whole.	
4.3	 The	cotton	system	
4.3.1	 The	socio‐cultural	setting	of	the	cotton	zone	
In	 Benin,	 the	 provinces	 heavily	 impacted	 by	 cotton	 production	 are	 those	 of	 Borgou	
and	Alibori	in	the	North.	Between	1990	and	2010,	these	provinces	together	accounted	
for	48	to	80	per	cent	of	the	national	production	(AIC,	2008a).	Alibori	is	considered	the	
cotton	 belt	 of	 the	 nation,	 while	 Borgou	 is	 the	 food	 belt	 though	 also	 producing	 an	
important	 share	 of	 cotton.	 Together	 they	 formed	 the	 Benin	 part	 of	 the	 pre‐colonial	
kingdom	of	Borgu,	dominated	by	the	Baatombu	(Jones,	1998).	
Before	 the	 partition	 of	 1898	Borgu	was	 a	 kingdom,	 stretching	 from	North	 Benin	 to	
North‐west	Nigeria	(Kuba,	2000).	The	term	Borgu	designates	a	socio‐cultural,	political	
and	economic	space	with	complex	and	diverse	power	relations	between	the	different	
ethnic	 groups	 (Boesen,	 Hardung,	 &	 Kuba,	 1998).	 It	 also	 comprised	 other	 ethnic	
groups,	 namely	 the	 Boo,	 the	Mokole,	 the	 Fulani,	 cattle	 breeders	 and	 herdsmen,	 the	
Gando,	and	the	Dendi,	migrant	traders	descending	from	the	Wangara	of	Mali	(Brégand,	
1998).	The	Baatombu,	 the	Boo	and	the	Fulani	are	considered	the	 indigenous	groups,	
the	Baatombu	being	land	owners	(Jones,	1998).	The	large	majority	of	the	other	ethnic	
groups,	however,	speak	Baatonum,	the	language	of	Baatombu.	
Borgu’s	 economy	 was	 “land‐based,	 with	 few	 resources	 to	 attract	 external	 trade”	
(Adekunle,	1994:	1),	though	it	was	located	at	the	crossroads	of	important	commercial	
networks	 between	 the	Yoruba	 and	Hausa	 states	 of	Nigeria	 and	 the	 former	 Songhay	
empire	 (Kuba,	 1998).	Due	 to	 colonisation,	 the	 kingdom	disintegrated	politically	 and	
economically.	 In	 addition,	 urbanization	 and	 modernization	 have	 transformed	
Baatombu	 society	 and	 have	 weakened	 community	 cohesion	 and	 some	 practices	 of	
solidarity.	But	even	so,	contemporary	Borgou	exhibits	the	hierarchical	structure	of	the	
ancient	Borgu,	quite	“complex	and	rigid”	with	the	noble	or	aristocratic	Wassangari	at	
the	top,	and	commoners	who	are	cultivators	and	hunters	at	the	lower	end	(Lombard,	
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1960,	 1998).	 In	 spite	 of	 its	 ethnic	 diversity,	 Borgou	 is	 socially	 integrated	 through	
cultural	practices	and	processes	that	aim	at	peace	keeping.	Among	them	is	the	joking	
relationship,	 which	 involves	 cross‐cousins,	 kin	 of	 alternate	 generations,	 different	
craftsmen,	 and	 neighbouring	 ethnic	 groups.	 It	 forms	 a	 harmless	 outlet	 for	 social	
tensions	within	and	between	groups	(Brydon,	2010).	By	joking	people	avoid	open	and	
destructive	antagonism	due	to	 jealousy	or	competition”	and	give	“proof	of	solidarity	
with	 every	 joke	 they	 gamely	 endure”	 (Schottman,	 1998:	 159).	 Neither	 the	 socio‐
cultural	 customs	 and	 beliefs	 nor	 the	 historical	 links	 between	 the	 different	 ethnic	
groups	have	completely	disappeared.	These	links	are	alive	across	borders	and	ethnic	
consciousness	among	the	Baatombu	sub‐groups	is	still	strong	(Akinwumi,	1998).	The	
social	organisation	of	the	society	in	chiefdoms	around	the	central	kingdom	still	plays	a	
role.	Each	Baatombu	society	has	several	layers	of	historical	titles	and	political	offices	
that	 are	 still	 locally	 relevant	 and	 conserve	 their	 attributes	 of	 power	 (Alber,	 2004;	
Harneit‐Sievers,	2002).	
4.3.2	 The	first	cotton	elite:	The	rise	of	school	dropouts	
During	the	Marxist‐Leninist	era	in	the	1970s,	farmer	organisations	were	purposefully	
promoted	 throughout	 the	 country	 by	 the	 military	 regime	 as	 a	 form	 of	 village	
associations.	 These	 associations	 were	 used	 to	 infiltrate	 and	 control	 the	 grassroots	
populations.	 This	 logic	 is	 reflected	 in	 their	 name:	 Groupement	 Révolutionnaire	 à	
Vocation	 Coopérative	 (GRVC)	 (Maboudou	 Alidou,	 2002).	 The	 revolutionary	
cooperatives	served	as	 the	basis	 for	 the	process	 that	 took	place	 from	the	end	of	 the	
1980s	onwards,	i.e.	the	networking	among	farmer	organisations.	But	where	the	GRVC	
had	almost	no	freedom	of	action	and	was	constrained	by	political	control,	the	present	
Groupements	 Villageois	 (GV)	 are	 autonomous.	 Belloncle,	 cited	 by	 Tossou	 (1993)	
contended	 that	 the	emergence	of	new	 forms	of	 farmer	organisations	 coincided	with	
the	 appeal	 for	 a	 real	 dialogue	 between	 farmers	 and	 developers	 after	 the	 rural	
development	approaches	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	failed	to	live	up	to	expectations.	The	
shift	of	 status	also	benefited	 from	the	advent	of	democracy	when	 the	1990	National	
Conference	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	 socio‐political	 unrest	 of	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	 1980s.	
This	 policy	 shift	 gave	 the	 new	 forms	 of	 organisations	 a	 level	 of	 importance	 that	
previous	organisations	never	had.	It	also	led	to	the	emergence	of	a	new	elite:	that	of	
school	dropouts.	
Northern	Benin	was	characterised	by	a	 low	rate	of	 literacy	and,	apart	 from	primary	
school	 teachers,	 rarely	 did	 intellectuals	 live	 in	 the	 villages.	 The	 first	 rural	 literacy	
program	in	Benin	started	in	the	province	of	Borgou	during	the	1970s,	to	train	the	GV	
managers	in	reading	and	counting	in	the	local	language.	The	acquired	skills	were	used	
in	 cotton	 production	 to	 report	 inputs	 distribution	 among	 members,	 and	 in	 cotton	
commercialization	 (Abou‐Moumouni,	 2011).	 But	 the	 skills	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
insufficient	when	 cotton	 production	 became	 really	 important.	 School	 dropouts	 then	
started	 taking	 over	 the	 daily	 management	 of	 the	 GVs.	 The	 little	 literacy	 they	 had	
constituted	 a	 highly	 appreciated	 asset	 for	 farmer	 organisations,	 where	 they	 would	
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occupy	the	positions	of	secretary	on	the	board.	Later	on,	the	secretaries	turned	out	to	
be	 crucial	 board	 members,	 due	 to	 the	 critical	 importance	 of	 their	 role	 in	 the	
redistribution	of	inputs,	the	commercialisation	of	cotton,	and	payment.	Until	recently,	
in	 many	 farmer	 groups	 the	 two	 other	 important	 board	 positions,	 namely	 that	 of	
president	 and	 treasurer,	were	 occupied	 by	 virtually	 illiterate	 persons.	 This	 enabled	
secretaries	 to	 encroach	 upon	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 president	 and	 the	 treasury.	
With	the	atomisation	of	cotton	organisations,	this	pre‐eminence	of	the	secretaries	led	
members	to	equate	the	organisation	with	the	secretary.	The	most	common	answer	to	
the	question	about	which	organisation	a	farmer	belongs	to	is:	“I	am	in	the	organisation	
of	Secretary	X	or	Y”,	X	and	Y	standing	for	the	name	of	this	secretary.		
The	 development	 of	 cotton	 production	 paralleled	 the	 capacity	 building	 of	 rural	
organisations.	Leaders	of	organisations	were	earmarked	for	all	kinds	of	training.	Their	
acquired	 skills	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 relate	 directly	 to	 donors	 and	 other	 outsiders,	
mediating	 for	 their	 populations	 (Olivier	 de	 Sardan,	 2005).	 Thanks	 to	 the	 booming	
cotton	production	and	the	huge	outputs	the	sector	generated,	farmer	leaders	grew	in	
importance,	both	economically	and	socially,	thereby	becoming	role	models	for	young	
people	 in	 the	 villages.	 Leaders	 of	 cotton	 farmer	 organisations	 formed	 a	 distinctive	
social	 class	 in	 their	 localities.	 They	were	 blessed	with	 various	 social	 and	 economic	
privileges	 that	 distinguished	 them	 from	 the	 others.	 Inter‐connected	 from	 village	 to	
province,	 they	 tended	 to	 self‐reinforce	 the	 system	 by	 putting	 in	 place	 institutional	
arrangements,	 irrespective	 of	what	was	 stated	 in	 statutes	 and	 laws.	 Lack	 of	 control	
allowed	the	leaders	to	manage	public	resources	as	their	own.	By	staying	on	the	board	
infinitely,	some	of	 the	 leaders	used	the	power	they	held	not	only	 for	 the	community	
but	 also	 for	 themselves.	 As	 a	 result,	 their	 social	 ascension	 led	 to	 power	 abuses	 and	
mismanagement	that	escalated	free‐riding	behaviour.	
4.4	 Cotton	production	and	collective	action	
There	 were	 three	 constituent	 functions	 of	 the	 village	 associations:	 driving	 up	
agricultural	 production,	 including	 food	 crops;	 facilitating	 access	 to	 credit	 and	 tools;	
and	 serving	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 cotton	 elite	 (Roy,	 2010).	 These	
functions	are	assumed	mainly	by	agents	at	positions	of	authority,	who	are	in	charge	of	
promoting	 solidarity	within	 the	 group	 and	 collective	 action	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 group	
members	and	the	community	at	large.	
	
The	ancient	Borgu	 is	characteristic	of	the	collective	action	that	stemmed	from	cotton	
production.	Through	 a	 combination	of	 community‐	 and	hierarchy‐based	 approaches	
(Kiser,	 1997)	 rules	 and	 institutions	 were	 created	 within	 cotton	 production	
communities,	 endorsed	by	 the	State’s	 assistance	policy	 to	promote	 collective	 action.	
Despite	 the	 low	 level	 of	 literacy	 of	 the	 organisations’	 leaders,	 collective	 action	was	
effective	there	and	benefitted	 the	communities,	as	 is	still	visible	 in	villages.	 It	seems	
probable	that	the	success	of	collective	action	in	this	area	was	boosted	by	certain	socio‐
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cultural	 values.	 In	Baatombu	 society,	 selfishness	was	 strongly	detested	and	sacrifice	
for	 the	 group	 highly	 appreciated.	 Studies	 of	 Borgou’s	 socio‐cultural	 characteristics	
have	 revealed	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 orientation	 towards	 others,	 “shown	 to	 be	 of	
crucial	 importance	 for	 grasping	 the	 dynamic	 social	 construction	 of	 group	 identities,	
and	 the	 various	 power	 and	 exchanges	 relations	 between	 populations	 groups”	
(Breusers,	2000:	311‐312).	With	regard	to	the	sociological	argument	that	cultural	and	
structural	 factors	 are	 the	 determinants	 of	 collective	 action	 (Kiser,	 1997),	 it	 can	 be	
inferred	 that	 the	 society	 bears	 some	 of	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	
collective	 action.	 Communities	 availed	 themselves	 of	 basic	 services	 that	 were	 not	
adequately	 supplied	 by	 the	 state.	 Collective	 action	 driven	 by	 cotton	 production	
concerned	a	wide	range	of	domains	going	from	education	to	the	maintenance	of	roads,	
as	summarised	in	Table	4.1.	
	
Because	the	provinces	of	Borgou	and	Alibori	were	known	for	their	low	levels	of	school	
attendance,	 collective	 action	 first	 backed	 up	 education	 at	 local	 level.	 Communities	
built	 schools	 and	 recruited	 teachers	 who	 were	 paid	 from	 cotton	 levies.	 This	
community	 support	 for	 education	 became	 a	 phenomenon	 known	 as	 “Enseignants	
communautaires”	that	spread	throughout	the	country.	Until	recently,	farmer	unions	at	
district	 level	 used	 to	 pay	 the	 tuition	 fees	 for	 school	 girls	 sent	 to	 the	 provincial	
boarding	 school.	 Residences	 were	 also	 built	 on	 the	 university	 campus	 to	 house	
students	from	districts	like	Banikoara,	Gogounou	and	Sinende.	The	example	convinced	
other	 district	 unions	 to	 do	 the	 same	 and	 inspired	 students	 from	 other	 cotton‐
producing	 districts	 to	 claim	 similar	 benefits	 from	 the	 cotton	 levies	 their	 district	
earned.	
	
In	 addition,	 farmer	 unions	 built	 lodging	 houses	 in	most	 of	 the	 districts	where	 such	
infrastructure	 and	 services	 could	 hardly	 be	 found.	 Municipal	 buildings	 and	 leisure	
centres	 were	 built	 in	 villages,	 making	 the	 farmers	 proud,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 the	
following	quote:	“This	building	where	we	are	meeting	actually	is	not	built	by	a	Minister;	
it	is	built	by	our	own	hoes	and	effort.”	(Source:	Focus	group	discussion,	Sekere,	January	
2009).	 This	 shows	 how	 farmers	 were	 empowered,	 availing	 themselves	 of	 basic	
services	that	are	supposed	to	be	provided	by	“ministers”.	These	achievements	made	
the	deprived	villages	 in	 the	 region	more	appealing	and	 lively.	But	because	of	power	
abuse,	cotton	production	became	troublesome	and	deprived	rural	populations	of	their	
potential	for	development.	
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Table	4.1	 Collective	action	in	the	study	area	
Types		 Infrastructure	 Level	(Village	or	District)	
Social	and		
community		
infrastructure	
Agricultural	inputs	stores	 Both	
Schools	(buildings	or	entire	schools)	 Both	
Residence	for	school	directors	 Village	
Students	residence	at	university	(Cotonou)	 District	
Water	pumps/wells	 Both	
Rural	roads		 Both	
Health	centres	 Both	
Leisure	centres	 Both	
Equipment	for	modern	music	orchestra		 Village	
Lodging	centres	 District	
Municipal	buildings	 Both	
Public	lightening	 Both	
Kerosene	selling	points	 Village	
Football	fields	 Both	
Rural	Radio		 District	
Mosques	 Village	
Payment	
Salaries	for	community	teachers	 Both	
Assistance	to	students	 Both	
Assistance	to	the	municipal	council	 Both	
Contribution	for	the	realisation	of	infrastructure	by	
partners	 Both	
Maintenance		 Maintenance	of	community	infrastructure	 Both	
Source:	Focus‐group	discussions,	January	2009.	
4.5	 The	rise	of	conflicts	and	violence	
The	dynamics	of	 farmer	organisations	have	always	been	 idealised,	overlooking	 their	
weaknesses	 that	 undoubtedly	 hampered	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	 cotton	 system.	
Evidence	from	other	West	African	cotton	producing	countries,	however,	showed	that	
cotton	 farmers	played	a	 role,	directly	or	 indirectly,	 in	 the	way	 the	process	of	 cotton	
development	 unfolded	 (Bassett,	 2001).	 Far	 from	 being	 passive	 actors,	 Benin	 cotton	
farmers	 have	 greatly	 influenced	 cotton	 production	 through	 their	 agency.	 First,	
positively,	by	their	contribution	to	the	increase	of	production,	and	second,	negatively,	
by	the	confrontational	way	into	which	the	management	of	their	organisations	lapsed.	
4.5.1	 Typology	of	conflicts	in	cotton	farmer	organisations	
From	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s,	 the	 cotton	 sector	 in	 Benin	 has	 been	 overwhelmed	 by	
various	 conflicts	 that	 undermined	 the	 cohesion	 of	 cotton	 organisations.	 These	
conflicts	 were	 identified	 and	 ranked	 by	 farmers	 during	 focus	 group	 discussions	
according	 to	 their	 frequency.	 The	 ranks	 range	 from	 1	 (most	 frequent)	 to	 9	 (least	
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frequent).	Table	4.2	shows	the	ranking	of	the	conflicts	according	to	farmers,	and	the	
comparison	of	mean	ranks	between	grassroots	farmers	and	leaders.	
Table	4.2	 Rank	of	conflicts	in	cotton	organisations	according	to	their	frequency	
Nature	of	conflicts	 Grassroots	farmers	
(N=62)	
Leaders	
(N=46)	 t	
Inputs	allocation	 3.0	(2.07)	 3.2	(2.14)	 ‐.43	
Lack	of	payment	 3.5	(2.31)	 3.7	(2.17)	 ‐.53	
Application	of	joint	liability		 3.7	(2.07)	 3.7	(2.18)	 .13	
Mismanagement	of	resources	 4.7	(2.27)	 3.9	(2.11)	 2.16*	
Commercialisation	of	cotton	 4.6	(2.07)	 4.5	(2.07)	 .19	
Leadership	 5.5	(2.39)	 4.6	(2.32)	 1.88	
Lack	of	commitment	to	group	work	 6.5	(2.18)	 6.2	(1.91)	 .64	
Outlets	for	inter‐personal	
arguments	 6.6	(2.58)	 7.4	(1.68)	 ‐1.97	
Payment	of	membership	fees	 6.9	(1.88)	 7.9	(1.49)	 ‐2.84**
N=108;		*	=	p	<	.05;		**	=	p	<	.01	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
The	mean	ranks	of	the	frequencies	of	two	types	of	conflict	sources	showed	significant	
differences	 between	 grassroots	 farmers	 and	 leaders.	 Leaders	 ranked	 mis‐
management‐related	conflicts	higher	 than	grassroots	 farmers	 (p<.05).	 Indeed,	of	 the	
nine	 breakaway	 organisations	 investigated,	 seven	 reported	mismanagement‐related	
conflicts.	 Also	 leadership‐related	 conflicts	 were	 ranked	 higher	 by	 leaders	 than	 by	
grassroots	 farmers,	 but	 the	 difference	 was	 not	 significant,	 indicating	 similar	
importance	of	this	cause	to	all	categories	of	farmers.	
Having	 a	 leadership	 position	 gave	 access	 to	 material	 and	 financial	 benefits	 that	
improved	 the	 livelihoods	of	 leaders	 and	 enhanced	 their	 visibility	 in	 the	 community.	
This	 explains	 why	 conflicts	 about	 inputs	 allocation	 are	 ranked	 first	 in	 the	 overall	
ranking.	 This	 first	 position	 ascertains	 the	 critical	 importance	 of	 fertilisers	 and	
pesticides	 in	 cotton	 production.	 Controlling	 inputs	 gave	 enormous	 power	 to	 farmer	
leaders,	who	could	use	these	for	purposes	even	unrelated	to	cotton.	The	payment	of	
membership	 as	 a	 cause	 of	 conflicts	 was	 ranked	 significantly	 higher	 by	 grassroots	
farmers	than	by	leaders	(p<.01).	Farmers	struggled	to	control	their	organisations	and	
the	social	processes	and	power	play	involved.	These	processes	were	aggravated,	how‐
ever,	by	new	types	of	actors	who	invaded	cotton	production.	
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4.5.2	 The	first	uprising:	“Orou	Bagou”	vs.	“Orou	Sori”	
The	district	of	Gogounou	witnessed	the	first	 inter‐community	conflict	resulting	from	
the	1990s	production	boom.	The	conflict	resulted	in	the	emergence	of	the	first	cotton	
dissident	 organisation.	 It	 opposed	 farmers	 from	 two	 villages:	 Sori	 and	 Bagou.	 Both	
villages	were	important	cotton	producers	and	participated	in	the	management	of	the	
district	farmer	union,	on	which	board	Bagou	held	more	power	than	Sori.	A	native	from	
Bagou	was	 appointed	 as	 a	 vice‐president	 and	 destined	 to	 take	 over	 the	 lead	 of	 the	
union.	The	president	at	the	time,	who	was	then	also	leading	the	national	federation	of	
farmers,	 was	 controversial	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 being	 illiterate,	 being	 involved	 in	
mismanagement,	 and	 extending	 his	 ‘reign’	 for	 years.	 The	 contestation	 was	 led	 by	
natives	from	Sori,	who	requested	him	to	step	down.	Sori,	the	most	urban	village	in	the	
district,	had	been	contesting	the	position	of	Gogounou	as	the	district	capital	for	some	
time.	Therefore,	Sori	could	not	accept	to	be	deprived	of	certain	positions	by	the	village	
of	 Bagou,	 which	 cotton	 farmers	were	 accused	 of	 connivance	with	 the	 controversial	
president	 in	 the	mismanagement	 of	 union	 resources.	 Farmers	 from	 Sori	 decided	 to	
resolve	the	matter	by	taking	control	of	properties	of	the	union.		
In	October	1997,	tens	of	farmers	filled	up	a	truck	and	invaded	the	village	of	Bagou	to	
seize	 selected	 properties	 of	 the	 union	 controlled	 by	 the	 vice‐president,	 thereby	
triggering	a	violent	conflict	between	the	two	villages.	A	pitched	battle	opposed	the	two	
groups	of	 farmers	at	midday,	 resulting	 in	a	 lot	of	destruction	and	hatred.	 It	was	 the	
first	and	most	violent	conflict	between	the	two	neighbouring	villages	since	they	grew	
cotton.	Therefore,	the	opposed	parties	were	nicknamed	“Orou	Bagou”	and	“Orou	Sori”,	
referring	 to	 the	 camps	 of	 Bagou	 and	 Sori	 respectively,	 the	 term	 “Orou”	 being	 the	
Baatombu’s	 birth	 rank	 name	 assigned	 to	 the	 first	 son	 (Schottman,	 2000).	 Although	
there	were	no	casualties,	the	protagonists	want	to	forget	about	the	conflict	because	of	
its	violence	and	the	dire	consequences	it	generated.	None	of	the	men	in	the	male	focus	
group	discussions	in	the	two	villages	mentioned	it;	but	the	women	in	the	female	focus	
group	discussions	did.	They	timidly	stressed	its	violence	and	referred	us	to	the	men	if	
we	 wanted	 more	 details.	 Silencing	 the	 conflict	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 “shared	 denial	 of	
painful	 realities”	 (Cairns	&	Niens,	1999).	Cotton	had	become	a	nightmare,	and	some	
wondered	why	they	ever	went	so	far	in	their	disputes.	At	the	time	of	the	fieldwork,	the	
conflict	was	still	pending	at	the	court,	like	many	other	conflicts	in	cotton	production.	
Nevertheless,	the	contesters	succeeded	in	creating	the	first	breakaway	organisation	in	
cotton	 production,	 supported	 by	 traders	 and	 businessmen.	 This	 tumultuous	
experience	 that	 unfolded	 in	 the	 district	 of	 Gogounou	 inspired	 the	 claim	 of	 its	
producers	to	be	the	“laboratory	of	cotton	networks”.	
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4.5.3	 Political	interference	and	the	advent	of	traders	and	intellectuals	
in	cotton	organisations	
The	 success	 story	 of	 cotton	 production	 contributed	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 to	 improving	
people’s	 perceptions	 of	 agriculture.	 Before	 cotton	became	 a	 critical	 livelihood	 asset,	
agriculture	was	not	highly	valued	and	being	a	farmer	had	a	lower	social	status.	Thanks	
to	the	boom	in	cotton	production,	this	status	improved	and	agriculture	became	a	new	
type	 of	 entrepreneurship.	 The	 wealth	 generated	 by	 cotton	 to	 formerly	 deprived	
farmers	attracted	new	farmers.	With	the	number	of	people	involved	in	its	production,	
cotton	also	became	an	instrument	that	political	leaders	sought	to	control	for	electoral	
purposes.	 The	 contestation	 of	 cotton	 “illiterate	 leaders”,	 voiced	 on	 the	 ground	 of	
embezzlement,	 became	 politically	 motived.	 Indeed,	 two	 succeeding	 Ministers	 of	
Agriculture,	 activists	 from	different	political	parties	 that	were	 strong‐holding	one	of	
the	 largest	 cotton‐producing	 districts,	 supported	 opposing	wings	within	 the	 farmer	
union	 to	 get	 control	 over	 the	 organisation	 for	 electoral	 purposes.	 This	 struggle	
between	 local	 politicians	 is	 captured	 in	 the	 following	 quote	 from	 the	 agricultural	
advisor	to	the	Head	of	the	State:	
	
The	profound	but	unsaid	motive	of	the	conflict	and	the	atomisation	of	
cotton	networks	was	political.	Every	politician	 in	 the	area	wanted	 to	
have	the	 farmer	 federation	under	his	sway.	Therefore,	they	backed	up	
the	emergence	of	dissident	networks.	
Source:	Key	informant	interview,	Banikoara,	January	2011	
	
Meetings	to	settle	the	disputes	convened	as	high	as	the	Presidency	yielded	no	or	little	
result,	because	leaders	of	cotton	organisations	became	aware	of	their	importance.	To	
the	Head	of	the	State,	who	asked	the	contested	leader	to	step	down,	the	latter	dared	
replicate:	“If	it	were	so	easy	to	step	down,	why	did	you	refuse	when	you	were	requested	
to	 do	 so”,	 referring	 to	 the	 President’s	 refusal	 to	 step	 down	 at	 the	 1990	 National	
Conference	 to	 end	 the	 country’s	 socio‐political	 unrest	 of	 the	 1980s.	 To	 resolve	 the	
tense	 situation,	 the	 President	 asked	whether	 the	 contesters	 could	 create	 their	 own	
organisation,	 which,	 according	 to	 witnesses,	 triggered	 the	 atomisation	 of	 cotton	
organisations.	 Henceforth,	 the	 best	 solution	 to	 disputes	 within	 an	 organisation	 has	
become	the	creation	of	“one’s	own	organisation”.	As	a	consequence,	the	local	conflict	
within	 a	district	 union	 resulted	 in	 the	 fragmentation	of	 the	national	 federation.	The	
conflict	was	also	fuelled	by	rivalry	about	a	farmer’s	wife	who	was	allegedly	snatched	
by	a	leader,	showing	how	some	leaders	abused	their	power.	Traders	and	retired	civil	
servants	 skilfully	 used	 the	 discontent	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 struggle	 for	 a	 “better	
management”	 of	 the	 organisations.	 They	 started	 practicing	 cotton	 production,	
however	marginally.	These	new	farmers	were	termed	“farm	goers”	instead	of	farmers	
by	 the	 leaders	of	 the	original	 federation,	arguing	 that	 they	were	simply	attracted	by	
the	profits.	 In	addition,	 inputs	suppliers	and	cotton	ginners	relying	on	 their	political	
contacts,	 encouraged	 dissidence	 among	 farmers	 and	 actively	 supported	 the	 new	
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entrepreneurs	to	create	dissident	organisations.	About	29	per	cent	of	the	promoters	of	
breakaway	 organisations	 in	 the	 sample	 were	 newcomers	 in	 cotton	 production.	
Leaders	 of	 this	 category	 represented	 about	 16	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 leaders.	 Their	
influence	can	be	grasped	by	observing	their	level	of	involvement	in	the	organisations.	
They	all	occupied	positions	at	the	highest	level	in	the	hierarchy	from	where	they	could	
attend	 important	 board	 meetings	 and	 influence	 the	 process	 of	 decision‐making.	
Though	 some	 had	 been	 moonlighting	 as	 farmers,	 many	 others	 had	 never	 planted	
cotton.	 Some	 started	 cultivating	 cotton	 from	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	organisations,	
growing	 the	minimum	necessary	 to	be	 considered	 a	 cotton	 farmer.	A	 retired	 leader	
said:	“I	cultivate	cotton	because	I	am	on	the	board	of	the	network.”	
Being	 a	 cotton	 farmer	 was	 no	 longer	 a	 condition	 for	 membership	 of	 cotton	
organisations,	which	shed	doubt	on	 the	 intention	of	 the	new	 leaders	 to	 improve	 the	
management	 of	 organisations.	 Their	 main	 motive	 was	 to	 gain	 financially	 from	 the	
crop.	 A	 former	 federation	 leader	 contended	 that	 “creating	 cotton	 organisations	 has	
become	 a	 business	 to	 cheat	 farmers	 and	 be	 enriched”.	 Therefore,	 the	 intrusion	 of	
traders	 and	 intellectuals	 is	 seen	 by	 farmers	 and	 their	 former	 leaders	 as	 the	 main	
source	 of	 the	 trouble	 the	 sector	 and	 its	 actors	 have	 been	 experiencing.	 About	 the	
atomisation	of	cotton	organisations	and	its	corollaries	of	tension,	a	farmer	expressed	
his	grievance	as	follows:		
	
You	[intellectuals]	are	the	only	ones	responsible	for	conflicts	within	and	
between	cotton	organisations.	Our	woes	originate	from	the	top	and	the	
solution	may	come	from	the	top.	Write	down	on	your	note	book:	We	are	
disgusted	by	your	cotton.	
Source:	Focus	group	discussion,	Sekere,	January	2009	
	
Indeed,	pensioners	and	traders	led	and	masterminded	the	emergence	of	seven	of	the	
nine	 dissident	 organisations.	 But	 trust	 usually	 collapsed	 after	 a	 short	 collaboration.	
The	 promoters	 started	 accusing	 one	 another	 of	 secretly	 negotiating	 contracts	 with	
input	 suppliers	 and	 receiving	money	 from	 ginners	 before	 the	 cotton	was	 produced,	
thereby	 subordinating	 the	 organisations	 to	 the	 whims	 of	 businessmen.	 The	 most	
frequent	accusations	were	mismanagement	of	resources,	illicit	enrichment,	bad	social	
behaviour,	 and	 the	 denial	 of	 legality	 and	 a	 pronounced	 taste	 for	 racketeering.	 The	
vocabulary	used	by	the	former	proponents	who	soon	became	opponents	was	rich	with	
words	such	as	 ‘illiterate’,	 ‘bandit’	or	 ‘crook’.	The	scramble	to	take	control	over	these	
organisations	and	their	resources	resulted	 in	never‐ending	 inter‐personal	and	 intra‐
organisational	conflicts.	
4.5.4	 The	Altruist	and	the	Saint	
Anda	 is	 a	 retired	 agricultural	 engineer	 who	 gave	 himself	 the	 title	 of	 “itinerant	
benevolent	advisor	to	cotton	networks”.	He	considers	himself	an	experienced	authority	
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on	cotton	and	he	wanted	the	cotton	farming	community	to	benefit	from	that.	Having	
headed	an	agricultural	extension	agency	for	years	and	having	worked	in	the	Ministry	
of	Agriculture	and	Rural	Development,	Anda	still	has	connections	within	the	ministry.	
Because	 of	 that,	 he	 took	 it	 upon	 him	 to	 provide	 proofs	 of	 embezzlement	 and	 to	
confront	the	“illiterate	leaders”,	during	the	conflict	between	“Orou	Bagou”	and	“Orou	
Sori”.	 He	 worked	 together	 with	 his	 friend	 Segue,	 a	 retired	 primary	 school	 teacher.	
Anda	and	Segue	jointly	led	the	contestation	that	resulted	in	the	emergence	of	the	first	
breakaway	organisation.	They	wrote	 the	 statutes	 and	Anda’s	 home	 served	 as	office.	
The	organisation,	however,	was	 led	by	another	newcomer,	 a	 trader	who	 funded	 the	
initial	activities.	Both	friends	held	a	position	on	the	board,	Segue	as	the	secretary	and	
Anda	as	 the	advisor.	But	a	year	 later,	 they	could	not	 trust	 their	 leaders,	whom	 they	
accused	of	racketeering.	Consequently,	they	created	“their	own	organisation”,	always	
sharing	roles	on	the	board.	But	while	Anda	“never	has	cropped	a	plant	of	cotton”,	Segue	
grows	cotton.	
At	 the	 end	 of	 their	 first	 cotton	 season,	 Anda	 and	 Segue	 had	 a	 dispute	 about	 the	
redistribution	 of	 huge	 amounts	 of	money,	 about	which	 both	 have	 a	 different	 story.	
According	 to	 Segue,	 Anda	 would	 have	 claimed	 a	 percentage	 for	 advising	 the	
organisation.	 But	 according	 to	 Anda,	 Segue	 would	 have	 used	 the	 resources	 for	
personal	purposes.	While	Segue	considers	himself	a	saint	who	“never	has	misused	one	
franc”,	Anda	assumes	he	is	“hated	for	his	righteousness”.	After	they	had	masterminded	
and	 headed	 two	 dissident	 organisations,	 the	 once	 “best	 friends”	 ended	 up	 in	
exchanging	 correspondence	 in	 which	 they	 accused	 each	 other	 of	 greed	 and	 mis‐
conduct.	Anda	was	finally	thrown	out	of	this	second	organisation.	The	two	friends	had	
a	different	 interpretation	of	the	experience.	Segue	acknowledged	that	they	“were	the	
best	friends	in	the	world”,	whereas	Anda	denied	their	previous	friendship.	
4.5.5	 The	brothers‐in‐law	
Sidi	and	Boni	are	brothers‐in‐law.	Boni	is	a	farmer,	and	Sidi	a	trader.	When	Boni	was	
approached	 to	 lead	 a	 breakaway	 organisation	 backed	 up	 by	 executives	 of	 the	 State	
cotton	 parastatal	 company	 to	 “thwart	 the	 actions	 of	 private	 companies	 and	 secure	
supplies	to	the	State	cotton	ginning	mills”,	he	contacted	Sidi	to	help	spreading	the	new	
organisation	throughout	the	cotton	belt.	As	Sidi	said:	
	
I	was	 a	 trader	 and	 I	 did	 not	 grow	 cotton.	 They	 involved	me	 in	 this	
nightmare.	 I	was	at	home	when	 they	knocked	on	my	door.	They	 said	
they	wanted	 to	create	a	cotton	network	 that	would	be	profitable	and	
asked	 for	 my	 financial	 support.	 Who	 would	 refuse	 the	 promise	 of	
profits?	
	
As	promoters	of	the	organisation,	they	shared	the	roles	on	the	board.	Boni	became	the	
president	 and	 Sidi	 the	 secretary.	 They	 vied	 with	 contending	 organisations	 to	 get	
farmers	 adhere	 to	 theirs.	 But	 quarrels	 about	 the	 redistribution	 of	 production	
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outcomes	 and	other	 benefits	 broke	 the	 trust	 that	 had	prevailed	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	
endeavour.	 Sidi	 then	 plotted	 to	 overthrow	 Boni	 from	 the	 lead.	 With	 the	 newly	
appointed	 leader,	 he	 signed	 a	 deal	 by	 which	 the	 organisation	 was	 engaged	 to	
reimburse	 a	 private	 credit	 he	 got	 using	 his	 position	 as	 secretary.	 But	 Boni	made	 a	
successful	 come‐back	 as	 the	 president	 on	 the	 board.	 The	 credit	 scheme	 was	
discovered	and	Sidi	was	sent	to	jail.	The	former	allies	are	now	mutually	accusing	each	
other	of	falsification,	theft,	and	money	grabbing.	
4.6	 The	decay	of	“caution	solidaire”	and	the	demise	of	collective	
action	
The	“caution	solidaire”	is	a	collective	commitment	to	pay	for	cotton	inputs	allocated	to	
groups	by	all	the	affiliated	members	and	is	based	on	the	joint	liability	mechanism.	The	
mechanism	 was	 first	 used	 by	 the	 Grameen	 Bank	 to	 overcome	 traditional	 banking	
policies	 of	 lending	 that	 require	 physical	 collaterals	 and	 could	not	 be	 applied	 to	 dis‐
advantaged	 poor	 people	 (Ghatak	 &	 Guinnane,	 1999;	 Rai	 &	 Sjöström,	 2004).	 The	
formulae	became	popular	in	developing	countries	to	give	poor	people	access	to	credit.	
Among	the	reasons	mentioned	by	scholars	for	its	success	are	the	reduction	of	“trans‐
action	costs”,	the	“peer‐pressure”,	and	the	use	of	“social	capital”	(Ghatak	&	Guinnane,	
1999).	
In	 Benin’s	 cotton	 production,	 the	 caution	 solidaire	 allowed	 farmers	 access	 to	 basic	
inputs	 for	 cotton	production	without	any	 collaterals.	The	mechanism	contributed	 to	
the	production	boom	by	protecting	 farmers	 from	the	 incertitude	of	affording	 inputs.	
The	caution	solidaire,	however,	was	misinterpreted	and	showed	its	limits	later	on	due	
to	 its	 misuse.	 In	 its	 implementation,	 the	 only	 requirement	 to	 get	 credit	 was	
membership	of	an	organisation.	Therefore	the	only	guarantors	were	the	boards	of	the	
organisations,	and	not	individual	farmers.	In	addition,	the	organisations	were	so	large	
that	members	hardly	knew	one	another.	As	a	result,	all	actors	involved	drew	unduly	
huge	 advantages	 from	 the	 scheme.	 Inputs	 suppliers	made	 profits	 by	 over‐supplying	
inputs	to	farmer	organisations,	regardless	of	their	real	needs.	Leaders	in	turn	misused	
the	stocks	of	inputs	by	giving	inputs	to	acquaintances	who	were	neither	members	of	
an	 organisation	 nor	 producing	 cotton.	 Entire	 villages	 and	 organisations	 used	 more	
inputs	 than	 they	 needed	 and	 could	 afford.	 Because	 the	 mechanism	 entails	 the	
deduction	of	inputs	credit	before	farmers	are	paid,	cotton	repayment	became	erratic.	
Free‐riding	 behaviour	 of	 farmers	 trying	 to	 compensate	 their	 arrears	 increased,	
rendering	 the	 inputs	 credit	 recovery	 more	 problematic.	 Henceforth,	 self‐interest	
prevailed,	at	the	expense	of	the	group,	inflating	the	indebtedness	of	organisations.	As	
more	 positive	 attitudes	 and	 cooperation	 derive	 from	higher	 levels	 of	 trust	 (Dirks	&	
Ferrin,	 2001),	 it	 can	 be	 asserted	 that	 lower	 levels	 of	 trust	 result	 in	 more	 negative	
attitudes	and	lower	levels	of	cooperation	and	performance.	As	a	solution,	the	caution	
solidaire	 was	 extended	 from	 village	 level	 to	 district	 and	 province	 level,	 a	 strategy	
termed	the	communalisation	and	departmentalisation	of	the	caution	solidaire.	
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The	 extension	 of	 the	 caution	 solidaire	 aimed	 at	 securing	 the	 repayment	 to	 inputs	
suppliers,	 ignoring	the	problems	of	 farmers.	Indeed,	with	the	departmentalisation	of	
the	 caution	 solidaire,	 a	 village	 or	 an	 organisation	 could	 reimburse	 for	 an	 unknown	
village	 or	 organisation	 without	 the	 consent	 of	 its	 members.	 This	 aggravated	 the	
indebtedness	 in	 the	 sector	 by	 delaying	 the	 payment	 and	 increasing	 inter‐
organisational	 conflicts.	 Mismanagements	 affected	 common	 resources	 that	 were	
meant	 for	 collective	 action,	 leading	 to	 their	 scarcity.	 Thus,	 collective	 action	 was	
drastically	 reduced	 and	 frozen	 in	 many	 districts.	 Joint	 actions	 by	 multiple	
organisations	 became	 impossible,	 their	 relationships	 being	 dominated	 by	 distrust.	
Leaders	 mutually	 accused	 one	 other	 of	 mismanagement	 and	 plotting	 against	 their	
respective	 organisations,	 providing	 that	 fear	 and	 greed	 inhibit	 behaviour	 that	
contribute	to	public	goods	(cf.	Komorita	&	Parks,	1995).	
4.7	 Conclusion:	Killing	the	goose	that	lays	golden	eggs	
Cotton	production	yielded	important	amounts	of	resources,	which	allowed	rural	and	
semi‐urban	 communities	 to	 avail	 themselves	 of	 the	 basic	 infrastructure	 the	 State	
failed	to	supply	them	with.	The	early	stage	of	the	boom	in	cotton	production	revived	
the	hope	of	a	better	 life	 in	rural	areas.	However,	the	resources	generated	stirred	the	
appetite	 of	 traders	 and	 intellectuals	 who	 skilfully	 took	 over	 control	 of	 farmer	
organisations.	But	these	new	cotton	entrepreneurs	turned	out	to	be	more	greedy	and	
self‐interested	 than	 the	 former	 leaders.	 The	 lack	 of	 enforcement	 of	 rules	 combined	
with	 the	 decline	 of	 some	 cultural	 values	 such	 as	 unselfishness,	 encouraged	 mis‐
management	practices	that	remained	mostly	unpunished.	As	a	consequence,	mistrust	
and	its	corollaries	of	free‐riding	behaviour	and	lack	of	cooperation	increased,	freezing	
collective	 action.	 Cotton,	 previously	 considered	 the	most	 profitable	 crop	 and	 a	 cash	
cow,	 became	 troublesome	 for	 individuals	 and	 communities.	 The	 dynamics	 showed	
that	both	the	psychological	and	the	behavioural	components	of	trust	are	indispensable	
for	 an	 effective	 cooperation	 within	 groups.	 This	 is	 easier	 to	 realise	 within	 smaller	
groups,	where	members	 can	exert	more	 control	 on	one	 another	 and	 feel	 personally	
committed	 to	 their	 obligations.	 Hence,	 enforcing	 limits	 to	 the	 size	 of	 cotton	 farmer	
organisations	 would	 improve	 their	 functioning	 and	 preserve	 the	 public	 goods.
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Chapter	5	
	
	
Gender	Roles	in	Cotton	Production	and	Management	
of	Cotton	Organisations	in	Benin	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT:	 Women's	 productive	 roles	 have	 nurtured	 important	 debates,	
heuristic	as	well	as	practical,	in	the	scientific	and	development	community.	In	
Benin,	 women	 farmers	 are	 playing	 a	 key	 role,	 particularly	 in	 cotton	
production,	where	they	are	involved	throughout	the	production	process.	Only	
a	 negligible	 portion	 of	 them,	 however,	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 management	 of	
farmer	 organisations.	 The	 present	 chapter	 aims	 to	 identify	 factors	 that	
constrain	 or	 enable	 women's	 representation	 in	 the	 management	 of	 cotton	
organisations.	It	uses	survey	data	and	the	life	history	method.	The	latter	was	
applied	 to	 two	 women	 leaders	 who	 are	 exceptions	 to	 the	 rule,	 and	 their	
experience	 as	 board	 members	 of	 the	 organisations	 was	 documented.	 Both	
were	cajoled	and	pressed	into	their	position,	and	experienced	a	similar	end	by	
being	 ousted.	 The	 results	 suggest	 that	 gender	 myths	 and	 stereotypes	 are	
critical	 in	 women's	 involvement	 in	 managing	 organisations.	 Furthermore,	
men's	 motives	 for	 involving	 women	 in	 the	 management	 appear	 to	 be	
questionable.	
	
Keywords:	Cotton	farming;	gendered	division	of	labour;	women	leadership;	
Benin.	
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5.1	 Cotton	production	in	Benin	and	the	division	of	labour	
The	persistence	of	gender	disparities	in	Benin	and	its	ensuing	inequalities	in	access	to	
and	control	of	economic	and	social	resources	is	hindering	the	country's	economic	and	
social	development	(World	Bank,	2002,	2003).	The	prevalence	of	these	disparities	 is	
in	 part	 favoured	 by	 traditional	 codes	 overlapping	 with	 legal	 dispositions	 about	
gender,	 which	 are	 still	 governing	 the	 beliefs	 and	 behaviour	 of	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	
population	 (Falen,	 2008).	 Women	 are	 often	 "treated	 as	 minors	 with	 most	 of	 their	
rights	coming	through	their	relationships	with	men	–	fathers,	husbands,	and	brothers"	
(World	Bank,	2002:	17).	Gender	disparities	are	acute	in	rural	areas,	where	agriculture	
is	the	main	source	of	employment	and	where	traditional	practices	reproduce	women's	
subordinate	 position.	 Indeed,	 about	 80	 percent	 of	 the	 active	 population	 in	 Benin	
engages	 in	agriculture,	which	constitutes	an	 important	source	of	employment	 for	69	
percent	of	women	and	66	percent	of	men.	According	to	the	World	Bank	(2007:	320),	
women's	contribution	to	agricultural	activities	is	at	least	as	important	as	that	of	men,	
and	their	share	in	the	agricultural	labour	force	amounted	to	46	percent	in	2003‐2005.	
The	 increase	 of	 women's	 participation	 in	 agriculture	 is	 the	 result	 of	 changes	 in	
production	patterns	such	as	the	extension	of	cash	crops,	namely	cotton	(World	Bank,	
2002).	
Before	the	1990s,	 the	cotton	sector	was	under	a	state	monopoly.	 Its	production	was	
mostly	men‐business	and	its	revenues	were	marginal	(Gandonou,	2005;	World	Bank,	
2003).	At	that	time,	women	were	involved	in	cotton	production	by	working	as	casual	
labour	 for	 men’s	 cooperatives,	 the	 main	 instrument	 of	 cotton	 production	 (Albert,	
1993).	 From	 the	 early	 1990s	 onwards,	 cotton	 has	 become	 the	most	 important	 cash	
crop	in	Benin,	 thanks	to	the	 liberalization	of	the	sector	and	the	consecutive	boom	in	
production.	It	provided	up	to	80	percent	of	rural	households’	income	and	it	was	also	
responsible	for	40‐45%	of	the	total	foreign	exchange	earnings	of	the	State	(Gergely	&	
Poulton,	2009;	Hahonou,	2011).	Cotton	constituted	 the	only	agricultural	value‐chain	
of	 which	 the	 production	 was	 organized	 into	 a	 marketing	 channel	 (Nissanke	 &	
Mavrotas,	2010;	World	Bank,	2003).	A	network	of	institutional	stakeholders	managed	
the	 sector	 under	 the	 control	 of	 an	 inter‐professional	 association.	 Of	 these	
stakeholders,	 farmer	 organisations	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important.	
Individually	or	 as	 groups,	 farmer	were	producers	of	 raw	cotton	and	 constituted	 the	
largest	 stakeholders,	 though	 qualified	 as	 weak	 (Sinzogan	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 For	 the	
management	of	the	inputs	and	the	marketing	of	the	outputs,	farmers	were	organized	
from	 village	 to	 national	 level	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 three‐level	 administrative	
division	 of	 the	 country.	 At	 village	 level	 there	 were	 farmer	 groups,	 grassroots	
organisations	that	formed	a	farmer	union	at	the	districts	level.	District	farmer	unions	
formed	a	union	at	 the	provincial	 level,	 and	 the	 latter	 formed	a	 farmer	 federation	at	
national	level,	a	huge	network	of	farmer	organisations.	Each	level	of	the	organisation	
was	governed	by	a	board	where	members	were	elected	or	appointed.	Membership	in	
grassroots	organisation,	however,	was	 the	basic	 criterion	of	 accessing	 the	boards	at	
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any	hierarchical	level,	given	that	the	boards	of	these	grassroots	organisation	were	the	
departing	point	of	the	hierarchically	structured	network.	
Since	 the	 economic	 significance	 of	 cotton	 increased	 and	 cotton	 became	 critically	
important	 for	 rural	 welfare,	 its	 production	 moved	 from	 being	 primarily	 men's	
business	to	becoming	a	concern	of	both	men	and	women	(Baffes,	2004;	World	Bank,	
2002).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 women	 could	 have	 their	 own	 cotton	 plot,	 independently	
from	that	of	their	husband.	However,	only	those	who	were	heads	of	households	could	
be	 registered	 individually	 in	 the	 organisations	 and	married	women	 operated	 under	
the	 authority	 of	 their	 husbands	 (Tama‐Imorou	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 But	 still,	 women	were	
virtually	absent	 from	the	boards	of	organisations.	From	the	end	of	 the	1990s,	 intra‐	
and	inter‐group	conflicts	arose,	leading	to	the	atomisation	of	the	large	network,	which	
broke	 apart	 into	many	 conflicting	networks.	 Some	boards	 started	having	women	 as	
board	members.	Even	so,	women	are	still	critically	underrepresented	therein.	Cotton	
management	is	overly	male‐dominated,	exhibiting	a	huge	discrepancy	in	comparison	
to	women's	important	contribution	to	its	production.	The	gendered	division	of	labour	
in	cotton	farming	follows	the	traditional	pattern:	heavy	tasks	for	men	and	the	lighter	
ones	 for	 women	 (World	 Bank,	 2002).	 Tasks	 requiring	 physical	 strength,	 such	 as	
ploughing,	and	activities	that	pose	health	risks	or	require	specific	knowledge,	such	as	
the	 application	 of	 pesticides,	 are	 considered	 unsuitable	 for	 women.	 Insecticides	
treatment	is	deemed	to	be	particularly	more	harmful	to	women	than	to	men	(World	
Bank,	 2002).	 Tasks	 such	 as	 sowing,	 fertilizing	 and	 harvesting,	 are	 done	 by	 all	 the	
household	 members	 on	 the	 main	 plot,	 which	 is	 prioritized	 to	 any	 personal	 plot.	
Additionally,	 food	 has	 to	 be	 prepared	 for	 the	 workers,	 although	 this	 is	 rarely	
mentioned	as	a	cotton‐production	related	task.	Taking	this	all	into	consideration,	the	
World	 Bank	 (2002,	 2003)	 estimated	 that	 women	 spend	 more	 time	 in	 cotton	
production	 than	 men	 and	 that	 the	 time	 they	 devote	 to	 agricultural	 work	 could	 be	
under‐estimated	by	official	statistics.	
The	 present	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 bottlenecks	 to	 women's	 representation	 in	 the	
management	of	cotton	organisations	as	well	as	 factors	enabling	their	representation	
in	the	specific	setting	of	Benin.	It	addresses	the	following	questions.	Why	are	women	
underrepresented	 in	 cotton	 farmer	 organisations	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 increasing	
contribution	 to	 cotton	 production?	 What	 is	 the	 profile	 of	 women	 who	 do	 become	
board	members	of	cotton	organisations	and	what	kind	of	constraints	do	they	face?	In	
the	 sections	 that	 follow,	 we	 introduce	 the	 theoretical	 approach,	 after	 which	 we	
describe	 the	study	area,	particularly	with	 regard	 to	 the	gendered	division	of	 labour,	
and	 provide	 information	 on	 how	 the	 research	 was	 conducted.	 The	 results	 are	
presented	according	to	the	methods	of	data	collection.	Finally	we	discuss	the	findings,	
simultaneously	drawing	some	conclusions	and	implications	for	policy.	
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5.2	 Gender	and	leadership	
Women's	 reproductive	 functions	 have	 been	 always	 more	 acknowledged	 than	 their	
productive	 roles	 in	 society	 (Sprague	 &	 Kobrynowicz,	 1999).	 This	 has	 nurtured	
important	intellectual	debates,	heuristic	as	well	as	practical,	within	the	scientific	and	
development	 community,	 leading	 to	 theories,	 approaches,	 and	 concepts	 about	
women’s	position	and	needs	in	society	(eg.	Molyneux,	1985;	Moser,	1989,	1994).	Thus,	
Molyneux	(1985)	coined	the	concept	of	women's	interests	that	pertain	to	the	shared	
concerns	of	women	ensuing	from	their	 female	nature.	However,	 this	concept	glosses	
over	 the	 differences	 among	 women,	 and	 is	 different	 from	 the	 concept	 of	 gender	
interests	that	are	"those	arising	from	the	social	relations	and	positioning	of	the	sexes	
and	 therefore	 pertain	 [...]	 to	 both	 men	 and	 women"	 (Molyneux,	 1998).	 Gender	
interests	can	be	either	practical	or	strategic	(Molyneux,	1985;	Moser,	1989).	Practical	
gender	 interests	 are	 "interests	 based	 on	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 needs	 arising	 from	
women's	placement	within	the	sexual	division	of	labour",	such	as	access	to	safe	water	
for	domestic	production,	while	the	strategic	ones	relate	to	"those	involving	claims	to	
transform	social	relations	in	order	to	enhance	women's	position	and	to	secure	a	more	
lasting	 re‐positioning	 of	 women	within	 the	 gender	 order	 and	 within	 the	 society	 at	
large"	 (Molyneux,	 1998:	 232).	 The	 latter,	 therefore,	 include	 gender	 equity	 and	
reducing	women’s	subordinate	position.	
Gender	equity	 is	perceived	 to	be	beneficial	 to	 the	society	as	a	whole,	 and	can	result	
from	modernization,	when	 "socio‐economic	 development	 brings	 systematic	 changes	
in	political,	social,	and	cultural	life"	(Inglehart	&	Welzel,	2005:	46).	Recent	progress	in	
gender	 equity	 is	 reported	 in	 domains	 such	 as	 economics	 and	 politics	 (World	 Bank,	
2012).	 Gender	 differences	 in	 political	 participation	 in	 Sub‐Saharan	 Africa	 may	 be	
smaller	 thanks	 to	 institutionalised	 forms	 of	 participation,	 which	 constitute	 "safer	
arenas	 for	 women	 to	 participate"	 (Coffe	 &	 Bolzendahl,	 2011:	 259).	 However,	 this	
formal	equality	and	political	representation	hides	an	exclusion	from	leadership	roles.	
Most	 organisations	 may	 still	 	 exhibit	 gender	 disparities	 because	 of	 their	 failure	 to	
change	 (Ely	 &	 Meyerson,	 2000).	 For	 instance,	 based	 on	 informal	 practices	 and	
subjective	 criteria	 of	 competence,	 for	 a	 long	 time	 it	 has	 been	 conventionally	
understood	 that	 managerial	 jobs	 are	 for	 men	 and	 not	 suitable	 for	 women	 (Billing,	
2011;	 Ely	 &	Meyerson,	 2000).	 In	 addition,	women	 have	 a	 lesser	 voice	 than	men	 in	
decision‐making	both	in	the	private	and	public	sphere	and	are	poorly	represented	in	
the	public	 sphere	 (World	Bank,	 2012).	 Such	 a	paternalistic	 organisational	 culture	 is	
blocking	 women’s	 access	 to	 leadership	 positions.	 Particularly	 in	 rural	 areas	 in	
developing	countries,	women's	emancipation	seems	to	be	constrained	by	myths	and	
customs	that	are	still	 thriving	and	deprive	women	of	their	rights,	which	undermines	
the	 achievement	 of	 their	 strategic	 needs.	 For	 those	who	 reach	 leadership	 positions,	
they	have	to	conform	to	male	stereotypes	of	leadership	to	be	able	to	lead,	or	they	have	
to	 resign	 (Painter‐Morland,	 2011).	 Among	 factors	 that	 motivate	 some	 of	 them	 to	
resign	voluntarily	from	their	positions	are	the	"exclusion	from	male	social	networks"	
and	"values	clashes".	Thus,	"organisations	are	failing	to	retain	their	executive	female	
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talent	 because	 of	 their	 paternalistic	 organisational	 culture,	 the	 poor	 quality	 of	
management	 and	 their	 inability	 to	 accommodate	 the	 needs	 of	 their	 top	 female	
performers"	 (Clark	 &	 Kleyn,	 2011:	 203).	 Quoting	 Gardner	 (1995),	 Werhane	 and	
Painter‐Morland	 (2011:	 1)	 argued	 that	 defining	 leaders	 as	 "individuals	 who	
significantly	influence	the	thoughts,	behaviours,	and/or	feelings	of	others"	may	affect	
members’	 mindsets	 and	 results	 in	 a	 “demeaning”	 authority	 relationship.	 Instead,	
leadership	should	be	conceptualized	as	an	 interactive	and	complex	 interrelationship	
between	 various	 individuals	 or	 individuals	 and	 leaders	 of	 organisations.	 To	 better	
understand	 the	 gender	 role	 in	 leadership	 dynamics	 within	 organisations,	 Werhane	
and	 Painter‐Morland	 (2011)	 raised	 the	 point	 of	 why	 so	 few	 women	 rise	 to	 top	
leadership	positions	within	their	organisations.	The	answers	 lay	 in	persistent	myths	
about	 leadership	and	issues	of	the	site	where	leadership	is	enacted,	the	structures	it	
requires,	and	the	individuals	who	participate	in	it.	 In	society,	the	low	representation	
can	 be	 self‐perpetuating,	with	women	unable	 to	 convey	 their	 ability	 to	 lead	 (World	
Bank,	 2012).	 The	 present	 research	 sought	 to	 find	 out	 why	 so	 few	 women	 get	 into	
leadership	positions	in	cotton	organisations	and	whether	these	positions	empowered	
the	women	who	did.	
5.3	 Research	design	and	data	management	
The	data	used	come	from	a	research	project	about	cotton	networking	that	was	carried	
out	from	January	2009	to	April	2011	in	the	north‐eastern	provinces	of	Benin,	Borgou	
and	Alibori	from	where	the	bulk	of	the	cotton	produced	in	the	country	is	sourced.	As	
in	other	provinces	of	the	country,	traditional	codes	govern	the	gender‐related	beliefs	
and	behaviour	of	a	large	part	of	the	population	in	the	region,	which	overlap	with	legal	
dispositions.	 The	 region	 is	 characterized	 by	 many	 ethnic	 groups	 among	 which	 the	
Baatombu	are	dominant.	Baatombu	society	has	a	patrilineal	kinship	system,	virilocal	
residence,	 and	a	patriarchal	 culture.	Historically,	however,	women	could	have	many	
noble	titles	as	important	as	head	of	a	chiefdom9.	Few	of	the	honorary	ones	can	still	be	
inherited	 nowadays.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 achieved	 titles	 of	men,	 these	women	 titles	 are	
ascribed.	One	of	the	most	important	titles	is	that	of	"Yonkogui",	the	Queen	Mother	who	
chairs	 the	 name‐giving	 ceremony	 by	 shaving	 and	 bestowing	 a	 "baptismal	 name"	 on	
young	 descendants	 from	 noble	 families	 (Mama	 Debourou,	 2009;	 Schottman,	 2000:	
94).	 But	 still,	 women's	 productive	 functions	 are	 constrained	 by	 their	 limited	
entitlement	 to	 landed	property.	 Land	 is,	 indeed,	mostly	 community	 property	 in	 this	
region,	and	agricultural	 land	inheritance	is	regulated	by	customary	patrilineal	codes.	
As	a	result,	women's	"rights	are	contingent	on	status"	and	they	depend	upon	men	for	
the	location	of	their	personal	fields,	which	is	often	not	the	best	land	(Gray	&	Kevane,	
1999:	18;	World	Bank,	2002).	
The	research	used	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	methods	of	data	collection,	which	
were	applied	in	three	main	phases:	i)	an	exploratory	phase	of	focus	group	discussions	
																																																								
9	Key	informant	interview	with	Babou,	griot	(storyteller),	Parakou,	March	16th	2011.	
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with	farmers	in	ten	purposively	selected	villages;	ii)	individual	in‐depth	interviews	in	
five	 villages	with	 148	 respondents	 selected	 from	nine	 cotton	 organisations;	 and	 iii)	
key	 informant	 interviews	 that	 were	 done	 whenever	 a	 potential	 key	 informant	 was	
identified.	The	focus	group	discussions	used	a	check	list,	while	the	in‐depth	interviews	
were	 carried	 out	 by	 means	 of	 a	 semi‐structured	 questionnaire	 to	 simultaneously	
collect	quantitative	and	qualitative	data.	The	questionnaire	was	constructed	based	on	
the	outcomes	of	the	focus	group	discussions.	It	addressed	more	specific	gender	issues,	
such	as	the	division	of	labour	in	cotton	production,	and	women's	dependency	on	their	
husbands	during	and	after	the	cotton	boom.	Part	of	 the	data	was	collected	using	the	
life	history	method	(Angrosino,	2002;	Hagemaster,	1992),	which	was	applied	to	two	
women	 leaders.	We	 used	 their	 life	 stories	 as	 the	 primary	 data	 source	 (Shacklock	&	
Thorp,	 2005),	 but	 complemented	 them	 with	 individual	 in‐depth	 interviews	 for	 a	
better	 understanding	 of	 the	 full	 complexity	 of	 their	 lives	 (Pamphilon,	 1999).	 Issues	
addressed	included	the	women’s	family	of	origin,	their	own	family,	their	involvement	
in	cotton	production,	their	trajectory	as	board	members,	and	the	challenges	they	faced	
as	well	as	the	favourable	factors	that	helped	them	getting	on	the	board.	
For	 the	 individual	 interviews	 a	 sample	 of	 148	 cotton	 farmers	 was	 constructed,	
combining	 purposive	 and	 random	 sampling.	 A	 total	 of	 33	 leaders	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	
organisations'	hierarchy,	of	which	only	one	was	a	woman,	was	purposively	 selected	
for	 the	 first	 round	 of	 interviews.	 The	 remaining	 115	 farmers	 were	 selected	 by	
systematic	 sampling	 from	 farmer	 group	 membership	 lists	 at	 village	 level.	 These	
included	23	women,	which	raised	the	number	of	women	in	the	sample	to	24	(16%).	In	
search	 of	 women	 leaders	 in	 the	 organisations,	 we	 were	 informed	 of	 three	 other	
women	who	had	occupied	board	positions.	The	first	was	the	wife	of	a	leader,	who	had	
appointed	her	 to	be	"in	charge	of	women's	affairs."	She	 left	 the	position	a	 few	years	
ago,	after	she	divorced	her	husband.	The	other	 two	were	appointed	as	 treasurers	 in	
different	 villages,	 but	 both	 stopped	 many	 years	 ago	 and	 could	 not	 be	 reached.	
Therefore,	as	the	only	recently	active	women	on	cotton	organisations	boards,	the	two	
women	leaders	were	targeted	for	the	life	history	method.	
Quantitative	data	were	analyzed	using	SPSS	Statistics	19.0	for	a	t‐test	and	a	chi‐square	
to	compare	men	and	women	with	regard	to	their	characteristics	in	cotton	production,	
and	 a	 binary	 logistic	 regression	 to	 assess	 factors	 that	 affected	 farmers’	 leadership	
status	 in	cotton	organisations.	Qualitative	data	were	 interpreted	through	a	narrative	
analysis.	The	 life	stories	of	 the	two	women	leaders	were	transcribed	for	a	discourse	
analysis	(Shacklock	&	Thorp,	2005).	
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5.4	 Results	
5.4.1	 Gendered	profiles	of	cotton	farmers	and	the	division	of	labour	
The	 t‐test	 for	 equality	 of	 means	 (Table	 5.1)	 and	 the	 chi‐square	 (Table	 5.2)	 ran	 to	
compare	 cotton	 farmers’	 profile	 according	 to	 gendered‐groups,	 revealed	 significant	
differences	between	women	and	men	with	regard	to	selected	characteristics.	
Table	5.1	 Comparison	of	men’s	and	women’s	cotton	profile	(t‐test	for	equality	of	
means)	
Variables	 Gender	 				t	
Female	 Male	
Farmer’s	household	dependency	ratio	 	1.51	(.31) 	1.55	(.44)	 			‐.36
Experience	in	cotton	production	(Years) 14.17	(6.98) 21.32	(10.49)	 	‐3.22**
Cotton	production	in	Ha	(mean	2006‐2010)	 				.96	(1.13) 		2.91	(2.60)		 	‐3.61***
Share	of	cotton	income	(%)	 36.10	(19.91) 46.66	(27.26)	 	‐1.62
Cotton	organisational	membership	history 		1.67	(.70) 	2.15	(.78)	 	‐2.78**
Number	of	board	positions	occupied 					.29	(1.08) 	1.02	(.95)	 	‐3.38**
Duration	of	appointment	on	boards	(Years) 					.67	(2.70) 	4.62	(4.66)	 	‐4.02***
Note:	**	=	p<.01,	***	=	p	<	.001;	Figures	in	parentheses	are	standard	deviations	of	means.	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
On	average,	men	had	longer	experience	in	cotton	production	(M	=	21.32,	SD	=	10.48)	
than	women	(M	=	14.17,	SD	=	6.98),	with	 the	mean	difference	significant	at	p	<	 .01.	
Moreover,	men’s	cotton	area	was	larger	(M	=	2.91,	SD	=	2.60)	than	that	of	women	(M	
=	.96,	SD	=	1.13).	This	difference	was	highly	significant	at	p	<	.001.	
Table	5.2	 Cross‐tabulation	of	gender	and	education	
Level	of	Education	 Gender	 2	
Female	 Male	
No	education	(0)	 20	(83.3%) 63	(50.8%)	
9.05*	
Primary	school	(1) 	1	(4.2%) 26	(21.0%)	
Secondary	school	(2)	 	3	(12.5%) 31	(25.0%)	
University	(3)	 	0	(0.0%) 	 4	(3.2%)	
Note:	*	=	p	<	.05.	Percentages	appear	in	parentheses	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011		
With	 regard	 to	 the	 membership	 history	 in	 cotton	 organisations,	 women	 had	 been	
members	of	fewer	cotton	organisations	(M	=	1.67,	SD	=	 .70)	than	men	(M	=	2.15,	SD	
=	.78),	with	a	significant	difference	at	p	<	.01.	There	was	also	a	significant	difference	at	
p	<	.01	between	the	average	number	of	board	positions	occupied	by	men	(M	=	1.02,	SD	
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=	 .95)	and	by	women	(M	=	 .29,	SD	=	1.08).	A	highly	significant	difference	(p	<	 .001)	
also	 existed	 between	 the	 average	 duration	 of	 appointment	 on	 boards	 of	 men	 (M	 =	
4.66,	 SD	 =	 4.66)	 and	 that	 of	 women	 (M	 =	 .67,	 SD	 =	 2.70).	 In	 addition,	 the	 cross‐
tabulation	of	gender	and	education	showed	a	significant	association	between	the	level	
of	education	and	gender.	
When	asking	about	 the	division	of	work	 in	cotton	production,	 the	answers	reflected	
the	 taken‐for‐granted	 gendered	 division	 of	 labour	 that	 underrates	 women's	 share.	
Thus,	men	spontaneously	and	widely	cited	harvesting	as	exclusively	a	women's	task.	
Ploughing	 and	 pesticides	 treatment	 were	 listed	 as	 exclusively	 men’s	 tasks,	 while	
sowing	and	fertilizing	were	identified	as	shared	tasks.	However,	to	avoid	delays	in	the	
work	 on	 their	 cotton	 farms,	 certain	women	household	 heads	 are	 forced	 to	 perform	
tasks	 that	 were	 deemed	 unsuitable	 and	 risky	 for	 women,	 such	 as	 ploughing	 and	
pesticides	treatment.	Even	so,	 there	were	always	men	claiming	inferiority	of	women	
to	 men.	 During	 a	 discussion	 about	 the	 gendered	 division	 of	 labour,	 a	 former	
organisation	leader	alluded	to	women’s	inferiority	as	follows:	
	
Is	 it	 not	 you	 intellectuals	who	 have	 decreed	 that	women	 are	 equal	 to	 us	
men?	You	ignore	the	common	first	inquiry	after	a	birth.	Which	child	[sex]	is	
it?	"Tònkuro"	[a	girl],	meaning	someone	who	is	going	to	leave	the	home,	or	
"Tònduro"	[a	boy],	meaning	the	one	who	is	coming	into	the	house.	How	can	
you	equate	the	two?	
	
In	 addition,	 women	were	 less	 involved	 in	 the	management	 of	 cotton	 production	 at	
household	 level	 compared	 to	men,	 and	 this	was	 reflected	 in	 the	 level	of	 accuracy	of	
cotton‐related	 information	 they	 provided.	 While	 men	 were	 likely	 to	 record	 cotton	
production	 data	 in	 the	 area	 and	 could	 specify	 tonnage	 over	 the	 past	 years,	women	
rarely	did	so.	The	figures	the	latter	were	able	to	provide	were	mostly	the	amounts	of	
money	they	received	from	their	production.	To	shorten	the	attempt	to	recall	the	exact	
production	 records,	 a	woman	 admitted:	 "I	 do	 not	 go	 to	 the	 cotton	market.	 It	 is	 our	
husband	who	goes	there	and	brings	back	home	what	is	left	after	the	deduction	of	the	
inputs	costs."	
5.4.2		 Women	and	cotton	organisations	
Women	 figured	 in	 the	 organisation	 lists	 and	 represented	 about	 20	 percent	 of	 the	
random	sample.	However,	 they	still	 lacked	control	over	 their	membership	and	often	
did	not	know	the	name	of	the	organisation	they	belonged	to.	A	divorced	woman	said:	
"I	am	member	of	 the	organisation	of	which	my	brother	 is	a	member."	As	a	 result	of	
this	 lack	of	 control,	 she	 could	not	 freely	 change	organisation	as	 long	as	her	brother	
was	 a	member,	 though	 she	 had	 been	 growing	 cotton	 for	 three	 years	without	 being	
paid.	When	 the	brother	 finally	decided	 to	step	out,	 she	 felt	deeply	disappointed	and	
abandoned	cotton	growing.	
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Women's	 absence	 from	 cotton	marketing	 could	 generate	 tension	 among	 couples.	 A	
cotton	 farmer	 swore	 not	 to	 have	 received	 the	 money	 from	 the	 last	 cotton	 season,	
neither	 for	himself	nor	 for	his	wife.	But	 the	wife	did	not	believe	him.	 "She	has	been	
accusing	me	of	having	spent	her	money	without	telling	her",	complained	the	farmer.	A	
woman	 farmer	 had	 a	 different	 experience	 with	 her	 husband.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	
2007/08	 season,	 she	 had	 quite	 a	 good	 harvest	 and	 was	 expecting	 some	 cash.	
Meanwhile,	 her	 husband	 was	 indebted.	 Applying	 the	 principle	 of	 joint	 liability	 for	
debts	reimbursement	between	members	of	the	same	organisation,	the	board	used	the	
financial	outcome	of	the	woman's	production	to	compensate	for	her	husband's	debts,	
without	her	consent.	She	could	not	accept	that	"as	a	woman,	one	grows	cotton	to	pay	
for	a	man's	debts".	Because	of	her	husband's	incapacity	or	unwillingness	to	reimburse,	
she	decided	to	separate	and	to	go	back	to	her	family	of	origin.	There	were,	however,	
married	 women	 who	 grow	 cotton	 in	 shared	 plots	 with	 their	 husbands.	 They	 were	
mostly	not	registered	in	cotton	organisations	in	their	own	name.	After	marketing,	they	
receive	their	share	of	the	proceeds	from	their	husband.	In	polygamous	households	as	
we	 found	 in	 a	 remote	 village	 in	 the	 heart	 of	 cotton	 belt,	 the	 redistribution	 is	 done	
according	to	each	wife's	contribution	to	the	production	as	estimated	by	the	husband.	
A	 head	 of	 a	 polygamous	 household,	 husband	 of	 three	 wives,	 assumed	 that	 "this	
collective	way	of	growing	cotton	is	more	beneficial	for	wives	because	they	earn	more	
than	they	could	have	got	from	a	separate	plot."	
The	low	involvement	of	women	in	organisation	management	was	captured	by	another	
woman	in	the	following	statement:	"We	women,	we	do	not	know	the	answers	to	your	
questions	because	we	are	not	involved	in	the	management	of	the	organisation.	So	you	
should	 ask	 our	 husbands."	 Despite	 this	 complaint,	 a	 woman	 stated	 that	 "it	 is	 not	
worthwhile	 to	 be	 a	 board	member	 as	 a	woman	because	 you	will	 always	 be	 left	 out	
from	activities	with	no	information."	This	is	because	of	the	lack	of	consideration	from	
men	who	rarely	 judge	it	necessary	to	 involve	women.	"When	a	woman	is	 invited",	 it	
would	 be	 just	 symbolic,	 because	 "men	 would	 agree	 first	 among	 themselves	 before	
inviting	 you	 as	 a	 woman",	 argued	 another	 woman,	 assistant	 to	 the	 councilor	 of	 a	
village.	
The	 absence	 of	 women	 from	 cotton	 boards	 came	 out	 as	 one	 of	 the	 causes	 that	
triggered	lengthy	discussions	with	women	when	investigating	the	causes	of	conflicts	
within	and	between	farmer	organisations.	Indeed,	the	binary	logistic	regression,	with	
leadership	 as	 the	 dependent	 variable	 that	 takes	 the	 value	 “1”	 for	 leaders	 and	 “0”	
otherwise,	 revealed	 a	 positively	 significant	 effect	 of	 gender	 (p	 <	 .01)	 on	 leadership	
status	(Table	5.3).	
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Table	5.3	 Logistic	regression	of	factors	affecting	the	access	to	leadership	positions	in	
cotton	organisations		
Variables	 B	(SE)	 Exp(B)	
Farmer’s	household	dependency	ratio		 			‐.25	(0.64)	 					.78	
Experience	in	cotton	production	(Years)	 				.04	(0.02)	 		1.04	
Cotton	production	in	Ha	(mean	of	the	past	5	years)	 				.06	(0.10)	 		1.06	
Cotton	organisational	membership	history	 		1.01**	(0.34)	 		2.74	
Gender	 		3.05**	(1.13)	 21.07	
Level	of	education	 		1.82***	(0.37)	 		6.18	
Constant	 	‐6.29***	(1.73)	 					.00	
N	=	148;	R2	=	.56;	Model	2(6)	=	79.52;	Prediction	power	=	78.9%;	**	=	p	<	.01,	***	=	p	<	.001	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011	
	
Education	and	cotton	membership	history	were	also	significant	at	p	<	.001	and	p	<	.01	
respectively.	The	model	2(6)	=	79.52,	 it	had	also	a	good	prediction	power	of	about	
79%,	with	an	R2	=	.56.	
5.4.3		 Life	histories	of	women	leaders	
The	 life	 history	 method	 was	 applied	 to	 investigate	 the	 life	 experience	 of	 the	 two	
women	leaders	accessed	during	the	research.	
Case	1:	Rita	the	'iron	lady'	
Birth	and	childhood.	Rita	 is	a	57‐years‐old	woman,	 living	in	a	remote	village	in	the	
northwest	of	Benin.	Although	Rita’s	father	was	extremely	poor,	she	was	sent	to	school	
at	 the	 age	 of	 six.	 Rita	was	 still	 at	 primary	 school	 and	 nine	 years	 old,	 when	 –	 from	
money	 she	had	 saved	herself	 –	 she	 paid	 the	 taxes	 for	 her	 father,	who	was	 arrested	
because	he	could	not	afford	paying	them.	After	the	father	was	released,	he	declared,	in	
tears:	"If	it	were	possible	to	change	the	sex	of	a	child,	I	would	have	transformed	you	into	
a	boy	 to	stay	with	me	 forever."	When	Rita	was	 in	 the	 third	year	of	secondary	school,	
her	 father	 could	 no	 longer	 afford	 her	 education	 and	 took	 her	 out	 from	 school.	 Rita	
then	stayed	with	a	religious	foster	family,	where	she	took	up	petty	trade.	She	used	to	
sell	 at	 the	 church,	where	 she	met	her	husband	who	was	 the	pastor.	The	pastor	was	
amazed	by	her	diligence	and	hard	work	and	expressed	his	love	for	her.	
Own	family	life.	A	few	months	after	Rita	got	married	to	the	pastor,	he	was	assigned	to	
a	 remote	 village	where	 "life	was	hard",	 according	 to	Rita.	 But	 her	 experience	 of	 the	
economic	 hardship	 she	 had	 suffered	 as	 a	 child	 helped	 her	 facing	 the	 situation.	 She	
combined	 farming	 and	 petty	 trading	 to	make	 her	 family's	 living	more	 comfortable.	
The	relative	wealth	of	the	family	made	the	church	hierarchy	decide	to	send	them	twice	
to	places	where	they	would	not	have	the	opportunity	to	cultivate	or	 trade.	After	 the	
third	assignment,	Rita	had	an	argument	with	her	husband	who	would	not	let	her	farm	
anymore	because	he	did	not	want	to	be	moving	constantly.	However,	Rita	managed	to	
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acquire	 a	 piece	 of	 land	 and	 started	 farming,	 in	 combination	with	petty	 trading.	 The	
resources	generated	by	her	activities	allowed	them	to	build	the	house	they	currently	
live	in.	"I	am	proud	of	these	achievements.	We	have	no	salary	but	God	blessed	us!",	she	
said.	
Rita	 is	 a	 mother	 of	 twelve	 children,	 of	 whom	 only	 her	 eldest	 daughter	 got	 a	
baccalaureate,	 but	 she	 refused	 to	 continue	with	 her	 studies.	 On	 the	 ground	 of	 that	
refusal	and	the	ensuing	behaviour,	they	had	a	strong	argument	that	led	to	a	breach	of	
contact	between	the	mother	and	the	daughter.	
Cotton	farming	and	related‐organisations	activism.	Rita	started	growing	cotton	at	
the	 end	 of	 the	 1980s,	 after	 the	 third	 assignment	 of	 her	 husband.	 In	 1998,	 she	was	
elected	 as	 the	 treasurer	 of	 the	 district	 farmer	 union,	 "against	 a	man",	 she	 proudly	
specifies.	From	2001	onwards,	after	Rita	resigned	from	the	organisation,	she	had	led	
the	 implementation	 of	 three	 cotton	 dissident	 organisations	 in	 the	 district.	 She	 was	
successively	appointed	as	in	charge	of	women's	affairs,	deputy	treasurer,	and	general	
secretary	in	the	respective	boards.	She	always	battled	for	better	management	of	these	
organisations.	
In	the	third	organisation	she	was	a	member	of,	the	private	cotton	ginner	they	supplied	
with	 their	production	at	 their	 second	season	brought	 in	 several	million	FCFA	 to	 the	
organisation.	The	few	board	members	who	collected	the	money	from	the	businessman	
kept	 it	 for	 themselves	 and	 denied	 having	 received	 it.	 Among	 the	 frustrated	 board	
members,	Rita	was	the	only	one	who	dared	to	confront	them	on	the	issue	at	stake.	She	
declared	 them	 guilty	 at	 a	 meeting.	 The	 other	 male	 colleagues	 afterwards	
congratulated	her:	"We	really	appreciated	your	courage,	and	we	would	like	you	to	join	
us	to	create	our	own	organisation."	But	she	straightforwardly	notified	the	men	of	her	
fears,	 saying	 that	 she	 preferred	 to	 stay	 at	 home	 to	 take	 care	 of	 herself	 instead	 of	
suffering	for	people	"who	will	leave	me	out	from	the	redistribution	of	the	benefits."	But	
they	 promised	 her	 that	 such	 things	 would	 not	 happen.	 The	 initial	 meeting	 was	
organized	at	her	place,	where	 they	decided	 to	create	a	new	cotton	organisation	and	
assigned	 board	 positions	 to	 the	 creators.	 The	 organisation	 operated	 for	 four	 years	
before	an	extraordinary	assembly	was	convened.	Rita	refused	to	attend	because	she	
was	informed	very	late	and	had	to	travel	far	for	the	meeting.	In	addition,	she	could	not	
leave	while	her	husband	was	on	travel.	At	the	meeting,	partial	changes	were	made	in	
board	membership	positions	and	Rita	was	ousted	for	"unknown	reasons".	About	her	
not	having	 reacted	 to	being	ousted,	Rita	 explained:	 "I	decided	 to	keep	quiet	 to	avoid	
controversies,	though	they	have	never	notified	me	of	any	fault	of	mine	for	being	ousted	in	
that	way."	
Being	successively	a	member	of	many	cotton	organisations	boards,	Rita	attended	the	
most	 important	meetings	and	negotiations	with	 inputs	suppliers,	most	of	whom	she	
accused	of	being	inclined	to	corruption.	She	said	that	many	times	she	had	been	offered	
important	amounts	of	money,	directly	or	through	intermediaries.	She	felt	quite	proud	
CHAPTER	5	
	
108	
	
to	 never	 have	 succumbed	 to	 the	 temptation.	 She	 also	 faced	 all	 kinds	 of	 gender	
stereotypical	naming,	because	"men	have	never	accepted	me	as	a	full	member	capable	
of	achieving	something",	she	commented.	Her	commitment	earned	her	the	nicknames	
'iron	lady'	from	her	fellow	board	members	and	'crusher'	from	inputs	suppliers.	"They	
thought	that	by	nicknaming	me,	I	would	be	upset	and	give	up,	but	I	did	not	mind",	she	
said.	 Rita	 still	 recalls	 how	 some	 people	 tried	 to	 discourage	 and	 demobilize	 her	
followers	 when	 she	 promoted	 the	 breakaway	 organisations,	 saying:	 "You	 are	 silly!	
Otherwise	you	would	not	 follow	a	woman.	Do	you	want	to	be	ruled	by	a	woman?"	But	
she	 did	 not	 give	 up	 and	 many	 followers	 trusted	 her.	 For	 that,	 she	 judged	 her	
participation	on	the	boards	as	a	success	and	continues	growing	cotton.	She	said:	
		
If	I	stop	producing	cotton	now,	farmers	would	think	that	I	betrayed	them.	
They	 acknowledge	 my	 contribution	 in	 defending	 their	 interests	 and	
usually	say:	'Without	that	woman	who	halted	other	board	members'	theft,	
we	would	have	been	 in	a	 lot	of	trouble	 for	a	 long	time'.	I	am	grateful	for	
such	an	acknowledgment.	
	
Membership	 in	organisations.	 Rita	 is	 also	 a	member	 of	many	 organisations	 other	
than	 cotton,	 on	 the	 boards	 of	which	 she	 has	 positions	 like	 president	 (of	 a	women’s	
group)	and	treasurer	(on	the	board	of	the	district	civil	society	organisation).	For	over	
ten	years	she	has	kept	her	 leading	position	in	the	women’s	group.	When	it	comes	to	
renew	 the	board	members,	"women	 say	 'It	 is	you	we	prefer'	and	 they	do	not	want	 to	
replace	me",	 she	 argued.	Rita	 also	 has	 a	 political	 life,	 though	with	 no	 affiliation	 to	 a	
particular	 political	 party.	 In	 2008,	 she	 headed	 an	 independent	 list	 and	 ran	
unsuccessfully	for	a	position	at	a	municipal	council.	
According	 to	 Rita,	 her	 domestic	 responsibilities	 rarely	 impede	 her	 activism.	 "My	
husband	encourages	me	 in	my	organisational	activities	 [...].	He	 is	not	 like	others",	 she	
said.	Replying	to	the	question	as	to	why	she	has	been	appointed	on	some	many	boards	
and	how	she	deals	with	the	duties,	Rita	contended:	"You	know	nobility	is	not	given;	it	is	
deserved."	
Case	2:	Gnon	the	'libertine'	
Birth	and	 family	of	origin.	Born	as	 the	eldest	of	 a	 family	of	 five	brothers	and	 four	
sisters,	 Gnon	 is	 a	 37	 year‐old	 widow,	 living	 with	 her	 siblings,	 together	 with	 their	
widowed	mother.	She	takes	care	of	the	family	with	the	help	of	her	unmarried	younger	
brother.	 However,	 it	 is	 rather	 the	 brother	who	 acts	 as	 the	 head	 of	 their	 household.	
Gnon	 dropped	 out	 from	 school	 when	 she	 was	 in	 the	 third	 grade,	 because	 she	 was	
ashamed	to	have	to	repeat	the	class	while	her	friends	went	to	a	higher	grade.	"It	was	
due	to	 ignorance.	If	 it	were	now,	I	would	have	simply	redone	my	class.",	she	regretted.	
After	 Gnon	 dropped	 out,	 she	 was	 trained	 as	 a	 seamstress.	 Soon	 after	 getting	 the	
diploma,	she	got	married.	
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Own	family.	Gnon	married	into	a	large	household	of	seven	married	brothers,	sharing	
domestic	tasks	with	many	"co‐wives".	She	gave	birth	to	four	children.	Her	matrimonial	
duties	did	not	impede	her	organisational	activism,	in	spite	of	the	gossip	going	on	at	the	
time	 because	 of	 her	 multiple	 travels	 for	 training.	 Her	 husband	 was	 regularly	
confronted	with	statements	such	as:	"You	an	illiterate	farmer,	you	have	a	drop‐out	wife	
travelling	everywhere	[...]	Make	her	stop	these	activities".	But	he	would	answer:	"Only	
her	father	knows	how	much	he	expended	to	educate	her.	I	am	not	willing	to	spoil	her	job.	
I	even	like	her	to	continue	because	what	she	finds	belongs	to	my	family."	This	husband	
died	prematurely,	much	to	Gnon’s	regret.	
After	her	husband's	death,	 she	and	all	her	 children	 returned	 to	her	 family	of	origin.	
However,	she	continues	cultivating	the	land	of	her	late	husband,	and	which	is	owned	
by	her	 family‐in‐law.	Five	years	after	 the	husband's	death,	 the	eldest	brother‐in‐law	
asked	her	to	leave	this	plot	of	land,	of	which	the	yields	were	used	to	raise	her	children.	
Allegedly,	 the	 brother‐in‐law	 declared:	 "A	 woman	 cannot	 inherit	 land	 from	 her	
husband!"	
Cotton	 farming	 and	 the	 cotton	 organisation	 experience.	 Though	 Gnon	 started	
producing	cotton	with	her	husband,	her	involvement	with	cotton	boards	started	after	
her	 husband's	 death.	 As	 a	widow	 and	 relatively	 free	 in	 a	 society	 full	 of	 stereotypes	
about	unmarried	woman,	Gnon	first	served	as	the	person	in	charge	of	weighing	cotton	
in	a	farmer	group.	When	the	fourth	breakaway	organisation	emerged	in	the	village,	its	
local	president	could	not	 find	a	man	 to	be	 the	secretary,	due	 to	a	violent	conflict	he	
was	involved	in.	He	approached	Gnon	and	tried	to	convince	her	to	accept	the	position.	
She	refused.	He	asked	Gnon's	parents	to	intercede	for	him,	explaining	that	he	pressed	
their	daughter	 to	 'save	him	 from	shame'	but	 that	 she	 refused.	Gnon's	 father	obliged	
her	 to	 accept	 the	 position,	 ordering	 "to	 go	 and	 help	 him	 doing	 what	 he	 wanted."	
According	to	Gnon,	her	presence	on	the	board	made	the	group	steadily	grow	in	size.	
She	recalled	new	members	saying:	"As	it	is	a	woman	who	is	the	secretary	of	this	group,	
the	group	 should	be	 trustworthy	because	women	are	not	 contaminated	by	hypocrisy."	
However,	she	also	challenged	sceptics	who	were	waiting	to	see	how	a	woman	would	
be	able	to	manage	cotton	marketing	and	pay	farmers.	She	proudly	added:	"I	marketed	
cotton	as	any	man	could	do.	I	had	no	debts	and	no	arrears."	To	the	question	what	made	
her	 leave	 the	 organisation,	 she	 answered:	 "If	 a	 husband	who	 courted	 you	 does	 not	
accept	you	anymore,	better	leave	him	and	go	your	way..."	
Indeed,	at	the	end	of	their	second	cotton	season,	the	organisation	decided	to	allocate	
motorbikes	 to	 some	 leaders.	Gnon's	was	selected	among	 those	 leaders	because	"our	
only	lady	is	so	brave	and	hard‐working	that	she	deserves	a	motorbike",	some	of	her	men	
colleagues	would	have	argued.	But	a	few	days	before	the	allocation	of	the	motorbikes,	
a	 board	 meeting	 was	 convened	 by	 the	 president.	 The	 president	 would	 have	
introduced	the	meeting	straightforwardly:	
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At	 the	 point	 we	 are	 now,	 the	 government	 [...]	 said	 that	 it	 is	 time	 for	
change.	 You	 Gnon,	 as	 I	 see	 you,	 you	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 do	 the	 work	
pertained	by	that	change	in	cotton	management;	it	is	beyond	a	woman's	
capabilities.	
	
Replying	to	the	question	as	to	why	this	work	would	be	beyond	a	woman's	capability,	
Gnon	 commented:	 "Because	 change	 has	 come,	 our	 president	 said	 [...]	 and	 only	men	
would	be	members	of	 their	board."	 In	spite	of	her	disenchantment,	Gnon	respectfully	
knelt	in	front	of	the	president,	saying	with	loquacity:	
		
Daddy,	thank	you.	When	you	needed	me	to	run	the	organisation,	I	was	not	
an	incapable	woman.	But	I	will	tell	you	one	thing:	this	is	a	'white	power'	
[a	modern	power].	If	it	were	the	traditional	title	I	am	entitled	to	inherit,	
you	would	 never	 have	 been	 able	 to	 oust	me	without	 fear	 for	 your	 life.	
Thank	you	and	only	God	will	pay	you	back.	
	
And	she	left	the	meeting.	When	Gnon	got	back	home,	she	reported	to	her	parents	what	
had	just	happened:	
	
You	 remember	 that	 the	 president	 told	 me	 a	 gourd	 of	 honey	 was	
hanging	on	and	on	the	day	it	would	be	mature,	I	would	benefit	greatly	
from	 it.	 Today	 this	 honey	 is	mature,	 but	 he	 broke	 the	 container	 and	
poured	all	the	honey	on	the	floor	before	I	could	enjoy	it.	
	
She	 explained	 how	 she	was	 just	 ousted	 from	 the	 cotton	 board	 and	 held	 her	 father	
accountable	 for	 that	 outcome.	 The	 father	 argued	 that	 a	 board	 position	 is	 not	 an	
inherited	title	and	that	God	would	requite	the	president	for	what	he	had	done.	
Membership	 in	 organisations.	 Gnon	 is	 a	 very	 active	 woman	 who	 participates	 in	
diverse	activities.	Apart	from	sewing,	she	is	the	secretary	of	a	women’s	group,	the	only	
woman	 literacy	 teacher	 in	 the	 village	 for	 ten	 years,	 and	 a	 community	 volunteer	 for	
health	promotion.	Gon’s	membership	in	organisations	other	than	cotton	started	a	few	
months	 after	 she	 got	 her	 diploma,	when	 she	was	 appointed	 as	 the	 secretary	 of	 the	
group	 without	 her	 knowing.	 But	 despite	 being	 busy	 with	 all	 these	 duties,	 she	 has	
misgivings	 about	being	 a	 'free	woman'.	 She	 feels	 people's	 eyes	on	her	because	 they	
think	 that	 she	 does	 not	 want	 to	 marry	 again	 to	 keep	 her	 freedom.	 "I	 am	 really	
concerned	about	getting	a	husband,	but	I	am	not	lucky",	she	concluded.	
Men’s	reaction	to	women’s	ousting	
Men	were	not	inclined	to	comment	on	the	way	the	two	women	leaders	were	ousted.	
The	president	of	Rita's	organisation,	who	was	ousted	together	with	her,	explained	that	
he	did	not	attend	the	meeting	because	he	decided	to	stay	far	from	cotton,	which	had	
become	a	 troublesome	business.	He	 said	he	did	not	know	why	Rita	was	ousted	and	
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was	 not	 "willing	 to	 comment	on	 it".	 The	 newly	 appointed	 president	 argued	 that	 the	
former	board,	of	which	he	was	also	a	member,	"did	not	report	to	network	members".	As	
for	 the	 leader	of	Gnon's	organisation,	he	 found	one	peccadillo	of	Gnon	 to	 justify	her	
ousting:	"You	know	she	is	not	so	clean	morally."	
5.5	 Discussion	and	conclusion	
The	 random	 selection	 of	 women	 from	 the	 list	 of	 the	 organisations	 reveals	 that	
women’s	 membership	 of	 cotton	 organisations	 has	 progressed	 and	 that	 they	 can	
actually	be	registered	as	members	in	their	own	name.	This	could	be	(partly)	a	result	of	
the	 atomisation	 of	 organisations	 with	 its	 corollary	 of	 competition	 for	 membership.	
Hence,	 women’s	 relatively	 recent	 investment	 in	 cotton	 production	which	 limits	 the	
expression	of	their	potential	of	production.	Women’s	ignorance	of	their	organisations	
of	membership	means	that	some	of	them	might	have	been	registered	by	their	husband	
or	other	male	relatives	to	increase	the	group	size.	The	ensuing	culturally	underpinned	
division	of	labour	has	social	implications	by	forcing	women	to	adopt	and	adapt	to	men	
hegemonic	 views,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 that.	 Deeply	 entrenched	myths	 and	
stereotyped	images	are	internalized	by	women	as	well,	although	they	are	demeaning	
to	 them.	 This	 is	 what	 Bourdieu	 (1989:	 18)	 called	 “construction	 carried	 out	 under	
structural	constraints”,	a	process	through	which	even	the	most	disadvantaged	actors	
tend	 to	perceive	 the	 familiar	world	as	natural.	This	 false	 consciousness	 justified	 the	
woman	farmer’s	contestation	of	the	(forced)	use	of	her	yields	to	pay	for	her	husband's	
debts,	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 her	 "femininity".	 Such	 cognitive	 processes	 take	 place	 in	
everyday	life.	The	significant	differences	between	men	and	women	with	regard	to	the	
experience	 in	 cotton	production,	 the	 area	planted	with	 cotton,	 and	 the	 organisation	
membership	 profile	 (membership	 history,	 number	 of	 board	 positions	 and	 the	
duration	of	the	appointment)	are	certainly	rooted	in	these	processes.	In	this	instance,	
harvesting	 is	 widely	 considered	 a	 women’s	 task	 in	 cotton	 production,	 because	 it	 is	
presumably	easy.	 In	 reality,	harvesting	 is	 a	 tiring	activity.	 It	 is	 very	 time‐consuming	
and	 requires	 concentration.	 In	 addition,	 performing	 tasks	 in	 cotton	 production	 has	
revealed	 a	blurred	boundary	between	 'heavy	 and	 risky	 tasks'	 and	 'light	 tasks'	 since	
the	 labour	 constraints	 force	 women	 to	 perform	 tasks	 that	 are	 supposedly	 men’s	
preserve.	 As	 a	 result,	 women's	 participation	 in	 cotton	 production	 actually	 runs	
throughout	 the	 complete	 production	 cycle.	 This	 shows	 how	 women's	 tasks	 are	
underrated,	while	men	are	reluctant	to	do	them.	A	similar	observation	has	been	made	
in	Uganda	where	a	systematical	perceptional	bias	against	work	performed	by	women,	
which	 then	becomes	de‐skilled	and/or	de‐valued,	undermines	women’s	ability	 to	be	
fairly	remunerated	(Lodin,	2012).	
In	spite	of	women’s	omnipresence	throughout	the	production,	they	were	found	to	be	
largely	absent	 from	the	cotton	market,	where	the	produce	 is	weighed	and	payments	
are	 made,	 thereby	 lacking	 the	 control	 over	 the	 yields.	 Women	 were	 deprived	 of	
essential	 information	 and	 had	 limited	 autonomy	 in	 decision‐making	 within	 cotton	
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organisations.	They	accepted	the	money	from	their	own	production	given	to	them	by	
their	male	representatives	more	by	resignation	than	by	trust,	as	it	was	shown	by	the	
disputes	between	the	two	farmers	and	their	respective	spouses	described	above.	This	
lack	of	control	of	women	in	the	public	sphere	originates	from	cultural	practices	that	
strongly	shape	women's	position	in	the	private	sphere,	and	that	affect	their	strategic	
as	well	 as	 practical	 interests.	 For	 instance,	 economic	 and	 consumption	 needs	made	
both	 Rita	 and	 Gnon	 the	 de	 facto	 heads	 of	 their	 respective	 households,	 though	with	
different	 entitlements.	While	 Rita's	 role	 in	 the	 household	 was	 acknowledged,	 Gnon	
was	not	entitled	to	head	hers,	 though	 in	 fact	she	was	doing	so.	Her	younger	brother	
was	seen	as	the	head	of	the	household,	due	to	social	and	cultural	norms	that	prevent	a	
woman	 from	 heading	 a	 household	 where	 there	 is	 a	 man	 (Moser,	 1994).	 Also,	 the	
society	 at	 large	 seems	 to	 resist	 to	 women's	 autonomy,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 the	
stereotypical	 reasoning	 the	 two	 women	 leaders	 faced	 in	 their	 family	 and	 cotton	
networking	experience.	Women	exercising	 their	agency	hardly	manage	 to	overcome	
the	hurdles	that	block	their	aspirations.	Consequently,	when	meeting	practical	gender	
needs	 is	 the	 overriding	 concern,	 meeting	 their	 strategic	 gender	 needs	 can	 be	 put	
beyond	women's	reach	and	becomes	mortgaged.	
Women	have	a	poorer	cotton	organisational	membership	history	than	men.	The	high	
effect	 on	 and	 positive	 correlation	 of	 cotton	membership	 history	 with	 leadership	 in	
cotton	organisations	means	 that	 the	more	 cotton	organisations	 a	 farmer	has	been	a	
member	of,	the	more	likely	s/he	would	be	a	board	member.	The	odds	of	becoming	a	
board	member	was	 about	 3	 for	 an	 increase	 by	 1	 of	 the	 number	 of	 organisations	 a	
farmer	has	belonged	to.	Leadership	in	cotton	organisations	was	also	highly	affected	by	
gender,	and	by	education	that	women	were	less	endowed	with.	Less	than	one	fifth	of	
women	 in	 the	 sample	 had	 formal	 education	 against	 one	 of	 two	men.	 However,	 the	
World	Bank	(2012:	80)	identified	education	as	one	the	main	factors	to	reduce	gender	
gaps	 in	 the	 developing	 world.	 Moreover,	 the	 positive	 correlation	 of	 education	 and	
gender	 with	 leadership	 in	 cotton	 organisations	 implies	 that	 their	 effects	 had	 been	
cumulatively	 undermining	 women’s	 position	 therein.	 The	 odds	 ratio	 of	 21.07	 for	
gender	means	that	for	each	shift	from	0	(female)	to	1	(male),	a	farmer	was	about	21	
times	more	likely	to	become	a	leader	in	cotton	organisations.	This	likelihood	for	one	
level	 different	 in	 education	was	 about	 6.	 These	 illustrate	 how	women	 are	 excluded	
from	 cotton	 organisations.	 Crenshaw	 (1991)	 coined	 the	 concept	 of	 intersectionality	
for	such	interactions.		
The	research	showed	that	Rita	and	Gnon	were	exceptions.	Both	exhibited	exceptional	
features	 that	 many	 other	 women	 lacked,	 and	 which	 might	 have	 come	 into	 play	 in	
favouring	 the	 emergence	 of	 their	 leadership.	 Rita	 and	 Gnon	 were	 relatively	 well	
educated	women	in	their	respective	villages.	At	household	 level,	both	Rita	and	Gnon	
were	fortunate	to	have	open‐minded	husbands	whom	they	both	qualified	as	'different	
from	 the	 other	 men'.	 Rita’s	 hardworking	 caused	 her	 family	 to	 be	 moved	 from	 one	
place	 to	 another	 by	 the	 church	 hierarchy.	 As	 for	 Gnon,	 her	 capabilities	 were	
acknowledged	 by	 her	 late	 husband	 who	 rejected	 the	 gossip	 going	 on	 about	 her,	
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although	his	attitude	seems	rational	 in	view	of	 the	benefits	 for	 the	household	of	his	
wife's	 extra‐domestic	 activities.	 Men	 may	 be	 inclined	 to	 give	 more	 freedom	 to	
women's	 activities	 when	 they	 find	 them	 rewarding	 for	 themselves.	 Consequently,	
picturing	 gender	 equity	 as	 being	 in	men's	 interest	 could	 help	 to	 have	 it	 gain	more	
acceptance	among	the	male	community	in	rural	areas.	
Rita	and	Gnon	were	quite	active	as	members	of	and	having	responsibilities	 in	many	
organisations,	 which	 might	 have	 justified	 why	 they	 were	 among	 members	 with	 a	
richer	membership	history	in	cotton	organisations.	Rita's	initiative	and	assertiveness	
enabled	her	 to	 confront	her	male	board	mates	with	 their	 embezzlements.	Thus,	 she	
appeared	to	be	a	natural	leader	by	interacting	effectively.	This	is	why	she	was	referred	
to	 by	 many	 farmers,	 including	 men,	 for	 agricultural	 issues	 even	 before	 she	 was	
appointed	 as	 the	 treasurer	 of	 the	 district	 union.	As	 a	 result,	 she	 benefited	 from	 the	
ordinary	 farmers'	 support	 and,	 in	 turn,	 was	 concerned	 about	 being	 continuously	
trusted	by	these	farmers,	to	whom	she	felt	obliged.	As	Werhane	and	Painter‐Morland	
(2011:	3)	stated,	"leadership	is	not	necessarily	restricted	to	individuals	appointed	to	
positions	of	authority,	but	is	a	dispersed	capacity	of	the	organisation	as	a	whole."	Rita	
herself	 concluded	 the	 interview	 with	 a	 meaningful	 statement	 about	 the	 deserved	
character	of	nobility.	
The	fate	of	the	two	women	leaders	within	their	respective	organisations	confirms	the	
male	 stereotypical	denial	of	women's	 capabilities	 to	 lead,	 although	men	 individually	
admitted	these	capabilities.	Paternalistic	culture	is	still	dominant,	causing	men	to	deny	
certain	principles	at	group	level	while	personally	acknowledging	them.	However,	the	
reaction	 of	 Rita	 and	 Gnon	 to	 the	 unfair	 way	 they	 were	 ousted	 uncovers	 some	
differences	 of	 perception	 between	 men	 and	 women	 about	 organisation‐related	
conflicts.	Gnon's	reaction	shows	how	the	same	reference	to	traditional	noble	titles	is	
negotiable,	offering	a	different	perspective.	Considering	the	position	on	the	board	as	
an	elected	and	a	non‐ascribed	title	implies,	regardless	of	how	she	was	ousted,	that	she	
understood	that	as	a	board	member	one	is	replaced	by	somebody	else	at	some	point	in	
time.	 Rita's	 reaction	 was	 to	 keep	 quiet	 and	 not	 to	 stir	 trouble,	 while	 cotton	
organisations	 in	 Benin	 have	 been	 characterized	 by	 a	 stiff	 leadership	 competition.	
Indeed,	most	male	leaders	were	known	for	their	reluctance	to	leave	their	positions	on	
boards,	 referring	 to	 traditional	 ascribed	 titles	 to	 justify	 their	 behaviour.	 Thus,	 the	
women's	 reaction	 to	 group	 conflicts	 contrasted	 radically	 with	 that	 of	 the	 men.	 As	
indicated	by	Carli	(1989),	while	men	focus	more	on	disagreements,	women	are	more	
likely	 to	 voice	 agreements.	 The	 women's	 presumption	 that	 their	 presence	 on	 the	
boards	 could	 reduce	 intra‐groups	 conflicts	 does	not	 seem	 to	be	 entirely	unfounded,	
although	in	this	case	the	two	women	leaders	were	disempowered.	Consequently,	"the	
socialized	differences	between	men	and	women"	that	are	captured	in	the	concept	of	
gender	 should	 highlight	 the	 value	 of	 the	 female	 nature	 for	 an	 "effective	 and	much‐
needed	management	style"	(Ely	&	Meyerson,	2000:	108‐109).	
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Chapter	6	
	
	
Rural	Households’	Responses	to	the	Cotton	Crisis	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT:	 Relying	 on	 one	 source	 of	 income	 puts	 the	 livelihood	 system	 of	
rural	 households	 at	 risk.	 Cotton	production	 in	Benin	has	 long	been	 the	 core	
cash	crop	of	rural	livelihoods,	until	the	mid‐2000s	when	multiple	constraints	
led	to	the	demise	of	cotton.	The	present	chapter	investigates	rural	households’	
responses	to	the	economic	shock	resulting	from	the	decrease	of	income	from	
cotton.	The	results	reveal	that	households	diversified	their	sources	of	income	
on‐farm,	 with	 food	 crops	 gaining	 increasingly	 a	 cash	 function.	 However,	
because	 the	 production	 system	 heavily	 depends	 on	 cotton	 for	 access	 to	
fertilisers	 and	 other	 inputs	 for	 food	 crops,	 farmers	 continue	 to	 grow	 cotton	
despite	 its	 present	 low	 returns.	 In	 addition,	 because	 of	 their	multiple	 extra‐
domestic	activities	women	seem	to	be	less	vulnerable	than	men	when	it	comes	
to	 coping	with	 livelihood	 shocks.	 Hence,	 their	 contribution	 to	 providing	 for	
household	 needs	 increases	 in	 time	 of	 crisis.	 Further	 results	 suggest	 that	
decision	making	 and	 certain	 diversification	 strategies	 of	 young	 adults	move	
from	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 household	 to	 its	 periphery	 and	 loosen	 household	
boundaries.	
	
Keywords:	Cotton	production;	income	shortage;	livelihood	diversification;	
rural	Benin	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
A	shortened	version	of	this	chapter	will	be	submitted	to	a	suitable	journal	under	the	same	
title,	by	the	authors	Maboudou	Alidou,	G.	and	Niehof,	A.	
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6.1	 Introduction	
Cotton	production	has	for	long	been	a	vital	livelihood	activity	for	rural	households	in	
Benin	 where	 it	 constituted	 a	 smallholder	 cash	 crop	 for	 the	 last	 three	 decades	 (see	
Chapter	2).	It	was	critically	important	to	rural	welfare,	since	about	45	per	cent	of	rural	
households	depended	on	cotton	revenues,	which	constituted	a	source	of	livelihood	for	
more	than	325,000	rural	households,	i.e.	about	three	millions	of	people	(Baffes,	2004;	
UNCTAD,	2008;	World	Bank,	2003).	Cotton	is	grown	in	rain‐fed	lands	with	high	use	of	
agricultural	inputs	(Baffes,	2004).	During	the	2000s,	one	third	of	the	farm	households	
in	Benin	grew	cotton,	allotting	about	18	per	cent	of	the	total	cultivated	area	to	cotton	
(Kherallah	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 In	 the	 north‐eastern	 and	 central	 provinces	 of	 Borgou	 and	
Alibori	that	are	the	main	cotton	producing	areas,	cotton	farmers	had	on	average	2.62	
and	3.15	hectares	of	cotton	(Kpade,	2011).	During	the	cotton	boom	of	the	1990s,	the	
average	acreage	allotted	 to	 the	crop	steadily	 increased	 to	37	and	64	per	cent	of	 the	
total	cropped	land,	respectively	(Gandonou,	2005;	Minot	&	Daniels,	2005).	
During	the	1990s,	cotton	provided	up	to	80	per	cent	of	the	income	to	over	45	per	cent	
of	 rural	 households	 (Minot	 &	 Daniels,	 2005;	 World	 Bank,	 2003).	 The	 income	
generated	 by	 cotton	 has	 the	 comparative	 advantage	 of	 being	 received	 in	 important	
amounts	 at	 once,	which	provides	money	 for	 large	expenditures	as	 construction	of	 a	
house,	weddings,	school	fees,	motorcycles	and	cars.	These	features	of	cotton	revenues	
made	cotton	a	critical	crop	for	poverty	alleviation	among	poor	rural	households,	and	
created	 a	 large	 dependency	 of	 those	 households	 on	 cotton	 incomes	 for	 their	
livelihoods	(Baquedano	et	al.,	2008;	Woodward,	2007).	Minot	and	Daniels	(2005:	460)	
found	 that	 a	 40	 per	 cent	 fall	 in	 the	 cotton	 prices	 resulted	 in	 8	 per	 cent	 rise	 of	 the	
incidence	of	poverty,	resulting	in	about	334	thousand	additional	people	falling	below	
the	 poverty	 line.	 Thus,	 the	 cotton	 sector	 constituted	 the	 backbone	 of	 the	 country’s	
economy.	However,	about	two	decades	after	the	boom	in	the	production	started,	with	
the	ensuing	increased	prosperity	of	cotton	farmers,	signs	of	crumbling	appeared.		
From	 the	 mid‐2000s	 onwards,	 the	 positive	 benefits	 of	 cotton	 have	 completely	
reversed	 (World	 Bank,	 2003),	 due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 multiple	 constraints	 that	
overwhelmed	the	production.	Among	other	constraints	were	the	fall	of	cotton	prices	
on	 international	 markets,	 the	 mismanagement	 of	 cotton‐related	 organisations,	 and	
payment	arrears	to	farmers.	A	40	per	cent	decrease	of	prices	resulted	in	a	61	per	cent	
increase	of	poverty	 (Minot	&	Daniels,	2005).	The	World	Bank	(2003)	and	 the	UNDP	
(2005)	 linked	 12	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 increase	 of	 the	 incidence	 of	 poverty	 in	 the	 North	
during	 the	 early	 2000s	 to	 the	 decline	 of	 cotton	 prices	 on	 international	 markets.	
Therefore,	 cotton	had	become	 an	 erratic	 and	 insecure	 source	 of	 living,	 especially	 in	
the	 north‐eastern	 provinces	 where	 an	 18	 per	 cent	 reduction	 in	 per	 capita	 income	
resulted	 in	 an	 equivalent	 increase	 in	 the	 incidence	 of	 poverty.	 As	 a	 consequence,	
farmers	 became	disenchanted	 and	massively	 abandoned	 cotton	production,	 thereby	
narrowing	drastically	the	basis	of	their	livelihoods.	To	the	growing	disillusionment	of	
producers,	 the	 State	 offered	 no	 or	 very	 few	 solutions	 (World	 Bank,	 2003).	 The	
alternatives	 explored	 to	 remedy	 the	 country’s	 high	 dependency	 on	 (conventional)	
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cotton	and	to	release	both	the	State	and	farmers	from	their	woes	were	diversification	
of	 agriculture	 and	 exports	 and	 organic	 cotton	 production	 (MAEP,	 2011).	 The	 first,	
diversification,	 seemed	 an	 empty	 shell,	 since	 farmers	 have	 always	 diversified	 their	
agricultural	production	despite	their	dependency	on	cotton	for	cash.	Rural	households	
always	 possessed	 diverse	 livelihood	 portfolios	 to	 absorb	 social,	 economic	 and	
environmental	 shocks,	 implying	 that	 especially	 among	 poor	 rural	 households,	
diversification	is	the	norm	(Barrett	et	al.,	2001;	IFAD,	2010).		
Since	1996,	organic	cotton	production	 is	being	promoted	by	NGOs	 in	particular	as	a	
sustainable	 solution	 to	 the	 numerous	 environmental	 side	 effects	 imputed	 to	
conventional	 cotton.	 Organic	 cotton	 production	 is	 also	 used	 in	 the	 lobby	 against	
genetically	 modified	 cotton	 (Tovignan	 &	 Nuppenau,	 2004).	 However,	 not	 all	 actors	
believe	 in	 its	potential.	The	relatively	higher	price	compared	 to	 that	of	 conventional	
cotton	does	 not	 compensate	 for	 its	 lower	 yields.	Hence,	 organic	 cotton	 turns	 out	 to	
play	 a	 marginal	 role.	 Instead,	 based	 on	 their	 traditional	 modes	 of	 production,	
households	deploy	various	strategies	to	respond	to	the	decline	of	cotton	revenues	in	
order	to	make	ends	meet.	
The	objective	of	the	present	chapter	is	to	identify	farmers’	strategies	to	deal	with	the	
shortage	 of	 income	 consecutive	 to	 the	 demise	 of	 cotton	 in	 the	 north‐eastern	 and	
central	provinces	of	Benin.	How	do	households	adapt	 to	or	 cope	with	 the	decline	of	
cotton	 revenues?	 How	 did	 changes	 in	 income	 patterns	 modify	 men’s	 and	 women’s	
contribution	to	the	provision	for	their	households’	daily	needs	and	how	did	this	affect	
the	 gender	 relations	 within	 the	 household?	 The	 following	 section	 of	 the	 present	
chapter	first	sets	out	the	theoretical	perspective	of	livelihoods	and	households	before	
describing	 the	study	area	and	study	design	 in	Section	6.3.	 In	Section	6.4,	 the	results	
are	presented	 and	discussed.	The	 chapter	 concludes	with	 a	 final	 discussion	 and	 the	
formulation	of		agricultural	policy	implications	derived	from	the	findings.	
6.2	 Livelihoods	and	households	
During	the	past	decades,	unravelling	the	logic	of	family	and	household	production	and	
consumption	has	received	 increasing	attention	 from	scientists	and	policy	makers.	 In	
an	 attempt	 to	 uncover	 the	 dynamics	 of	 urban	 economies	 in	 Africa,	 two	 types	 of	
approaches	have	been	documented:	the	informal	sector	approaches	and	the	survival	
approach.	 The	 informal	 sector	 approaches	 use	 three	 dominant	 perspectives	 –	 the	
reformist,	 the	 institutionalist,	 and	 the	 neo‐Marxist	 –	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 economic	
situation	 of	 people	 classified	 as	 active	 in	 the	 informal	 sector,	 but	 these	 approaches	
failed	 to	 capture	 the	 interplay	 of	 simultaneous	 informal	 and	 formal	 sector	
employment.	However,	the	approaches	“played	a	crucial	role	in	drawing	attention	to	
the	 poverty	 and	 the	 plight	 of	 people	 involved	 in	 such	 activities,	 the	 employment	
potentials	of	the	sector,	and	the	creativity	and	entrepreneurial	skills	of	informal	sector	
participants	who	make	it	amidst	inappropriate	state	regulations”	(Owusu,	2007:	451).	
While	formal	sector	approaches	focus	more	on	economic	activities	than	on	the	people	
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performing	 these	activities	 to	make	 their	 living,	 informal	 sector	 approaches	 capture	
the	 variety	 of	 people	 concerned	 and	 their	 activities.	 Indeed,	 the	 constraints	 of	 the	
formal	sector	have	forced	many	employees	to	join	the	informal	sector	as	an	“income‐
supplementing	and/or	income‐diversification	strategy”	(Owusu,	2007:	452).		
The	 survival	 strategy	 approach,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 the	merit	 of	 analysing	 both	
people’s	 responses	 to	 economic	 hardship	 and	 the	 context	 of	 their	 decision‐making	
processes.	 The	 survival	 strategy	 approach	 is	 mostly	 applied	 to	 rural	 contexts	 and	
exclusively	to	poor	people,	who	are	attributed	a	rationality	in	risk	minimization.	It	has	
been	widely	used	to	analyse	people’s	strategic	responses	to	economic	crises,	showing	
its	 value	 “for	 exploring	 the	 dynamic	 nature	 of	 the	 environment	 in	which	 livelihood	
decisions	are	made”	(Owusu,	2007:	452).	The	limitation	of	this	approach	stems	from	
the	 fact	 that	people	with	more	assets	and,	 consequently,	not	poor,	 are	more	able	 to	
“strategise”	than	poor	people	who	are	 limited	in	their	strategic	choices.	This	 implies	
that	analysing	adaptation	to	economic	crisis	cannot	be	limited	to	survival	strategy	but	
should	 be	 extended	 to	 capital	 accumulation	 strategies	 by	 richer	 people.	 In	 fact,	 the	
assumption	of	rational	choice	is	only	justified	when	an	individual	has	multiple	options.	
Because	of	these	conceptual	limitations	livelihood	approaches	gained	momentum.	
Compared	to	the	previous	approaches,	livelihood	approaches	are	more	encompassing,	
since	they	are	directed	at	discovering	the	interactions	between	the	domestic	unit	and	
its	environment	and	integrate	institutionalist	and	neo‐Marxists	views	(Owusu,	2005).	
Livelihood	approaches	provide	 	 a	model	 that	helps	apprehending	 the	many	ways	of	
raising	extra	income	through	additional	activities.	The	unstable	and	adverse	economic	
conditions	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 sub‐Saharan	 Africa	 have	 led	 households	 to	 search	 for	
additional	 income	 by	 engaging	 in	 multiple	 activities	 (Owusu,	 2007).	 Although	 the	
practice	blossomed	among	public	civil	servants	as	one	of	 the	direct	consequences	of	
the	structural	adjustment	programs	during	the	1990s	(Owusu,	2005),	it	constitutes	a	
historical	 strategy	 among	 vulnerable	 rural	 populations	 (Ellis,	 1998;	 Niehof,	 2004).	
Unfavourable	natural	conditions,	such	as	low	and	erratic	rainfall,	droughts,	poor	and	
infertile	soils,	are	considered	severe	constraints	to	the	improvement	of	the	situation	of	
rural	 communities	 (Frost	 et	 al.,	 2007),	 forcing	 them	 to	 strategize	 to	 improve	 their	
household	livelihood.	Relying	on	more	than	one	source	of	income	is,	therefore,	neither	
the	prerogative	of	public	sector	employees	nor	of	a	social	class.	
Livelihood	 is	 a	 complex	 and	 “multi‐faceted	 concept,	 being	 both	what	people	do	 and	
what	they	accomplish	by	doing	it,	referring	to	outcomes	as	well	as	activities”	(Niehof,	
2004:	 322).	 Livelihood	 refers	 to	 “the	 mix	 of	 individual	 and	 household	 strategies,	
developed	over	a	given	period	of	time,	that	seeks	to	mobilize	available	resources	and	
opportunities”	(Owusu,	2007:	452).	According	to	IFAD	(2010:	52),	“the	livelihoods	of	
poor	 rural	 households	 reflect	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 opportunities	 and	 constraints	
characterizing	the	areas	where	they	live	[...]	and	on	the	other,	their	own	profiles	and	
characteristics	as	households.”		
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The	household	constitutes	the	“locus”	of	the	livelihood	system	(Niehof,	2004),	because	
it	 provides	 the	 immediate	 context	 for	 the	 strategic	 management	 and	 allocation	 of	
resources	to	provide	for	daily	needs.	As	a	consequence,	most	studies	about	livelihood	
diversification	use	the	household	as	the	unit	of	analysis,	which	conceptualisation	has	
changed	 over	 time.	 Unitary	 models	 previously	 used	 to	 apprehend	 the	 household	
perceived	 it	 as	 “a	 collection	 of	 individuals	 who	 agree	 over	 the	 broad	 principles	 of	
intrahousehold	 resources	 allocation”	 (Akram‐Lodhi,	 1997:	 28).	 But	 in	 these	models,	
the	interaction	between	household	members	and	their	different	power	positions	and	
logic	 tended	 to	 be	 glossed	 over.	 Alternative	models	 of	 household	 conceptualisation	
were	 proposed	 that	 led	 the	 concept	 to	 undergo	 some	 changes.	Niehof	 (2011)	 notes	
that	contrary	to	the	family,	the	household	has	fluid	and	adaptable	boundaries	and	that	
household	 ties	 are	 not	 underpinned	 by	 law,	 which	 makes	 them	 more	 fragile	 and	
makes	 the	 exit	 option	 relatively	 easy.	 The	 collective	 or	 joint	 utility	 model	 of	 the	
household	succeeded	in	shedding	more	light	on	the	internal	dynamics	of	household	as	
unit	of	consumption	(Maurizio,	2007),	but	the	assumption	of	joint	utility	failed	to	take	
into	account	the	agency	of	household	members	as	social	actors	who	face	the	dilemma	
of	 cooperation	and	 conflict	 in	household	production	and	 livelihood	generation	 (Sen,	
1990;	Wallace,	2002).	The	bargaining	approaches	put	the	focus	on	power	relations	in	
the	 distribution	 and	 allocation	 of	 resources	 within	 the	 household	 (Agarwal,	 1997;	
Holger	 Seebens,	 2007).	 Following	 Rudie	 (1995:	 228),	 we	 see	 the	 household	 as	 a	
family‐based	 co‐residential	 unit	 that	 takes	 care	 of	 resource	 management	 and	 the	
primary	needs	of	its	members.	We	also	acknowledge	the	points	made	by	Sen	(1990)	
and	 Agarwal	 (1997)	 that	 household	 members	 may	 have	 conflicting	 interests	 and	
unequal	 power	 positions,	which	 necessitate	 bargaining	 and	 can	 result	 in	 household	
members	leaving	the	household	temporarily	or	permanently.		
Conceptualising	 the	 household	 livelihood	 has	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 two	 closely	
related	 concepts:	 diversification	 and	 adaptation.	 Though	 not	 synonymous,	 the	 two	
concepts	 are	 sometimes	 used	 interchangeably,	 both	 being	 referred	 to	 as	 strategies.	
Evidence	 has	 shown	 the	 strategic	 role	 of	 diversification	 in	 rural	 livelihood	 systems	
(Niehof,	 2004).	 Diversification	 is	 defined	 as	 “the	 process	 by	 which	 rural	 families	
construct	 a	 diverse	 portfolio	 of	 activities	 and	 social	 support	 capabilities	 in	 order	 to	
survive	and	to	improve	their	standards	of	living”	(Ellis,	1998:	4).	In	this	process,	not	
only	 income	 but	 also	 social	 institutions,	 gender	 relations,	 and	 property	 rights	 that	
contribute	to	a	standard	of	living,	are	included.	Diversification	should	not	be	limited	to	
only	sources	of	 income,	as	many	studies	do,	but	 includes	diversification	of	assets	as	
well	 (Ellis,	 1998).	 Diversification	 as	 an	 individual	 or	 a	 household	 level	 strategy	 is	
neither	a	rural	phenomenon	nor	the	preserve	of	only	developing	countries	(Barrett	et	
al.,	 2001;	 Ellis,	 1998;	 Wallace,	 2002).	 It	 can	 occur	 as	 a	 purposive	 strategy	 or	 an	
involuntary	response	to	a	crisis.	The	latter	is	equated	with	coping:	diversification	out	
of	necessity,	or	for	‘bad’	reasons	(Niehof,	2004).	The	first	is	diversification	by	choice,	
which	 aims	 at	 strengthening	 the	 livelihood,	 accumulation	 of	 assets,	 and	 risk	
management.	 In	 the	economic	model	of	 the	rural	households	 the	on‐farm	returns	 to	
labour	 time	 can	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 returns	 of	 off‐farm	 or	 non‐farm	 earning	
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opportunities	 (Ellis,	 2000:	 292).	 Hence,	 livelihood	 diversification	 can	 be	 realized	
through	farm,	off‐farm	and	non‐farm	activities,	 thereby	generating	different	types	of		
incomes	and	assets.	Barrett	et	al.	 (2001:	368‐369)	used	a	 three‐way	classification	of	
rural	households’	sources	of	income	and	use	of	productive	assets:	by	sector	(e.g.	farm	
vs.	nonfarm),	by	function	(wage	vs.	self‐employment),	and	according	to	space	(local	vs.	
migratory).	Abdulai	and	CroleRees	(2001)	found	that	income	of	poorer	households	is	
less	diversified	due	to	their	 lack	of	capital,	which	offers	them	fewer	opportunities	 in	
non‐farm	work.	
Livelihood	adaptation	is	perceived	as	adjustments	of	individuals’	or	households’	con‐
sumption	and	production	patterns	in	response	to	observed	or	expected	economic	and	
social	hardship	such	as	income	decline.	Ellis	(2000:	298)	defines	livelihood	adaptation	
as	 the	 continuous	 process	 of	 “changes	 to	 livelihoods	which	 either	 enhance	 existing	
security	 and	 wealth	 or	 try	 to	 reduce	 vulnerability	 and	 poverty.”	 The	 concept	 of	
adaptation	is	broader	than	that	of	diversification,	because	it	offers	more	opportunity	
for	 including	 activities	 outside	 the	 traditional	 domains	 of	 the	 targeted	 group.	
Adaptation	 can	 be	 by	 choice	 (positive)	 or	 of	 necessity	 (negative),	 the	 latter	 being	
constrained	 by	 limited	 options.	 Ellis	 (2000:	 290),	 argued	 that	 the	 distinguishing	
features	 of	 rural	 livelihood	 strategies	 in	 poor	 countries	 are	 the	 “maintenance	 and	
continuous	 adaptation	 of	 a	 highly	 diverse	 portfolio	 of	 activities.”	 The	 scope	 for	
diversification	 and	 adaptation	 depends	 on	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 individual	 or	
household	 concerned.	 Vulnerability	 is	 dynamic	 and	multidimensional,	 capturing	 the	
response	 to	 changes	 over	 times.	 Household	 vulnerability	 is	 determined	 by	 external	
threats	 and	 internal	 assets.	 Consequently,	 vulnerability	 “measures	 the	 resilience	
against	 a	 shock	 [and]	 is	primarily	a	 function	of	 a	household’s	 asset	endowment	and	
insurance	mechanisms”	(World	Bank,	2000:	139).	
This	chapter	analyses	the	ways	in	which	farm	households	in	the	study	area	strategise	
to	deal	with	 the	economic	shock	 to	 their	 livelihoods	caused	by	 the	decline	of	cotton	
profitability.	It	focusses	mainly	on	on‐farm	income	diversification	as	the	main	strategy	
of	 the	 rural	 households,	 given	 the	 scarcity	 of	 non‐agricultural	 income‐earning	
opportunities.			
6.3	 Research	area	and	data	sources	
The	provinces	where	the	field	work	was	conducted	cover	two	agro‐ecological	zones	in	
the	north‐eastern	region	of	Benin:	the	“cotton	zone”	and	the	“north‐central	zone”,	also	
called	 the	 “food	belt”.	The	relatively	 low	rainfall,	 the	 types	of	 soil,	 and	 the	relatively	
high	temperature	in	the	area,	made	it	suitable	for	cotton	production.	Throughout	this	
region,	 households	 have	 been	 always	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 cotton	 for	 their	
livelihoods,	due	to	the	high	share	of	cotton	income	in	their	overall	income.	Siaens	and	
Wodon	 (2008:	 174)	 argued	 that	 “cotton	 producers	 fared	 relatively	 well”	 over	 the	
1990s.	They	found	a	7	per	cent	reduction	in	the	probability	of	being	poor	for	cotton	
producing	 households	 compared	 to	 non‐producing	 ones.	 Therefore,	 people	 are	
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reluctant	to	abandon	cotton.	Additionally,	in	the	study	area	there	are	fewer	alternative	
income‐generating	opportunities	than	in	the	southern	part	of	the	country.	
Four	 villages	 were	 selected	 as	 the	 research	 sites	 in	 three	 of	 the	 largest	 cotton	
producing	 districts:	 Banikoara,	 Gogounou	 and	 Sinende.	 Banikoara	 contributes	 up	 to	
45	per	cent	to	the	national	production,	which	makes	the	district	the	heartland	of	the	
cotton	 belt.	 Gogounou	 represents	 the	 third	 biggest	 producer,	 while	 Sinende	 is	 the	
largest	 cotton	 producer	 within	 a	 region	 that	 is	 considered	 the	 food	 belt.	 In	 2004,	
Banikoara	 and	 Gogounou	 together	 supplied	 64	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 national	 cotton	
production,	 while	 the	 production	 of	 the	 north‐central	 zone	 comprising	 Sinende	
represented	29	per	cent	of	the	national	production	(Gergely,	2009).	The	research	was	
carried	out	during	2009‐2011.	This	was	a	 few	years	after	 the	precipitous	decline	of	
cotton	 production	 had	 set	 in.	 The	 relatively	 huge	 amounts	 of	 subsidies	 invested	 to	
repay	various	debts	in	the	sector	had	little	or	no	effect	on	this	trend	that	was	triggered	
in	2005.	This	led	the	government	to	envision	(re)managing	the	sector,	which	had	been	
completely	left	to	private	monopolies	since	the	beginning	of	the	1990s.	
The	 districts	 and	 villages	 were	 selected	 purposefully	 to	 cover	 zones	 of	 high	 and	
middle	 levels	 of	 cotton	 production,	 areas	 of	 low	 and	 high	 abandonment	 of	 cotton	
production,	and	both	accessible	and	remote	villages.	As	respondents	in	the	survey,	a	
sample	of	148	cotton	farmers	was	selected	by	systematic	sampling	from	member	lists	
of	 farmer	groups.	These	 farmers,	both	male	and	 female,	were	also	household	heads.	
Prior	 to	 the	 household	 survey,	 qualitative	 data	were	 collected	 through	 focus	 group	
discussions	conducted	with	groups	of	cotton	farmers.	The	household	survey	was	done	
by	 means	 of	 a	 semi‐structured	 questionnaire.	 It	 addressed	 household	 livelihood	
issues,	such	as	the	composition	of	the	household,	production	and	management	of	food	
and	 cash	 crops,	 the	 place	 of	 cotton	 in	 the	 livelihood	 portfolio	 during	 the	 boom	 and	
after	 the	 decline	 of	 cotton	 production,	 the	 evolution	 of	 household	 income	 sources	
during	 the	 same	 period,	 and	 spouses’	 contribution	 to	 the	 household	 needs	 (see	
Appendix	 2)	 for	 the	 complete	 questionnaire).	 Only	 the	 heads	 of	 households	 were	
interviewed	about	household	strategies	and	to	provide	information	on	all	household	
members.	 Household	 membership	 included	 all	 persons	 participating	 in	 the	
household’s	daily	life	for	at	least	one	year.	
For	analytical	purposes,	we	distinguished	 the	prime	 time	of	 cotton	production	 from	
the	decline.	The	cotton	prime	started	from	the	boom	at	the	beginning	of	the	1990s	and	
ended	 in	 the	 mid‐2000s.	 During	 this	 period,	 cotton	 production	 had	 high	 economic	
returns,	although	some	inputs,	such	as	family	labour,	were	not	taken	into	account.	The	
decline	 began	 in	 2005,	 when	 farmers	 experienced	 ineffective	 inputs,	 mainly	 bad	
quality	pesticides.	This	resulted	in	low	yields	and	led	to	indebtedness.		
Although	 there	 was	 a	 high	 ratio	 of	 male	 to	 female	 respondents	 in	 the	 sample	
(124/24),	it	was	tried	to	avoid	masculism	(Blais	&	Dupuis‐Déri,	2011)	or	the	mistake	
of	 using	 a	 male	 perspective.	 Farmers’	 perceptions	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 respective	
contributions	of	 	husbands	and	wives	to	the	provision	for	household	needs	between	
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the	 period	 of	 cotton	 prime	 and	 the	 time	 of	 the	 decline	 were	 investigated	 and	 are	
presented	 by	 gender.	 The	 gender	 subjectivity	 in	 appreciating	 the	 spouses’	
contributions	 could	 thus	be	documented.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 appreciation	of	wives’	
contribution	to	household	provision,	the	men	said	that	during	the	cotton	prime	their	
wives’	contribution	was	nil,	while	according	to	the	women	they	did	contribute.	
6.4	 Results	and	discussion	
Agriculture	 remains	 the	main	 economic	 activity	 in	 the	 study	 area.	 Raw	 agricultural	
products	and	some	locally‐processed	foods	constitute	the	bulk	of	the	items	sold	in	the	
many	 rural	 markets	 organised	 in	 villages.	 Few	 local	 farmers	 engage	 in	 (informal)	
business	 activities.	Manufactured	 products	 are	mostly	 sold	 by	 traders	 coming	 from	
nearby	 urban	 centres	 or	 by	 foreign	 traders	 who	 settled	 in	 the	 villages.	 For	 the	
indigenous	population,	agriculture	remains	the	cornerstone	of	their	livelihoods,	often	
providing	their	total	income,	with	cotton	as	the	major	cash	crop.	
6.4.1		 Demographic	and	household	characteristics	
Regarding	education,	the	literacy	rate	among	the	male	heads	of	households	is	higher	
than	that	of	the	female	heads	of	households.	While	there	were	no	women	farmers	with	
university	level	education	about	3	percent	of	men	in	the	sample	had	higher	education.	
In	 both	 groups	 however,	 secondary	 school	 level	 education	 represented	 the	 largest	
category.	 The	 difference	 between	 men’s	 and	 women’s	 education	 was	 significant	
(p<	.05).	
Table	 6.1	 offers	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 female	 and	 male‐headed	
households	in	the	study	area.	It	shows	that	male‐headed	households	are	significantly	
(p<.001)	 larger	 than	 female‐headed	 ones.	 Overall,	 the	mean	 household	 size	 is	 high,	
which	 corroborates	 the	 general	 opinion	 that	 northern	 Benin	 has	 the	 largest	
households	 in	 the	 country	 (INSAE,	2004).	Minot	and	Daniels	 (2005)	 also	 found	 that	
cotton‐growing	households	 in	Benin	had	more	dependants	 than	households	 that	do	
not	grow	cotton.	The	larger	household	size	could	be	due	to	the	agricultural	orientation	
of	the	region,	since	agriculture	has	a	high	labour	demand.	The	number	of	workers	in	
the	households	was	calculated	in	male	adult	equivalents	using	the	conversion	table	by	
Norman	(1973).	According	to	this	table,	women’s	contribution	to	agricultural	 labour	
force	 represents	 three	 quarters	 of	 that	 of	men’s.	 Based	 on	 observation	 in	 the	 field,	
however,	 it	was	decided	 to	assign	equal	weights	 to	men	and	women.	Cotton	 is	very	
labour‐intensive	 and	 requires	 the	 involvement	 of	 all	 able	 household	 members,	
particularly	 that	 of	 women	 (cf.	 Chapter	 5).	 In	 addition	 to	 their	 agricultural	 work,	
women	 also	 prepare	 the	 food	 for	 those	 working	 on	 the	 farm.	 The	 success	 of	 farm	
activities	 is,	 therefore,	 	 related	 to	 the	performance	 of	 domestic	 activities.	Moreover,	
female	heads	of	households	are	solely	responsible	for	their	(cotton)	farms,	on	which	
they	 have	 to	 perform	 all	 the	 work.	 Male‐headed	 households	 have	 significantly	
(p<.001)	 more	 labour	 available	 than	 female‐headed	 households.	 The	 prevailing	
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tradition	of	polygyny	in	the	region,	where	men	often	have	more	than	one	wife,	even	
among	 Christians	 (Falen,	 2008;	 Mandel,	 2004),	 is	 part	 of	 the	 explanation.	 No	
significant	difference	was	found	in	the	household	dependency	ratio	between	male	and	
female‐headed	households.		
Table	6.1	 Characteristics	of	surveyed	households	
Description	of	variables	 Female‐headed	(n=24)	
Male‐headed	
(123≤n≤124)	 2	and	t	
Education	of	the	head	
(level)	
No	education		 20	(83.3%)	 63	(50.8%)	
			9.05*	Primary	school		 1	(4.2%)	 26	(21.0%)	Secondary	school		 		3	(12.5%)	 31	(25.0%)	
University	 0	(0.0%)	 4	(3.2%)	
Household	size	(person)	 							11.33	(5.62)	 									17.33	(11.96)	 ‐2.40***	
Labour	available	(male	adult	equivalents)	 					6.75	(3.33)	 		10.96	(9.32)	 ‐2.18***	
Dependency	ratio	 					1.70	(0.39)	 				1.70	(0.54)	 	.096	
Experience	in	cotton	production	of	the	head	
(years)	 			14.17	(6.98)	 				21.32	(10.45)	 		‐3.22**	
Ratio	of	the	head’s	experience	in	cotton	
production	by	his	experience	in	agriculture		 					0.86	(0.16)	 	1.17	(.92)	 3.48**	
Note:	*	=	p	<	.05,**	=	p	<	.01,	***	=	p	<	.001.	Figures	in	parentheses	are	percentages	and	
												standard	deviations	of	means.	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009‐2011.	
Men	 have	 significantly	 (p	 <	 .001)	 more	 experience	 (factor	 of	 1.17)	 in	 cotton	
production	as	part	of	 their	agricultural	experience	 than	women.	This	 relatively	high	
ratio	of	men’s	to	women’s	years	of	experience	 in	cotton	production	could	be	greater	
than	 the	 ratio	 relating	 to	 experience	 in	 agriculture	 in	 general.	 Experience	 refers	 to	
years	of	autonomy	in	decision‐making	about	the	production	system	and	about	the	use	
of	 the	yields.	Since	cotton	 is	a	cash	crop	and	the	main	source	of	 income,	young	men	
start	growing	cotton	early	on.	Already	during	adolescence,	boys	have	their	own	cotton	
plots,	 independently	 from	 the	main	plots	 of	 the	 household,	which	 they	 fully	 control	
from	the	sowing	and	planting	to	harvesting	and	the	use	of	the	yields.	The	young	men’s	
interest	in	cultivating	food	crops	usually	starts	later,	when	they	are	heads	of	their	own	
household.	 It	 is	 household	 headship	 that	 confers	 the	 right	 to	 control	 all	 household	
production.	Women	have	on	average	fewer	years	of	experience	in	cotton	production	
as	part	of	experience	in	agriculture	(factor	0.86)	and	their	control	over	cotton	plots	is	
on	 average	more	 recent	 than	 that	 of	men.	 Indeed,	 young	 girls	 rarely	 own	a	plot	 for	
cropping	before	they	get	married.	
Some	particularities	need	to	be	mentioned	here	in	order	to	shed	light	on	the	dynamics	
of	some	households	that	reflect	the	often	complex	structure	of	the	household	 in	this	
modern‐rural	 context.	 Multiple	 arrangements	 could	 be	 identified	 based	 on	 criteria	
such	as	 the	place(s)	where	 the	household	members	 live,	 the	mode(s)	of	production,	
and	processes	of	decision‐making	and	household	management.	This	complexity	gives	
the	household	as	a	productive	unit	a	blurring	shape	that	overlaps	with	the	family	and	
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its	 holdings	 and	 with	 the	 household	 as	 a	 unit	 of	 consumption	 (cf.	 Niehof,	 2011).	
Basically,	 three	 types	 of	 households	 can	 be	 distinguished	 in	 the	 study	 area:	 (i)	 the	
nuclear	family	household	with	one	male	adult	head,	his	wife(ves)	and	dependants,	(ii)	
a	household	where	brothers	share	a	homestead	that	 is	headed	by	the	eldest	brother	
with	 limited	autonomy	 for	 the	younger	brothers,	 and	 (iii)	households	where	 two	or	
more	 brothers	 live	 at	 different	 locations	 and	 share	 some	 resources,	 produce	 jointly	
but	are	relatively	autonomous	in	managing	the	non‐food	outcomes.	The	following	two	
cases	illustrate	the	variety	of	household	configurations.	
	
Case	6.1:	Dari	is	co‐heading	a	household	of	22	dependants	with	his	younger	brother.	
There	are	two	homesteads,	one	in	the	village	where	the	household	head	is	living,	and	
the	other	on	the	farm,	which	is	managed	by	the	younger	brother.	The	latter	homestead	
was	installed	to	be	closer	to	the	farm	and	ended	up	becoming	a	permanent	homestead,	
with	the	brother	living	there	having	little	autonomy	of	decision	making.	The	practice	
of	setting	up	homesteads	on	the	farm	emerged	during	the	cotton	boom.	The	growing	
scarcity	 of	 land	 for	 cotton,	 the	 intensity	 of	 cotton	 activities,	 and	 the	 necessity	 to	
protect	the	inflammable	crop	from	bushfires,	 led	some	households	to	partly	transfer	
the	 household	 to	 the	 farm.	 Dari’s	 household	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 case	 where	 the	
intensity	of	 cotton	 farming	and	 the	distance	 to	 the	home	made	 the	 stay	 at	 the	 farm	
much	 more	 frequent	 and,	 in	 the	 end,	 permanent.	 The	 two	 components	 of	 the	
household	then	coordinate	their	functioning.	While	the	homestead	at	the	farm	is	the	
centre	of	production,	the	one	in	the	village	is	where	decisions	come	from	or	are	made	
and	resources	are	managed.	Both	cash	crops	and	 food	crops	are	cultivated	 together.	
Cotton	 is	 produced	on	 the	 collective	 farm	 cared	 for	 largely	 by	 the	 younger	 brother.	
The	 resources	 generated	 by	 cotton	 production	 are	 particularly	 used	 for	 big	
investments.	The	yields	of	the	jointly	produced	crops	are	jointly	managed,	but	with	a	
pre‐eminent	 role	 in	 decision	 making	 of	 the	 elder	 brother.	 Cotton	 still	 remains	 the	
household’s	 main	 source	 of	 income,	 though	 its	 falling	 profitability	 and	 the	 erratic	
payment	of	cotton	money	have	led	the	household	to	diversify	with	maize	and	rice.	The	
production	 of	 these	 crops	 demonstrates,	 however,	 some	 exceptions	 in	 resources	
pooling	 strategies.	 Maize	 for	 example,	 which	 is	 primarily	 a	 food	 crop	 with	 a	
considerable	cash	 function,	 is	cultivated	 together.	Rice	that	 is	considered	a	cash	and	
food	 crop	 too	 but	 has	 primarily	 a	 cash	 function,	 is	 cultivated	 separately	 for	 private	
cash	needs.	In	addition	to	the	common	farm,	however,	the	elder	brother	owns	a	small	
cotton	plot	near	the	village,	for	his	“personal	purposes”.	Indeed,	most	of	the	household	
members	live	in	the	village	with	the	household	head,	including	the	younger	brother’s	
school‐age	 children.	Dari	 looks	 after	 their	 basic	 needs,	 education	 and	health,	 asking	
assistance	 from	 their	 father	 only	 when	 really	 necessary.	 To	 do	 this,	 Dari	 uses	 the	
money	from	his	private	plot.		
A	common	granary	for	food	crops	is	located	on	the	farm,	from	which	each	homestead	
can	 freely	draw	 the	 food	needed.	Most	 resources	 and	outcomes	 are	 pooled	because	
“dividing	the	yields	of	our	production	will	weaken	the	family”,	according	to	the	head	of	
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the	household.	Figure	6.1	portrays	the	arrangements	of	this	household	and	the	flow	of	
resources	between	the	two	homesteads.	
	
	
	
Figure	6.1	 Household	and	homestead	arrangement	of	Dari’s	household	
Case	6.2:	This	household	of	36	members	is	composed	of	four	brothers	with	their	six	
wives	and	26	dependants.	The	brothers	live	the	same	homestead.	The	wives	share	the	
domestic	tasks,	cooking	in	turn	for	the	entire	household.	The	household	is	headed	by	
Gounou,	 the	 eldest	 brother,	who	 decides	 to	 certain	 extent	 on	 behalf	 of	 his	 younger	
brothers.	 They	 grow	 all	 the	 necessary	 food	 crops	 together	 and	maintain	 a	 common	
granary	to	 feed	 the	members	of	 the	household.	Their	cotton	 farms	are	on	a	block	of	
land,	where	they	all	have	a	bounded	plot	(Figure	6.2).	
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Figure	6.2	 Household	and	homestead	arrangement	of	Gounou’s	household	
The	arrangement	allows	the	household	to	join	efforts	in	growing	the	labour‐intensive	
crop	 of	 cotton.	 The	 sizes	 of	 the	 respective	 cotton	 plots	 reflect	 birth	 rank.	 The	 size	
decreases	from	the	eldest	to	the	youngest	brother,	regardless	of	how	hardworking	the	
owner	is.	Harvesting	is	done	collectively	but	the	produce	is	displayed	separately	and	
sold	 accordingly.	 Each	 of	 the	 wives	 is	 attached	 to	 her	 husband	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
entitlement	 to	 cotton	 yields.	 A	 younger	 brother	 cannot	 have	 a	 bigger	 farm	 than	 his	
elder	 brother.	 The	 youngest	 and	 unmarried	 brother	 has	 no	 plot	 within	 the	 block.	
Instead,	he	 is	under	the	eldest	brother.	“It	 is	 like	that	because	as	the	eldest,	 I	have	to	
deal	with	 their	matters”,	 said	 the	 eldest.	 These	 arrangements	 allow	 for	 a	minimum	
level	of	autonomy	for	each	brother.	“Each	of	us	has	his	private	financial	issues	to	deal	
with,	together	with	his	wife(ves).	And	money	issues	are	difficult	to	settle	nowadays”,	said	
the	 eldest	 brother	who	 acts	 as	 the	 head	 of	 the	 household.	 Big	 investments	 such	 as	
wedding	ceremonies,	or	issues	that	engage	directly	the	honour	of	the	family,	are	dealt	
with	 in	 the	 group	 in	which	 the	 eldest	 has	 a	 prominent	 voice.	 The	 decline	 of	 cotton	
Orchard	 Rice	
Kitchen	gardens	 Kitchen	gardens	
Sto
cky
ard
	
Homestead	(Head	of	
household	&	brothers	
+	wives	+	dependents)
	
Fold	
Coop	
Granaries	
&	Stores	
Housing
Housing
	 RURAL	HOUSEHOLDS’	RESPONSES	TO	THE	COTTON	CRISIS	
	
127	
	
profitability	affected	only	 slightly	 the	 land	devoted	 to	 the	 crop,	which	has	 remained	
almost	 constant	 from	 2005	 to	 2010.	 Until	 now,	 cotton	 is	 the	 most	 important	 cash	
provider,	which	 is	why	 it	 is	 still	 the	main	 crop	 in	 Gounou’s	 household,	 although	 its	
share	has	drastically	declined	from	about	75	percent	 to	40	per	cent.	However,	more	
effort	 is	 now	 put	 in	 cultivating	 groundnut,	 rice	 and	 maize,	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	
reduction	of	cotton	income.	
The	 two	 examples	 above	 illustrate	 the	 central	 position	 of	 kinship	 ties,	 the	
preservation	 of	which	 is	 an	 important	 concern	 for	 all	 types	 of	 households.	 Ties	 are	
strengthened	through	regular	interaction.	One	way	of	preserving	these	ties	is	to	work	
together	in	food	production	and	share	the	granary.	The	criterion	of	co‐residence	in	the	
definition	of	 household	 that	was	used	 (see	 above)	does	not	necessarily	 imply	 living	
under	 one	 roof.	However,	 the	 proximity	 of	 household	members	 has	 to	 be	 such	 that	
they	 share	 –	 at	 least	 a	major	 part	 of	 –	 household	 resources	 and	 daily	 activities,	 of	
which	eating	from	the	same	granary	is	fundamental.	Applied	to	the	households	in	the	
study	 area,	 this	 entails	 that	 different	 domestic	 units	 in	 one	 homestead	 or	 different	
homesteads	in	one	domestic	unit	can,	in	fact,	constitute	one	household,	provided	they	
share	at	least	a	type	of	resources	and	jointly	manage	them	to	provide	for	their	primary	
needs.	A	household	can	 therefore	be	defined	as	a	group	of	people	who	eat	 from	the	
same	 granary,	 pool	 the	 necessary	 basic	 resources,	 and	 abide	 to	 some	 extent	 by	 a	
power	holder’s	decisions	about	the		management	of	resources.	
6.4.2	 Land	allocation	to	cotton	
Of	the	sample	of	148	cotton	farmers,	about	three	quarters	were	still	producing	cotton	
against	one	quarter	who	declared	to	have	abandoned	cotton	production.	However,	the	
dynamics	of	cotton	production	make	it	difficult	for	farmers	to	abandon	it	completely.	
Indeed,	about	58	per	cent	of	 those	who	abandoned	cotton	production	(about	14	per	
cent	of	the	total	sample)	were	willing	to	resume	it	when	the	conditions	of	production	
would	improve.	Because	during	the	past	three	years	incentives	were	implemented	to	
revive	cotton,	e.g.	the	revocation	of	the	private	monopoly	in	inputs	supply	and	the	sus‐
pension	of	 the	main	cotton	bodies,	many	 farmers	are	now	resuming	 the	production.	
However,	many	 others	 remain	 suspicious	 of	 the	 strategy.	 These	 dynamics	 testify	 to	
the	economic	importance	of	cotton,	which	played	a	crucial	role	in	the	monetisation	of	
the	 rural	 economy	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1990s	 onwards	 (World	 Bank,	 2003).	
Despites	this	importance,	a	decline	of	the	average	level	of	cotton	production	between	
2006	and	2010,	along	with	a	net	decrease	of	 the	average	cotton	plot	size	within	 the	
same	 time	 frame	 could	 be	 observed	 (Table	 6.2).	 This	 overall	 decrease	 points	 to	 a	
general	 trend	 of	 cotton	 abandonment	 during	 2006‐2010,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	
troubles	witnessed	by	the	sector	from	the	beginning	of	the	decade.	
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Table	6.2	 Evolution	of	cotton	production	between	2006	and	2010.	
Production	parameters	 N M SD Min.	 Max.
Household's	cotton	plot	in	2006	 132 3.67 4.50 .00	 30.00
Household's	cotton	plot	in	2010	 146 2.27 2.37 .00	 12.00
Household's	cotton	production	in	2006	 127 5.15 8.03 .00	 60.00
Household's	cotton	production	in	2010	 134 2.38 2.53 .00	 10.00
Average	area	of	cotton	plot	(2006	‐	2010)	 147 3.30 3.70 .00	 30.00
Average	cotton	production	(2006	‐	2010)	 132 4.48 5.71 .00	 49.20
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
6.4.3	 Structure	of	cotton	farmers’	income	
Among	the	wide	range	of	sources	of	income	of	farmers	in	the	study	area	are	kitchen	
gardens,	 breeding	 of	 animals,	 processing	 of	 agricultural	 products,	 food	 crops	 trade,	
(petty)	 trade	 such	 as	 selling	 of	 condiments,	 handicraft,	 and	 salaries	 and	 pensions.	
There	 was	 no	 statistically	 significant	 difference	 between	 male‐	 and	 female‐headed	
households	with	regard	to	the	average	number	of	sources	of	income	(Table	6.3).	The	
number	of	 income	sources	 in	each	category	of	households	 indicates	 that	an	average	
household	has	at	least	two	sources	of	income.		
Table	6.3	 Structure	of	income	sources	of	male‐	and	female‐headed	households	
Parameters	 Men		(111≤N≤124)	
Women		
(19≤N≤24)	 t	
Mean	number	of	sources	of	income	 2.02	(.71)	 2.13	(.68)	 0.69
Average	percentage	of	agricultural	income	
in	total	income	 			73.83	(31.01)	 			65.17	(24.76)	 ‐1.26
Average	share	of	cotton	in	agricultural	
income	 		47.78	(26.18)	 			36.43	(19.77)	 ‐1.80
Note:	Figures	in	parentheses	are	standard	deviations	of	means.	
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
However,	while	men	can	be	 limited	 in	 the	number	of	 livelihoods	activities,	women’s	
livelihood	portfolio	is	richer.	In	addition	to	agricultural‐related	activities,	breeding	of	
animals,	and	handicraft,	in	which	both	men	and	women	are	involved,	food	processing	
and	food	products	trading	are	exclusively	women’s	activities.	More	women	than	men	
are	engaged	 in	 small	 trade	of	 items	 like	condiments	or	groceries.	This	gives	women	
more	opportunities	of	adaptation	than	men.	Of	all	activities,	agriculture	has	remained	
the	main	income‐generating	activity,	providing	about	74	per	cent	of	income	to	male‐
headed	households	 and	65	per	 cent	 to	 female‐headed	households	 (difference	 is	 not	
significant).	 Cotton	 now	 represents	 36	 per	 cent	 of	 agricultural	 income	 of	 female‐
headed	 households	 and	 48	 per	 cent	 for	male‐headed	 households,	making	 the	 latter	
more	 dependent	 on	 income	 from	 cotton	 than	 the	 former.	 The	 present	 figures	
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represent	a	steep	decline	from	the	share	cotton	income	had	before	2006.	However,	the	
averages	hide	considerable	differences	between	households.	Some	still	earn	up	to	100	
per	cent	of	their	income	from	cotton,	while	others	reported	that	cotton	provided	them	
no	longer	with	income	although	they	continue	growing	it.	The	reasons	for	the	decline	
are	the	lesser	profitability	of	the	crop	and	the	problems	in	getting	paid	for	the	produce	
(see	Chapter	3).		
6.4.4	 Importance	of	cotton	for	strengthening	the	household’s	asset	
base	
Cotton	production	brought	much	wealth	and	well‐being	to	the	North	of	Benin	during	
the	1990s	and	the	early	2000s	and	was	valued	as	“white	gold”	(see	Chapter	2).	It	has	
been	critical	 for	both	men	and	women,	not	only	 for	 the	regularity	of	 its	 income,	but	
also	for	the	relative	importance	of	the	amounts	of	money	received	at	once.	This	made	
cotton	 income	 the	 means	 for	 big	 investments,	 such	 as	 construction	 of	 a	 house,	
acquisition	of	cars	and	motorbikes,	lasting	equipment	like	grinding	mills,	for	wedding	
ceremonies,	 etcetera.	 Most	 of	 the	 surveyed	 households	 reported	 improved	 living	
conditions,	which	 they	 acknowledged	 to	 originate	 from	 cotton	production.	 Concrete	
houses,	roofs	of	corrugated	sheets,	agricultural	equipment,	motorized	transport,	and	
all	sorts	of	equipment	and	appliances,	were	reportedly	financed	from	cotton	 income	
(Table	6.4).	Cotton	had	become	the	backbone	of	the	country’s	economy	and	the	source	
of	rural	households’	assets.	
The	economic	growth	of	the	country	during	the	1990s	is	largely	imputed	to	the	cotton	
boom.	By	contributing	to	assets	and	resources	endowment,	cotton	has	had	enduring	
effects	 for	 individuals,	 households,	 and	 communities	 in	 the	 North,	 and,	 at	 national	
level,	 for	 the	 State.	 An	 increase	 of	 houses	with	 corrugated	 roofs,	 a	 symbol	 of	 “rural	
ease”,	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 community	 infrastructures	 are,	 among	 others,	 the	
visible	improvement	of	farmers’	living	conditions	driven	by	cotton	production	(World	
Bank,	 2003).	 Through	 this	 substantial	 contribution	 to	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 rural	
households,	 cotton	 production	 shaped	 people’s	 life	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 Following	 the	
soaring	prices	of	inputs	and	lower	yields	from	cotton,	hundreds	of	farmers	abandoned	
or	 drastically	 reduced	 the	 area	 planted	 with	 the	 crop.	 The	 World	 Bank	 (2003)	
identified	low	returns	to	labour	as	one	of	the	risk	factors	to	individual	and	household	
poverty.	About	14	per	cent	of	farmers	reported	halting	the	construction	or	enhancing	
the	 quality	 of	 their	 house	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 decline	 of	 cotton	 production.	
Another	 16	 per	 cent	 of	 farm	 households	 had	 to	 reduce	 their	 provision	 for	 animal	
traction	and	agricultural	equipment	for	the	same	reason.	The	incidence	of	prestigious	
funerals	and	memorial	ceremonies,	which	inflated	during	the	cotton	boom	and	were	
organised	after	farmers	had	received	their	cotton	income,	has	reportedly	declined	as	
well.	For	many	farmers,	the	reduction	of	cotton	income	by	50	per	cent	meant	halving	
their	income.		
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Table	6.4	 Improvement/reduction	in	households’	assets	endowments	with	regard	to	
cotton	production	(percentage	of	households)	
Assets		 Acquisition	
during	Cotton	
prime	(N=115)
Reduction	in	
quantity/quality	
after	the	decline	
(N=115)
Categories	 Types	
House	
Concrete	(or	half)	with	
corrugated	sheets	 39.13 23.91
Clay	with	corrugated	sheets 33.91 		6.38
Agricultural	equipment	 Animal	traction 80.87 10.58Tractor	 	1.74 			0.00
Means	of	
transportation		
Motorbikes	 61.74 07.35
Cars	 	2.61 			0.00
Home	and	"luxurious"	
equipment	
Table,	chairs,	sofa,	etc. 86.96 09.18
TV,	CD	player,	etc. 75.65 11.50
Fridge,	generator,	grain	mill 12.17 		7.70
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
Orou	 is	a	65	year‐old	cotton	 farmer,	heading	a	household	of	26	members	 in	Sekere.	
The	household	earns	hundred	per	cent	of	its	incomes	from	agriculture	of	which	cotton	
represents	 up	 to	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 yearly	 income.	 Because	 of	 this	 paramount	
importance	of	cotton	to	his	livelihood,	Orou	maintains	a	constant	production	and	he	is	
one	 of	 the	 largest	 producers	 in	 his	 farmer	 group.	 But	 he	 resents	 the	 problems	
overwhelming	the	sector	that	forced	many	farmers	to	reduce	their	land	allocation	to	
cotton.	Orou’s	woes	result	from	the	lack	of	payment	for	his	produce	that	squeezed	his	
livelihood	 and	 reduced	 the	 household	 assets.	 “All	 my	 assets	 come	 from	 cotton	
production,	 and	 therefore	 the	 deterioration	 of	 my	 living	 conditions	 comes	 from	 the	
cotton	problems”,	he	contends.	He	points	at	an	unfinished	building	that	was	intended	
for	his	three	sons	of	whom	two	are	married	but	still	not	independent.	Clearly,	the	high	
dependency	on	cotton	has	 shown	 its	 limits	and	necessitated	 farmers	 individually	as	
well	as	collectively	to	devise	new	ways	of	generating	income.	
6.4.5		 Adapting	to	and	coping	with	the	cotton	crisis	
The	causes	of	diversification	as	well	as	 its	outcomes	are	affected	by	 location,	assets,	
incomes,	 opportunities	 and	 social	 relations	 (Ellis,	 1998).	 Three	 types	 of	 livelihood	
assets	 are	 relevant	 and	 critical	 to	 rural	 areas	 for	 people’s	 adapting	 and	 coping	
strategies.	These	are	natural,	social	and	human	capital,	in	addition	to	the	social	norms	
and	rules	regulating	the	access	to	these	assets	(Scoones,	1998).	These	assets	are	the	
main	 instruments	for	diversification	of	 income	and	resources.	Multiple	motives	such	
as	the	reduction	of	risk,	the	experience	of	shocks,	and	the	use	of	opportunities	drive	
the	choice	of	diversification	(Barrett	et	al.,	2001).	In	the	cotton	zone	of	Benin,	the	fall	
of	prices	and	 the	erratic	payment	 for	 cotton	yields	 resulted	 in	a	 shortage	of	 income	
that	created	an	economic	shock.	Consequently,	both	cotton	producers	and	those	who	
(pretended	 to)	have	abandoned	 it,	 have	 to	adapt	 to	 and	 cope	with	 the	new	context,	
diversifying	to	various	degrees	to	compensate	for	the	reduction	of	income	(Table	6.5).		
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Table	6.5	 Patterns	of	adaptation	and	coping	strategies	in	cotton	zone	
Adaptation	(Choice)	 Coping	(Necessity)	
‐	Commercial	food	crops	production	 ‐	Reduction	of	cotton	area	
‐	Increasing	economic	importance	of	marginal	cash	
crops			 ‐	Diversion	of	fertiliser	to	food	crops	
‐	Emergence	of	organisations	around	
food	crops	production	
‐ More	freedom	for	wives’	entre‐
preneurship	
	 ‐ Seasonal	migration	of	teenagers
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011	
The	 main	 strategies	 of	 adaptation	 and	 coping	 are	 shifting	 agricultural	 production	
patterns,	migration,	 and	 granting	de	 facto	more	 freedom	 to	women,	 to	mitigate	 the	
economic	 shocks	 or	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 failure.	 The	 changes	 in	 agricultural	
production	 patterns	 are	 exemplified	 by:	 (i)	 the	 shift	 of	 the	 purpose	 of	 cotton	
production,	(ii)	the	growing	economic	role	of	previously	marginal	cash	crops,	and	(iii)	
the	 changing	 status	 of	 food	 crops	 that	 have	 gained	 a	 cash	 function,	 and	which	have	
become	particularly	profitable	after	the	food	crisis	of	2008.	However,	whether	these	
strategies	are	sustainable	remains	a	question.	
Adaptation	and	coping:	on‐farm	diversification.	The	first	two	adaptation	strategies	
are	 all	 a	 diversification	 by	 choice,	 and	 aim	 to	 manage	 the	 risk.	 They	 consist	 of	
conferring	 a	 primary	 cash	 function	 on	 food	 crops,	 such	 as	 maize,	 sorghum,	 yam,	
cassava,	 and	 cowpea,	 which	 in	 the	 past	 were	 produced	 exclusively	 for	 home	
consumption,	 and	of	which	only	 the	 surpluses	were	 sold.	Rice,	which	was	produced	
both	as	food	and	as	cash	crop,	soybean,	and	groundnut	have	seen	their	marginal	cash	
function	increasing	(Table	6.6).	
About	69	per	 cent	of	 the	 respondents	 cited	a	 food	crop	as	 their	 actual	 first	 income‐
generating	 crop,	 of	 which	maize	 represents	more	 than	 half,	 followed	 by	 groundnut	
and	soybean.	Rice	and	sorghum	follow	suit	as	 income‐generating	crops.	This	 implies	
that	 about	 less	 than	one	 third	 (31	per	 cent)	of	 farmers	 still	 has	 cotton	as	 their	 first	
cash	crop.	Maize	also	dominates	as	second	 income	generating	crop,	 followed	by	rice	
and	groundnut.	
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Table	6.6	 On‐farm	income	diversification	among	cotton	farmers	
Crops	 Frequency	(%	of	farmers)1st	rank 2nd rank 3rd rank	 4th	rank
Maize	 60.9 28.7 4.3	 1.7
Groundnut	 2.6 12.2 16.5	 8.7
Rice	 2.6 13.9 20.0	 7.8
Sorghum		 1.7 3.5 7.0	 8.7
Soybean	 0.9 3.5 10.4	 9.6
Yam	 ‐ 6.1 4.3	 ‐
Cowpea	 ‐ 3.5 1.7	 3.5
Cashew‐nut	 ‐ ‐ 1.7	 1.7
TOTAL	 68.7 71.3 67.0	 41.7
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.	
Cultivating	these	crops	provides	additional	 income	and	contributes	to	compensating	
for	 the	 loss	 of	 income	 from	 cotton.	 Thus	maize,	 sorghum,	 yam,	 and	 to	 some	 extent	
cowpea,	previously	produced	primarily	for	own	consumption,	are	now	largely	sold	for	
cash.	 However,	 their	 growth	 needs	 fertilisers	 that	 until	 recently	 were	 hardly	
accessible	 for	 non‐cotton	 producers.	 Those	 who	 can	 afford	 fertilisers	 on	 the	 black	
market,	or	through	their	social	networks	within	the	formal	cotton	organisation,	have	
completely	 given	 up	 cotton	 production	 in	 favour	 of	maize.	 The	 production	 is	 rarely	
sold	 locally	 but	 transported	 to	 trans‐border	 and	 urban	 markets,	 though	 with	 no	
guarantee	of	higher	 returns.	Those	who	 cannot	 access	 fertilisers	 through	 the	 cotton	
system	continue	to	grow	cotton,	albeit	in	small	quantities.	In	this	way,	they	continue	
to	 receive	 fertilisers	 that	 are	 subsequently	 partly	 or	 fully	 diverted	 to	 food	 crops.	
Therefore,	 the	primary	purpose	of	 cultivating	 cotton	has	 strategically	 changed	 from	
earning	 income	 to	 accessing	 inputs.	 But	 following	 the	 disqualification	 of	 farmer	
organisations	 in	managing	cotton	production,	a	 close	control	of	 inputs	 is	exerted	by	
the	extension	services.	This	has	led	to	strategic	behaviour	to	access	the	critical	inputs	
in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 decreasing	 land	 fertility,	 showing	 a	 combination	 of	 adaptation	
and	coping	strategies.	
The	 strategies	 to	 access	 inputs	 (coping)	 aim	 at	 increasing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
diversification	of	income	sources	(adaptation).	In	the	case	of	a	full	diversion	of	cotton	
fertilisers	 to	 food	 crops,	 the	yields	of	 the	 food	 crops	benefitting	 from	 that	diversion	
are	 expected	 to	 cover	 the	 inputs	 debts.	However,	 this	 does	 not	 always	work	 out	 as	
planned.	Whenever	there	is	an	over‐production	of	maize	and	concomitant	low	prices,	
or	 when	 the	 agricultural	 season	 experiences	 torrential	 rains	 or	 another	 natural	
contingency	 occurs,	 farmers	 become	 heavily	 indebted.	 Up	 to	 half	 of	 the	 maize	
produced	may	be	used	 to	 pay	back	 such	debts.	 There	 is	 a	 high	 covariate	 risk	 (Ellis,	
2000)	between	these	alternative	cash	crops,	due	to	the	fact	that	they	all	belong	to	the	
farm	 sector.	 When	 fertilisers	 are	 partially	 diverted,	 farmers	 drastically	 reduce	 the	
cotton	surface	to	the	extent	they	expect	to	produce	enough	to	cover	the	inputs	debts.	
But	this	strategy	is	not	always	successful.	If	cotton	does	not	benefit	enough	attention	
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to	yield	well,	farmers	have	to	use	the	total	production	of	the	food	crop	to	pay	for	the	
inputs,	thereby	reducing	the	returns	of	the	alternative	crop.	
Youth	 male	 migration	 as	 non‐farm	 diversification.	 Out‐migration	 has	 been	
identified	 as	 an	 important	 strategy	 for	 improving	 livelihood	 systems	 in	 Africa.	 In	
stimulating	out‐migration,	factors	such	as	the	reduction	of	employment	prospects,	the	
increase	in	poverty,	and	the	pressure	on	natural	resources	are	intertwined	with	social	
dynamics	 (de	 Haan,	 1999;	 de	 Haan	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 Francis,	 2002;	Mosse	 et	 al.,	 2002).	
Rural‐urban	migration	has	 long	been	 identified	as	 the	dominant	migration	 flow	and	
was	used	to	explain	the	growth	of	African	cities.	But	a	flow	in	the	opposite	direction	
can	 be	 observed	 as	 well	 (Beauchemin,	 2011).	 For	 example,	 Bigsten	 and	 Kayizzi‐
Mugerwa	 (1992)	 found	 that	 urban	 households	 may	 let	 members	 migrate	 to	 rural	
areas	 and	 to	 remit	 food	 to	 the	members	 left	 behind.	However,	migration	 is	 rarely	 a	
first	 choice	 or	 preferred	 option.	 Farmers	 resort	 to	 migration	 when	 the	 available	
opportunities	 of	 diversification	 on‐farm	 do	 not	 result	 in	 any	 prospect	 of	 improving	
their	well‐being.		
Rural‐urban	(or	semi‐urban)	migration	was	observed	in	the	village	of	Sekere	(district	
of	 Sinende),	 where	 seasonal	 migration	 of	 teenagers	 has	 become	 an	 emergent	
phenomenon	and	de	 facto	part	of	 the	 livelihood	system.	On‐farm	diversification	has	
failed	 to	 live	 up	 to	 farmers’	 expectations	 of	 earning	 income	 to	 improve	 their	
livelihoods.	 Foods	 crops,	 of	 which	 the	 production	 has	 shifted	 in	 purpose,	 cannot	
generate	enough	income	to	meet	all	needs,	particularly	those	arising	from	the	modern	
aspirations	of	the	youth	to	have	motorbikes	and	mobile	phones.	To	be	relieved	from	
this	 pressure,	 some	 households	 let	 their	 boys	 temporary	migrate	 to	 Nigeria.	 About	
nine	 per	 cent	 of	 surveyed	 households	 had	 up	 to	 three	 members	 who	 were	 on	
migration	 simultaneously.	 The	 migration	 to	 Nigeria	 is	 nurtured	 by	 clandestine	
networks	 of	 traffickers10,	 who	 may	 have	 no	 previous	 direct	 connection	 with	 these	
teenagers	whom	they	recruit	by	chance.		
Two	 types	 of	 decision‐making	 were	 observed	 that	 shaped	 the	 migration	 of	 young	
people	 in	 Sekere,	where	 about	 62	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 heads	 of	 households	 interviewed	
reported	 to	 have	 had	 (a)	migrant	 child(ren).	 The	 first	 and	most	 common	pattern	 is	
migration	as	the	outcome	of	the	migrant’s	personal	decision,	as	happens	in	about	78	
per	cent	of	the	cases.	A	farmer	described	how	they	leave	as	follows:		
	
	 	
																																																								
10	Thanks	to	a	stop	on	my	way	back	from	Sinende	in	2010,	I	came	across	a	scene	of	dispute	in	
the	 village	 of	 Guinagourou	 at	 the	 Nigerian	 border.	 A	 car	 driver	 carrying	 a	 group	 of	 eight	
teenagers,	who	turned	out	to	originate	from	Sinende,	was	arrested	by	vigilantes.	None	of	the	
teenagers	 gave	 any	 name	 of	 who	 contacted	 or	 helped	 them.	 Instead,	 the	 older	 one,	
approximately	15	years	old,	said	they	were	relatives	and	friends	and	argued	they	were	on	a	
visit	 to	 their	mother.	The	driver	succeeded	 to	escape	and	 left	his	 car,	driven	along	with	 the	
teenagers	to	the	nearest	police	office.	
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They	 usually	 leave	 the	 village	 in	 small	 groups	 by	 night	 and	 their	
absence	 is	noticed	the	following	morning.	Sometimes,	it	is	after	many	
days	 that	 the	 parents	 become	 convinced	 that	 their	 child(ren)	 have	
migrated.	
	
The	 second	 pattern	 is	 joint	 decision‐making	 and	 concerns	 those	 who	 inform	 their	
parents	 of	 their	 decision	 to	 migrate.	 Because	 informing	 is	 different	 from	 getting	
permission,	 two	 sub‐types	 can	 be	 distinguished.	 The	 first	 one	 includes	 the	 cases	
where	 parents	 accept	 the	 proposal	 against	 their	 will,	 because	 they	 cannot	 afford	
giving	their	children	what	they	want.	Therefore,	they	accept	with	resignation	and	can	
be	qualified	as	passive	actors	in	the	process.	The	second	sub‐type	differs	from	the	first	
by	 the	 fact	 that	 parents	 discuss	 the	 issue	 with	 their	 children	 and	 advise	 them.	
Although	not	providing	the	means	for	transportation,	in	this	case	the	parents	have	an	
active	role.	
In	all	cases,	the	migration	was	a	trans‐border	movement	that	led	the	young	migrants	
to	Nigeria	for	a	while.	The	average	duration	of	the	migration	is	six	months.	During	this	
period,	parents	are	usually	 ignorant	about	 the	whereabouts	of	 their	children	and	do	
not	know	when	and	whether	the	children	intend	to	return.	They	are	commonly	known	
to	work	 primarily	 in	 agriculture	 and,	 in	 the	 second	place,	 in	 construction.	 Probably	
they	are	involved	in	illegal	employment	in	high‐risk	domains	such	as	mining	as	well.	
At	 the	 end	 of	 their	 stay,	 young	 migrants	 reappear	 at	 the	 parental	 home	 in	 small	
groups,	 just	 as	 when	 they	 left,	 each	 of	 them	 riding	 his	 motorbike.	 They	 travel	
overnight	 on	 rural	 roads	 like	 smugglers,	 to	 avoid	 being	 arrested	 by	 custom	officers	
who	would	fleece	them,	requesting	substantial	amounts	of	money.		
The	motorbikes	 they	 returned	 with	 are	 exhibited	 at	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 village	 square	
where	parties	 are	 organised	 in	 the	 evening	 and	where	 young	migrants	 stage	 rallies	
with	 their	 motorbikes.	 This	 display	 of	 their	 acquisitions	 contributes	 to	 nurture	
migration.	 Thus,	 the	 principal	motive	 behind	 this	 temporary	migration	 of	 youths	 is	
acquiring	a	motorbike,	which	in	their	view	helps	them	to	maintain	a	prospect	for	life.	
The	 boom	 in	 the	 cotton	 sector	 had	 engendered	 aspirations	 that	 could	 no	 longer	 be	
realized	 after	 its	 decline.	 To	 keep	 their	 expectations	 of	modernity	while	 living	 in	 a	
rural	area,	the	young	people	want	to	cultivate	a	modern	lifestyle,	which	forces	them	to	
migrate	temporarily	(cf.	Ferguson,	1994;	1999).	
The	migration	 of	 youth	 in	 Sekere	 differs	 from	both	 circular	 and	 seasonal	migration	
(Hampshire,	2002;	Rogaly	et	al.,	2002).	Unlike	 in	 the	case	of	seasonal	migration,	 the	
youth	migration	from	Sekere	can	take	place	at	any	time	of	the	year.	The	migrants	send	
no	remittances	and	have	no	contact	with	 their	parents	 till	 they	are	back	home.	This	
migration	 is	also	not	cyclical.	 Instead,	 the	reproduction	of	 the	process	 is	 fed	by	new	
migrants.	Successful	and	experienced	migrants	recount	their	adventures	to	their	peers	
who	 then	decide	 to	 try	 it	 themselves,	using	or	not	 the	same	 itinerary.	 In	contrast	 to	
commonly	 known	 processes	 of	 migration	 in	 which	 the	 flow	 is	 maintained	 by	 a	
network	of	social	relations	(cf.	de	Haan,	1999),	 in	this	case	the	temporary	migration	
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revolves	out	of	established	networks.	Although	it	does	not	provide	the	household	with	
direct	cash,	it	constitutes	a	diversified	source	of	income	if	assumed	that	it	is	the	head	
of	 household’s	 duty	 to	 supply	 the	 young	members	with	 assets	 such	 as	motorbikes.	
When	this	requirement	is	not	met,	out‐migration	becomes	an	option	for	boys	to	afford	
their	needs.	Although	their	absence	from	home	for	several	months	implies	a	deficit	of	
labour,	their	return	home	in	possession	of	what	they	wanted,	releases	not	only	them	
but	also	the	parents	from	a	pressure	on	the	household	means.	Therefore,	this	strategy	
supports	the	household.	In	addition,	the	divergence	of	interests	between	children	and	
parents,	 and	 the	shift	of	power	relations	between	 them,	 implies	 that	 this	 temporary	
migration	involves	implicit	bargaining	through	the	processes	of	decision	making	from	
which	it	takes	place	(cf.	Agarwal,	1997;	Sen,	1990).		
While	the	shortage	of	income	and	social	pressure	are	push	actors,	the	demand	for	the	
services	 that	 can	 be	 delivered	 with	 the	 acquired	 asset	 constitutes	 a	 pull	 factor	 for	
coming	back.	The	use	of	the	motorbikes	is	manifold.	In	addition	to	the	psychological	
feeling	 of	 achievement	 they	bring	 to	 the	 owners,	 the	motorbikes	 are	 used	 for	 “taxi‐
moto”,	an	important	contemporary	means	of	transportation	in	the	country.	Taxi‐moto	
nowadays	 is	an	 income‐generating	activity	 that	can	generate	substantial	amounts	of	
money	to	it	practitioners.	It	ensures	easy	traffic	in	rural	areas	where	other	means	of	
transportation	 are	 not	 always	 available.	 The	 migrants	 also	 help	 the	 household	
members	travelling	by	motorbike	when	necessary.	
Institutional	diversification	as	livelihood	adaptation	strategy.	Cotton	organisations	
have	 lost	 their	pre‐eminent	position	of	yesteryear,	being	 in	competition	with	 farmer	
organisations	 that	 focus	 on	 other	 crops,	 which	 emerged	 from	 the	 quest	 for	 new	
opportunities	 of	 added	 value.	 Their	 emergence	 also	 benefited	 from	 the	 support	 of	
NGOs	 that	 are	 not	 interested	 in	 cotton	 production,	 apart	 from	 those	 lobbying	 for	
organic	 cotton.	 Commercial	 as	 it	 is,	 cotton	 production	 is	 highly	 regulated	 and	 fully	
controlled	 by	 economic	 lobbies	 that	 do	 not	 leave	 any	 space	 for	 NGOs.	 Thus,	
organisations	 (pretending	 to	 be)	 specialised	 in	 the	 production	 of	 maize,	 rice,	
groundnut,	 cashew‐nut,	 cassava,	 soybean,	 or	 beekeeping,	 emerged	 in	 the	 villages	 to	
compete	with	the	declining	cotton	organisations	that	were	overwhelmed	by	debts	and	
mismanagement.	Pre‐existing	associations	that	were	on	the	edge	of	collapse	for	lack	of	
time	or	lack	of	interest,	such	as	those	of	traditional	dancers	and	craftsmen,	benefitted	
from	 the	 development.	 The	 membership	 of	 cotton	 organisations	 made	 farmers	
familiar	with	organisations.	Being	a	member	of	an	organisation	became	part	of	 their	
lives.	Farmers	who	were	involved	in	managing	cotton	organisations	began	to	use	their	
experience	to	structure	and	lead	the	new	organisations.	
It	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 although	 cotton	 production	 has	 declined	 and	 cotton	
organisations	are	fading,	cotton	has	contributed	to	building	human	capital,	a	resource	
that	 farmers	 use	 to	 organise	 themselves	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 production.	 The	 new	
organisations,	 therefore,	 contribute	 to	 improving	 farmers’	 livelihoods,	 given	 that	
participating	in	a	wide	array	of	associations	increases	the	ability	to	smooth	livelihood	
fluctuations	 (Grootaert	 et	 al.,	 2002).	 In	 addition,	 leading	 an	 organisation	 gives	
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opportunities	 of	 mediating	 between	 donors	 and	 NGOs	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 fellow	
farmers	 on	 the	 other	 (Olivier	 de	 Sardan,	 2005).	 It	 also	 entitles	 leaders	 to	 manage	
common	 resources	 of	 which	 the	 use	 can	 be	 diverted	 from	 public	 needs	 to	 private	
purposes,	as	happened	in	cotton	production.	Although	farmers	are	complaining	about	
the	low	income‐generating	capacity	of	these	diversified	sources	of	income,	not	having	
to	deal	with	cotton	anymore	satisfies	some	of	them.	As	a	farmer	said:	
	
For	sure,	the	decline	of	cotton	production	is	not	hurting	me,	as	long	as	
maize	is	profitable.	Instead,	we	will	benefit	from	this	situation	because	
the	extension	agents	will	stop	disturbing	us.	
	
6.4.6	 Effects	on	intra‐household	resource	allocation	and	gender	roles		
The	decline	of	cotton	production	has	modified	the	share	of	men’s	and	women’s	con‐
tribution	 to	 provision	 for	 household	 needs	 and	 expenditures.	 Men’s	 higher	
dependency	on	cotton	income	led	them	to	being	more	deprived	of	alternative	income	
sources	than	women.	As	a	consequence,	their	purchasing	power	compared	to	that	of	
their	 wives	 has	 been	 drastically	 reduced.	 This	 decreased	 purchasing	 power	 of	
husbands	 is	 automatically	 reflected	 in	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	 household	 needs,	
which	is	not	without	consequence	for	the	spousal	relationship.	As	a	wife	said:	
	
During	 the	prime	of	 cotton,	we	gave	money	 to	our	 school	 children	without	
any	 concern	 of	 being	 paid	 back	 by	 our	 husbands.	But	now,	 because	 of	 the	
decline	of	 cotton	production,	we	are	always	quarrelling	with	 the	husbands	
about	money.	
	
Table	6.7	 Evolution	of	wives’	contribution	to	household	needs	(%)	
Women’s	perspective	(N=24)	 High Average Low	to	negligible
Schooling	fees	 During	the	cotton	prime	 21.7 43.5 34.8After	the	decline	2005	 26.1 56.5 17.4
Clothing	 During	the	cotton	prime	 59.1 18.2 22.7After	the	decline	2005	 68.2 18.2 13.6
Health	care	 During	the	cotton	prime	 9.1 9.1 81.8After	the	decline	2005	 31.8 13.6 54.5
Daily	feeding	 During	the	cotton	prime	 22.7 22.7 54.5After	the	decline	2005	 40.9 22.7 36.4
Source:	Survey	data,	2009–2011.		
Women’s	 purchasing	 power,	 however,	 is	 sustained	 because	 of	 the	 wide	 range	 of	
income‐generating	activities	they	perform	during	a	long	period	of	their	life.	Women	in	
Benin	are	economically	very	active	and	start	to	earn	their	own	income	as	early	as	at	
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the	age	of	15	and	continuing	to	work	into	their	70s	(Mandel,	2004;	World	Bank,	2002).	
Therefore,	 their	 contribution	 to	providing	 for	 the	household’s	basic	needs	 increases	
relative	to	men,	who	have	fewer	opportunities	to	earn	income.	Table	6.7	presents	the	
changes	 in	 the	 contribution	of	wives	 to	 the	provision	 for	household	needs	 from	 the	
wives’	perspective.	
The	demise	of	 cotton	has	 resulted	 in	women	having	more	 freedom	to	perform	 their	
own	 income‐generating	 activities.	 But	 although	 wives	 contribute	 more	 to	 the	
provision	for	household	needs,	they	are	not	as	empowered	as	could	be	expected.	The	
process	 of	 decision‐making	within	 the	 household	 is	 still	 unbalanced.	 Husbands	 still	
have	a	pre‐eminent	voice	because	of	cultural	practices	and	social	beliefs	that	not	only	
impose	on	them	to	provide	their	wives	and	children	but	also	endow	them	with	rights	
over	 the	wives.	 Although	 to	 the	 young	 generation	 this	may	 seem	old‐fashioned,	 the	
culturally	underpinned	subordination	of	wives	 to	husbands	 turns	out	 to	be	 thriving.	
The	paternalistic	culture	that	subordinates	women	to	men	and	the	unbalanced	power	
relations	 in	 decision	 making	 between	 men	 and	 women	 within	 the	 household	 are	
reinforced	 by	 the	 unequal	 allocation	 of	 resources	 to	 enable	 men	 to	 perform	 their	
‘natural	duty’	as	providers.	The	married	women	who	were	interviewed	said	that	their	
autonomy	 to	 decide	 on	 matters	 without	 referring	 to	 the	 husband	 is	 not	 positively	
affected	 by	 their	 increased	 contribution	 to	 the	 provision	 for	 household	 needs.	 They	
always	 refer	 to	 their	 husband	 for	 their	 own	 resources	 allocation.	 A	male	 head	 of	 a	
cotton‐farming	household	strongly	believed	that:	“It	 is	not	because	a	wife	contributes	
to	clothing	or	feeding	the	children	at	home	that	she	and	her	husband	will	have	an	equal	
status.”	The	statement	shows	how	strong	cultural	values	on	gender	in	northern	Benin	
still	 are.	 However,	 there	 is	 also	 bargaining	 within	 households,	 which	 is	 neither	 a	
formal	 negotiation	 of	 rights	 and	 entitlements	 nor	 an	 open	 conflict	 for	 control	 of	
resources.	 It	 is	a	permanent	repositioning	of	household	members	for	mutual	respect	
and	self‐esteem.	And	rarely	do	men	in	the	area	publicly	acknowledge	the	superiority	
of	wives	over	their	husbands	(see	Chapter	5).	Nevertheless,	the	important	part	taken	
by	wives	in	households’	economic	life	confirms	that	women	act	as	a	shock	absorber	in	
times	of	 economic	hardship	 (Molyneux,	2002),	 and	entails	 a	 tacit	handover	of	 some	
space	of	power	to	women	within	households.	
6.5	 Conclusion	
“The	 household	 is	 a	 complex	 phenomenon.	 In	 rural	 areas	 such	 as	 northern	 Benin	
where	 patrilineal	 kinship	 ties	 are	 strong,	 the	 household	 follows	 the	 contours	 of	 the	
joint	family	in	which	brothers	have	limited	autonomy	to	manage	and	use	income	for	
their	 own	 family	 independently	 from	 the	 joint‐family	 household.	 This	 attests	 to	 the	
importance	 of	 kinship	 as	 the	 fundamental	 element	 in	 establishing	 a	 household	 and	
helps	gaining	a	sense	of	how	the	pooling	of	resources	is	far	more	important	than	the	
location	 of	 the	 homesteads.	 The	 household	 feature	 of	 co‐residence	 can	 also	 be	
strategically	 reduced	 to	 sufficient	 proximity	when,	 as	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 household	 is	
dispersed	over	more	than	one	homestead	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	production	and	
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management	 of	 resources.	 In	 the	 area,	 people	 refer	 to	 this	 phenomenon	 as	 ‘split	
families’.	Therefore,	 the	core	criteria	 for	being	a	household	member	are	eating	 from	
the	same	granary	and	abiding	–	to	a	certain	extent	–	by	the	prominent	role	in	decision‐
making	of	the	eldest	brother	who	is	considered	the	household	head.	Households	in	the	
study	area	are	large,	with	often	many	married	adults,	which	characteristic	is	a	sign	of	
wealth.	 This	 situation	 contradicts	 the	 perception	 that	 relying	 mostly	 on	 farm	 and	
agricultural	 labour	 is	 a	 characteristic	of	poor	 rural	households	 that	 tend	 to	be	 large	
and	have	a	higher	dependency	ratio	than	non‐poor	households	(IFAD,	2010).	
The	decline	of	cotton	production	and	the	ensuing	shortage	of	 income,	resources	and	
livelihood	assets	have	brought	about	shifts	in	decision	making	on	the	diversification	of	
sources	 of	 income.	 When	 an	 economic	 shock	 occurs,	 farmers	 first	 tend	 to	 devise	
strategies	 by	 using	 the	 resources	 available	 on	 the	 farm.	 They	 only	 look	 beyond	 the	
farm	when	on‐farm	opportunities	do	not	turn	out	to	be	an	adequate	response	to	the	
shock.	Both	on‐farm	and	non‐farm	diversification	took	place	within	households	in	the	
study	 area.	 But	 the	 heads	 of	 households	 control	 on‐farm	 diversification	 because	 of	
their	 control	 over	 land	 allocation	 to	 household	 members.	 Off‐	 and	 non‐farm	
diversification	that	aims	at	complementing	on‐farm	income	can	therefore	escape	their	
control.	Time	is	allotted	to	extra‐domestic	activities	by	wives	to	a	certain	extent,	and	
young	dependants	can	decide	when	and	where	to	migrate	to	meet	their	needs	as	well.	
This	made	these	categories	of	household	members	 less	vulnerable	to	the	shock	than	
men,	 thereby	 increasing	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	provision	of	 household	needs	 and	
expenditures.	
In	spite	of	 the	wide	range	of	activities	performed	by	rural	households	to	make	their	
living,	the	low	average	number	of	incomes	sources	attests	to	the	relatively	poor	liveli‐
hood	 portfolio	 at	 household	 level,	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 to	 the	 precariousness	 of	 the	
livelihood	 systems.	 Food	 crops	 are	 of	 paramount	 importance	 in	 diversification	
strategies	 and	 they	 actually	 outnumber	 the	 traditional	 cash	 crops	 in	 providing	
incomes	 to	 rural	households.	Most	notably	maize,	 of	which	 consumption	has	 grown	
steadily,	has	gained	a	cash	function	in	addition	to	its	food	function	and	is	now	ranked	
higher	 than	 cotton	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 ability	 to	 generate	 income.	 But	 this	 double	
function	 as	 food	 and	 cash	 crop	 and	 the	 covariate	 risks	 existing	 between	maize	 and	
other	alternative	cash	crops	 limit	 its	ability	 to	 fully	replace	cotton.	The	 income	from	
cotton	 still	 is	 the	main	 on‐farm	 cash	 revenue	 for	many	 farmers.	 As	 a	 consequence,	
cotton	is	grown	as	a	coping	strategy	to	make	the	diversified	crops	more	profitable,	in	
spite	of	its	decreasing	importance	in	providing	income.	Therefore,	when	farmers	rely	
heavily	 on	 one	 crop	 for	 their	 livelihoods,	 they	 can	 always	 invent	 new	 ways	 of	
cultivating	it	to	make	their	 living,	even	when	it	 is	not	financially	profitable	anymore.	
To	make	 the	 food	 crops	 profitable	 and	 to	 reduce	 the	 dependency	 on	 cotton,	 policy	
makers	 should	 give	more	 attention	 to	 the	 supply	 of	 inputs	 for	 promising	 food‐and‐
cash	crops	and	to	improving	their	marketing	options.	
The	plurality	of	households’	responses	to	the	cotton	crisis	in	Benin	explains	why	there	
is	no	 ideal	type	of	diversification.	Diversification	is	dynamic	and	this	makes	possible	
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for	 one	 household	 to	 adopt	 more	 than	 one	 diversification	 strategy.	 However,	 two	
strategies	 can	 basically	 be	 distinguished	 in	 the	 study	 area:	 first,	 on‐farm	
diversification	of	income	sources,	and,	second,	allowing	more	household	members	to	
decide	upon	and	engage	in	earning	(additional)	income.	
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Chapter	7	
	
	
General	Discussion	and	Conclusions	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT:	The	present	chapter	discusses	the	overall	findings	of	the	research	
presented	in	the	previous	chapters.	It	addresses	the	central	research	question	
and	 the	questions	and	hypotheses	 subsumed	under	 the	headings	 in	 the	 first	
chapter.	This	is	followed	by	a	theoretical	reflection	based	on	the	outcomes	of	
the	research.	The	chapter	ends	with	a	 look	at	the	implications	for	policy	and	
future	research.	
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7.1	 Shedding	light	on	the	research	questions	and	hypotheses	
Networking,	 social	 capital,	 and	 gender	 roles	 in	 the	 cotton	 system	 in	 Benin	 are	 of	
interest	 to	 the	 State,	 farmers	 and	 private	 actors	 because	 these	 issues	 influence	 not	
only	the	economic	profitability	of	the	sector	but	especially	because	they	constitute	the	
social	dynamics	that	drive	the	cotton	system	and	shape	rural	livelihoods	in	the	cotton	
belt.	 The	main	 question	 addressed	 by	 the	 research	 is	 how	 farmers’	 agency	 affected	
their	organisations,	cotton	production,	and	the	collective	action	 that	evolved	around	
their	 activity.	 With	 cotton	 as	 the	 central	 focus,	 the	 interfaces	 between	 individual	
dispositions	and	actions	(micro	level)	and	the	institutional	and	political	mechanisms	
(meso	 and	 macro	 level),	 and	 their	 effects	 on	 household	 livelihood	 systems	 were	
investigated.		The	dimensions	of	the	main	research	question	were	framed	under	three	
headings:	 the	emergence	of	breakaway	networks,	 the	decline	of	 social	 cohesion	and	
the	 squeeze	 of	 collective	 action,	 and	 livelihoods	 reconstruction	 after	 the	 demise	 of	
cotton	 production.	 Subsumed	 under	 these	 headings	 research	 questions	 and	
hypotheses	were	formulated	(see	Chapter	1).	The	actor‐oriented	approach	and	actor‐
network	theory	were	the	main	pillars	of	 the	theoretical	 framework	that	was	used	in	
the	research	and	gender	was	a	cross‐cutting	theme,	even	though	in	relation	to	some	
issues	more	 pronounced	 (e.g.	 Chapters	 5	 and	 6)	 than	 in	 others.	 In	 this	 part	 of	 the	
chapter	 the	 research	 findings	 will	 be	 discussed,	 aligned	 according	 to	 the	 three	
headings	that	were	formulated.	At	the	end	of	this	section	we	come	back	to	the	main	
research	question.	
7.1.1		 The	emergence	of	breakaway	networks	
Breakaway	networks	 started	 emerging	 from	a	 local	 conflict	within	 a	 district	 farmer	
union,	 before	 extending	 to	 national	 level,	 and	 resulted	 in	 atomised	 networks.	 The	
process	of	cotton	networks	atomisation	lasted	less	than	one	decade.	It	concerned	both	
grassroots	 farmers	 and	 network	 leaders,	 and	 resulted	 into	 more	 than	 12	 officially	
registered	networks.	The	process	revolved	around	push	and	pull	 factors,	proceeding	
by	 constant	movements	 of	 breaking	 away	 from	networks,	 joining,	 or	 creating	 other	
networks,	 thereby	 yielding	 three	 categories	 of	 cotton	 farmers:	 stayers,	 joiners,	 and	
creators.	Push	factors	to	atomisation	are	causes	that	motivated	farmers	to	leave	their	
networks	while	pull	factors	guided	their	choices	of	actions	and	their	new	network	of	
membership.	The	most	influential	push	factors	with	regard	to	their	overall	ranking	are	
the	 lack	of	payment,	 the	mismanagement	of	 resources	within	networks,	 intra‐group	
conflicts,	 and	 manipulation	 of	 farmers	 by	 outside	 actors.	 However,	 only	 mis‐
management	 of	 resources	 and	manipulation	 of	 farmers	 by	 outside	 actors	 exhibited	
mean	ranks	of	attached	importance	that	were	significantly	different	between	stayers,	
joiners	 and	 creators.	 When	 controlled	 for	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	
background,	only	manipulation	had	a	significant	effect	on	 farmers’	decision	to	break	
away	from	networks.	As	for	the	pull	factors,	the	payment	on	time,	the	facility	of	getting	
inputs,	and	trust	in	boards	members	(network‐efficiency	factors)	were	overall	ranked	
higher	 than	 kinship,	 the	 hope	 for	 board	 positions,	 and	 the	 expectation	 of	 profit	
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(personal	aspiration	factors).	However,	only	trust	in	board	members,	and	the	hope	for	
board	positions	exhibited	mean	ranks	significantly	different	between	stayers,	joiners,	
and	 creators.	 When	 controlled	 for	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 back‐
ground,	trust	in	board	members	and	expectations	of	profit	had	a	significant	effect	on	
farmers’	 decision	 and	 made	 a	 difference	 between	 staying	 in,	 joining	 or	 creating	
networks.		
In	this	process,	investigated	in	Chapter	3,	farmers	were	backed	up	by	various	kinds	of	
relationships,	 in	 particular	 by	 the	professionals	 in	 cotton	production	 such	 as	 inputs	
suppliers	 and	 cotton	 ginners,	 whose	 support	 was	 ranked	 high	 by	 all	 categories	 of	
farmers.	Yet,	support	from	public	officials	and	from	members	of	the	same	ethnic	group	
members	also	had	a	significant	effect	on	stayers,	joiners,	and	creators	when	controlled	
for	 socio‐economic	 and	 socio‐demographic	 background.	 The	 significant	 effects	 of	
public	 officials	 and	 ethnicity	 show	 that	 strong	 ties	 as	 well	 as	 weak	 ties	 constitute	
secure	sources	of	support	on	which	farmers	could	base	their	actions.	As	for	the	public	
officials,	 they	 provide	 breakaway	 network	 proponents	 with	 support	 on	 the	 official	
procedures	 about	 creating	 and/or	 managing	 cotton	 networks.	 The	 role	 of	 social	
networks	 and	 the	 derived	 social	 capital	 in	 cotton	 networking	 are	 attested	 by	 the	
positive	relationship	between	leadership	and	the	number	of	social	networks	farmers	
had	belonged	 to.	Though	breaking	away	gave	cotton	 farmers	more	access	 to	 leader‐
ship	positions,	those	who	had	more	membership	in	social	networks	were	privileged.	
Hence,	 the	 hypothesis	 postulating	 that	 leaders	 of	 breakaway	 networks	 are	 more	
strongly	embedded	in	social	relations	than	ordinary	farmers	is	verified.		
However,	 leadership	 in	 cotton	 organisations	 was	 correlated	 with	 gender	 and	
education,	a	field	where	women	lag	behind,	which	adds	to	the	entrenched	myths	and	
stereotyped	 images	 about	 women’s	 inferiority	 vis‐à‐vis	 men.	 Hence,	 women	 are	
trapped	 in	 the	 intersection	(Crenshaw, 1991)	of	 factors	 that	create	a	gendered	social	
order,	of	which	the	main	feature	remains	the	exclusion	of	women	from	public	spheres.	
This	social	order	creates	a	false	consciousness	among	women	that	makes	them	accept	
their	position,	a	process	that	Ridgeway and Correll (2004: 511)	referred	to	as	the	“social	
relational	context.”	This	explains	why	women	are	excluded	from	cotton	organisation	
boards	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 key	 position	 in	 the	 cotton	 production	 system	 at	 household	
level.		
7.1.2	The	decline	of	social	cohesion	and	the	squeeze	of	collective	
action	
As	 Chapter	 4	 shows,	 most	 of	 the	 infrastructures	 realised	 in	 the	 cotton‐producing	
communities	 during	 the	 1990s	 and	 the	 early	 2000s	 were	 achieved	 before	 the	
atomisation	of	cotton	networks.	The	relatively	strong	cohesion	prevailing	within	the	
organisations	nurtured	collective	action	through	which	communities	compensated	for	
the	 deficiencies	 of	 the	 central	 State,	 availing	 themselves	 of	 basic	 facilities	 that	
benefitted	 non‐cotton	 farmers	 as	 well.	 Hence,	 through	 collective	 action	 cotton	
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networks	 produced	 public	 goods	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 their	 entire	 communities	 (cf.	
Kollock,	1998).	Furthermore,	 the	social	and	economic	privileges	 that	 came	out	 from	
managing	 cotton	 resources	 enhanced	 the	 social	 status	 of	 leaders	 and	 made	 these	
leaders	a	role	model	at	village	level.	This	improved	the	overall	perception	of	the	value	
of	 agriculture	 and	 aroused	 the	 interest	 of	 new	 actors	 to	 invest	 in	 cotton	 either	 by	
farming	or	by	supplying	inputs.		
However,	 collection	 action	 faded	 when	 the	 networks	 disintegrated	 due	 to	 mis‐
management	 and	 conflicts	 increased.	 Breaking	 away	 from	 networks	 first	 steered	
competition	 and	 mismanagement	 practices,	 which	 in	 turn	 generated	 payment	
problems	and	more	conflicts.	Indebtedness	and	the	accumulation	of	arrears	therefore	
transformed	 cotton	production	 into	 a	 nightmare.	Additionally,	 the	 despair	 of	 cotton	
farmers	 resulted	 in	 the	decline	of	 trust	within	 and	between	network	members.	The	
temptation	 of	 free‐riding	 increased	 the	 tension	 between	 individual	 and	 collective	
rationality,	leading	to	the	diminution	of	the	public	goods.	Where	once	network	leaders	
decided	on	relevant	actions	to	undertake	with	cotton	resources	for	the	benefit	of	the	
community,	 now	 concerted	 action	 between	 leaders	 of	 contending	networks	 became	
impossible.	 The	 demise	 of	 collective	 action	 ultimately	 resulted	 from	 this	 chain	 of	
reactions.	 This	 thesis	 revealed	 the	 intertwined	 relations	 between	 trust,	 reciprocity,	
cooperation,	 and	 collective	 action.	Ordinary	 farmers	 felt	 fooled	by	 their	 leaders	 and	
resorted	 to	 free‐riding	 to	 compensate.	 Distrust	 can,	 therefore,	 be	 equated	 to	 the	
disappearance	of	the	basic	functions	of	trust:	the	integrative	function,	the	reduction	of	
complexity,	 and	 cooperation.	 Distrust	 among	 members	 of	 the	 networks	 created	 a	
situation	 in	which	 no	 collective	 action	 could	 be	 initiated.	 Therefore,	 the	 hypothesis	
that	the	decline	of	social	cohesion	resulted	in	the	demise	of	collective	action	in	cotton	
producing	areas	is	verified.		
What	deserves	to	be	singled	out	too	from	Chapter	5	is	the	salient	gender	difference	in	
the	 settlement	 of	 network	 conflicts.	 Men	 and	 women	 proved	 to	 have	 a	 different	
perspective	 on	 modern	 as	 compared	 to	 traditional	 power.	 As	 apparent	 from	 the	
reaction	of	the	profiled	women	to	their	ousting	from	cotton	boards,	the	perception	of	
the	legitimacy	of	power	is	gendered.	Referring	to	the	same	traditional,	ascribed	titles	
that	a	holder	can	only	 lose	when	committing	an	 immoral	act,	women	tend	to	accept	
that	this	cannot	be	the	case	with	modern	power.	Contrarily,	men	do	not	differentiate	
between	 the	 two	sources	of	power.	Although	 in	 the	case	of	modern	power	access	 is	
achieved	by	election	instead	of	ascription,	men	would	tend	to	ignore	the	expiration	of	
their	term	as	if	a	board	position	were	an	ascribed	title.	This	difference	of	perceptions	
made	the	settlement	of	conflicts	easier	with	women	than	with	men,	with	the	 former	
accepting	the	rules	of	the	game,	even	at	their	own	expense,	better	than	the	latter.	
7.1.3	 Livelihoods	reconstruction	after	the	demise	of	cotton	
production	
While	acknowledging	the	household	as	the	locus	of	the	livelihood	system,	the	results	
presented	in	Chapter	6	make	clear	that	the	household	follows	the	contours	of	the	joint	
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family	and	that	in	the	research	area	patrilineal	kinship	is	the	fundamental	principle	in	
household	 composition	 and	 decision‐making.	 A	 household	 often	 comprises	married	
brothers	 and	 their	 families.	 Its	 members	 are	 strategically	 located	 in	 different,	
sometimes	distant	places	for	the	efficient	production	and	management	of	resources.	In	
spite	 of	 the	 spatial	 separation,	 specific	 types	 of	 resources	 are	 pooled.	 While	 some	
management	autonomy	is	granted	to	individual	adults,	 in	the	end	all	members	abide	
by	 the	 authority	 of	 one	 among	 them,	 usually	 the	 eldest	 brother.	 The	 feature	 of	 co‐
residence	that	is	part	of	classic	definitions	of	the	household	(e.g.	Rudie, 1995)	proved	
to	 be	 of	 minor	 importance.	 In	 the	 study	 area,	 eating	 from	 the	 same	 granary	 and	
patrilineal	kinship	are	the	core	constituents	of	the	household.		
Cotton	 producing	 households	 proved	 to	 exhibit	 a	 relatively	 large	 asset	 basis	 and	
amount	of	welfare.	Siaens	and	Wodon	(2008:	174)	concluded	that	“cotton	producers	
fared	 relatively	 well”	 over	 the	 1990s,	 and	 they	 found	 a	 7	 percent	 reduction	 in	 the	
probability	 of	 being	 poor	 for	 cotton‐producing	 households	 compared	 to	 other	 ones.	
Additionally,	 during	 the	 prime	 of	 cotton	 production	 when	 it	 still	 deserved	 the	
qualification	of	white	gold,	 cotton	nurtured	young	people’s	 autonomy	vis‐à‐vis	 their	
parents,	 and	 indirectly	 lightened	 for	 the	 latter	 the	 burden	 of	 proving	 for	 the	 young	
people’s	 needs.	The	decline	of	 cotton	profitability	 brought	 about	 a	 livelihood	 shock,	
for	 which	 farmers	 envisioned	 institutional	 and	 technical	 remedies.	 Cotton	 farmers	
long	 to	 see	 the	 cotton	 sector	 revive,	 but	 the	 regains	 of	 cotton	 production	 are	 very	
erratic	 and	 the	 sector	 still	 continues	 to	 languish.	 The	 continuous	 decline	 of	 cotton	
returns	triggered	the	adaptation	capacity	of	these	households	through	three	types	of	
strategies:	 changing	 agricultural	 production	 patterns,	 migration	 of	 male	 youth,	 and	
granting	more	freedom	to	women.	These	strategies	are	not	the	prerogative	of	any	one	
type	of	household.	However,	the	centre	of	the	decision	making	about	a	given	strategy	
varies	within	the	household.	In	the	shift	in	agricultural	production	patterns	cotton	is	
always	 included	 in	 the	strategies,	and	 the	household	heads	are	the	decision	makers.	
This	 shows	 that	 a	 long‐term	 dependency	 on	 cotton	 production	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	
abandon	 cotton	 in	 spite	 of	 its	 lost	 profitability.	 But	 this	 first	 strategy	 fell	 short	 of	
expectations	 and,	 in	 particular,	 failed	 to	meet	 the	 ‘modern’	 needs	 of	 young	 people.	
Youth	 migration	 then	 emerged	 as	 an	 additional	 strategy.	 Migration	 concerns	
exclusively	young	men,	who	decide	on	 this	and	almost	 impose	 their	decision	on	 the	
head	 of	 their	 household.	 Granting	 more	 freedom	 to	 women	 in	 the	 households	 to	
undertake	 more	 extra‐domestic	 income‐generating	 activities	 is	 a	 solution	 that	
followed	from	women’s	 increasing	contribution	to	the	household	income	when	their	
husbands’	income	from	cotton	declined.	Because	of	the	traditional	imbalance	of	power	
between	 husbands	 and	 wives	 within	 the	 household,	 however,	 women’s	 increased	
economic	 contribution	 did	 not	 notably	 improve	 their	 bargaining	 power	 and	 they	
remained	 dependent	 on	 their	 husbands	 for	 decision	making.	 Hence,	 the	 hypothesis	
that	 livelihood	 losses	 consecutive	 to	 the	 demise	 of	 cotton	production	would	modify	
the	gender	relations	in	cotton‐producing	households	had	to	be	rejected.	
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7.1.4	 Answering	the	main	research	question	
The	analysis	of	 the	process	of	atomisation	 from	the	micro	 to	 the	macro	 level	allows	
answering	 the	main	 question	 of	 the	 research	 that	was	 stated	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 namely:	
How	 did	 farmers’	 agency	 affect	 their	 organisations,	 the	 cotton	 production,	 and	 the	
collective	action	that	evolved	around	that	crop?		
It	 was	 found	 that	 breaking	 away	 from	 cotton	 networks	 enhanced	 the	 access	 to	
leadership	 positions	 and	 the	 advantages	 attached	 to	 these	 of	 previously	 ordinary	
farmers.	 However,	 it	 also	 turned	 out	 that	 social	 connections	 are	 needed	 to	 make	
cotton	 networks	 thrive,	 and	 that	 long‐lasting	 leaders	 had	 more	 social	 connections	
than	simple	leaders.	Accessing	these	positions	on	the	one	hand	and	holding	on	to	them	
on	the	other,	shows	that	the	stocks	of	social	capital	farmers	could	mobilise	from	their	
social	networks	make	the	difference	among	them.	
The	major	conclusion	 that	 transpires	 from	all	 this	 is	 that	 farmers’	agency	 is	 the	key	
element	in	the	process	of	cotton	networking.	Agency	has	two	sides.	It	matters	through	
its	 positive	 (the	 power	 to)	 and	 negative	 (the	 power	 over)	 manifestations	 (Kabeer,	
2005).	Both	sides	of	the	coin	of	agency	are	visible	in	the	processes	that	were	analysed	
in	 this	 thesis.	The	process	of	 atomisation	 is	 the	observable	and	aggregated	 result	of	
individual	farmers’	choices	in	their	constant	movements	of	breaking	from,	joining,	or	
creating	networks.	 Their	 choices	have	modified	not	 only	 the	 internal	 organisational	
dynamics,	 but	 also	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 networks.	 The	 choices	weakened	 the	previously	
prevailing	trust	and	inhibited	cooperation	for	collective	action.	These	outcomes	of	the	
atomisation	show	that	in	the	end,	the	agency	of	individuals	was	more	determinant	in	
modifying	the	networking	trajectories	than	that	of	institutions	and	organisations.		
7.2	 Theoretical	and	conceptual	reflections	
7.2.1		 Agricultural	(and	institutional)	liberalisation	
The	cotton	sector	 in	Benin	seems	to	be	 in	a	permanent	flux.	When	the	 farmers’	pre‐
dicament	wears	off	and	signs	of	prospects	become	visible,	another	crisis	appears.	Such	
a	 cycle	 of	 recommencement	 has	 led	 cotton	 farmers	 to	 being	 disgruntled	 and	 worn	
down	by	the	despair	of	making	the	cotton	sector	revive.	The	merit	of	liberalisation	has	
been	 to	 help	 cotton	 farming	 gain	 an	 entrepreneurial	 status	 by	 putting	 together	
resources	 and	 people	 previously	 unconnected	 (Weik,	 2011).	 Some	 new	 governance	
structures	emerged.	However,	 the	slack	regulation	of	 the	sector	by	 the	State	did	not	
promote	 compromise	 between	 groups	 of	 actors.	 It	 is	 assumed	 that	 “optimising	
individuals	 choose	 the	 most	 efficient	 institutional	 arrangement	 or	 governance	
structure	for	carrying	out	transactions	in	a	specific	environment”	(Slangen	et	al.,	2004:	
104).	Yet,	the	outcomes	of	the	struggles	for	controlling	resources	were	full	of	winner‐
loser	situations,	where	parties	endlessly	seeking	for	equilibrium	could	hardly	come	to	
an	agreement.		
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It	also	has	to	be	noted	that	cotton	networking	in	Benin	has	contributed	to	building	and	
strengthening	human	capital	in	rural	organisations,	a	trend	that	also	was	observed	in	
a	similar	context	 in	Mali	 (Roy, 2010).	 Individuals	and	communities	became	aware	of	
the	benefits	of	organising	themselves,	also	around	other	crops	and	other	causes,	and	
gained	much	 experience	 by	 doing	 so.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 after	 the	 decline	 of	 cotton	
production	 in	 the	 area,	 organisations	 flourished	 to	 replace	 the	 cotton	 organisations	
that	 had	 begun	 to	 wane.	 The	 permanently	 changing	 perceptions	 about	 the	 crop,	
however,	shows	that	farmers	are	more	rational	than	is	often	assumed,	and	that	they	
continue	growing	a	crop	as	long	as	they	find	some	benefits	in	it.	
7.2.2	 Networking	and	social	capital:	building	trust	within	
organisations	
The	dynamics	of	 cotton	networking	exhibit	 the	 features	described	by	actor‐network	
theory	(ANT).	Different	social	actors	were	interconnected	through	cotton	production	
and	 marketing.	 Cotton	 commanded	 these	 interconnections	 and	 each	 of	 the	 actors	
involved	attributed	a	particular	meaning	 to	 the	product,	depending	on	 their	 specific	
relationship	with	the	crop	at	a	certain	time.	Hence,	cotton	became	an	actant	as	defined	
by	Latour	(2005),	changing	its	meaning	in	interaction	with	the	actors.	These	relations	
and	their	meanings	are	illustrated	in	Figure	7.1.	
	
	
Figure	7.1	 Changing	meanings	of	cotton	
In	a	spatial	sense,	cotton	as	an	actant	can	be	either	output	(for	 farmers),	 inputs	(for	
ginners	 and	 transporters),	 or	 a	 means	 (for	 the	 State	 inputs	 suppliers	 and	 the	
regulatory	bodies	of	 the	 cotton	platform).	 Seen	 from	a	 temporal	 perspective,	 cotton	
changed	meanings	throughout	the	years,	 from	being	a	colonial	symbol	(just	after	In‐
dependence)	to	becoming	white	gold	(during	the	nineties),	and	later	on	(second	half	
of	the	2000s	to	the	present)	being	deemed	a	pest,	in	spite	of	the	amount	of	effort	and	
resources	 put	 in	 to	 make	 it	 revive.	 The	 shift	 of	 meanings	 is	 nurtured	 by	 cotton	
profitability	 with	 its	 corollary	 of	 disagreements,	 conflicts,	 and	 the	 social	 divides	 it	
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generates	among	individuals	and	between	individuals	and	institutions.	The	dynamics	
involved	bring	about	a	power	play	that	unveils	an	 imbalance	 in	 the	decision‐making	
process	about	the	management	of	cotton	and	the	direction	of	cotton‐related	policies.	
An	 actor‐oriented	 approach	 and	 actor‐network	 theory	 together	 convey	 the	message	
that	objects,	even	inanimate	and	lacking	will,	should	not	be	considered	as	exempt	of	
action.	 While	 persons	 and	 their	 networks	 “attribute	 agency	 to	 various	 objects	 and	
ideas,	which,	 in	turn,	can	shape	actors’	perceptions	of	what	 is	possible”	(Long, 2001: 
241),	 the	 actant	 is	 anything,	 human	 or	 non‐human	 that	 induces	 an	 action	 (Latour, 
2005).	In	addition,	besides	the	interactions	accounting	for	the	life	of	the	organisations,	
cotton	leaders	developed	social	relations	that	perhaps	would	not	exist	if	there	were	no	
cotton.	Networks	 leaders	 became	 role	models	 and	maintained	 a	 network	 of	 leaders	
with	the	cotton	system,	developing	some	cultural	capital	among	them	and	“forming	an	
elite	structure”	(Kilduff	and	Tsai,	2003:	22).		
The	 complexity	 of	 exchange	 in	 cotton	 production	 and	 marketing	 requires	 trust,	
particularly	in	situations	where	legal	frameworks	are	weak	or	fuzzy.	The	importance	
of	trust	as	a	critical	input	for	successful	organisations	has	been	established	for	years.	
But	 the	 success	 of	 organisations	 is	 not	 only	 determined	 by	 trust.	 The	 types	 of	
institutions	prevailing	within	a	society	influence	that	success	for	any	organisation	in	
the	 society	 concerned,	because	organisations	 are	 always	 shaped	by	 the	 institutional	
arrangements	 prevailing	 in	 a	 society.	 The	 social	 structures	 of	 a	 given	 society	 are	 a	
cultural	 manifestation	 of	 that	 society.	 Hence,	 effective	 organisations	 emerge	 in	
societies	with	intense	interactions,	while	those	societies	with	poor	interactions	would	
produce	ineffective	organisations.	
7.2.3			 Gender	leadership	in	rural	organisations	
In	this	study	it	was	found	that	women	are	admitted	on	boards	of	organisations	as	long	
as	they	accept	to	play	figurative	roles	defined	for	them	by	paternalistic	culture.	When	
they	start	standing	for	something	that	reduces	the	power	and	influence	of	men,	they	
inspire	reticence	and	distrust	from	their	male	colleagues.	Men,	therefore,	see	women’s	
involvement	 in	management	 as	 excluding	 real	 participation	by	decision	making	 and	
resources	distribution,	which	would	never	improve	gender	equity	in	the	organisation.	
This	points	to	an	aspect	of	the	gendered	difference	of	management	style	as	described	
by	 Rosener (2011),	 who	 demonstrated	 that	 participation	 reduces	 the	 likelihood	 of	
opposition	to	decisions	within	organisations.	This	study	shows	that	women’s	under‐
representation	in	cotton	organisation	and	their	limited	roles	therein	derive	from	their	
traditional	subordinate	position	in	society	where	men	ascribe	women	only	domestic	
roles,	 which	 bear	 a	 high	 potential	 of	 being	 a	 burden	 to	 them	 (Moser, 1989).	 The	
intertwined	character	of	life	spheres	makes	that	inequalities	and	achievements	in	one	
sphere	can	be	reproduced	in	another	(Kabeer, 2005).	
The	 struggle	 of	 the	 two	 women	 profiled	 in	 Chapter	 5	 shows	 that	 some	 women’s	
agency	 is	capable	of	modifying	 to	a	great	extent	 their	positions	within	 their	 families	
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and	 improve	 their	 trajectory	 within	 men‐dominated	 organisations.	 That	 agency,	 as	
shown	by	 the	World	Bank	(2012),	has	both	 intrinsic	and	 instrumental	 relevance	 for	
women’s	quality	of	life	and	for	actions	that	improve	their	well‐being.	Given	the	inter‐
section	of	constraints	that	hinder	women’s	advancement	and	empowerment	in	society	
at	 large,	 this	 agency	 is	 highly	 required	 if	 they	 “are	 to	play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 shaping	
institutions,	 social	 norms,	 and	 the	 well‐being	 of	 their	 communities”	 (World	 Bank,	
2012:	 115).	 Yet,	 generally,	 individual	 men	 exercise	 less	 negative	 power	 to	 curtail	
women’s	agency	than	their	associations	do.	At	 individual	 level,	men	do	acknowledge	
women’s	 values	 and	 merits.	 To	 break	 the	 cycle	 of	 the	 reproduction	 of	 gender	
inequalities	there	is	a	need	to:	(i)	lift	up	rural	women’s	false	consciousness	(cognitive)	
by	 demonstrating	 that	 their	 disadvantaged	 position	 is	 not	 natural	 but	 socially	
constructed;	and	(ii)	get	the	legitimacy	of	gender	equity	widely	acknowledged	at	the	
individual	 level	 for	 its	 wider	 acceptance	 at	 other	 societal	 levels.	 Addressing	 these	
strategic	gender	needs	of	women	requires	(re)constructing	gender	as	“a	complex	set	
of	social	relations	enacted	across	a	range	of	social	practices	that	exist	both	within	and	
outside	of	formal	organisations”	(Ely	and	Meyerson,	2000:	113),	and	as	embedded	in	
three	societal	dimensions:	individual,	interactional,	and	institutional	(Risman,	2004).	
7.2.4	 Rural	household	and	livelihood	adaptation	
The	findings	of	this	research	question	the	classical	definition	of	the	household	with	a	
powerful	head	deciding	on	all	issues	of	production	and	consumption	on	behalf	of	the	
dependants.	The	processes	of	decision	making	encountered	show	different	centres	of	
gravity	with	regard	to	domestic	arrangements	and	decision	making.	Also,	a	household	
has	an	objective	and	a	subjective	dimension	which	makes	 the	co‐residence	criterion	
problematic.	Although	members	can	be	objectively	separated	and	dispersed,	either	by	
living	in	different	homesteads	or	by	being	a	migrant,	the	head	of	the	household	would	
automatically	list	them	as	dependent	members	of	the	household.	In	spite	of	the	often	
long	absence	of	migrant	members,	they	were	considered	household	members	by	the	
heads	of	the	households	concerned,	whereas	those	paid	workers	labouring	and	eating	
in	 the	 household	 were	 not	 perceived	 as	 household	 members.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	
brothers	 living	 in	 dispersed	 homesteads,	who	were	 listed	 as	 household	 dependants	
and	 considered	 themselves	 as	members	 of	 a	 household	whose	 head	was	 living	 at	 a	
different	 place.	 This	 attests	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 power	 of	 kinship	 relations.	 As	
Rudie (1995: 228)	 noted,	 “households	 are	 small	 units	 in	 which	 primarily	 familial	
loyalties	 have	 to	 come	 to	 terms	with	 some	 requirements	 for	 efficient	 resources.”	 In	
our	 case,	 the	 subjective	 (and	 cognitive)	 dimension	 of	 household	 outweighs	 the	
objective	(and	spatial)	dimension.	
Dispersed	 and	 spatially	 separated	 members	 of	 a	 household	 may	 still	 pool	 specific	
types	 of	 resources	 for	 the	 consumption	 and	other	 needs	 of	 all	 household	members.	
This	 is	 what	 (Elmhirst,	 2008)	 called	 the	 multi‐locality	 of	 livelihoods.	 In	 a	 study	 of	
migration	in	rural	Nepal,	Gartaula	(2011)	found	a	similar	situation	of	households	split	
up	 across	 different	 geographic	 locations	 but	 interacting	 through	 information	 and	
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communication	 technologies.	 He	 referred	 to	 this	 type	 of	 households	 as	 modified	
extended	households.	
To	 tackle	 the	decline	of	 cotton	 incomes,	 cotton‐farming	households	diversified	 their	
sources	of	income	and	resources	and	developed	adaptation	or	coping	strategies.	While	
adaptation	strategies	are	exclusively	on‐farm	strategies	 that	 include	granting	a	 cash	
function	to	or	increasing	the	cash	function	of	other	crops,	coping	strategies	primarily	
consist	 of	 changing	 the	 purpose	 of	 production	 to	 the	 crop	 in	 crisis.	 This	 suggest	 a	
temporal	dimension	to	diversification	strategies.	The	fact	that	cotton	is	still	part	of	the	
coping	 strategies	 implies	 that	 these	 types	 of	 diversification	 are	 reversible,	 and	 that	
households	 that	 diversify	 by	 coping	 are	 highly	 likely	 to	 resume	 cotton	 production	
when	 the	 fundamental	 production	 parameters	 improve.	 In	 contrast,	 adaptation	 can	
turn	out	to	be	irreversible	if	the	alternative	sources	of	income	yield	as	much	income	as	
the	former	crop	and	bear	less	constraints.	
7.3	 Conclusion	and	future	research	
The	 importance	 of	 cotton	production	 to	Benin’s	 economy	 is	 undeniable.	 By	 shaping	
the	country’s	production	system	over	the	last	two	to	three	decades,	cotton	has	become	
the	 backbone	 of	 its	 economy.	 Decision	 makers	 became	 aware	 of	 the	 necessity	 to	
organise	 the	 sector	 and	 devised	 and	 implemented	 reform	policies	 to	 effect	 changes	
and	make	 the	 sector	 more	 efficient.	 These	 reforms	 aimed	 at	 suppressing	 the	 State	
intervention	 in	 the	 sector	 and	 granting	 full	 autonomy	 to	 private	 actors	 for	 joint	
management	within	 their	professional	organisations.	Yet,	 the	 implementation	of	 the	
State’s	 interventions	 intended	 to	 induce	 qualitative	 (and	 quantitative)	 changes	 into	
the	 fundamental	 organisational	 system	 of	 the	 sector	 proves	 to	 be	 inadequate.	 The	
reform	policies	as	well	as	 their	 implementation	had	 flaws	that	hindered	the	sector’s	
efficiency.	Among	 these	were	 the	 lack	 of	 coordination	 and	 the	 over‐politicization	 of	
the	sector,	the	surplus	ginning	capacity	of	the	country,	and	the	over‐regulation	of	the	
sector.	While	the	State	legislated	for	liberalisation,	it	continues	subsidizing	the	sector,	
on	 the	 grounds	 of	 ensuring	 minimum	 revenue	 to	 cotton	 farmers.	 Hence,	 relatively	
important	 amounts	 of	 money	 are	 invested	 to	 support	 inputs	 costs	 and	 sustain	 the	
cotton	 prices	 at	 the	 farm	 gate.	 These	 subsidies	 became	 sources	 of	 power	 play	 and	
conflicts.	 Furthermore,	 the	 institutions	 installed	 to	 enforce	 regulations	 in	 the	 sector	
were	in	their	actions	not	backed	up	by	clearly	formulated	rules.	The	highly	regulated	
system	 implemented	 to	 control	 the	 interactions	 between	 actors	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
heavy	 and	 ineffective.	 The	 reforms	 therefore	 burdened	 the	 sector	with	 institutional	
and	political	constraints	in	addition	to	the	technical	ones.	
What	this	thesis	shows	is	that	due	to	the	relatively	high	profitability	of	cotton	sector,	
the	necessity	of	diversifying	agriculture	has	always	remained	a	good	intention.	All	the	
actors	in	the	cotton	production	and	management	remain	‘addicted’	to	the	crop	for	the	
important	amount	of	resources	it	generated.	As	a	consequence,	the	State	interventions	
in	cotton	are	moulded	by	political	motives	and	the	technical	aspects	are	overlooked.	
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The	successive	crises	the	sector	has	been	undergoing	since	the	mid‐2000s	are	some	of	
the	outcomes	of	such	a	political	management	of	a	productive	sector.	Hence,	reforms	
are	 being	 permanently	 implemented	 into	 the	 sector,	 the	 assessment	 of	 an	 on‐going	
one	followed	by	the	implementation	of	new	ones.	
The	 present	 thesis	 went	 beyond	 the	 aggregate	 level	 to	 investigate	 the	 dynamics	 of	
smallholders’	 cotton	production,	 providing	micro‐level	 data	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
demise	of	 the	cotton	system	on	 farmers.	Taking	 together	 the	 five	empirical	chapters	
highlights	the	saliency	of	the	use	of	a	mixed‐methods	approach	for	understanding	the	
complexities	 of	 the	 interfaces	 between	 informal	 and	 formal	 structures.	 Indeed,	 the	
focus	on	the	 interaction	between	actors	and	structures	offered	room	to	explore	how	
individual	 cotton	 farmers	 navigate	 through	 cotton	 networks	 in	 the	 context	 of	
atomisation.	 Human	 agency	 is	 always	 constrained	 by	 structures,	 which	 implies	 the	
necessity	 for	 individuals	 to	 integrate	 them	 into	 whatever	 their	 options	 are.	 At	 the	
same	 time,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 individual	 agency	 through	 choices	 and	 actions	 also	
changes	structures.	
The	demise	of	 cotton	production	yielded	negative	as	well	 as	positive	outcomes.	The	
most	significant	negative	effects	are	the	drastic	shrinking	of	livelihood	assets	and	the	
freeze	 of	 collective	 action.	 Among	 the	 positive	 outcomes	 that	 could	 be	 blessings	 in	
disguise,	 is	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 human	 capital	 of	 farmers.	 Their	 struggle	 for	
representation	 provided	 them	with	 invaluable	 experience	 that	 could	 be	 invested	 in	
organising	the	production	of	other	crops.	It	is	also	important	to	mention	the	enlarged	
manoeuvring	space	for	women	and	the	 increased	autonomy	of	youth,	which	derived	
from	their	increased	financial	independence.	
Cotton	is	special	to	Benin	and	has	been	specially	managed	for	decades	through	unique	
structures.	 But	 the	 management	 of	 such	 a	 critical	 crop	 requires	 transparent	 and	
effective	regulation.	The	findings	of	this	research	call	for	further	policies	and	rules	for	
their	 implementation	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 farmer	 organisations,	 gender	 equity,	 and	
livelihood	 systems.	 For	 their	 application	 to	 be	 sound	 and	 effect	 lasting	 changes,	
however,	 these	 policies	 would	 need	 further	 investigation	 of	 insufficiently	 explored	
issues.	Below,	three	such	issues	are	elaborated.	
1. Returning	 to	 the	 cotton	 system,	 with	 regard	 to	 networks,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	
impose	 limits	 on	 their	 size	 if	multiple	 networks	 are	 admitted.	 Members	 should	
know	each	other	in	order	to	be	able	to	exert	control	over	their	peers.	That	would	
leave	less	room	for	the	malpractices	that	have	created	mounting	competition	for	
controlling	the	networks	and	their	resources.	
2. It	 would	 be	 highly	 relevant	 to	 do	 research	 on	 the	 ways	 of	 empowerment	 of	
women	 through	 their	 involvement	 in	 cotton	 management.	 The	 results	 of	 such	
research	could	further	the	possibility	for	women	cotton	farmers	to	register	and	be	
accountable	 in	 their	own	name,	 thereby	deciding	upon	 the	use	of	 their	produce	
within	the	organisations.		
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3. Through	longitudinal	research,	it	could	be	investigated	whether	the	dispersion	of	
household	members	 reduces	 their	 vulnerability	 to	 shock.	 This	would	 provide	 a	
better	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 adaptation	 and	 coping	 strategies	 complement	
each	 other	 and	 of	 how	 providing	 cotton‐producing	 households	 with	 specific	
inputs	for	food	crops	would	sustain	their	livelihood	strategies.	
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Appendix	1:	Focus‐group	discussion	guide	
Province	:	 	 	 	 Date	:	 	 	 	 	
District	:	 	 	 	 Discussion	Group	(Men/Women)	:	
Village	:	 	 	 	 Surveyor	(s)	:	
	
N°  Topics Answers 
I. 	
Institutional	mapping	(Social	
networks/organisations	of	all	types	
operating	in	the	village)	
Networks/Organisations Hierarchy	
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
II. 	 Meaning	of	association	membership	
	
III. 	
Cotton	farmers	organisations	
operating	in	the	village	(rank	the	
most	important)	
Networks/Organisations Hierarchy	
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
IV. 	
Possible	links	between	farmers	
organisations	and	others	social	
networks	
	
V. 	 Importance	of	cotton	production	in	the	village	
Economic Social Cultural		 Other
	
VI. 	
Social	constructs	(songs,	proverbs,	
etc.)	about	cotton	and	they	
meaning	
VII. 	
Collective	actions	induced	by	
cotton	production	(constructions	of	
community	infrastructures,	supply	
of	public	services,	etc.)	in	the	
village	
	
VIII. 
Types	of	conflicts	within	and	
between	farmers	organisations	
(leadership,	redistribution	of	
resources,	etc.)	
Conflicts	
Hierarchy	(decreasing	order)
Numerical	
importance	
Critical	
importance	
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
IX. 	
Consequences	of	conflicts	for	the	
organisations	and	for	cotton	
production	
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X. 	
Causes	of	and	motivation	behind	
the	creation	of	new	organisations	
(rank)	
Causes Motivations	
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
XI. 	 Profile	of	new	organisations’	leaders	
	
XII. 	
Factors	determining	the	decision	to	
adhere	to	a	given	(new)	
organisation	
Factors Hierarchy		
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
XIII. Reasons	of	cotton	production	abandonment	
Reasons Hierarchy	
1st	
2nd		
3rd	
Etc.	
XIV. 
Consequences	of	the	multiplicity	of	
farmers’	organisations	for	
collective	action	at	village	level	
	 	
XV. 	 Income‐generating	activities	that	substitute	for	cotton	
Activities	
Hierarchy	
Number	of	
people	
involved	
Amount	of	
income	
generated	
	
XVI. Suggestions	of	reform	actions	for	the	revival	of	cotton	sector	
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Appendix	2:	Semi‐structured	questionnaire	
	
Preamble	(to	the	surveyors)	
1. Present	yourself	as	complete	as	possible;	
2. Present	the	context	and	objectives	of	the	research	and	ensure	the	interviewee	that	the	information	
collected	will	be	kept	confidential	and	that	the	research	has	no‐commercial	purpose;	
3. Solicit	 the	permission	to	record	the	 interview	(try	 to	convince	 the	respondent	 in	case	 there	 is	any	
resistance);	
4. Solicit	the	respondent’s	patience	for	the	interview	to	be	conducted	to	its	end;	
5. Invite	the	respondent	to	introduce	him(her)self;	
6. Then	lead	the	interview.	
	
	
I. SOCIO‐ECONOMIC	AND	DEMOGRAPHIC	CHARACTERISTICS	OF	THE	RESPONDENT	
	
N°	 Characteristics	 Code	 Answers	
1.1	 Name	 	
1.2	 Gender	 0=Female	;	1=	Male	 	
1.3	 Age	 	
1.4	 Religion	 	
1.5	 Ethnic	group	 	
1.6	 Marital	status	 1=Married	;	2=Single	 	
1.7	 Level	of	instruction		
0=Without	any	formal	instruction	
1=Primary	school	[1‐6	years]	
2=Secondary	school	[6‐13	years]	
3=University	[+13	years]	
4=Informal	education	(specify)	
	
1.8	 Household	size	 	
	
1.9	
Number	of	
household	members	
at	working	age	
8‐14	years	 Male	 	Female 	
15‐60	years	 Male	 	Female 	
>	60	years	 Male	 	Female 	
1.10	 Residence	status	 1=Born	in	the	village	2=Migrant		
	
1.11	 If	migrant,	since	how	many	years		 			
1.12	 Experience	in	cotton	production	 	
1.13	 Experience	in	agriculture11		 	
1.14	 Main	incomes	source	 	
	
1.15	 Place	of	agriculture	in	incomes	sources12	
05‐06	 06‐07	 07‐08	 08‐09	 09‐10
R	 %	 R	 %	 R	 %	 %	 R	 % R	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
1.16	 Place	of	cotton	in	agricultural	incomes	
05‐06	 06‐07	 07‐08	 08‐09	 09‐10
R	 %	 R	 %	 R	 %	 %	 R	 % R	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
1.17	 Cotton	production	over	the	past	5	years13	
05‐06	 06‐07	 07‐08	 08‐09	 09‐10
A	 P	 A	 P	 A	 P	 A	 P	 A	 P	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1.18	 Membership	status	in	a	network	 1=Excluded;	2=Dismissed;	3=Still	member	
	
1.19	 Status	of	cotton	production	 0=Abandon;	1=Still	producing;	2=On	 	
																																																								
11	Consider the time from when the person has his own farm.	
12 R = Rank; % = contribution. 
13 A = Area in ha; P = production in tons. 
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break	
1.20	 Membership	of	a	political	party/movement	 0=No	;	1=Yes	 	
1.21	 Number	of	years	of	political	activism	 	
	
	
II. EXPLORING	THE	CURRENT	NETWORK	OF	MEMBERSHIP	
2.1 Emergence	and	growth.	
N°	 Characteristics	 Answers	
2.1	 Name	of	the	network	
2.2	 Original	network	from	which	it	derived
2.3	 Date	of	creation	
2.4	 Place	of	registration	
2.5	 Registration	number
2.6	 Number	of	promoters
2.7	 Size	of	the	first	board
2.8	 Number	of	board	official	renewals	since	its	creation
2.9	 Number	of	Presidents	since	the	creation
2.10	 Farmer	groups	compositing	the	network	 At	creationNow
2.11	 Number	of	network	members		 At	creationNow
2.12	 Maximum	and	minimum	sizes	reached	by	the	network	
	 Farmers’	groups	
Members
Maximum 	
Minimum 	
2.2 Relations	between	the	proponenets.	
	 A	 B	 C D E F	
A	 X	 	 	
B	 	 X	 	
C	 	 	 X 	
D	 	 	 X 	
E	 	 	 X 	
F	 	 	 X	
2.3 How	would	you	now	qualify	the	creation	of	your	current	network,	spontaneous	or	motivated	
from	outside?	Justify.	
2.4 Relationships	between	the	first	board	members.		
	 President	 Secretary Treasurer Coordinator	
President	 X	 	
Secretary	 	 X
Treasurer	 	 	 X
Coordinator	 	 	 X	
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III. NETWORKING	DYNAMICS	
3.1 Membership	of	cotton	networks	and	board	positions	occupied.	
N°	 Cotton	Network	 Period	(Year/month)	 Positions	
Period
(Year/month)	
N1	 	 	 	 	
N2	 	 	 	 	
N3	
3.2 Mapping	farmer’s	personal	network	(with	regard	to	cotton	production).	
N°	 Organisations	
Membership	with	regard	to	cotton	
production	(1=Yes;	0=No)	 ResponsibilityBefore	the
prime	
During	the	
prime	
After	the	
decline	
A1	 	 	
A2	 	 	 	 	 	
A3	 	 	
3.3 Interactions	between	these	associations/organisations	and	the	cotton	networks	(0=No	
communication/no	relation;	1=Exchange	of	inputs;	2=Support	from	cotton	network;	
3=Consultation	for	collective	action).	
	
																Cotton	Networks	
Organisations	 Network	1	 Network	N2	 Network	N3	
A	1	 	 	 	
A	2	 	 	 	
A	3	 	 	 	
3.4 Rank	the	following	causes	of	breaking	away	according	to	their	importance.	
	
N°	 Factors	 Rank Remarks	
1 	 Lack	of	payment	
2 	 Manipulation	(and	corruption)
3 	 Mismanagement	of	resources	
4 	 Lack	of	communication	
5 	 Extension	of	villages	
6 	 Intra‐group	conflicts	
7 	 Imitation	
3.5 Rank	the	following	motives/objectives	in	the	creation	of	breakaway	networks.	
	
N°	 Motives/Objectives Rank Remarks	
1 	 Leadership		 	
2 	 Altruism	 	
3 	 Selfishness		 	
3.6 How	did	you	become	President/Secretary/Treasurer/Coordinator…?	(For	leaders)	
	
3.7 Rank	the	following	personal	abilities/assets	according	to	their	importance	in	helping	leaders	to	
get	position	into	network	boards?	
	
N°	 Abilities/Assets	 Rank Remarks	
1 	 Level	of	instruction	 	
2 	 Experience	in	a	previous	board 	
3 	 Extend	of	cotton	production	 	
4 	 Good	morality	(deserving	trustworthiness	&	faith) 	
5 	 Level	of	prosperity		 	
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6 	 Mastery	of	cotton	sector	 	
7 	 Relations	with	outsiders	(inputs	suppliers,	etc.)	 	
8 	 Being	an	opinion	leader	(fame)	 	
9 	 Youthfulness	 	
10 	 Commitment	and	availability	(for	group) 	
11 	 Courage	 	
12 	 Ability	to	negotiate	 	
3.8 Rank	the	following	sources	of	support	in	the	process	of	creating	breakaway	network.	
N°	 Types	of	support	 Rank Remarks	
1 	 Family	and	Relatives	
2 	 Friends	
3 	 Religious	groups	
4 	 Ethnic	solidarity	(sharing	of	cultural	values)
5 	 Political	membership 	
6 	 Professional	groups	(Producers,	inputs	suppliers,	ginners,	etc.)	 	 	
7 	 Personnel	from	administration	
	
3.9 Messages/discourses	offered	to	the	“supporters”	by	the	leaders	to	convince	them	of	supporting	
in	the	creation	of	the	network.	
3.10 Messages/discourses	delivered	to	cotton	farmers	to	decide	them	to	join	the	network.	
3.11 Rank	the	following	determinants	in	farmers’	decision	to	adhere	to	a	network.	
N
°	
Determinant	factors	 Rank Remarks	
1 	 Payment	on	time	
2 	 Expectation	of	profits
3 	 Taste	for	novelty	
4 	 Trust	in	network	board	members	
5 	 Kinship		
6 	 Size	of	networks	
7 	 Facility	of	getting	inputs	
8 	 Hope	of	occupying	a	board	position	
	
3.12 Rank	the	following	reasons	according	to	their	importance	in	farmers’	decision	to	give	up	cotton	
production.		
	
N
°	
Reasons	of	abandonment		 Rank Remarks	
1 	 Absence	of	payment	
2 	 Decline	of	cotton	profitability	
3 	 Generalization	of	the	“caution	solidaire”	(joint	liability	mechanism)	 	 	
4 	 Late	supply	of	bad	quality	inputs	
5 	 Inter‐	and	intra‐networks	conflicts	
6 	 Imprisonment	of	farmers	
7 	 Decline	of	soil	fertility	and	its	corollary	of	low	yield	
8 	 Incapacity	to	work	(old	age)	
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IV. NETWORK	CONFLICTS		
4.1 Rank	the	following	causes	of	conflicts	within	and	between	networks	according	to	their	
frequency	and	the	acuity	of	their	related‐conflicts.	
N°	 Types	of	conflict	 Frequency	 Acuity	
1 	 Resources	distribution	 	
2 	 Leadership		 	
3 	 Mismanagement	of	resources	 	
4 	 Cotton	commercialization	 	
5 	 Absence	of	payment	 	
6 	 Extension	of	the	“caution	solidaire”	 	
7 	 Lack	of	commitment	at	work	 	
8 	 Payment	of	membership	fees	 	
9 	 Outlets	(Expression	of	other	rivalries) 	
		
4.2 Factors	that	make	the	conflicts	critical	(internal,	external,	etc.).	
4.3 Ways/strategies	of	settlement	and	their	relation	with	the	types	of	conflicts.	
4.4 Effects	of	the	conflicts	on	the	respondent	(membership	of	networks,	cotton	production,	etc.).	
4.5 Effect	of	the	conflicts	on	collective	action	(community	level).	
	
V. INTERACTIONS/RELATIONS	BETWEEN	COTTON	NETWORKS	
	
	 ANPC	 FENAPRA	FENAPROC	
FENAG‐
ROP	
AGROP	
BENIN	
AGROP‐
NOUVELL
E	VISION
AGROP	
DEDE	
UNAPRO‐
B	
UPROC
OB	
ANPC	 X	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
FENAPRA	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
FENAPROC	 	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	
FENAGROP	 	 	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	
AGROP	
BENIN	 	 	 	 	 X	 	 	 	 	
AGROP‐
NOUVELLE	
VISION	
	 	 	 	 	 X	 	 	 	
AGROP	DEDE	 	 	 	 	 	 X	 	 	
UNAPRO‐B	 	 	 	 X	
UPROCOB	 	 	 	 	 X
	
VI. COLLECTIVE	ACTION		
6.1 Types	of	actions	realised	in	the	village	from	cotton	resources.	
N°	 Actions	 Realisation		(0=No;	1=Yes)	 Effects	
1	
Construction	of	
community	
infrastructures		
Agricultural	inputs	stores 	
Schools	
Water	digs
Bridges	and	rural	roads	
Health	centres
Leisure	centres	
Football	field
Municipal	buildings
Public	lightening
Kerosene	selling	points
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Rural	radio	
2	 Payments	
Compensation	for	infrastructures	
construction	
	
Salaries	of	community	teachers
Support	to	students	
Support	to	municipal	counsel
3	 Maintenance	of	infrastructure	 	 	
	
6.2 Way	the	collective	action	affected	the	household	livelihood.	
6.3 Continuity	of	such	actions	after	the	decline/abandonment	of	cotton	production.	
6.4 Effects	on	the	households’	daily	life.	
6.5 Adaptation	strategies	to	face	the	freeze	of	collective	action.	
	
VII. HOUSEHOLDS’	LIVELIHOOD	AND	GENDER	RELATIONS	
7.1 Labour	division	in	cotton	production.	
N°	 Tasks	 Executed	by	(Men=1	;	Women=2	;	Children=3)
Time	consumption	
(Low	–	Medium	–	High)
Observations	(Other	
intervening	worker)
1	 Clearance	 	 	 	
2	 Ploughing	 	 	 	
3	 Sowing	 	 	 	
4	 Expanding	fertilisers	 	 	 	
5	 Weeding	 	 	 	
6	 Pesticide	treatment	 	 	 	
7	 Harvesting	 	 	 	
8	 Transport	 	 	 	
9	 Other	 	 	 	
	
7.2 Evolution	households’	income	sources.	
N°	
Sources	of	
incomes	
(Activities)	
Performed	
by	
Rank Contribution	(%)	
During	the	
prime	of	cotton
After the	
decline/abando
nment	
During	the	
prime	of	cotton	
After	the	
decline/abando
nment	
1	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4	 	 	 	 	 	 	
5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
7.3 Households’	livelihood	assets.	
N°	 Assets	
Evolution	of	assets	with	regard	to	cotton	production	
Before	the	boom	 During	the	prime	of	cotton	
After	the	
decline/abandonment
1	 Type	of	house	 	
2	 Agricultural	equipment		 	
3	 Household’s	basic	equipment	 	 	 	
4	 Luxurious	equipment	 	 	 	
5	 Transportation	means 	
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7.4 Evolution	of	spouses’	contribution	to	household	expenditures.	
N°	 Household	needs	
Spouses’	Contribution	(Low	– Medium	–	High)	
During	the	prime	of	cotton	 After	the	decline/abandonment	
Husband	 Wife(ves) Other	 Husband	 Wife(ves)	 Other	
1 	 Education	 	 	 	
2 	 Clothing	 	 	 	
3 	 Health	care	 	 	 	
4 	 Food	 	 	 	
5 	 Access	to	public	services	 	 	 	
6 	 Ceremonies	(wedding,	baptisms,	etc.)	
	 	 	
	
7.5 Effect	of	the	decline/abandonment	of	cotton	production	on	the	household	livelihood.	
7.6 Evolution	of	gender	relations	with	regard	to	cotton	production.	
N°	 Domains	
Nature/intensity	of	relations	(Low	–	Medium	– High)
During	the	prime	of	
cotton	
After	the	
decline/abandonment	
1 	 Intensity	of	women’s	extra‐
domestic	activities	(Time	devoted)	
2 	 Women’s	access	to	farming	land
3 	 Autonomy	in	decision	making
	
7.7 Which	of	the	following	cultures	are	used	to	substitute	for	cotton	as	provider	of	incomes.	
N°	 Cultures	 Rank Contribution	to	incomes	
(%)	
1 	 Maize	 	 	
2 	 Soy	bean	 	 	
3 	 Groundnuts	 	 	
4 	 Rice	 	 	
5 	 cowpea		 	 	
6 	 Sorghum	 	 	
7 	 Yam	 	 	
8 	 Cassava	 	 	
9 	 Shea	butter	 	 	
10 	 Cashew	nut	 	 	
	
7.8 Are	rural	exodus	or	migration	an	income	earning	means	that	substitute	for	cotton?		
7.9 Members	of	household	who	migrated	or	went	on	exodus?	
7.10 Place	of	exodus/migration	and	the	process	of	decision	making	(where	and	when?)	
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VIII. PERSPECTIVES	ON	COTTON	PRODUCTION	AND	RELATED‐NETWORKING	
	
8.1 Is	it	still	possible	to	make	the	cotton	sector	revive?	How?	
8.2 Rank	the	following	reform	actions	according	to	their	likelihood	to	make	the	cotton	sector	
revive.	
N°	 Suggested	reforms	actions	 Rank Remarks	
1 	 Payment	on	time	
2 	 Improving	the	inputs	quality	and	supply
3 	 Lowering	inputs	prices	
4 	 Raising	cotton	price
5 	 Re‐nationalisation	of	the	cotton	sector
6 	 Restoring	the	refunds	
7 	 Merging	the	networks	in	one	
8 	 Suppressing	all	cotton	debts	
9 	 Eliminating	the	“caution	solidaire”	(joint	liability	
mechanism)	
10 	 Sharing	the	risks	between	farmers	&	inputs	suppliers
	
IX. CHARACTERISTICS	OF	THE	VILLAGE	(For	leaders)	
	
N°	 Characteristics	 Answer
4.1	 Province		
4.2	 District	
4.3	 Village	
4.4	 Main	ethnic	groups	in	the	village	
4.5	 Agro‐ecological	zone
4.6	 Evolution	of	cotton	producers	the	last	5	years	
05‐06 06‐07 07‐08	 08‐09	 09‐10
Men 	 	
Women 	 	
4.7	 Evolution	of	cultivated	land	in	cotton	the	last	5	years	
05‐06 06‐07 07‐08 08‐09	 09‐10
	
4.8	 Evolution	of	cotton	production	the	last	5	years	
05‐06 06‐07 07‐08 08‐09	 09‐10
	
4.9	 Distance	from	the	village	to	the	main	city
4.10	 Accessibility	of	the	village	 1=Paved	road ;	2=Rural	track ;	3=Small	track	 	
4.11	 Number	of	cotton	networks	operating	in	the	village	
4.12	 Number	of	farmers’	associations/organisations	
4.13	 Number	of	NGOs	operating	in	the	village	
During	cotton	prime
After	the	
decline/abandonment	
	
X. WHAT	DO	YOU	THINK	ABOUT	THE	ON‐GOING	REFORM	TO	TRANSFORM	COTTON	FARMERS	
ORGANISATIONS	INTO	COOPERATIVES?	
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SUMMARY	
Cotton	 production	 in	 Benin,	 West	 Africa,	 is	 intertwined	 with	 colonialism,	 which	
contributed	to	the	transformation	of	the	crop’s	production	system	from	traditional	to	
modern.	Throughout	the	years,	the	importance	of	the	crop	for	the	stakeholders	varied.	
The	last	decades	have	witnessed	a	growing	interest	in	cotton	of	farmers,	businessmen,	
and	the	State.	From	having	a	marginal	status	during	the	seventies	and	the	first	half	of	
the	 eighties,	 cotton	 grew	 in	 importance	 during	 the	 nineties,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 area	
covered	and	income	generated,	averaging	37	percent	of	the	total	cultivated	area	in	the	
country.	 Thus,	 cotton	 has	 a	 critical	 cash	 function	 and	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 Benin’s	
economic	growth,	accounting	for	an	important	share	in	the	State’s	revenues	and	farm	
households	incomes.	Indeed,	the	share	of	cotton	exports	represented	75	percent	of	the	
country’s	total	agricultural	exports	during	the	2000s,	and	the	crop	provided	up	to	80	
percent	of	rural	households	incomes	in	the	North.	Though	cotton	is	grown	throughout	
the	 country,	 its	 production	 was	 always	 concentrated	 in	 the	 North,	 where	 it	 is	
embedded	 in	 a	 farming	 system	 formerly	 dominated	 by	 food	 crops.	 Hence,	 cotton	
transformed	subsistence	farming	into	semi‐subsistence	farming.	
The	central	position	of	the	crop	in	the	country’s	economy,	which	loomed	large	at	the	
beginning	 of	 the	 1990s,	 led	 to	 agricultural	 and	 economic	 policies	 being	 greatly	
influenced	by	 the	 crop	 for	decades.	The	Structural	Adjustment	Program	of	 the	early	
1990s	prescribed	the	liberalisation	of	the	cotton	sector,	which	had	huge	effects	on	the	
sector.	This	 resulted	 in	an	 increased	 importance	of	cotton	 farmer	organisations	 that	
elapsed	into	the	first	ever	hierarchical	network	in	the	country,	and	the	crop	being	put	
at	the	forefront	of	agricultural	development	programs.	Enduring	benefits	for	farmers,	
farming	communities,	private	actors,	and	the	State	were	derived	from	that	evolution.	
This	gained	cotton	the	status	of	‘white	gold’.	However,	the	institutional	dynamics	that	
followed	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 their	 corollary	 of	 actors’	 interactions	
generated	 never‐ending	 conflicts	 of	 various	 kinds,	 particularly	 within	 the	 cotton	
farmers’	 networks.	 These	 resulted	 in	 atomised	 networks.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	
benefits	 attached	 to	 cotton	 then	 started	 to	 wane	 and	 cotton	 production	 became	 a	
dilemma	for	farmers,	as	reflected	in	a	steep	decline	of	cotton	production.	
This	 thesis	 aims	 at	 understanding	 the	 dynamic	 interactions	 between	 the	 economic	
activity	of	cotton	production	and	the	structure	of	social	relations	from	community	to	
household	 and	 individual	 level.	 It	 addresses	 the	 question	 of	 how	 farmers’	 agency	
affected	their	organisations,	the	cotton	system,	and	the	collective	action	that	evolved	
around	the	crop.	The	research	was	aligned	along	 three	main	axes:	 the	emergence	of	
breakaway	 networks,	 the	 decline	 of	 social	 cohesion	 and	 the	 squeeze	 of	 collective	
action,	and	the	livelihoods	reconstruction	after	the	demise	of	cotton	production.	The	
main	 theoretical	 perspectives	 underlying	 the	 conceptual	 framework	were	 an	 actor‐
oriented	approach,	actor‐network	theory,	livelihood	theory,	and	a	gender	perspective. 
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The	research		is	based	on	fieldwork	carried	out	in	four	provinces	in	the	North	of	Benin	
from	January	2009	to	April	2011.	Benin	is	a	country	whose	employment	capacity	and	
economic	growth	heavily	rely	on	the	agricultural	sector,	in	which	cotton	is	a	dominant	
factor.	This	is	still	the	case	for	rural	areas	in	the	North,	where	rural	households	have	
been	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 cotton	 as	 a	 critical	 cash	 crop	 for	 poverty	 alleviation.	
Northern	Benin	supplies	more	 than	75	percent	of	 the	cotton	yearly	produced	 in	 the	
country,	 thanks	 to	 the	 favourable	 agro‐ecological	 conditions	 prevailing	 there,	 and	
because	there	is	 less	population	pressure	than	in	the	southern	part.	The	exploratory	
phase	 of	 the	 research	 covered	 four	 provinces:	 Borgou,	 Alibori,	 Atacora	 and	 Donga.	
Since	the	provinces	of	Borgou	and	Alibori	host	the	heart	of	the	cotton	belt,	subsequent	
data	collection	progressively	focussed	on	these	two	provinces.	
The	research	adopted	a	mixed‐methods	design,	applying	quantitative	and	qualitative	
methods	of	data	collection.	A	survey	was	combined	with	focus‐group	discussions,	in‐
depth	 interviews	 and	 the	 life	 history	 method,	 to	 unveil	 the	 dynamic	 interactions	
between	social	actors	and	their	interactions	with	the	material	and	technical	elements	
of	the	cotton	system.	The	life	history	method	was	used	to	document	the	experience	of	
women	 leaders	 that	 had	 made	 them	 exceptions	 to	 the	 rule	 among	 women	 cotton	
farmers.	 Apart	 from	 cotton	 farmers	 and	 their	 leaders,	 other	 targets	 groups	 of	 the	
research,	like	inputs	suppliers	and	executives	of	cotton	bodies,	often	had	to	be	found	
beyond	 the	 two	provinces	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country.	 The	 research	 covered	 nine	
cotton	networks	in	ten	villages	in	the	four	provinces.	Survey	interviews	and	in‐depth	
interviews	were	conducted	with	148	heads	of	cotton	farming	households,	men	as	well	
as	women.	
About	80	percent	of	the	farmers	in	the	sample	were	in	their	40s	or	50s,	and	more	than	
half	of	them	had	no	formal	education.	Educated	women	represented	only	17	percent	
of	their	category,	suggesting	that	male	cotton	farmers	are	significantly	more	educated	
than	 their	 female	 counterparts.	 The	 average	 household	 size	was	 16,	 with	 about	 11	
workers	in	male	adult	equivalents.	While	agriculture	is	the	main	occupation	and	often	
the	only	source	of	 income	in	the	area,	women	turned	out	to	rely	 less	on	agricultural	
incomes	than	men.		
With	regard	to	networking,	the	process	of	atomisation	resulted	in	about	20	percent	of	
stayers	in	remnant	networks,	51	percent	of	joiners	of	operating	networks,	and	about	
28	percent	of	creators	of	new	networks.	It	was	found	that	more	than	three	quarters	of	
cotton	 farmers	 broke	 away	 from	 their	 original	 network	 at	 least	 once	 during	 their	
cotton	 cropping	 career,	 and	 that	 creators	 of	 new	 networks	 were	more	 likely	 to	 be	
leaders	than	stayers	or	 joiners.	The	results	further	tell	us	that	more	than	one	in	two	
cotton	 farmers	 (ever)	had	a	 leadership	position.	A	 significant	association	was	 found	
between	 these	 three	 categories	 of	 farmers	 and	 leadership	 status.	 Finally,	 a	 greater	
stock	of	social	capital	was	correlated	with	the	ability	of	leading	cotton	networks.	
The	 research	 indicates	 that	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 an	 agricultural	 value‐chain	 can	 be	
harmful	rather	than	beneficial	when	the	State	fails	to	play	a	coherent	role	during	the	
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shift	 from	 State	 monopoly	 to	 private	 interest.	 Cotton	 proved	 to	 be	 the	 lifeline	 for	
farmer	organisations,	 and	drove	 collective	 action	 in	 rural	 areas	 from	 the	 important	
resources	it	generated.	However,	the	decline	of	trust	within	networks	in	conjunction	
with	 poor	 management	 of	 cotton	 resources	 led	 to	 a	 reversed	 dynamic	 that	 tore	
networks	 apart,	 which	 resulted	 in	 their	 atomisation.	 Social	 relations	 deteriorated	
when	 the	 financial	 stakes	 became	 higher.	 As	 attested	 by	 the	 way	 the	 process	 of	
network	 atomisation	 evolved,	 cooperation	 within	 large	 groups	 requires	 legal	
sanctions	 to	 be	 sustainable.	 The	 qualitative	 results	 showed	 that	 the	 process	 of	
atomisation	 was	 nurtured	 by	 ties	 of	 friendship,	 kinship,	 and	 ethnicity	 at	 the	 start,	
after	which	networks	extended	to	include	other	areas	and	more	general	membership.	
From	 the	 survey	 results	 it	 can	 be	 inferred	 that	 push	 and	 pull	 factors	 interacted	 to	
influence	 the	 process	 of	 cotton	 network	 atomisation.	 The	most	 influential	 of	 these	
factors	 were,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 mismanagement	 of	 network	 resources	 and	
manipulation	 of	 farmers	 by	 outsiders,	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 trust	 in	 board	
members,	hope	for	board	positions,	the	expectation	of	profit,	and	support	from	public	
officials	and	ethnic	or	religious	connections.	
 
The	 research	 further	 demonstrates	 that	 gender	 myths	 and	 stereotypes	 obstruct	
women's	active	involvement	in	managing	organisations,	in	spite	of	their	key	position	
in	the	cotton	production	system	at	household	level.	Women	were	found	21	times	less	
likely	to	be	a	 leader	than	men	in	cotton	organisations,	and	their	presence	on	boards	
hardly	empowered	them	because	they	spend	their	energy	struggling	to	meet	practical	
needs.	Women’s	admission	to	cotton	boards	appears	to	be	instrumental	for	men	and	
hides	men's	real	motives,	judging	by	the	way	male	board	members	tend	to	restrict	the	
power	of	their	female	colleagues.	However,	men	are	inclined	to	give	more	freedom	to	
women	when	they	find	their	activities	benefitting	themselves,	as	was	revealed	by	the	
data	on	livelihood	adaptation	strategies.		
The	research	clearly	ascertains	that	farmers	are	more	rational	than	often	assumed	and	
that	they	grow	a	crop	as	long	as	it	is	a	source	of	livelihood	and	food	security.	Despite	
its	 current	 low	 to	 negative	 returns,	 cotton	 remains	 part	 of	 the	 livelihood	
diversification	 strategies	 of	 households	 because	 cotton	 production	 gives	 access	 to	
resources	 that	 can	 then	 be	 used	 for	 food	 crops.	 However,	 relying	 on	 one	 source	 of	
income	puts	the	 livelihood	system	of	rural	households	at	risk.	Faced	with	the	cotton	
problems,	households	diversified	their	sources	of	income,	first	and	primarily	on‐farm	
with	food	crops	increasingly	gaining	a	cash	function.	Additionally,	they	would	deploy	
beyond‐farm	 alternative	 strategies,	 including	migration	 of	 youth.	 It	 was	 also	 found	
that	 the	decline	 of	 cotton	production	proved	 to	 result	 in	more	 freedom	 for	women.	
Because	 of	 their	multiple	 extra‐domestic	 activities,	women	 are	 less	 vulnerable	 than	
men	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 coping	 with	 livelihood	 shortages.	 Their	 contribution	 to	 the	
provision	for	household	needs	increased	during	the	decline	of	cotton	production	and	
the	 ensuing	 income	 shortages	 compared	 to	 that	 of	 men.	 The	 livelihood	 adaptation	
strategies	showed	the	decision	making	about	income	diversification	to	move	from	the	
centre	of	the	household	to	its	periphery.	
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SAMENVATTING	
In	 Benin,	 West	 Afrika,	 is	 de	 katoenproductie	 verweven	 met	 het	 kolonialisme,	 dat	
bijdroeg	aan	de	transformatie	van	een	traditionele	naar	een	moderne	productiewijze	
van	 katoen.	 Door	 de	 jaren	 heen	 veranderde	 het	 belang	 van	 het	 gewas	 voor	 de	 be‐
trokkenen.	Gedurende	de	 laatste	decennia	was	er	 sprake	van	een	groeiende	belang‐
stelling	 voor	 katoenproductie	 onder	 boeren,	 zakenmensen,	 en	 nationale	 overheid.	
Terwijl	katoen	een	marginale	status	had	in	de	jaren	70	tot	halverweg	de	jaren	80,	nam	
het	 belang	 van	 katoen	 sterk	 toe	 in	 de	 jaren	 90,	 zowel	 in	 termen	 van	 areaal	 als	 in	
termen	 inkomen.	 Gemiddeld	werd	 in	 die	 tijd	 op	 37	 procent	 van	 de	 landbouwgrond	
katoen	verbouwd.	Daarmee	speelde	katoen	een	cruciale	rol	in	het	genereren	van	geld	
en	economische	groei,	en	had	het	een	belangrijk	aandeel	in	het	nationaal	inkomen	en	
de	 inkomens	 van	 boeren.	 In	 de	 jaren	 2000	 bestond	 75	 procent	 van	 de	 agrarische	
export	 uit	 katoen	 en	 kwamen	75	 tot	 80	 procent	 van	de	 inkomsten	 van	 rurale	 huis‐
houdens	 in	 noord	 Benin	 uit	 katoen.	 Ofschoon	 katoen	 door	 het	 hele	 land	 wordt	
verbouwd	 is	 de	 productie	 geconcentreerd	 in	 het	 noorden	 van	 Benin.	 Daar	 wordt	
katoen	verbouwd	naast	voedselgewassen	en	heeft	katoen	ook	deels	voedselgewassen	
verdrongen.		
De	centrele	positie	van	het	gewas	in	de	economie	van	het	land	vanaf	de	jaren	90	leidde	
er	 toe	dat	 landbouwbeleid	en	economisch	beleid	decennia	 lang	door	katoen	werden	
gedomineerd.	 In	 het	 kader	 van	 het	 Structurele	 Aanpassingsprogramma	 van	 begin	
jaren	 90	 werd	 de	 katoen	 sector	 geliberaliseerd.	 Dit	 resulteerde	 in	 een	 toenemend	
belang	van	boerenorganisaties	die	opgingen	 in	 een	nationaal	hierarchisch	netwerk	 ,	
waarbij	katoen	het	speerpunt	werd	van	agrarische	ontwikkelinsprogramma’s.	Hiervan	
profiteerden	 de	 boerengemeenschappen,	 particuliere	 ondernemers	 en	 de	 Staat.	
Katoen	 kreeg	 de	 status	 van	 ‘wit	 goud’.	 De	 institutionele	 dynamiek	 die	 dit	 teweeg	
bracht	 en	de	belangen	die	 op	het	 spel	 stonden,	 leidden	echter	 tot	 talloze	 conflicten,	
vooral	 in	 de	 katoenorganisaties.	 Daarmee	 viel	 het	 hierarchische	 netwerk	 uiteen	 en	
ontstond	 een	 versplintering	 van	 netwerken.	 Als	 gevolg	 daarvan	 leverde	 katoen	
minder	 op,	 liep	 de	 productie	 terug,	 en	 werd	 katoen	 verbouwen	 voor	 boeren	 een	
dilemma.		
In	 dit	 proefschrift	 wordt	 de	 dynamische	 interactie	 onderzocht	 tussen	 enerzijds	 de	
productieactiviteiten	 en	het	 economisch	belang	 van	 katoen	 en	 anderzijds	 de	 sociale	
relaties	 van	 de	 betrokken	 actoren,	 op	 gemeenschaps‐,	 huishoud‐	 en	 individueel	
niveau.	De	vraag	die	wordt	gesteld	is	hoe	de	keuzes	en	acties	van	boeren	van	invloed	
waren	op	hun	organisaties,	het	katoen	productiesysteem	en	de	collectieve	acties	die	
daaruit	 voortkwamen.	 Het	 onderzoek	 werd	 gestructureerd	 langs	 drie	 assen:	 het	
opkomen	van	 splinternetwerken,	de	afname	van	 sociale	 cohesie	en	 collectieve	actie,	
en	 de	 aanpassingen	 in	 de	 wijze	 waarop	 de	 huishoudens	 van	 katoenboeren	 in	 hun	
levensonderhoud	gingen	voorzien	nadat	de	katoenproductie	 steeds	problematischer	
werd.	 De	 belangrijkste	 theoretische	 perspectieven	 die	 aan	 het	 onderzoek	 ten	
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grondslag	 lagen	 zijn	 een	 actor‐georiënteerde	 benadering,	 actor‐netwerk	 theorie,	
livelihood	theorie	en	een	gender	perspectief.	
Het	 onderzoek	 is	 gebaseerd	 op	 veldwerk	 dat	werd	 uitgevoerd	 in	 vier	 provincies	 in	
Noord	Benin	in	de	periode	januari	2009‐april	2011.		In	Benin	zijn	werkgelegenheid	en	
economische	groei	zeer	afhankelijk	van	de	agrarische	sector	en	daarin	is	katoen	een	
dominante	factor.	Dit	is	zeker	het	geval	in	het	Noorden,	waar	rurale	huishoudens	van	
katoen	afhankelijk	zijn	voor	hun	geldinkomsten	en	om	armoede	op	afstand	te	houden.	
Dankzij		de	voor	katoen	gunstige	agro‐ecologische	omstandigheden	wordt	75	procent	
van	 de	 katoen	 in	 dit	 deel	 van	 het	 land	 geproduceerd.	 In	 de	 exploratieve	 fase	werd	
onderzoek	gedaan	in	de	vier	provincies	Borgou,	Alibori,	Atacora	en	Donga.	In	een	later	
stadium	werd	 het	 onderzoek	 geconcentreerd	 in	Borgou	 en	Alibora.	Deze	 provincies	
vormen	het	hart	van	het	katoengebied.		
In	 het	 onderzoek	werd	 een	mix	 van	 kwantitatieve	 zowel	 als	 kwalitatieve	methoden	
toegepast.	 De	 survey	 werd	 gecombineerd	 met	 focus	 groep	 discussies,	 diepte	
interviews	en	het	documenteren	van	levensgeschiedenissen,	om	de	dynamiek	van	de	
interactie	 tussen	 de	 actoren	 onderling	 en	 die	 van	 hun	 omgang	met	 de	materiële	 en	
technische	 aspecten	 van	 het	 katoensysteem	 te	 kunnen	 blootleggen.	 De	
levensgeschiedenis	van	een	aantal	vrouwelijke	leiders	in	de	katoenorganisaties	werd	
opgetekend	 om	 te	 begrijpoen	 hoe	 zij	 hun	 leiderschapspositie	 hadden	 verworven	 en	
weer	kwijtraakten.	Naast	katoenboeren	en	hun	 leiders	werden	andere	actoren	zoals	
opkopers	 en	 staf	 van	 katoenbedrijven	 ondervraagd	 voor	wat	 betreft	 hun	 rol	 in	 het	
katoensysteem.	Deze	mensen	wonen	vaak	ver	van	het	gebied	waar	de	katoen	vandaan	
komt	 en	 werden	 daar	 thuis	 bezocht.	 Acht	 netwerken	 in	 tien	 dorpen	 in	 de	 vier	
provincies	 werden	 geanalyseerd.	 De	 survey	 interviews	 werden	 gedaan	 met	 148	
hoofden	van	huishoudens	van	katoenboeren,	zowel	mannen	als	vrouwen.	
Ongeveer	80	procent	van	de	respondenten	was	tussen	de	40	en	60	jaar	oud.	Iets	meer	
dan	de	helft	had	geen	formele	scholing	gehad.	Voor	de	vrouwen	in	de	steekproef	was	
dit	 percentage	 83,	 waaruit	 blijkt	 dat	mannelijke	 katoenboeren	 beter	 geschoold	 zijn	
dan	hun	 vrouwelijke	 collega’s.	De	 gemiddelde	huishoudgrootte	was	16,	waarvan	11	
volwassen,	 werkende	 personen.	 Terwijl	 landbouw	 het	 belangrijkste	 middel	 van	
bestaan	is,	bleken	vrouwen	vaker	inkomsten	uit	niet‐agrarische	activiteiten	te	hebben	
dan	mannen.	
Uit	 de	 analyse	 van	 het	 proces	 van	 de	 versplintering	 van	 netwerken	 bleek	 dat	 een	
vijfde	 van	 de	 ondervraagde	 boeren	 waren	 gebleven	 bij	 de	 resten	 van	 een	
uiteengevallen	 netwerk,	 51	 procent	 hadden	 zich	 aangesloten	 bij	 opererende	
netwerken,	en	de	rest	bestond	uit	boeren	die	een	nieuw	netwerk	hadden	gecreëerd.	
Het	 bleek	 dat	 meer	 dan	 driekwart	 van	 de	 katoenboeren	 tenminste	 een	 keer	 het	
netwerk	 waar	 ze	 oorspronkelijk	 toe	 behoorden,	 had	 verlaten.	 Degenen	 die	 nieuwe	
netwerken	 hadden	 opgericht	 waren	 vooral	 boeren	 met	 leidersposities.,	 waarbij	
aangetekend	moet	worden	dat	meer	dan	één	op	twee	boeren	een	leiderspositie	had	of	
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ooit	 had	 gehad.	 Leiders	 bleken	 te	 beschikken	 over	 meer	 sociaal	 kapitaal	 dan	 niet‐
leiders.	
Het	 onderzoek	 wijst	 uit	 dat	 liberalisering	 in	 de	 landbouw	 eerder	 schadelijk	 dan	
gunstig	uitpakt	als	de	Staat	verzuimt	een	coherente	sturende	rol	te	spelen	tijdens	de	
transitie	 van	 staat	 monoplie	 naar	 vrije	 markt.	 Katoen	 was	 de	 drijvende	 kracht	 in	
boerenorganisaties	en	de	motor	achter	collectieve	actie	voor	algemeen	nut	in	de	urale	
gebieden.	Het	verloren	gaan	van	het	vertrouwen	tussen	de	leden	van	de	netwerken	en	
het	slechte	beheer	van	de	katoenopbrengsten	leidden	echter	tot	uiteen	vallen	van	de	
organisaties.	 Dit	 laat	 zien	 dat	 samenwerking	 binnen	 grote	 groepen	 waarbij	 grote	
belangen	op	het	spel	staan	niet	zonder	wettelijke	sancties	en	regulering	kan.	Uit	het	
kwalitatieve	 onderzoek	 bleek	 dat	 factoren	 zoals	 vriendschaps‐	 en	 verwantschaps‐
relaties,	 woonplaats	 en	 etniciteit	 een	 belangrijke	 rol	 speelden	 in	 het	 proces	 van	
versplintering	 en	 hergroepering	 van	 netwerken.	 Van	 de	 factoren	 die	 boeren	 deden	
besluiten	een	netwerk	te	verlaten	bleken	slecht	 leiderschap,	slecht	geldbeheer	en	de	
manipulatie	van	boeren	door	buitenstaanders	het	meest	bepalend.	In	de	aantrekkings‐
kracht	 van	 andere	 netwerken	 bleken	 het	 vertrouwen	 in	 de	 leiders,	 de	 hoop	 op	 een	
leiderschapspositie,	de	verwachting	van	winsten,	de	steun	van	ambtenaren	en	politici,	
en		etnische	en	religieuze	connecties	de	dominante	factoren.		
Het	 onderzoek	 laat	 ook	 zien	 dat	 gender	 mythen	 en	 stereotypen	 een	 active	 rol	 van	
vrouwen	in	de	katoenorganisaties	in	de	weg	staan,	ondanks	hun	belanrijke	rol	in	het	
productieproces.	Vrouwen	hadden	81	keer	minder	kans	op	een	bestuursfunctie	dan	
mannen	 en	 als	 ze	 een	 bestuursfunctie	 hadden	 was	 het	 een	 probleem	 om	 die	 te	
verenigen	 met	 hun	 andere	 verplichtingen.	 Het	 lijkt	 erop	 dat	 vrouwen	 met	 een	
bestuursfunctie	 worden	 gebruikt	 door	 hun	 mannelijke	 collega’s	 die	 er	 tevens	 voor	
zorgen	dat	ze	niet	te	veel	macht	krijgen.	Op	persoonlijk	niveau	zijn	mannen	echter	wel	
geneigd	hun	vrouw	ruimte	voor	economische	activiteiten	buitenshuis	te	geven	als	ze	
daar	de	voordelen	van	inzien.		
Uit	het	onderzoek	blijkt	duidelijk	dat	boeren	rationeler	zijn	dan	veelal	wordt	aange‐
nomen;	 ze	 verbouwen	 een	 gewas	 zo	 lang	 het	 een	 goede	 bron	 van	 bestaans‐	 en	
voedselzekerheid	 is.	 Ondanks	 de	 crisis	 in	 de	 katoen,	 wordt	 het	 gewas	 nog	 veel	
verbouwd,	vooral	omdat	boeren	via	katoen	toegang	tot	kunstmest	hebben.	Die	kunnen	
ze	dan	gebruiken	voor	andere	gewassen	als	die	meer	opleveren.	Hieraan	zijn	echter	
risico’s	verbonden.	Daarnaast	vinden	andere	aanpassingen	plaats,	zoals	migratie	van	
jongeren	en	meer	economische	activiteiten	van	vrouwen.	Hun	bijdrage	aan	het	huis‐
houdinkomen	bleek	gestegen	 in	vergelijking	tot	die	 tijdens	de	hoog	conjunctuur	van	
de	 katoen.	 De	 besluitvorming	 over	 aanpassingsstrategieën	 in	 huishoudens	 lijkt	 als	
gevolg	van	de	recente	ontwikkelingen	minder	bij	het	hoofd	en	meer	bij	andere	leden	
van	de	huishouding	te	liggen.	Met	het	verdwijnen	van	de	centrale	rol	van	katoen	lijkt	
er	op	het	micro	niveau	van	het	huishouden	ook	sprake	 te	zijn	van	een	verschuiving	
van	de	macht	van	het	centrum	naar	de	periferie.			
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